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ABSTRACT
2
This thesis examines some economic and political 
concomitants of a system of land tenure - called kipat - 
associated with the Limbus, one of the peoples indigenous 
to East Nepal,, It considers some of the ways in which 
this system affects social relationships both among the 
Limbus and between them and members of other groups, espec­
ially Brahmins. Particular attention is paid to the changes 
which have followed from alterations in the tenure system. 
The analysis is based on data collected in a cluster of 
settlements, inhabited mainly by Limbus, m  the district of 
ll am.
Chapter I describes the environmental and histori­
cal background of the area, as well as certain cultural 
features associated with the principal groups inhabiting 
the settlements. Chapter II considers the nature of Limbu 
descent groups and their relations to land. The follow­
ing chapter indicates how Government policy affected the 
availability of kipat land, and led to the emergence of the 
household - dealt with in Chapter IV - as the group with 
the greatest interests m  this land. Two subsequent chap­
ters deai with economic ties resulting from heavy mortgaging 
of kipat land and the growth of commercial sources of income 
outside the agricultural economy. Chapter VII then con­
siders the political configuration in the settlements with
d •
particular emphasis on readership and the settlement of 
disputes. Factions, a^d their implications for Limbus are 
also dealt with. Finally, Chapter VIII analyzes the 
structural cleavages between Limbus and brahmins based 
primarily on the confrontation over land, and views its 
effects on relationships both within and outside the 
settlements.
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T RA if Cn1fEKAf ±0 N 
Como Nepali words are treated as though they are 
English, are given. a plural version where necessary, and 
are not underlined,, Certain proper names are also left 
iii their English version. All other terns in the vernacular 
are rendered as close to their proper pronounciatloii as 
possible and underlined in the text 5 they are tnen trans­
cribed in the Glossary according to the system devised
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CHAPTNR I 
INTRODUCTORY
The Problem
This thesis is about the social relations of land
tenure, and the changes in these relations which follow
from modifications in the tenure system.
Despite the great variety of tenure forms found
on the Indian sub-continent, most anthropologists who have
worked in India and other parts of South Asia have neglected 
1tneir study. This is not to suggest, of course, that the 
importance of land tenure has not been appreciated. 
Generally, however, consideration of the problems connected 
with land has been subsumed 111 the analysis of caste and 
its various attributes. Not unnaturally, then, studies 
of social change have concentrated 011 the ways in which 
the traditional relations between castes have altered in 
response to a variety of external stimuli. Thus, accounts 
by bailey, Rao, Gough and Cohn have described changes 
taking place at the village level as a result of the intro­
duction of a cash economy and new economic and political
2opportunities created by Government. If we can extract 
a single theme from these and other recent studies it is 
that tne pattern of involution or role summation which 
formerly integrated tne caste structure has begun to come
1. There are of course, exceptions. See, for example,
Mayer 19525 Leach, 1961b.
2. Bailey, 1957; Rao# ^957; Gough, 1955; Cohn, 1955.
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asunder under the impact of industrialization.
In the context of oast Nepal society, however, to 
achieve an understanding of the social changes which are 
taking place the ohserver must regard land tenure as the 
key to these changes. Indeed, Harriott's observation 
that 'as far back as we are able tu look, the social struc­
tures of little communities (in the area of Indian 
civilization) must have been profoundly affected by state 
land policy' is nowhere more applicable than in east Nepal.1
In the latter half of the 18th century Limbuan, 
the country of the Limbus, occupying the eastormost portion
of present-day Nepal, was incorporated into the Gorkha 
2state. Since that time the Government has sought to extend
and secure its hegemony over the Limbus by means of a land
policy designed to reduce - and, presumably, eventually
to abolish - an area of land held under a customary form
of tenure, callud 'kipat'. Ihis policy has wrought a
number of changes in the internal structure of Limbu
communities, as well as snaped their relations with other
sections of the population.
lvly fieldwork was conducted in a cluster of four
contiguous settlements situated along a ridge in the Ilam-
Darda sub-division of H a m  district in East Nepal.
They are referred to throughout the text as the indreni
Cluster, hiovation, terrain and a salubrious climate allow
1. Marriott, 1955? p.187.
2 . See p • 26.
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for a fairly dense settlement pattern in most parts of the 
district. Ihure are no nuclear villages of the kind found 
in the plains, only a continuous flow of homesteads along 
the m a m  ridges and the spurs which extend laterally from 
these ridges. Clusters of homesteads - which jl call settle­
ments - are usually named after a well-known peculiarity 
of the landscape around which they are situated, hut except 
where distinctive geographical features divide these settle­
ments from their neighbours, the boundaries between them 
are vague and, for the people themselves, ^uite 
unimportant. Indeed, it is possible that giving names to 
settlements is a recent phenomenon. Until about fifty 
years ago, communications from the administration to 
inhabitants in the indreni Cluster, for example, referred 
to the individual's place of residence either as Ilam or 
Ilam-Darda, but never to the settlement names in use 
nowadays.
Given the settlement configuration how then was
the unit of study to bo defined? Ihe groat majority of
anthropological accounts of social life in India have
centered on the village. Irue, even the most physically
isolated village cannot be treated as a social isolate,
so that the factors bearing on it from the outside must be
1taken into consideration. But a village study has the 
advantage of being able to concentrate on a clearly defin-
1. Opier, 1956, pp.5-10.
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able face-to-face community within which the external 
forces can be sueu to affect the internal structure.
In the absence of such an arena, the choice of 
a focal unit must be determined by the interests of the 
study. Since the problems in which I was most interested 
concerned in crude terms, the social concomitants of kipat 
land tenure, I chose to study a cluster of settlements 
inhabited mainly by Limbus. The Indreni Cluster is not 
a definitive geographical unit, surrounded as it is on 
throe sides by other settlements into which it merges. Nor 
is it a unit in any administrative sense. It has sociolo­
gical significance, however, in that it is recognized by 
people in the surrounding area as the place where the Limbus 
live, and is referred to as 'Limbu gaon'
There are many such Limbu clusters situated 
throughout Ilam. The location of their settlements in 
the midst of non-Limbu populations reflects both the 
manner in which the district came to be settled and the 
effects of Government land policy. Since this is dealt 
with in some detail in the following chapters, only a brief 
outline need be given here.
Luring the years prior to the absorption of Ilam 
into the Gorkha state Lir^bu settlements had been established 
throughout the district. These settlements were generally 
situated on the tops of riuges, and the settlers laid claim
1. 'Gaon' , normally translated as 'vij-iage', is m  fact 
used in a variety of contexts, dee below, p. 39.
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to largo tracts of forest and uncultivated bush surrounding 
the areas they inhabited. Following the Gorkha conquest 
large-scale migrations of non-Limbus from the west entered 
the district and the Limbus made generous grants of land to 
accommodate the immigrant settlers. Towards the end of the 
19th century the Government changed the system of tenure 
under which these lands had been granted, thus effectively 
removing them from Limbu control. By and large, the Limbus 
were left only the lands they had not granted the immigrants, 
which in effect meant those which they were cultivating and 
living on themselves. This historical process is mirrored 
in the settlement pattern, which finds the original Limbu 
settlers now living on lands held primarily under kipat 
tenure, and surrounded by settlements of non-Limbus who 
enjoy rights to land under a different tenure system 
(raikar), To a limited extent, the Limbu settlements con­
tain some non-Limbus as well - indicating that some of the 
lands in their midst are held under raikar tenure. About 
one-fifth. of the inhabitants of the Indreni Cluster, for 
example, are members of other groups settled intersticially 
among the Limbus.
Although the locus of this study is the Indreni 
settlement cluster, it is the Limbu sector within the 
Cluster which provides the focus for my analysis. I can 
not, of course, ignore the existence of the non-Limbus 
living within or for that matter in the area surrounding
16.
the Cluster. But the relations between the Limbus and
their neighbours as well as the changes which are talcing
place in these relations are presented essentially from
the standpoint of the Limbus. In a similar vein, I make
no attempt to disregard the presence of Government - of
1•cominauding heights* as v/orsley puts it - or the now
opportunities which exist for earning cash in and outside
the area. Those are treated as factors of greater or lesser
import influencing the social scene.
I am not prepared to say that the detailed changes
recorded in this study of Indreni Limbus are representative
of othur settlement clusters in Limbuan or even the district 
2
of Ilam. factors such as the ratio of Limbu to non- 
Limbu population, the availability of land or the existence 
of alternatives to agriculture vary from one locality to 
another and influence the extent and pace of change in any 
one settlement cluster. Nevertheless, from the documents 
and writings I have seen, and from superficial observa­
tions made during visits to other parts of the region it 
is abundantly clear that Government land policy has 
contributed to bring about far-reaching changes in the
1. Worsley,1961, p.219.
2. As Cohen points .out, from the sociological point of view, 
the question of typicality is of no real significance.
(1965, p.176.)
3. Unless otherwise indicated, the historical material 
presented in this thesis is based on documents or on 
published works which refer to primary sources.
K <1 uJ A d, yain i s V t*<u-t i w 4.  ^in s* 0
—r ^N^6.M'\a.f/6no.l b o u ^ d i r  vj
^  * '"v  • <£ o wo. \ b A & la. r  w
  k  is \  vI c t  b f t .u .y >« tc « , r^
S c a l e . ' .  A j i ^ r c j t  I ” »• MOwvl*
*°i * ’ I % \
%
"^WS, \  IU*
r
17 *
economic and political spheres of Limbu social life through- 
out east Nepal* The process may differ from place to 
place, but the substantive pattern is discernible every™ 
where.
The remainder of this chapter presents an 
environmental, historical and cultural background to the 
problems with which the thesis is concerned.
The Background
Ilam District
The settlements of Angbung, Bharapa, Chitok and 
Dorumba - which for shorthand purposes I call the Indreni 
settlement cluster * are situated in the district of Ilam 
in East Nepal. The greater part of the district falls in 
the middle ranges of the country, a strip of rugged hills 
reaching to heights of 12,000 feet above sea level and 
stretching from east to west along the 500 mile length of 
the country. The hills of Ilam rise sharply from the 
Terai to the south, a 20-milc wide belt of low-lying 
flatlands which is a continuation of the Grange tic plain 
of India.
Ilam encompasses an area of 540 square miles. It 
is bounded on the east by bikkim and the Darjeeling district 
of West Bengal, while to the west and north lie the 
districts of Dhankutta and Panchthar.
18.
The area, is mainly characteristic! by irregular 
terrain a^d poor soil, necessitating the use of terraces 
for cultivation. The principal crops are paddy, grown in 
irrigated fields (xhet) at altitudes of up to 5000%  
maize and millet, which latter are grown in dry fields
(bari) up to 8000* above see. level.
The district of H a m  experiences a moderate cli­
mate, temperatures seldom rising above 85 degrees F* during 
the warm season from April to September, or falling below 
45 degrees F. during the cool months of January and 
February. From mid-June to mid-September the south-west 
monsoon rains persist, and leave a precipitation of some 
60". Ilam contains a small basin, drained by four rivers - 
Mai, Pua Mai, Deo Mai and Jog Mai - which dissect the 
district into four main sub-divisions (thum).
The indreni settlements lie in a contiguous belt
along the eastern slope of a 4500* ridge in the ilam-Darda
sub-division of the district. Ilam-Darda, with an area of 
55 square miles, comprises about 10^ of the total area of 
Ilam district. It is bounded on the east by the Mai 
River and on the west by the Pua Biver, which rivers meet 
south of Ilam Bazaar, the district capital, and join with 
the Jog Mai and Deo Mai Rivers to flow southward into the 
plains as the Konhai.
1. Ilam is often referred to as 9Char Khoja* (Four Rivers).
19.
Ilam-Darda sub-division contains a population of 
approximately 16,200 or roughly* 13^ of the total popula­
tion of the district. This makes Ilam-Darda the most 
densely settled of Iiam's four sub-divisions with a ratio 
of 294.5 persons per square mile as against 235.2 for the 
district as a whole.
These are net figures, however, and take no 
account of the emigrants who have left the district to 
settle mainly in West Bengal, in Bikkim, Bhutan, and as 
far east as Assam and Burma. Although there are no statis­
tics available on emigration from Ilam, nor, indeed, on 
the flow of emigrants out of Nepal, the movement of popula­
tion across the borders has been going on for almost a
century. An official of the administration mentioned an
1emigration figure of four millions. One author remarks 
that there are three million people of Nepali origin regu­
larly resident m  North Bengal and North Assam alone, while
another estimates that two million Nepalis live in India,
2Sikkim and Bhutan. According to the 1941 census of India, 
Nepal provided 45^ of the foreign immigrants into India.
As early as 1891, over half the population of Darjeeling
3was of Nepali origin, and one-third had been born in Nepal.
1. Patterson, 1962, p.193.
2. Rose, 1963b, p.117.
3. O ’Mailey, 1907, p.43.
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Nepaiis have provided trie greater part of the labour force 
for the tea estates of Darjeeling.
To take Sikkim alone, Nepali immigration into 
that State began in the latter half of the 19th century 
and reached such proportions that laws had to be promulgated 
to check the flow.1 Still, by 1951? 77.2% of the people
2spoke one of the languages of Nepal as their mother tongue.
The primary reason for this emigration is the 
growing pressure on land. In the area of the Indreni 
Cruster, as in many regions of east Nepal, there is 
little new jungle to break, or virgin land to bring under 
cultivation. Land shortage was apparently a problem as 
early as the 1890s. One visitor to Sikkim at the time 
remarked of the Nepaiiss ’....it is because every bit 
of the land in their country is taken up that there is such 
a steady emigration into Sikkim.'
Given the existing level of technology and pattern 
of agriculture, the land is unable adequately to support 
the growing population. Nevertheless, the fact that over 
95% of the population of Ilam depends for a substantial 
part of its living on agriculture, the need to obtain land 
or to retain lands in one's possession, assumes the
1• Nakane, 1966, p.260.
2. Davis, 1951.
3. Donaldson, 1900, p.208. The extent of land shortage
in fact varies considerably from one part of the country 
to another. In a community in west Nepal studied by 
Hitchcock the problem is apparently not serious . 
(Hitchcock, 1966, p.61).
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proportions of a constant and unrelieved struggle* when
there is insufficient land to cultivate, supplementary or
alternative sources of income must be sought. A number of
opportunities for wage labour do exist both within and
outside the rural areas. But for those who are unable to
take advantage of these opportunities, the threat of
emigration looms large. The decision to emigrate is not
taken lightly. It means severing ties with kin — although
many retain links with their kin for some years - and can
lead to even greater difficulties than those left behind,
especially for the first generation of immigrants. Naxane
describes some of the hardships faced by Nepaiis who come
to Sikkim. Many become coolies in bazaar towns and hope in
this way to earn exiough to purchase laud and settle down in
a hamlet as peasants. In her words: !It normally takes
many many years from the time one leaves home until the
final place for settling down as a peasant is found...
Some fail to become peasants and remain as coolies ail 
1their life.'
This study will not concern itself with those 
who have left their homes in Ilam. But no examination 
of social life in this part of Nepal can be fully appre­
ciated without taking into account the ever-present 
possibility of having to emigrate.
Ilam is one of six districts in east Nepal
1. Nakane, 1966, p.255.
whicli constitute wiiat is known as Limbuan - the country 
of the Limbus* Limbuan, lying east of the Arun River, 
between the high Himalayas and the plains, comprises an 
area of approximately 4500 square miles, or about Qfo of the 
total area of present-day Nepal,
The Limbus, constituting 1.8fo of the total pepu- 
1lation of the country, are generally regarded as among 
the first inhabitants of east Nepal. Together with the 
Rais, who, like the Limbus, are a Mongoloid people, they
2
are thought to be the descendants of the ancient Kiratis.
In the Mahabharata*, the Kiratis were said to dwell in the 
eastern Himalayan regions. in many contemporary government 
documents the area of east Nepal is still referred to as 
'Kirat*. The country inhabited mainly by Rais lies in the 
mid-region of east Nepal between the Dudh Kosi and the Arun 
Rivers and is termed 'Middle Kirat', whereas the Limbu 
country east of the Arun River i.e. Limbuan is called 
'Par Kirat'.
Nothing’ is known of the early history of the 
Kiratis beyond what is found in the Nepalese Chronicles 
which are by and large based on myths and legends. One
1. Based on the census report of Nepal, 1952-54.
2* There is some disagreement over the proper designation 
of the term 'Kirati®. Although most writers include . 
both Rais and Limbus as Kirati, Vansittart (19152 7) 
says that it belongs properly to the Rais, but because 
of intermarriage between the two peoples, he includes 
the Limbus within the 'Kirati group*. Campbell, on the 
other hand (I840s95)y observed that 'Limbu* is a generic 
term for Rais, Eakas (a branch of the Rais) and 'Kerautis* 
Pinally, 1.8. Chemjong (1952) suggests that all Mongoloid 
peoples inhabiting the Himalayas and parts of South- 
East Asia as well are descendants of the Kiratis.
23.
Chronicle, dating from the mid-l8th century, speaks of the
Kiratis 'who cane from the east* and, after conquering
the Ahir rulers, established a dynasty which ruled the
Valley of Nepal through twenty-nine generations until they
1were driven out by the Somabansi rulers. A Nepali
historian dates the Kirati conquest sometime during the
2
7th century -B.C. As opposed to Levi and Kirkpatrick, who 
estimate that Kirati rule of the Valley extended over 
1000 years, D.R. Regmi believes that they may have ruled 
for a period of 725 years.
Limbu mythology attests to their early settlement 
in the Himalayas. A Limbu Chronicle x’elates that during 
the 6th century B.C. ten brothers and their kinsmen came 
from Assam to Kashi (Benares). Driven out by Hindu kings, 
they went north into the Himalayas and arrived at Phedap 
in east Nepal. Pive of the brothers, having gone directly 
from Kashi to Phedap are called Kashi 'gotra', while the 
remaining five, who went via Lhasa in Tibet are known as 
Lhasa *gotra'.^
1. Wright, 1958? pp.65-7.
2. D.R. Regmi, I960, pp.59-60. Regmi also suggests that 
the Kiratis conquered not the Ahirs but the 
Neminites.
3. Ibid, p.62.
4. Limbus still maintain this distinction between Lhasa 
clans and Kashi clans, although the term 'gotra' here 
has no implications as regards marriage.
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At that tine in Phedap, the Chronicle relates,
there were eight Kings, tuid the ten brothers and their
followers were given refuge in these kingdoms. After
some generations their descendants came to be known as
Lirabu or Yakthumba (as the nimbus refer to themsenves).
A series of repressive measures designed to thwart the
growing power of the Limbus soon led to rebellion. The
eight kings were defeated and the victorious Limbus
renamed the area Limbuan. The descendants of the Ten
Limbus chose their rulers, and each was given a portion
of Limbuan over which to rule. The erstwhile subjects of
the eight Phedap kings either fled to Sikkim or "became
1nimbus* and followers of the victorious Lirnbu rulers.
Historical sources on east Hepal, although still
scanty, become more reliable from the middle of the 18th
century. By that time a number of small chiefdome which
had grown up in Limbuan were subject to the Rajput-ruled
2kingdom of Bijayapur. Both the Rai area of Middle hirat 
to the west, which had a separate capital at Chaudandi, 
and Bijayapur, with its capital at Morang, were ruled 
by separate branches of the Sen dynasty of Muckwanpur.
Limbu leaders held the office of prime minister
1. Quoted in Vausittart, 1915, p.101. 1.3. Chemjong, (1952) 
includes almost the same accuunt, Only a handful of 
educated Limbus who have access to these printed 
sources, can relate this myth in coherent fashion.
All Limbus, however, are aware of their descent from 
the legendary Ten Limbu brothers.
2. I.S. Chemjong, 1952 argues that there were a number
of independent Limbu chiefdoms which were not subservient 
to Hindu kings.
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under the Sens and tlioir foi Lowero .in tho hills formed
the main strexjgt^ of tnese Rajput kings. Limbu chiefs
were appareixtly not averse to playing off competing Hindu
kings to gain their own ends. Hamilton recounts how the
shift of allegiance from Bijayapur to Iviuckwanpur by one
chief enabled the Iviuckwanpur ruler to absorb the other
kingdom into his domains. He notes that the power of the
kings and their Hindu adherents was very much limited by
the kiratis. The prime minister signed all commissions
and orders, while the king merely apijlied his seal.
Furthermore, the former could appropriate 10°/b of the total
1
revenues of the Kingdom. Another writer comments; "the
last wox'd lay with the Kirati chiefs who more than once
cast down the Rajput king of Bijayapur and set up
2
another in his place. The tenuous control of the Sen
rulers over their hill subjects led one missionary resident
in the Valley of Nepal in the middle of the 18th century
to refer to the * indepiendentJ nation of the 'Ciratas'
lying to the east of Kathmandu.
There appears to be some uncertainty about the
extent of Bijayapur* s influence 111 the hill country.
The Nepali historian, D.R. Regmi, apparently following
Hamilton, suggests that until the late 18th century the
Bijayapur kingdom included a^ .1 of Limbuan and that part
1. Hamilton, 1819, p.147*
2• Tuker, 1957, p.42.
3. Giuseppe, 1790, p.308.
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of Sikkim west of the Tista River."* Some writers imply
that until the Gorkha conquest, ail of Limbuan had been a
2
part of Sikkim, while Chemjong notes that during the 17th
century the Sikkimese had extended their domains westward
and subjected many of the chiefs of the northern parts of
Limbuan. Whichever the correct view, what is certain is
that IIam was a part of Sikkim at the time of the Gorkha 
Ainvasion.
By 1772 the Gorkhas, having subdued the Valley of 
Nepal, began their conquest of the kirati country. In 
1774 H a m  fell. The Gorkhas erected there a series of 
forts to secure communications with the plains and from 
which to launch an eastern offensive. By 1810, they 
reached the banks of the Tista in Sikjtcim. Only the 
intervention of the British stopped the Gorkha advance, 
and in 1817 Nepal's eastern boundary was put back to the 
Mechi River, where it has remained since,
From the time of its conquest by the Gorkhas,
Ilam, largely because of its natural boundaries and 
strategic location, has remained a distinct unit of 
administration. During the quarter century following the
1. D.R. Rogmi, 1961, p.37; Hamilton, 1819, p.132.
2. See for example, J.C. tfhite, 1909, pH7-
3. I.S. Chemjong, 1952, Chapter 6.
4. Gorkha was one of the petty kingdoms which had arisen 
in west Nepal following the large migration of high- 
cast 0 Hinuus fleeing from north India m  the wake of 
the Moslem invasion of the 13th century. The reigning 
Shah king of Gorkha took advantage of wars between the 
Newar rulers in the Valley of Nepal to further his own 
political ambitions.
5: D.R, Rogmi, 1961, p.96.
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Cow ruie s t , aitho ugh Lhankutt a b o c am^ the ? 1 nrgest and mo st 
important xjiuqm xn eastern nexmi, and the headquarters of 
the civil and military administrator9 for the area, H a m  
was administered separately by its own military authorities.**" 
In the early years ox' the 19th century Chainpur 
was made a separate division to aon-u nistor the hill areas 
east of the Arun River* "Until 1890, H a m  wab nominally 
a part of the Chainpur division, although the district Con­
tinued to be administered by the military, who collected
2customs and revenues and dispensed justice* According- to 
Hodgson, the head of the H a m  garrison ’is a captain and has 
a hundred soluiers under him, with eight artillerymen and 
one cannon of small calibre. This officer is also the civil 
authority of the arondissem^nt, and raises the extra­
ordinary revenue thereof to meet the local expenses, send­
ing the balance, if any, to kathmandu. The land revenue 
is wholly assigned to his troops in pay.*
By the end of the 19th century, at which time 
the country was divided into thirty-eight administrative 
districts, the civil authority had largely replaced the
1. Hodgson, 1880, p.201.
2* A former governor of 11am claims that the first civil 
Governor of the district was appointed in 1817, although 
there is every likelihood that at least until the latter 
half of the 19th century military men were assigned the 
post* (Cf* Lama, 1959, p.27).
3„ Hodgson, 1880, p.204. 1 have seen a receipt for taxes
given by the revenue department of the Ilan militia, 
dated 1873, in which it is specificaJLly stated that 
taxes submitted *will be spent as salary for the 
militia.*
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military in Ilcxi. In 1890 Xiao was removed from the nominal
oG-it-rr,! -f Ohn.i , pur r.i.ci the Governor (Bada Hah in) was made
directly responsible to the Durbar 111 Kathmandu* In that
year a magistrate's court was established in the district
capital, H a m  Bazaar. Onxy revenue matters continued to
be handled by the militia until about 1910 when a branch of
the treasury office (gal) was set up in the district.
1951 marked a turning point in the political life
of the country. Until that time, hepal remained virtually
isolated from the rest of the world. Between 1790-1950
diplomatic relations were maintained only with Britain 
1and Tibet. Foreigners were not permitted to travel in the
hills, and only a few privileged westerners were on occasion
allowed to hunt in the Terai, or wore invited to visit
the Vailuy of Kathmandu. The country's isolation was
reflected in the almost total lack of schools and of health
care, the paucity of roads and other means of communication,
2and the absence of industry.
In 1951 the Bana Regime, which had ruled the 
country for over a century, was ousted and the powers of 
the Monarchy restored. In 1952, the Government made its
1. In 1912 formal links with China were severed. Bee Maron, 
Rose and Heyman, 1956, pp. 241-247.
2. In 1950 about yfo of children of school age were in schools 
there were fewer than a dozen doctors in the country; 
there wei^ e 120 miles of motorable roads and 63 miles of 
railway.
3. For a good account of the events of 1950-51 and follow­
ing, see Driver, 1963.
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first attempt to establish, a Panchayat system of local 
committees and courts. In Ham, the Panehayat lasted four 
years in the first instance, and in 1962, under a recon­
stituted system, was reintroduced and was still in effect 
at the time of fieldwork.
The various 0011X11111008 established by the Panchayat 
system were grafted on to but did not replace the traditional 
administrative structure. At the national level, the locus 
of power in the country remains the Monarch and his 
appointees who head the various departments and ministries 
in the Government. Administration in the hill districts is 
still effected under the supervision of a Governor appointed 
by the Crown.
The Governor is primarily responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order in the district, and retains 
command of the militia and police. He also co-ordinates 
the activities of the various local administrative depart­
ments and initiates such programmes and activities as may 
fall outside the scope of district departments.
Traditionally, due to poor communications between 
Kathmandu and Ham, the Governor's authority extended to 
all matters of local administration. And since most 
appointees to the post were close kinsmen of the ruling 
Ranas, their de-facto powers were virtually absolute.
Recently, the boundaries of jurisdiction between 
the office of the Governor and the various departments have
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beeerao neru oloariy define (l, nincw jQ.^ 1, the atoini s t rat i oxi 
has bean reorganized tu cope with tne expansion of Govern­
ment services and activities throughout the country. Some 
district branches are now required to report directly to 
wider regional branches or oven to the central department 
in Kathmandu. 'With the gradual improvement of communications 
between kathmaudu and the districts, central departments are 
tending to exercise firmer control over their local branches 
than in the past. As a result, the rule of the Governor is 
more and more restricted to 'general supervision' of the 
various departments.^
To coixxcide with the establishment of a Panchayat 
system in 1962 administrative boundaries were redrawn.
The country is now divided into 14 'development zones'.
Pach zoug is divided into a number of 'development districts' 
- there are 75 throughout the country - which are further 
sub-divided into administrative 'Villages'. Together with 
the districts of Jhapa in the Turai and Panehtliar and 
Taplejung to the north, 11am became part of the ivlechi Zone, 
eastermost of the country's zonal divisions. The establish­
ment of new districts, however, did not affect Ham's 
boundaries. Although the 1962 re-organization foresees the 
eventual emphasis on zonal rather than on district pro­
gramming and administration, in 1964-65 the primary 
development entity was still the district, which continued
1. Malhotra 1956, pp. 455-56.
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to bo the effective unit of gnvp^iriii^nt. flam n s wo know 
it today has regained a constant administrative unit since 
its incorporation into the Borkhu State some two hundred 
years ago•
The Indreni Cluster
At the tine of fieldwork the Indreni settlements 
contained a population of 511# The population breakdown 
is shown in fable I*
TABLE I
Indreni Clusters population breakdown
Brahmins Jaisis Limbus Ma&ars Blacksmiths Total
Angbung 120 120
Bharapa 12 115 24 11 162
Chitok 22 112 3 137
Do rumba 23. 7, 62   _ 92
57 7 409 24 14 511
The Indreni settlements are located between three 
and four miles north of IIam Bazaar, the district capital*
They straddle a road which leads from the Bazaar to a point 
about four miles north of the settlements where the district's 
only lake is situated* Although vegetation in the area is 
lush, especially during and immediately following the rams, 
there is a conspicuous dearth of woodland. The dense bamboo 
forests which once covered the greater part of the ridge slopes 
have been denuded leaving only sparse groves dotted spora­
dically around the hills*
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There is no central meeting place where large 
numbers of local residents can gather to exchange news or 
relax after the day's work. At one point on the main road
to the west of Chitok there are two snarl shops and a tiny
hut where the Banchayat Committoo holds its meetings. At 
any tii#e of the day a few men are to be found tradiiog jokes 
with the talkative and witty young proprietress of one of 
the shops, but only when the Committee meets are the numbers 
who come together more than a handful.
About a mile south of the shops, beside the main
road on a small rise is the only school for the children 
of the Indreni Cluster and settlements to the north of it. 
Built of mud and stone, with a thatched roof, the school 
has three teachers for its five grades. Beside the school 
there is a large playground, the only flat spread of land 
to be seen m  the area, but only the school children use it 
for exercises or games, hone of the adults in the surroun­
ding settlements are ever to be seen playing on the field.
The indreni settlements suffer from no shortage 
of water for drinking or bathing and every house is within 
easy reach of at least one water source (dhara). Water is 
usually tapped from a spring and run through a split bamboo 
'pipe1 to an area which has been cleared and laid over 
with stones. At such water sources women are usually found 
washing clothes or filling copper or earthen jugs with water, 
and passing the time by exchanging gossip.
33.
Although several houses in the Cluster are situated 
alongside the m a m  road, most are set back a distance and can 
be reached only by a series of narrow footpaths. The houses 
are constructed on unirrigated plots along tho crest of 
the main ridge at altitudes between 3500 - 4500® above sea 
level. Vegetable gardens growing spinach, tomatoes, 
cucumbers, squash, etc. are located on small plots adjacent 
to the houses and an occasional banana or guava tree will 
be situated nearby.
An area in front of each house is cleared and 
levelled to provide a courtyard, in which most domestic 
chores are carried out. Often a raised platform on which 
the household's maize crop is stored is placed in the centre 
of the yard. During the dry season, men weave wicker 
baskets, repair ploughs or pass the time away in the open 
courtyard. Here women pound and polish rice, wash utensils 
or brew millet beer, drams are left to dry on long mats 
of split bamboo and rice for the daily meals is winnowed 
in the open air.
Unlike the practice followed in some parts of 
Nepal, cattle and domestic animals are not kept inside the 
main house. Cattle byres, pig and goat pens are constructed 
on the edge of the courtyard, while chickoiis kept under 
baskets or m  other co.utainers out of reach of preying 
jackals.
Houses arc of varying constructions they can be
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roughly classified into four m a m  types. The simplest and 
least expensive consists of one stone and mud wail with the 
remaining three wails made of bamboo strips and mud filling. 
There is only one room measuring approximately 10* x 12* 
which is used botfe. for cooking and sleeping. A tiny attic 
provides just enough space for storing millet and paddy, 
which are usually kept in large rectangle-shaped baskets made 
of bamboo strips. The roof is thatched with hay or occasio­
nally a more durable grass (khar) grown especially for the 
purpose.
A second type is slightly larger than the first, 
and here all four walls are of stone. It is constructed 
on a stone foundation about three feet in depth. In this 
house, too, there is only one room although if there are 
many people living in the house the attic may be used for 
sleeping as wexl as storage. The roof is thatch and there 
is a partly enclosed verandah at the front of the house 
facing the courtyard.
The third type of house is larger than the first 
two (perhaps 20* x 30*) and consists of two storeys in 
addition to a storage attic. The kitchen is normally on 
the ground floor, but the inhabitants sleep on both floors. 
There may be ad hoc partitions separating the sleeping 
quarters of various persons but this is not the rule. In 
addition to the front verandah there may be a narrow
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balcony on the second floor. Hero, too, the roof is of 
thatch.
The fourth type is the largest of all (approxi­
mately 25* x 40'). Inside, wood partitions divide the- 
space on both floors into several rooms and perhaps a 
separate kitchen. The porch is completely ehclosed in wood 
to provide shelter against the weather. There is a tin roof.
In none of these houses are chimneys or proper 
ventilation found. windows are the exceptiun and are 
usually covered by wooden shutters. As a consequence houses 
are generally dark and smoke-filled. The lower part of the 
outside walls are covered with red earth and the top may 
be whitewashed with lime. The floors of the inner house 
and the verandah are covered with a mixture of red earth 
and cow dung and repiastered at the beginning of each hepaii 
month and on other special ritual occasions.
Even in the most well-to-do house furniture is 
minimal. i3eds are uncommon^ people sleep on hay or bamboo 
mats laid out on the floor. While some of the wealthier 
houses have chairs, most people sit on small round mats made 
of maize coverings or on locaxly woven blankets. Meals are 
taken seated on such mats and food is placed on the freshly 
cleaned floor m  front of the person eating.
Since the Panchayat system is a recent creation 
the notion of belonging to a demarcated political unit such 
as a statutory village has not yet become an accepted part
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of social life. Traditionally, because of the nature of 
the terrain and the settlement configuration, there was no 
concept of belonging to a geographically or socially distinct 
unit. The characteristic residential pattern is one of wide 
distribution of dwellings, a pattern broken only occasionally 
by small clusters of houses. Instead of nucleated villages, 
we find dispersed settlements which merge into one another. 
The settlement is never accurately defined. Its name 
locates a man's place of residence, but boundaries are vague 
in the fringe areas between settlements. I have seen docu­
ments referring to the same man, living in the border area 
between settlements and written with his knowledge, citing 
his place of residence as Angbung on one occasion, Bharapa 
on another, and a third settlement outside the Cluster on 
yet another. A brief description of settlement boundaries 
in the Indreni Cluster will illustrate the residential 
pattern,
Angbung, the southernmost settlement in the 
Cluster, is the most compact of the four, so that every 
house is within easy reach, via a network of footpaths, of 
every other house in the settlement. Angbung has also the 
most definitive boundaries of any of the settlements in 
the Cluster. It is bordered on the west by the main road 
to IIam Bazaar (only one house is situated on the western 
side of the road, atop a small rise). On the north and east 
Angbung is bounded by fields, and on the south by a wood.
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It is not completely isolated, however, for the houses of 
Bharapa continue along the ridge, on both sides of the main 
road, from where those of Axigbung leave off*
fhere is a wider distribution of houses in Bharapa 
than in Angbung, save for one cluster of six houses to the 
west of the main road* Whereas the ridge top to the west, 
end fields down the eastern slope of the ridge bound the 
settlement on two sides, it ffades9 into Angbung on the south, 
into Chitok on the north-east, and into yet another settle­
ment outside the Cluster - Mewa - on the north-west.
Ihe residential pattern in Chitok is similar to 
Bharapa5 again with the exception of one cluster of four 
houses and another of five, most houses tend to be widely 
dispersed. Residents of Chitok have clear ideas about the 
boundaries of their settlement to the east (fields extend­
ing down to the Mai River) and to the north (a glen between 
two hills). Ihe boundaries with Bharapa to the south,and 
with Mewa to the west, however, are ill-defined.
Houses in Dorumba are more widely spaced than in 
any of the other settlements in the Cluster. Although the 
boundaries are clearly demarcated to the south (the glen 
north of Chitok) and to the east and north-west (fields) 
there is no clear boundary between the houses of Mewa which 
extend westward up the ridge to the main road and those of 
Dorumba, nor between those of the latter and the dwellings
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of yet another settlement to the north-east*
Settlements are xieither exogamous nor endogamous 
units. Nor are the inhabitants of any one settlement bound 
together by common rituals. Because of the necessity of 
sub-dividing scarce plots, sibling groups tend to live on 
adjacent lands and thus to inhabit the same settlement. In 
several cases, however, siblings do live in different 
settlements. Moreover, links to kinship units beyond the 
siblinggroup extend regularly into neighbouring settle­
ments within the Cluster. Those persons who pay taxes to 
a headman are linked across the vague boundaries of settle­
ment. Similarly, mourning obligations on the death of an 
agnate crystallize groups without reference to settlement.
In day-to-day contexts, the persons with whom one 
interacts most frequently are neighbours. A household which 
runs short of salt or cooking oil borrows from a neighbour; 
those without a foot pestle for pounding rice or millet 
use their neighbour’s. During the agricultural season 
neighbours exchange labour. They are the first to be 
invited to weddings or funeral rites. On warm evenings 
neighbours gather in each other's courtyards and tell 
stories or trade gossip. But because of the settlement 
pattern, a man's neighbourhood does not always coincide 
with his settlement. Those in the fringe areas between 
settlements count neighbours on both sides of the 
'boundary'. In a sense, then, neighbourhoods are ego-
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centred and must be conceptualized as a series of over­
lapping circles which transcend settlement boundaries, 
especially when these are not clear-cut geographical features.
There is no Nepali word which specifically denotes 
those units here called settlements. The word 'gaon9. 
usually translated as village, is employed in a variety of 
contexts. It may denote the named unit of residence, i.e. 
what I have meant by settlement. Graon can be employed when 
referring to the general area, so that a man out for a walk 
will say simply: *1 am going to the gaon'. The area
subsumed by the new Panchayat Committee is called a gaon 
although it includes a number of settlements. Finally, 
within the area of any settlement, a small cluster of houses 
may be called a gaon. Similarly, because the Indreni 
Cluster contains a majority of Limbus, it is often referred 
to as 'Limbu gaon'.
What has to be stressed, then, is the fact that 
the settlement is not a discrete social or political entity. 
Nor is it a unit in the administrative hierarchy seen from 
above. The notion of the settlement as a self-aware 
entity does not exist either in the conceptual notions of 
the inhabitants or 'on the ground'.
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The People
Prior to and for some years after the Gforkha
1conquest H a m  was inhabited mainly by Lepchas, Limbu 
migration into the area certainly took place before the 
G-orkha conquest, but was evidently catalyzed by the poli­
tical and military unrest m  other parts of Limbuan follow-
2ing the invasion. In addition, occasional migratory 
waves from Sikkim swelled the Lepcha population of east 
Nepal. The migrations led to intermarriage between the 
two peoples. Campbell, writing in 1840, remarks that 
•during the last twelve years, since the great migration 
of the Lepchas from Sikkim to the westward has been in 
progress, the mixture of these two tribes has greatly 
increased in frequency.*^ The almost total disappearance 
of the Lepchas as a separate group in Ilam would seem to 
support the notion of large-scale intermarriage. Although 
some informants insist that the Lepchas were driven out of 
Ilam by the Limbus migrating from other areas of Limbuan, 
others suggest that many Limbu clans are in fact hybrid.
While the Limbus tended to absorb or drive out 
the Lepchas, other migratory movements have given Ilam,
1. Cf. Rock, 1953, PP* 938-395 Nebesky-Wojkowitz, 1956, 
p.124? O'Malley, 1907, P*22. *the Limbu Chronicle 
cited above, it is stated that at the time of the 
division of Limbuan among the descendants of the Ten 
Limbus, the ilam area was inhabited by Lepchas.
2. Cf. Phago, 1843«
3. Campbell, 1840, p.596.
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like other regions of east Nepal, a highly heterogenous 
character. Although each of the o a m  tribal groups is 
identified with a particular area in the hills, in most 
parts there is to be found an admixture of peoples, generally 
with the tribe indigenous to a particular area predominating 
in that area. Since the direction of movement has tended to 
be from west to east, it is more common to find members of 
groups associated with the western part of the country 
living in the east than vice versa.
In addition to the migration of tribal populations,
large-scale immigration of Brahmins, Jaisis and Chetris
from the western regions of Nepal followed in the wake of
the G-orkha conquest. These immigrants settled among the
indigenous Limbus, thereby creating a multi-ethnic society
in Ilam. In the Panchayat area of Syawa, (which contains
the Indreni Cluster) whose heterogeneous population is
typical of H a m ’s villages, there are thirteen different 
1groups. Their numbers are shown in Table 2.
1. Throughout the text, the word ’Village* is used to refer 
to the area under the jurisdiction of the newly established 
Panchayat Committee.
42.
TABLE 2 
Population of Syawa Village
Percentage of 
Households Population Village Population
iri— llfc«lf — i to M I T  ■ — 111— y r — i — WW " HI 1 ^ 1  ....... .
Brahmin 159 929 32.5%
Jaisi 63 359 12.6
Chetri 38 223 7.8
Limbu 106 523 18.3
Rai 36 220 7.7
Sunwar 16 90 3.2
G-urung 10 62 2.2
Magar rj 42 1.5
Tamang 3 23 0.8
Newar 25 158 5.5
Blacksmith 21 95 3.3
Tailor lx 68 2.4
Gobbler 9 64 2.2
502 2856 100.0%
h3 & CD linking together of these many groups
1in the establishment of a caste hierarchy. Each caste -
with the exception of the Newars - is associated with one
2of three main tiers in the hierarchy. This is not to 
suggest that members of caste groups belonging to one tier 
always see those in other tiers as undifferentiated, but 
only that in certain contexts people are viewed as belonging 
to classifications larger than castes. Moreover, these are 
objective divisions in the sense that until 1963, the law
1. This switph in terminology from 'tribe* to 'caste* 
requires a word of explanation. Bailey (1961) has argued 
that the two represent polar opposites along a continuum 
of structural types. In this sense, the Limbus are no 
longer a tribe and not quite a caste. The latter terra
is used for the sake of consistency, and as a direct 
translation of the term jat, which is used indiscrimina­
tely of all groups.
2. The Newars are generally classified separately, since 
they are internally ranked. Bee Pdrer-Haimendorf, 1956.
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was applied differentially on the basis of castes which were 
for most purposes classified into three tiers.
1In the old legal Code the Brahmins, Jaisis and 
Chetris were designated as 9twice-born* (ta&adhari) castes.
In common parlance, Brahmins and Jaisis, and, less frequently, 
Chetris as well, may be referred to as ’Bahuns*. More 
frequently, the three groups are termed *Hhas-Bahuns* .
However, whereas Jaisis will generally refer to themselves 
as ’Bahuns9, Brahmins normally prefix the term ’Upadiya*, 
denoting- a status superior to both Jaisis and Chetris. All 
three groups wear the sacred thread, a symbol of their 
high ritual status. Brahmins serve as priests to the three 
’twice-born* caste groups, but aside from this, no specific 
occupation is associated with each groups all are cultiva­
tors.2
Below the twice-born castes in the ritual hierarchy 
come the various ’tribal.* groups. Limbus, along with Rais, 
Gurungs, Magars, Sunwars and Tamangs are termed (both in 
the old Legal Code and in everyday conversation) 'drinking 
(matwali) castes*. This refers to the fact that they drink 
beer and liquor, a practice forbidden to orthodox Hindus.
Each of these castes assigns to itself a position in the 
middle stratum of the hierarchy not axways in accord with 
the position it is assigned by other groups. So that
1. (These are the issue of unions between Brahmin men and 
Brahmin widows.
2. Brahmins m  east Nepal, unlike those in some parts of 
the country, piough.
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although it is generally accepted that drinking castes rank 
below twice-born groups in the ritual hierarchy, how the 
former are arranged is a matter of some uncertainty.
iSfone of these groups in the middle tier wears the 
sacred thread. Lor does any follow a specific occupation 
with which it is associated by tradition. Like the twice- 
born groups, those in the middle stratum of the hierarchy 
are primarily cultivators.
Finally come the menial castes - the ♦untouch­
ables* (pani na calrie) - who rank lowest in the hierarchy. 
Regarded as occupying a status below the pollution, ’barrier*
they • are not allowed to enter the homes of those in the
1higher strata. Although some Blacksmiths, Tailors and 
Gobblers live in symbiotic relationship to the higher ranked 
groups, and perform services for the latter, the majority 
do not follow their traditional occupations. Again, like 
most others in the area, they are mainly cultivators.
This three tier hierarchy of twice-born, ’drink­
ing* and untouchable caste groups was the social basis for 
and became crystallized through the old Legal Code of the 
country, abolished only in 1963. The law protected the 
interests of the Brahmins axid other twice-born castes 
by making an infringement of their exalted status a crime. 
Thus an offence against what was regarded as the sanctity
1. Tailors are also musicians.
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of the caste hierarchy was equated with an offence against 
the state.
The hierarchy is bolstered by rigid rules of 
commensality, such that a jjorson can accept ritually sig­
nificant foods only from members of groups accorded equal 
or higher status. No member of a twice-born caste will 
accept such food from a member of one of the driidcing castes 
in the middle stratum. And no member of a group considered 
ritually pure will take any food - cooked or otherwise - 
or water from an untouchable.
Certain cultural distinctions serve to emphasize 
the differences among the principal strata in the hierarchy. 
Since the majority of inhabitants of the Indreni Cluster of 
settlements are Brahmins and Limbus, I will only indicate 
some of the distinctions between these two groups.
The main cultural criteria differentiating Limbus 
and Brahmins are race, language and religion. Limbus are 
of Mongoloid racial stock and have a language of their own
which, in the Linguistic Survey of India is classified as
1part of the Tibeto-Burman family. In addition, they speak, 
with varying degrees of fluency, the lingua franca of the 
countrj', Nepali kura - an Indo-Aryan tongue. Because of the 
high admixture of castes in Ilam, all Limbu men and most 
womeii born and raised in the district are required to know
Nepali kura and so speak it with ease. It is not uncommon,
1. More precisely9 Limbu kura is"iLT~of the Laste'rn Pronomiha- 
lizod Croup (Austria Influence), Himalayan Croups of the 
Tibeto-Burman Family. (Cf. Chatterji, 1950).
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however, to find women married into the Indreni settle­
ments from Limbuan areas outside Ilam where there is a
greater concentration of nimbus, unable to converse in
1Nepali kura with any degree of fluency.
The Brahmins are associated with the Caucasian
or Indid racial category and speak Nepali kura as a first
language. This latter fact, aside from contributing to
differences in fluency and styles of spoech between the two
groups, enables Brahmins to communicate more easily with
members of the administration, most of whom are members
of twice-born groups. Moreover, since most Brahmins have
some knowledge of Sanskrit, the language of Hindu ritual,
they are better able to cope with written and spoken Nepali
’officialese1 which contains a considerable amount of
2
Sanskrit words. Some of the implications of this difference 
in laiiguage facility are discussed in the last chapter.
Although Limbus claim to be Hindus they are, as 
Bailey remarks of the Konds of Orissa, ’Hindus of a 
different kind*. Home of the differences between the forms 
of worship of Limbus and Brahmins are immediately apparent 
in certain diacritical features surrounding their respective 
dwellings. The courtyard of a Limbu house will not contain
1. Accordiijg to preliminary figures for the 1961 census, 
approximately one quarter of the population of Limbuan 
claims Limbu kura as its mother tongue. The figure for 
Ilam is about 10fe»
2. Limbus speak of *Bahun kura1 i.e. the language of the 
Brahmins when they mean to refer to Sanskrit.
3 . Bailey, I960, p.4.
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a shrine for the worship of a Hindu deity, The presence 
of such a shrine, usually a small mound of earth, or even 
an empty kerosene tin filled with earth and topped by a few 
branches of a tulasi bush, identifies the home as that of 
a Brahmin. Nor do Limbus follow the Brahminic practice of 
propitiating an ancestor god (kul deota) which requires the 
setting aside of a special place of worship within the 
Brahmin home.
The differences in the ritual significance attached 
to the taking of meals is expressed in the kinds of kitchen 
constructed by each. The Brahmin kitchen consists of a 
platform of mud raised several inches above the floor and 
to which only ritually qualified members of the household 
or their Brahmin guests have access. The cooking stove, 
too, is of special mud and stone construction and both stove 
and platform (which individually and jointly are called 
'chulo*) are required to be re-plastered with a mixture of 
mud and cow dung after each meal. Brahmin men take their 
meals only after ritual bathing and while wearing a special 
white loin cloth (dhoti) which replaces their ordinary 
clothes.
Limbu^ on the other hand, cook on a simple stove 
consisting of several stones or an iron tripod. They eat 
in their ordinary clothes after washing only their hands 
and face and no special platform is built for eating 
purposes.
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Distinct dietary practices arc associated with, 
each caste. As already mentioned, Brahmins are teetotal­
lers, whereas Limbus are free to drink intoxicating 
beverages. Although some Brahmins are strict vegetarians 
by choice-*" most eat the meat of goats and sheep. Limbus
also eat buffalo, chicken and pig meat, which are forbidden 
2
to Brahmins. Although Brahmins do not raise chickens or 
pigs, they do keep buffaloes for their milk, curd and 
clarified butter products.
Whereas Brahmins worship the universal Hindu 
pantheon, Limbus worship, by means of blood sacrifice, 
a host of deities which have no place in traditional 
Hindu belief. Limbu mourning practices also differ sig­
nificantly from those of the Brahmins. fo mention only 
two featuress the Limbus bury their dead whereas the 
Brahmins cremate theirsj and Limbus observe a period of 
three or four days of pollution (depending on whether the 
deceased is female or male), while Brahmins consider pollu­
tion to extend for thirteen days after death.
Marriage practices, too, differ considerably. 
Limbu marriages are performed by Limbu ritual specialists 
(jahe dangma) and require a blood sacrifice. Costs of 
marriage are borne by the bridegroom*s family, and the 
ceremony itself takes place at the home of the bridegroom,
1, Vegetarians and non-vegetarians are sometimes found 
living in the same Brahmin household.
2. Ail informants claim that beef was eaten by Limbus prior 
to the incorporation of Limbuan into the G-orkha polity.
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before and after which, a series of payments Eire trans­
ferred from the groom’s to the bride's family. Limbu 
widows are re-married in essentially the same ceremony as 
are new brides. Brahmin women, by- contrast, are married 
at their natal homes in ceremonies conducted by Brahmin 
family priests (purohit) and the marriages thereby made 
are considered indissoluble. The costs of the marriage 
are borne by the bride’s family. Brahmin widows are not 
re-married.
Other differences contribute to the identification 
of two distinct cultural groups in the region of the 
Indreni settlements. Limbus greet one another quite dis­
tinctly from the way in which Brahmins greet their caste 
fellows. Greeting practices thereby express not merely 
differences in kinship norms between the two castes but 
their cultural ’apartness.9
There are also distinctions in the ways in which 
members of each caste dress. All eastern hill men wear 
the same basic costumes a double-breamed upper garment 
which fails below the waist, and a pair of trousers loose 
at the waist but tapering gradually so that it is tight- 
fitting from the knees down. A European style jacket is 
worn above this costume on dress-up occasions and a cap 
which is high on one side and low on the other, is worn on 
the head. All men wear those component units of the dress, 
but the distinction is m  the manner in which the dress is
worn, Limbus tend to prefur the upper garment to be knee- 
length, while Brahmins wear the garment six or eight inches 
above the knees. The result is a distinctive Limbu ’style* 
despite the similarities 111 the component parts of the 
costume. Limbu women are even more set apart from Brahmin 
women. Like the latter, their head is covered by a shawl. 
Women of both castes wear a blouse and a sari as a lower 
garment. Limbu women, however, prefer their blouse to be 
made of velvet - usually black - while Brahmin women generally 
wear multi-coloured cotton or silk blouses. Limbu women 
also wrap a bright red cloth around their waists in the 
style of an apron back-to-front, a feature which Brahmin 
women omit. The result is that the caste affiliation of 
most people is readily apparent by the manner of their 
dress.
finally, a word might be said about differences
1m  the ’pleasure complex1 of the two groups. The most 
important aspects of this complex among the Limbus are 
drinking and dancing. Millet beer (jar) and liquor dis­
tilled from millet (raksi)» the two main kinds of intoxi­
cating beverage made and consumed in the settlements 
constitute an integral part of Limbu social life.
Obeisance to headmen is expressed in the presentation of 
liquor^ 'the request for a girl’s hand in marriage is 
preceded by the offering of liquor; marriage payments
1 . Qrans, 1965f p.8.
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include large quantities of liquor; the settlement of a 
dispute between Limbus is symbolized by the sharing of 
liquor. Indeed, there is hardly a social event which does 
not in some way involve the sharing of drink.
The importance of drink is especially evident 
during rituals which bring together large numbers of people. 
Marriages and funerary rites are characterized by the con­
sumption of vast quantities of beer. The norms of hospi­
tality, too, demand the serving of beer. A visitng kinsman 
or other guest is made welcome by offering beer in a bamboo 
container (tongba). I have heard one old Limbu remarks 
’Tongba is the Limbu god*.
On the weekly market day in the nearby bazaar town 
it is not unusual to see a number of Limbus drinking together 
in ad hoc stalls set up along the main road. Those intent 
on arriving at the market early will have a hard time avoid­
ing the invitations from kinsmen and friends to share ’one 
for the road’.
Another form of recreation which marks off the 
Limbus from the Brahmins is the formers’ enjoyment of 
dancing. The Limbu “paddy dance’ (dhan nac) involves a line 
of men and women, hand to hand, in a series of musical 
challenges and rebuttals, danced and sung in lugubrious 
rhythm over many hours and even days. Since certain cate­
gories of kin - especially agnates of the opposite sex - 
are barred from dancing together, dances are usually held
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when visitors arrive from another settlement cluster. In 
the Indreni settlement dances taxe place weekly on market 
day for the benefit of young men who want to spend a few 
hours dancing with the local girls before returning to 
their homes. The hosts or hostesses are expected to serve 
beer or liquor to their guests at intervals during the dance. 
Limbu weddings and other occasions for large gatherings 
invariably include dances for the young men and women.
A number of major Hindu festivals provide addi­
tional opportunities for Limbus to indulge their delight 
in dancing. One such occasion is a large four-day fair 
which takes place at the confluence of the Mai and Jogmai 
rivers beginning on the first day of the Nepali month of 
magh (January/February). The distinction in “pleasure 
complex’ between the Brahmins and Limbus is made manifest 
in the various ways in which the two groups regard the fair. 
Although the main purpose of the festival is sacred, viz. 
the worship of the Mai River, the Limbus gather in one 
section of the fair ground and spend the better part of the 
time dancing and drinking. For the Limbus this is primarily 
a secular event enabling the young people to meet others 
from every part of the district at the dances which con­
tinue for da;ys.
For the Brahmins the festival’s importance is 
in its sacred content: the ritual purification'obtained
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by bathing in the holy river, and the spiritual duty dis­
charged by propitiation of the Eivur G-oddess. Consequently 
the recreational or pleasure value of the festival is
inseparable from the sacred value.
This sacred aspect is the focus of all recrea­
tional activities in which Brahmins participate. Informal 
groups organized by wealthy Brahmins gather occasionally 
to sing religious songs. Brahmin weddings feature stylized 
singing competitions (silok) - usually recitations of 
passages from the sacred literature - between the camps of the 
bride and groom. Women from the groom's settlement gather 
on the night of his wedding (which takes place at the bride's
home) to indulge in songs and play (ratauli) - mostly of a
lewd nature - at the expense of the bride's relatives.
These aiid other ritual occasions provide the framework for 
the Brahmin 'pleasure complex'. The dearth of secular 
occasions for recreational activity and the prohibition on 
drinking and mixed dancing set the Brahmins apart from their 
Limbu neighbours.
Despite their sharing of a common environment 
and their fusion into a single social system, each caste 
thus maintains a distinct 'style of life'.
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Land Tenure
Those cultural differences are emphasized by the
fact that each group is associated with a separate kind of
land tenure. The Limbus are identified with the 'kipat*
tenure system, and only Limbus can own., this Kind of laud.
All other castes, including Brahmins, x^ossess land under the
'raikar® system, which is the dominant form of tenure in 
1the country. Both systems exist side by side in the
2Indreni settlements, as in the entire area of Limbuan.
The raikar system may be described as one of 'state 
landlordism1 under which the rights of an individual to 
utilization and transfer of the land are recognized by the 
state so long as taxes are paid. Possession of land under 
this system has no reference to the ca.ste affiliation or 
place of residence of the individual.
It is unlikely that the Gurkhas who established 
the Kingdom of Nepal actually created the kipat system.
As Regmi suggests, the system is probably ®a relic of the 
customary land tenure that the Mongolian communities 
established in the areas occupied by them prior to Indo- 
Aryan penetration.'^ The first rulers of the new state,
1. A variety of land tenure forms have been noted for Nepal. 
Most were abolished after the overthrow of the Ranas.
See M.C. Regmi, 1963, 1964, 1965, for a description of 
these sy st ems,
2. Limbus can, but on the whole do not, hold land under 
raikar tenure. See Chapter II.
3. M.C. Regmi, 1963.
4. M.C. Regmi, 1965, p.86.
however, confirmed the rights of these groups over their 
lands.
The term 'kipat* itself seems to have originated
in the western part of the country and only reached Limbuan
1
some years after the imposition of Gorkha rule. Although 
today only the Limbus possess this kind of land, other 
indigenous groups have held land under the kipat form of 
tenure. What is significant to note is that the Government 
of Nepal abolished the kipat system in all areas of the 
country save Limbuan. The Kipat associated with members of 
other groups was thereby also abolished. The reasons for 
thjis differential treatment of Limbus, as I show in Chapter 
III, appear to be largely political.
The Government's adoption of a special policy 
for east Nepal derives from the relations between the Gorkhas 
and the semi-independent Limbu chiefdoms of the pre-1770 
period. The incorporation of Limbuan into the Nepal state 
was as much a result of negotiation as of conquest. Gorkha 
expansion eastwards in the 1770s resulted in a series of 
alliances with potentially troublesome Limbu chiefs flank­
ing them on all sides. In a royal declaration issued at 
the time by King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the right of the 
Limbus to enjoy their traditional privileges and customs was
1. This view contradicts the argument put forward by some 
writers (Pradhananga, 19535 1.8. Chemjong, 1961) that
the term 'kipat* applies to land cleared and brought 
under cultivation by Limbus. In fact these writers imply, 
as some Indreni informants insist, that 'kipat* is a 
Limbu word.
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recognized. In return for their support the Limbus were
assured a measure of interiiai rule under their chiefs and
1
guaranteed their rights to ancestral lands.
1. Royal Order to the Limbus of Par Kirat, 1774. Quoted in 
Regmi, 1965, pp. 151-2.
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CHAPTER II 
LAND A juD DELCLrT GROUPS
How does an individual obtain rights to kipat land? In 
this chapter I attempt to answer the question by first 
describing the structure of Limbu groups and their relation­
ships to land. It is then shown how growing land shortages 
brought about two kinds of changes in these relationships. 
The first was a concern on the part of descent groups to 
define their criteria of membership more rigidly in order 
to defend their interests m  scarce land* The second was 
the tendency for groups of lowest genealogical depth in the 
nesting hierarchy i.e. the households to stress their rights 
to land against those of the wider group.
The Clan
The Limbus are divided into a number of named units 
which have been referred to as tribes or sub-tribes.
This is a translation of the term 9suhangr or ®swang*9
   ... mmnuwAi *
although Limbus 111 the Indreni settlements normally refer 
to this sub-division as thar, which is the same word they 
use for the exogamous unit, or clan. Vansittart lists over 
eighty such suhang among the Limbus. Most, but not all,
contain a number of clans, although ±±o single informant can
1. Vansittart, 1915* pp. 117-123.
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name more than a few, The suhang Tamling is represented
in the Indreni settlements by two clans, the Chongbung
and the hambo. These Tamling clans recognize descent from
a common ancestor with other clans in the suhang, but here
again they know of only six others, although Vansittart
1names thirty-eight. Some Chongbung informants claim not 
to marry with several other Tamling clans, but they contra­
dict one another about which ones. It can be assumed 
that the clan and not the suhang is the basic unit of 
exogamy.
Other suhangs, such as the Nembeke found in the 
Cluster, have no sub-divisions and so constitute both a 
suhang and a clan.
Clan members explain the rule of exogamy in terms 
of the belief of agnatic descent from a common ancestor.
But there is no occasion on which clan members meet for 
a common purpose. Nor is the clan a corporate group 
insofar as maintaining a continuity of possession to kipat 
land.
Over the years the clan has become dispersed, 
and its segments have cleared and laid claim to virgin 
lands in a number of areas of east Nepal.
In much of limbuan, certainly in IIam, rights 
to occupy particular areas of land under kipat tenure 
derive not from direct royal grants nor from * estates
1. Ibid.
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of holding* conferred by superior authority, but by virtue
1of being ’first settler *. These first settlers, migrating 
from areas of relatively high population density, or for 
political or military reasons, led small groups of kinsmen 
into what was mainly jungle and staked out claims to vacant 
areas. Even following the Gorkha conquest the Government 
allowed that limbuan was a kipat area, hence Limbus who 
cleared the land and brought it under cultivation ’by their 
own hoe* could legitimately claim the land as their own 
kipat. In some regions, as in parts of liam, they may have 
driveii off previously settled Lepcha inhabitants or perhaps 
intermarried with them. The legitimization by a royal decree 
of these claims to land by first settlers usually came much 
later, sometimes generations after the fact.
The Chongbungs of the Indreni settlements express 
clan dispersion in a kinship idiom which designates each 
settlement cluster known to harbour some members of the clan 
as the place where one Chongbung sibling founder settled 
after reaving the original (unspecified) clan territory in 
the district of Panchthar. Thus, the second Chongbung 
brother is said to have gone to Jidhpur, a settlement 
cluster to the south-west of the Indreni settlements; 
the third son ended up in Phungetapa, a cluster of settle­
ments in the western part of the district, and so on. The
1. This notion of ’first settler’ aiso exists in parts of 
Zambia. Cf. C.M.N. White, 1958, p.127.
Indreni Chongbungs reserve for their own apical ancestor - 
whose name, bai Kemba, can be cited by only a handful of 
the more articulate Chongbungs - the position of senior 
sibling (jetha) of the original group which staked out lands 
in various parts of east Nepal.
The justification for the presence of Kambos in 
the Indreni settlements presents something of a problem for 
the inhabitants, Since no other Kambo groups are known 
to exist outside the Indreni settlements, the Kambos cannot 
claim that they are part of a wider clan. Several varieties 
of explanation are offered for their presence. One suggests 
that the Kambos are in fact the descendants of the fifth 
Chongbung sibling who came to the Indreni settlements with 
his eldest brother. Another legend relates that the CJhong- 
bungs and Kambos were one clan until a severe famine came 
upon the lend. borne members of the clan ate a species of 
stinging nettle found in the hills and these people came 
to be known as Chongbungs. Others ate soil and they became 
kambos
A third legend, more commonly heard, ties together
elements of the first two with the early presence of Lepchas
in Ham. I quote the version of one Chongbung informants
’This was the place of the Lepchas. There was a fish-trap
1, *Kam1 is the Limbu word for soil. The word for nettle 
(silky a) bears 110 similar relation to ’Chongbung* .
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at the confluence of the Pua and Mai Rivers. Some Chong­
bungs from Panchthar arrived thore and asked the Lepchas if 
they could borrow the fish-trap since they were hungry.
The following morning the Lepchas came to ask for the trap. 
"We won't give it back", the Chongbungs said. "Why not?" 
the Lepchas asked, "We’ll teach you to make one and you can 
go somewhere else." But the Chongbungs would not leave.
So they fought there. Many Lepchas were killed, but they 
fought on. They came to Bharapa (in the Indreni Cluster) 
and still they fought. Then the Lepchas saids "We won't
leave until you eat this soil." What to do? So the Chong-
1
bungs sent for a kinsman and one came from Dharan. He ate 
the soil, and his descendants became kambos.'
This last legend, like the first, emphasizes the 
seniority of the Chongbungs in the Indreni settlements.
They are recognized as the first arrivals, the conquerors 
of the Lepchas, and as such the most prestigious of the 
clans in the Cluster. This position of seniority is 
expressed in a kinship idiom. They are .jetha in the Clus­
ter* The appelation 'jetha' attaches to the first-born, who 
is entitled to the respect and obedience of his younger 
brothers. This status is bolstered by the fact that the 
majority of the Limbu population of the Cluster are Chong­
bungs. That the kambos ate soil is a damning commentary 
on their prestige as compared to that of the Chongbungs.
1. Dharan is in the eastern Terai just north of Biratnagar.
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The third legend also points to the fact that the Chongbung 
who did e.at tho soil could not have been the aiDical fore­
father of the Indreni Chongbungs. On the contrary, it was 
an 'outsider® who was imported for the unsavoury task of 
soil eating. And since he lived in the Terai, which is not 
a part of Limbuan, he was probably a migrant who had lost 
contact with his ancestral kipat lands.
This tends to support the private speculations of 
some informants that the Kambos were probably outsiders who 
came to the Indreni area after the Chongbungs, and were 
granted kipat land by the latter.
The Nembekes, with the second largest Limbu popu­
lation in the Indreni Cluster, have links with a wider clan 
unit, but I have not heard any legends dealing with their 
arrival in Ham, The two clans with the smallest population 
in the Indreni settlements, the Phatras and Syelings, 
originally settled uxorilocally in the Cluster as affines 
of the Chongbungs. The latter conferred on them kipat grants 
which are now inherited in the male line by members of the 
two groups.
I refer to a group, the members of which share 
the same clan name and who believe in patrilineal descent 
from a common 'first settler' in the Indreni Cluster as a 
'local clan segment®. A case could be made for using the 
term 'maximal lineage' to describe such units since in all
/
likelihood members of such a group are descendants of a
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common ancestor. The notion is strengthened by the fairly 
wide spatial distance separating the members of one of the 
local groups from others bearing the same clan name. There 
are no occasions on which clansmen in other localities are 
invited to participate in the social functions of clansmen 
from the Indreni Cluster. In other words, there is no 
o/fctempt on the part of residents to maintain active ties 
with agnatic clansmen living in different areas of liam or 
other parts of east Nepal. This is true of the smaller 
groups as well,who might be expected to make such an attempt 
in view of their domination by the more populous groups.*1* 
Nevertheless, use of the term 'maximal lineage® 
to describe such local units would seem to imply ability 
to demonstrate links to a common ancestor. Most limbus in 
the Indreni settlements can remember only the names of 
their grandfathers. While some are able to remember ties 
beyond two generations, none can demonstrate agnatic links 
to the first settler. Indeed, there is some uncertainty 
among the Indreni Chongbungs about the identity of their 
founding ancestor. As pointed out earlier, the consensus 
among the more articulate minority is that his name was Sai 
Kemba. One literate member of the group, however, has 
suggested that one Sanagimba was in fact the first Chong­
bung settler. The informant who suggested this name, 
however, had come into possession of a document written at
1. See Mayer, I960, pp.167-69.
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the beginning of the 19th century giving Sanagimba and his 
descendants rights to hold land under Kipat tenure in per­
petuity. The incorporation of the recipient of such a royal 
decree into a Chongbung genealogy was very politic in view 
of constant pressures on contemporary kipat owners to present 
documentary evidence of their rights to land.
Given the fact that beyond three or four genera­
tions genealogies tend to become obscure, it seems preferable
to distinguish between local clan and lineage in terms of
1stipulated and demonstrated descent. 3?or this reason I adopt 
the term ?local clan segment’for the groups described above.
The population of the five local clan segments 
with rights to kipat land in the Indreni settlements are 
shown in the following tables
TABLE 3
Population of local clan segments
Local Clan Segment Population
Chongbung 256
Kambo 37
Nembeke 48
Syeiing 5
Phatra 5
351
By virtue of membership of such a local clan seg-
2
ment a Limbu obtains rights of ownership to kipat land in
This is the basis for Kuper’s distinction of the two kinds 
of groups (clan and lineage). Cf. kuper, 1947, p.11.
The term ’ownership* refers to the ’possession of a certain 
quantum of rights in respect of land’. (Lloyd, 1962, p.66). 
What these rights are in the context of the kipat land 
system will emerge during the course of the essay.
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the territory with which it is associated. While members 
of a particular local clan segment share in the belief of 
descent from a common ancestor with local segments of the 
same clan in other parts of east Nepal, rights to a share 
in the kipat land of one local group do not accrue to members 
of another local group. The bearing of a particular clan 
name, in other words does not of itself entitle a Limbu to 
attach himself to any local clan segment whose members happen 
to have the same name. The importance of locality is borne 
out by the following instance.
In 1953 a naan came to the Indreni Cluster and 
asked to speak to a Chongbung headman. He stated that he 
was a Chongbung and wished to settle in the Cluster on kipat 
belonging to the Chongbungs. He was questioned closely 
about his kinsmen and it became evident that the man was not 
a descendant of an Indreni Chongbung. Later the man admitted 
that his forebears had migrated to India many generations 
before and that he no longer knew whore his kipat was 
located. He only knew that he was a Chongbung limbu, and 
when he heard that there were members of his clan in the . 
Indreni settlements, he had come in the hope of being given 
land. The man was refused and went away.
This instance highlights the fact that clan 
membership is not sufficient credential for pressing a claim 
to kipat land. It is membership of a localised clan which 
validates a Limbufs right to land.
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In the sense that a local clan segment . retains a 
’continuity of possession’^  to kipat land and also confers 
(or witholds) membership of the group, it can be said to act 
as a corporation. As .Long as agnatic links can be remem­
bered and traced a member of a local clan segment, even if 
living away from the territory of the group, can exercise 
his rights to a plot of land. Thus the local clan segment
must be seen to include those who are not in fact permanently
2
resident in the group’s territory.
The Lineage
"When segmentation occurs within the local clan 
segment, the unilineal descent groups which emerge can be 
called lineages. No special term is used for the four to 
six generational unit which traces genealogical links to a 
common ancestor^ it is referred to by the same name as a 
clan i.e. thar or occasionally as ’brothers* (da.jyu-b'hai) 
although the latter term can refer to the wider agnatic 
unit as well. The corporateness of the lineage is expressed 
through the rights it possesses in kipat land as against
1. See Fried’s definition of ’corporate group*. (1957, p.23).
2. Fried spoans of corporate functions of a unilinear kin 
group which ’lie dormant... but continue to exist if 
strangers who con identify themselves as members of the 
kin may move in and enjoy the benefits of unilinear kii 
group membership.' Ibid, p.25*
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the rights of the local clan s e g m e n t J  
The lineage is the core of and to a large extent
synonymuus with the tax-paying unit. Kipat taxes are levelled!
!
not on the amount of land owned or cultivated but on house- 
2holds. Kipat-owning Limbus therefore pay tax without
reference to the amount of land they cultivate or have j
{
registered in their names. Instead, a Limbu pays tax as a 
member of a kipat-owning group provided he builds a home­
stead and establishes a right to a plot of the corporate 
land. Kipat taxes are paid to Government-approved tax- 
collectors or headmen (Subba).
The Gorkhas did not create bubbas among the Limbus. 
They only absorbed the traditional headmen into the admini­
strative structure of the new State. As pointed out earliey 
first settlers had staked out claims to land and later 
their patrilineal descendants sought confirmation of their 
rights to hold these lands as kipat. Authentication by 
Government automatically absorbed the Subba into the tax- 
collecting machinery and made him responsible for taxes 
due from lineage members.
The first written evidence of Limbu rights to hold 
kipat in the Indreni Cluster dates to the first half of the
19th century. The Chuiigbung Subba was the first to receive
1. The lineage is also corporate 111 certain ritual contexts. 
See Chapter Vic
2. The first Gorkha King Irithvi Narayan Shah refrained from 
taxing the Limbus. Their immunity, however, lasted only 
until the end of the 18th century. Cf.M.C. Regmi, 1965? 
p.105 .
3. The dating tends to confirm the statement by a former 
governor of Ilam that only after 1820 were such written 
decrees issued to Subbas in the district (Lama, 1959)*
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a royal decree (lalmoh.gr) in 1825; this was followed by
similar decrees to the Nomboke Subba in 1832, and the Kambo
Subba in 1852. hach ’lalmoharia Subba’ - as they are
termed - was able to choose a number of lesser functionaries
from among his lineage mates to assist him in his duties,
including those of tax-collection, and the functionaries
1were granted a measure of tax relief by the Government.
With the growth in numbers of a lineage, some of these 
functionaries were able to secure Government approval to 
submit the taxes they collected directly to the revenue 
office. In this way, new lineages emerged as separate 
entities. Thus, for example, in 1872 the Chongbung Subba 
applied to have subordinate titles granted to three of his 
father’s classificatory brother’s sons. The eldest of the 
three later became recognized as the first in a line of new 
tax-collectors for what is now a separate Chongbung lineage.
By this dual process of segmentation and valida­
tion of new tax-collectors by Government, five Chongbung 
lineages have emerged. Because of a dispute, however, the 
details of which I was unable to learn, the headman of one 
of these lineages was dispossessed and attempts to replace 
him apparently were not sanctioned by the Government.
Instead, his tax-colleciing duties were assigned to the Subba 
of another Chongbung lineage - the one genealogically closest.
1„ These functionaries are called 1rai’»’karta1,’karbari1 
and ’budyauli’.
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The members of the first linoagu now recognize the latter 
Subba as their own headman. As a result, the Chongbungs now 
have four recognized tax-cuiiectors, each of whom is regarded 
as a Subbaj although in fact only one holds the title by 
official grant of a decree. No special status accompanies 
either the officially-appointed Subba or his lineage.^ The 
differences between the latter hind of Subba and the lesser 
functionaries is known, but rights and obligations attending 
ail those carled Subba are identical. There is also the 
fact that all enjoy Government approval. The Limbus them­
selves make no point of emphasizing the distinction although 
the fact may be remembered when it seems worthwhile to do so. 
In the remainder of the text 1Subba® will be used to refer 
to all Limbu headmen regardless of the circumstances surroun­
ding their initial appointment.
The Nembeke have not experienced fission as have 
the Chongbungs. Their apical ancestor is traced back only 
five generations, so that the lineage has remained coincident 
with the local clan segment. The Nembeke consequently 
recognize only one Subba.
The kambo group is divided into two lineages, each 
with its own Subba.
The Subba, then, articulates the fissiparous
tendencies of the wider clan segment. I have heard it stated
1. To receive a decree (ialmohar) a Subba had to make certain 
payment s. See pp. 95-9?T.
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that »kipa,t belongs not to a thar (clan or claii segment) but
to a bubba. * This remarii stresses the corporateness of the
lineage as a land owning group.
Lineages vary considerably in size and extent of
kipat ownership. The smallest Chongbung lineage (4) with
5 .Ifo of the kipat owning Limbu population in the Indreni
1Cluster owns 4.2°/q of the kipat land, while Chongbung lineage 
(3), with 26,5fo of the population owns 14.25b of the land and 
Chongbung lineage (5) contains 18.55^ of the Limbu population 
and owns 21.2yc of the kipat land.
The average Kipat owning lineage contains only 
35.1 members (including inmarried wives), although if we 
disregard the population of the two lineage groups recently 
settled in the Cluster (see folxowing pages), the average 
number would be 42.6 per lineage. Chongbung lineages average 
51.2, Kambo lineages 18.5 and the Nembeke group totals 48 
persons. The percentage figures for lineage land ownership 
and population are given in Table 4.
1. This lineage lost half its paddy lands in a court case 
about 35 years ago. bee p. 408.
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Lineage
LAB-bE 4
tnd ownership and population
Percentage of 
Kipat land owned
Percentage of
Kipat-owning
population
Chongbungs
T . “1 Vi /*\ rr j”\Lineage 1 
Lineage 
Lineage 
Lineage 
Lineage
Kambos
Lineage 1 
Lineage 2
Nembekes
Phatras and 
Syelings
12,1%
11.0
14-2
4.2
21.2
62.7
11.5
7.8
18.3
15.1
2.6
11.1?°
12.5
26.5 
5.7
18.5
74.3
8.2
2.8
11.0
11.1
99.7?° 3.1 99.5?°
Lineage lands, especially irrigated fields for 
paddy, are scattered over an area of several square miles.
Dry plots, situated on higher ground and on which inhabitants 
construct their houses, though not as widely spaced as 
paddy lands, tend to be distributed through more than one 
settlement in the Indreni Cluster, fable 5 shows that 
Chongbung Lineage (i) owns dry land in three settlements, 
while kipat dry lands belonging to Chongbung Lineages (2),
(3) and (5) are found in two settlements.
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TABLE 5
Patturn of kipat dry land distribution
in Angbung - Chongbung Linoago3 (1), (2), (3)»
4), 5)
in Bharapa - Chongbung Lineages (1), (2), (5)
Syelings
in Chitok - Chongbung Linoages (1), (3)
- Kambo Lineages (1)> (2;
- Phatras
in Lorumba - Nembekes
The pattern of kipat dry land distribution indica­
tes that members of more than one kipat-owning lineage are 
usually neighbours within a single settlement* However, 
lineage land in a particular settlement is not distributed 
haphazardly among all lineage mates, but is likely to being 
to a branch of the lineage* So that siblings and extended 
families incline to sub-divide adjacent holdings and thus 
to occupy the same settlement* In some cases land associa­
ted with a particular lineage or Lineage branch extends 
across the vague boundaries of settlements, so that members 
of one lineage branch might live in the same neighbourhood 
but in different settlements.
Limbus Without Kipat
The distribution of kipat dry land on which home 
steads are erected must not be construed as a complete 
picture of the distribution of the Limbu population in the 
Indreni settlements. The Cluster is also inhabited by 
a number of Limbus who are not members of kipat-owning
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lineages and so possess no ownership rights to kipat land.
The existence in the Cluster of non-kipat-owning (NkO)
Limbus has created a situation in which two sections of the 
population enjoy unequal status on the basis of differential 
rights to land.
fhe presence of IVKO Limbus urges us to consider 
the relationships between kipat-owning lineages and 
'outsiders.1 Pormerly, in conditions of land abundance, 
lineages owning land either absorbed outsiders into the 
group or enabled them to acquire land in other ways. More 
recently, however, outsiders have been denied access to kipat 
land ownership as qualifications for lineage membership have 
been more stringently defined. In the following paragraphs 
I demonstrate how various outsiders were accommodated in the 
past and how the lineages owning kipat became less willing, 
indeed less able, to do so when land shortages reached acute 
proportions about the turn of the century. Underlying the 
analysis is the imjjlication that the lineage, by exercising 
its prerogatives to grant or deny land to outsiders reitera­
tes its corporateness in respect of that laud.
I have already alluded to the uncertain origins 
1
of the hambos. Perhaps due to these uncertainties, or 
because of their small numbers and high ratio of land to 
population, the kambos tended m  the past to absorb out­
siders into their ranks. Prior to the turn of the century
1. See above pp. 60-61.
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kipat paddy lands weru granted to outsiders by the then 
incumbent Subba of Kambo lineage (1). It is uncertain 
if or how the outsiders were related to the grantors, but 
in any event the genealogy was arranged to accommodate the 
new 1 ine ag e me lib e r s (see di agr am).
Kambo lineage(1) 
2\ ~
Kambo lineage (2)
%---
&
Accreted branches
<£>
»
*
t
l
*
&
etc * etc.
^  First known ancestor 
etc f Present Generation
Pig. 1.
Today, their descendants cultivate these lands 
as Kambos and pay taxes to the present Subba* They also 
observe pollution on the death of a lineage mate and 
in every way act as members of the lineage. The only dia­
critical evidence of their uncertain pedigree is the fact 
that they possess no dry pxots as part of their kipat 
estates. Only their iDaddy fields on the ridge slopes below
the residential areas are under kipat tenure.
There is no attempt to deny the fact that two
branches of Kambo lineage (1) are accretions to the original 
lineage. On the other hand the othur members of the 
lineage make no attempt to isolate or in any way embarrass 
the absorbed branches. One reason may be that due to 
death and migration the senior branch of the lineage is now 
outnumbered by the two accretions. Another reason may 
relate to the severe impoverishment of the entire lineage 
so that no crisis has arisen which might test the struc­
tural cleavage. Such a crisis, however, did arise among 
the Nembeke.
of a similar (alleged) absorption threatened the land­
holdings of lineage members.
A dispute erupted m  1944 when the consequences
A.gabir
*
Crajbir Lai Bahadur
Sukraj Indra Chandra
*
ITardo
f
/S. &
Phiste
A
Bagluk
2
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In that year Phiste, the son of Hukraj returned to 
the Indreni settlements after spending 23 years in India.
He claimed that his father’s lands had been registered at 
the time of the 1936 revenue settlement in the names of his 
father’s brothers Indra and Chandra and their sons. He 
demanded the return of the lands. He then went on to argue 
that since his father had been the oniy son of G-ajbir, who 
in turn had been the only son of the first wife of Agabir, 
the lineage founder, his (Phiste’s) branch of the lineage 
was entitled to one half of all lineage lands. He claimed that 
Sukraj had not inherited his due share because a final 
division of property had ©till not beejo n side at the time of 
his death. Phiste also pointed out that since his branch 
of the lineage was descended from Agabir*s first wife, it 
should claim the title of Subba as well. But since his 
father Sukraj had refused the headmanship because his duties 
as a diviner took him away from home constantly, Phiste would 
not claim the title. He demanded only the lands which he 
claimed were rightfully his.
Since Indra and Chandra had both died, their five 
sons came together to defend their interests against the 
interloper. Their lands together represented the great 
majority of lineage holdings and Phiste*s claim to half, if- • 
successful, would have constituted a blow of the severest 
kind. But thuy did not attempt to u.eny that Phiste had a
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right to the lands of Sukraj. Indeed, they proved that 
the lands of Sukraj had not been registered by Indra and 
Chandra, as Phiste claimed, but were in fact in the name of 
Phiste*s brother’s son Bagiuk.
The problem with which the defendants concerned 
themselves was Phiste*s claim to half of Agabir's lands 
i.e. half the lands of the lineage. They argued as follows? 
that, indeed, Agabir had two wives. But that the first was 
barren. The second then had a son Lai Bahadur and they are 
his descendants. Lai Bahadur died before the revenue 
settlement of 1890 which recorded his lands in the names of 
Chandra, and Indra, and the headmanship in the latter* s name. 
About this time, they then stated, Sukraj had come from 
Sikkim and in searching for a place to settle had come to 
Dorumba in the Indreni Cluster since he was related dis­
tantly to the Hembekes there. Sukraj had pleaded with Indra 
to give him some land to cultivate. Indra did grant him 
some kipat and made him a Nembeke (lit. ’built a Nembeke*). 
But even so, they concluded, neither Sukraj nor his son 
Phiste could now claim to be the co-heir to ail the lands 
of Agabir. ’They are not real (pakka) Nembeke.*
After a number of attempts to settle the matter 
within the Indreni settlements had failed the dispute went 
to court. The court faulted the plaintiff (Phiste) on a 
technicality and when he appealed the case, the higher court 
threw it back to the lower court and asked for a decision
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on the crucial question of descent. Litigation costs pre­
vented Phiste from pursuing the natter, and shortly there­
after ho returned to India.
Prom the viewpoint of the defendants it would 
have been folly to concede the point that Phiste was a lineage 
member by descent (even if he had been one), and then seek 
to avoid his claim to a share of lineage lands. They were 
constrained to attack the very basis of his status in the 
lineage. Only in this way could they hope to deny him the 
rights which would have accrued to him as a bona fide 
member. They could not deny him membership of the lineage 
since they had observed pollution on the death of Sukraj 
and acted in every way as lineage mates to the accreted 
branch. But they could suggest (or remind him, whichever 
it was) that he was a lineage member by absorption and not 
by descent.
A different way of accommodating outsiders was to 
grant them kipat lands, without attempting to incorporate 
the recipients into the kipat owning lineage. The Chong- 
bungs appear to have preferred this method to outright 
absorption. In the 1890s the Syclings and Phatras, who now 
possess kipat land in the Indreni Cluster, were gyiven grants 
in this way. The. Syelings received theirs 'from Chongbung 
lineage (2) when the sister of the lineage Subba married a 
Syeiing man who then settled uxorilocaliy. The original 
Phatra recipient came to the Indreni settlements as a boy
79.
with his mother, a widow, whu married the Subba of Chongbung 
lineage (4). In both cases these lands have been registered 
in the names of the recipients and are inherited through the 
male line * The descendants of those recipients recognize 
the Bubbas of the grantor lineages as their headmen and pay 
taxes to them.'1" But the grantor lineages have no right to 
repossess the land, although if a group which received the 
grant were to die out, the lands would jjrobably revert to 
the original grantor - unless patrilineal kinsmen of the 
deceased could exert a prior right.
It is i&ipossible to presume a single attitude by 
host lineages to requests for land from outsiders. Decisions 
as to whether such grants would be made undoubtedly depended 
on factors such as the need for labourers or supporters, the 
degree of kinship between the host and the outsider, and 
perhaps on the need for capital, since some of these grants 
might in fact have been made for financial gain. But the 
chief determining factor would have been the availability 
of land.
Since rights to kipat land were held by kinship
units smaller than the lineage group, kipat grants were in
fact made by households and not lineages. In the Indreni
Cluster, in most instances of land grants having been made
to outsiders, the grantors were most often Bubbas. This is
1. Only m  these two cases, as in the case of the Chongbung 
lineage without a Bubba, is the tax-paying group not 
synonymous with the lineage.
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not unusual in view of the fact tliat Subbas, because of the
rights attached, to hoadmanship. were able to accumulate more
1
lands than their -Lineage mates. Nevertheless, because all
lineage mates were potential co-heirs of any one lineage
member, no individual or group could alienate kipat lands
without the consent of the entire lineage. Prior to the
turn of the century, when land was relatively plentiful, a
decision to grant land to an outsider would have met with
little opposition on the part of the lineage. The fact that
the lineage could deny the right of any one of its members to
make such grants, however, supported the corporate character
of the group vis a vis kipat. During the past 70 years
no lineage in the Cluster has been in a position to make
land grants, land shortage has led to a more stringent
definition of criteria for lineage membership and rights to
2ali enate kipat.
The result is that there exists in the Indreni 
settlements today a category of persons without ownership 
rights to kipat. There are 58 persons in the NKO category 
comprising 12*7% of the Limbu population. Less than one- 
fifth are attached to kipat-owning households. Most, how­
ever, are the descendants of men who came to settle
1. See Chapter VII.
2. In a somewhat analogous situation, Colson notes that the 
Makah have become concerned to define membership in the 
tribe more rigidly since such membership brings with it 
political and economic privileges on the reservation 
(Colson, 1953, p.80).
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uxorilocally in the Cluster, and have established independent 
households. Pour household heads are members of a NKO 
lineage (Angu) whose founder, the father of one household 
head and the grandfather of three others, came to Bharapa to 
marry the sister of the Chongbung lineage (2) Su&ba. The 
father of another household head married the granddaughter 
of the same Subba. In Lorumba, the Nembeke Subba*s daughter 
was married to a Limbu who, after a decade of virilocal 
residence accepted the invitation of his father-in-law to 
settle in the Cluster. His sons are another of the NKO 
groups.
But not all HKG Limbus in the Indreni settlements 
are the patrilineal descendants of men who came to reside in 
their wives* natal settlements. Two are the offspring of 
women who married Indreni men and brought their sons by 
previous marriages with them. One example will illustrate 
how reluctant kipat owning lineages have become since the 
turn of the century to alienate land to outsiders. The case 
is especially interesting since it involves a Kambo man who 
was himself the descendant of an outsider absorbed by the 
Kambos into their 1ineage and given a kipat grant.
While Gabe, whose father was accreted to Kambo 
lineage (1), was in the army during the Pirst World War 
his wife went away with another man. Meanwhile, Gabe married 
another Limbu woman he met in Burma where he was stationed 
and had a son by her. Shortly after, the woman died, and
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when G-abe was given leave he brought the boy home to the 
Cluster to be cared for by kinsmen* On learning that his 
first wife had gone away G-abe went to her natal settlement 
to claim compensation* When he arrived he was met by the 
woman who was at the time visiting her natal home. After 
some pressure by the woman’s kinsmen G-abe agreed to waive his 
claim for compensation and instead to take the woman back 
with him. He agreed also to allow her to bring with her the 
son she had had by the other man. In the ensuing years she 
produced two more sons for Gabe.
Although the son of his wife by the other man 
became a part of Gabe’s household and was addressed by the 
kinship reference for eldest son or brother, he was not 
absorbed into the Kambo lineage. The lineage affiliation 
of the boy’s genitor was remembered and his rights to kipat 
land were considered to exist where those of his genitor
i
did, but not in the Indreni settlements. When the boy grew 
up he chose to remain in the Indreni Cluster and not t o . 
return to his kipat. Today, his son, Shanman, is head of 
a household in the Cluster, but, like his father is not a 
kambo and has no ownership rights to kipat land in the 
Indreni settlements. The position was dramatised when a 
member of Kambo Lineage (1) died in 1964. Dhanman took as 
full a part as any lineage member m  the various activities 
consequent upon the death of an agnate. But when it came time
8 3 .
for the purification rite to be performed Dhanman had to stand 
aside. Lineage members bunched together facing the ritual 
specialist, and, at a particular time, came forward to touch 
salt and oil which rendered them de-poiluted. Dhanman could 
only stand close to the grouio but not mingle with it, nor 
could he touch the holy foods.
’He isn't polluted when one of us dies, and we 
won’t be polluted when ho dies. His own ’brothers’ would 
have to mourn him,’ stated a Kambo spokesman.
Ideally, overy Limbu knows where his kipat is 
situated. Several NKO groups, only one generation removed 
from their kipat lands still retain links with agnates and 
even visit these kinsmen on occasion to take advantage of 
financial benefits accruing to kipat owners."**
But links to kipat fade as prolonged residence 
away from ancestral lands leads to the severance of contact 
witji agnatic kinsmen. Some NKO groups in the Indreni settle­
ments have no precise knowledge of where their kipat land 
is located and have lost contact with patrilineal kin.
The Angus for example, are aware that their ancestral home 
is in a region some three or four days away from the 
Cluster, but have dropped all ties and probably could not 
exercise a claim to their kipat even if it could be located.
The ownership of kipat carries with it prestige 
and members of NhO lineages in the Indreni settlements are 
1. See Chapter V.
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quick to refer tu the fact that they too have Kipat some­
where, even if they have none in the Indreni Cluster.
During the early period, of my fieldwork, when I was collect­
ing genealogies, on several occasions members of NKO groups 
attempted to conceal their lineage or clan affiliation. In 
every case they insisted that they were Cliongbungs and only 
later admitted that they were members of NKO groups whose 
kipat lands were in fact somewhere else.
Dor a member of a NivO group, there are two ways
to obtain land for both a homestead and cultivation. The
first is to provide credit to an owner of kipat land in
return for which rights to cultivate a plot of land are
granted. This kind of usufructuary or possessory mortgage
(bhog baridhaki) is the most common method used by MkO
inhabitants to gain access to land, especially irrigated
fields for paddy. Dive BkO homesteads have been built on
kipat dry land taken under mortgage in this way. A certain
degree of security attends the homestead on this kind of
land, since once it has been built the owner"1" could not
easily evict the inhabitant. But the security extends only
to the area on which the homestead stands, and not to the
cultivable plots which may surround it, so that both
irrigated and urnrrigated lands on which homesteads are not
constructed can be re-possessed at any time (after the
1. Usually, but not always, a descendant of the host house­
hold which enabled an outsider to settle uxoriiocaily 
on its land.
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annual harvest) by repayment of the mortgage. Dor the HLvO 
Limbu this means an almost continual state of insecurity 
on the land. One Angu put it this ways 'They (referring 
to some Chongbungs) are owners of Kipat (kipatiya) but I 
£un only a Limbu. My kipat as in another place. Here I live 
with my mao11 (mother’s natal group). I have no land of my 
own, only land taken under usufructuary mortgage. If my 
debtoi? returns the money to me and takes his land back I 
would have only my homestead plot (ghar bari) left. I would 
have nothing.’
This insecurity renders thase without kipat land, 
as I show in Chapter VI, economically the most vulnerable 
section of the Limbu population. The almost total lack of 
land to spare by KO groups, even to give under mortgage, 
would seem to be affecting- uxorilocal residence. It appeals 
to be significant that ail HKO residents 'living in the 
Cluster are at least one generation removed from the first 
uxorilocal settlor. In other words, during the last quarter 
of a century, no outsider has been accommodated in the 
Indreni settlements m  any manner whatsoever. Land shortage 
has virtually obviated any possibility of uxorilocal 
residence.
One of the ways m  which NkO groups have attempted 
to reinforce their position is by arranging marriages within 
the Cluster. Although marriages with J10 groups is preferable, 
the degrees of prohibited marriage and considerations of
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status do not always make such, matches possible. As a 
result, many marriages are with similarly placed NhO groups 
in the Indreni settlements. Of seven extant iutra-Clustor 
marriages, five involve partners who are of NhO status. 
Although the numbers are too small to be of any statistical 
use, they do point to the possibility that mtra-HhO group 
marriage is one way of fortifying a shaky position in the 
settlements. The following diagram shows how one i\IKO group, 
the Angus, have married with other groups in the Cluster.
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A married B, a Chongbung woman of Bharapa; settled 
uxorilocaily in Cluster.
C - a kipat-owning Phatra of Chitok
D - a kipat-owning Chongbung of Angbung
E - a Chongbung woman of Bharapa
P - a non-kipat-owning man of Chitok
G- - daughter of a non-xipat-owning man of Angbung.
Pig. 3
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In the part genealogy shown above, within two Angu 
generations, excluding that of the first uxorilocal settler, 
the Angus have married within the Cluster five times. They 
have given women to KO groups twice, to a NKO group once, 
and have taken one woman from each mind of group themselves,
I have referred to one way in which NKO Limbus 
can gain access to land. There is another way as well, and 
this is to purchase raikar land in.the open market. Raikar 
land can be bought and sold in a manner axin to western 
freehold. Moreover, raikar land has no reference to the 
caste affiliation of its owner. Unlike kipat, which can 
only be owned by Limbus, raikar can be owned by anyone, 
including Limbus.
None of the NKO residents in the Indreni settle­
ments have been able to afford irrigated raikar fields, 
although several own small raikar plots on which homesteads 
have been built. Descendants of the first Angu settler in 
the indreni Cluster, for example, now live on raikar land 
which he purchased with monies earned from service m  the 
local militia in Ham. Only one other NKO household, in 
Dorumba, lives on a tiny plot of raikar land purchased by 
the Nembeke Subba and given to the present household: head*s 
father when he came to settle in the Cluster after marrying 
the Subba * s danght or.
Several M) households have, in addition to t&eir 
kipat holdings, a few dry land raikar plots. The outsiders
Cxion^ouns
ICambo
Ipat- ovmin^
kipat land 
raikar land 
settlement 
boundary
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who were absorbed into a kambo lineage and given kipat paddy 
lands but no dry fields have built homusteads on raikar 
plots purchased by their forefathers.
By and largo, the high costs of raikar land, and 
the high taxes paid on this kind of land as compared with 
those for kipat place it out of the reach of the great 
majority of Limbus in the Indreni settlements. As a con­
sequence, with few minor exceptions noted above, raikar 
land tends to be associated with non-Limbu sections of the 
population. The map onp.87a gives a general picture of 
the distribution of homestead sites in the Indreni settlements.! 
It will be seen that the non-Limbu residents of the Indreni 
Cluster are settled intersticially among the Limbus, although 
of course only on raikar land.
Individual Kipat Rights
As we have seen, an individual obtains rights to 
kipat land by virtue of membership in a patrilineal descent 
group. These rights are secure if the individual continues 
to recognize his lineage membership and alternatively, to 
bo recognized as a kinsman by lineage mates. As long as 
agnatic links are remembered a man retains his right even 
if he resides away from the kipat territory. in this sense, 
then, the kipat land can be said to bo ’owned1 by individuals 
who enjoy complete security of tenure, subject only to
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certain overriding rights of the descent group*1 The
individual's prerogatives are reinforced by the fact that
for the past seventy years the boundaries of estates have
been fixed and titles registered. This has further obviated
the individual's responsibility to reaffirm constantly his
membership in any group wider than the household.
Formerly, there were obligations to reassert
lineage affiliation by demonstrating allegiance to the Subba.
It was necessary to do so because of the latter*s greater
2command of land resources than his dependents. Most lands 
which had been vacated or on which taxes had not beenpaid 
tended to revert to the Subba. Although co-heirs could 
claim the right to take these lands, the tax burden which 
they would have to assume at the same time prevented many 
from exercising their claims. Moreover, since the Subba 
had access to local officials by virtue of his position as 
headman and was usually in a financial position to afford 
the taxes himself he was favourably placed to assume rights 
to these lands. In such circumstances, on attentive kinsman 
might hope to be granted a plot when the need arose, or 
perhaps be assisted to pay his taxes by the Subba in the 
event of possible default and so retain the lands in his 
possession.
1. The system (called 'raibandi') whereby lineage land was 
redistributed xjoriodicaily to lineage members was apparen­
tly practiced by kipat owners in some parts of Nepal, but 
never in Limbuan. (Of. M.C. Regmi, 1965* P«83)-
2, A detailed description of the Subba's changing rights and 
obligations appears in Chapter VII.
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Land shortage has dissipated whatever advantages 
the Subba enjoyed in respect of land. In the unusual case 
of land being abandoned nowadays there is no' question of its 
reverting to the Subba,. Taxes are no longer an obstacle to 
potential co-heirs, so that these lands pass directly from 
one individual to another without any intervening authority. 
And since the individual is, first of all, a member of a 
household, this means that the latter unit has become the 
group with the greatest interests in land. Stated otherwise, 
there has occurred a shift to the household of rights 
previously monopolized by the lineage.
The foregoing analysis of land-owning groups, and
of the changes in their modes of accommodating outsiders
\H
as well as of the shift of importance away from the wig^er 
kin group towards the household as a kipat-owning unit has 
been predicated on the transition from abundance to scarcity 
of kipat land. By scarcity of land, three things are 
implied. Firstly,population ‘.growth has increased the pres­
sure on land resources. Although figures for the period 
prior to 1952 qre based on unofficial estimates, they
indicate that between 1920-61 the population of H a m  increased
■ 1by approximately 40$. Between 1952-4 and 1961 the increase 
was 8$. Although no separate statistics are available for 
the Limbu sector, there is no reason to suspect that their
1. Landon, 1928 (vol. 2), pp.256-257*
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rates of growth, have not kept pace with those of the remain­
der of the population.
Secondly, the amount of kipat land owned by Limbus 
has diminished over the past century. And thirdly, Limbu 
access to the productive capacity of their remaining kipat 
lands has been reduced due to heavy mortgaging. The latter 
manifestation, itself an outcome of the first two, will be 
discussed in some detail in Chapter V. The second trend 
has come about largely as a result of the G-overhment * s kipat 
policy. It is therefore necessary to consider this policy 
in order to understand the background to the land shortages 
which developed towards the end of the 19th century and
which had the kinds of social repercussions already noted.
It will then be appropriate to consider the structure of the
Limbu household in the Indreni settlements.
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CHAPTER III 
LAND AMD GOVERNMENT
By confirming the rights of Limbus to hold 
land under kipat tenure, the Government by no means 
abrogated its own rights to determine the course of 
events in its easternmost region, ” The policy which 
came to be followed by successive administrations in 
Kathmandu was based on the containment and reduction 
of lands under kipat tenure and a corresponding conver­
sion of these lands into raikar tenure. The results 
of this policy are evident in Ilam. In the district 
today, only 39*7$ of irrigated lands (khet) are under 
kipat tenure, with the remaining 60.3$ under raikar 
tenure. In the Ilam-Larda sub-division of the district 
the figures are 40.5$ under kipat end 59*5$ under 
raikar .
Following the incorporation of Limbuan into the
Gorkha state, Kathmandu's policy vis a vis the Limbus
became double-edged. On the one hand, it sought to
1. Since dry lands are not measured, there is no way of 
knov/ing whether the proportions of raikar and kipat are 
the same as on irrigated lands. There is no reason to 
believe that the proportion of raikar to kipat is any 
different for dry lands.
placate the Limbus, ever jealous of their rights, by 
providing safeguards of their land holdings. On the 
other hand, Kathmandu lost no opportunity to reduce the 
area under kipat tenure and concurrently increase that 
under raikar tenure. The first moves to reduce the 
amount of kipat land took place soon after the pacifi­
cation of Limbuan. The Gorkhas apparently dealt 
severely with those sections of the Limbu population 
which had opposed them during their march eastwards.
One Limbu v/riter estimates that some 32,000 Limbus fled 
in the face of cruelties perpetrated by the Gorkhas on
'I
those suspected of having aided the Sikkimese •
Buchanan also mentions that large numbers of hill people
2fled as far as Purnea in India to escape the invaders . 
Many returned after assurances were given by the Govern­
ment that the exiles could come back to their homes and 
lands, to enjoy the same privileges as those Limbus who
had not fled. But they discovered on their return that
in their absence the Government had confiscated their 
kipat lands and allowed them to be taken up under raikar 
tenure by non-Limbu immigrants from the west and the
plains of India who had entered Limbuan in the wake of
the Gorkha army. Some of the lands were restored to the
1. Phago, 1843.
2. Buchanan, 1928, p.257*
returning Limbus ss kipat, but the immigrant settlers 
could not be turned off the major portion of the lands 
they had begun to cultivate .
The arrival of non-Limbu settlers was part of a 
policy instituted by Kathmandu encouraging the immigration 
of other peoples into Limbuan. Limbu Subbas, for their 
part, were urged to settle these immigrants on their 
lands. Since Limbu land holdings were extensive and 
there was a need for settlers to provide both labour 
and a following, the Limbus gave away land grants
p
called 1soranni ' to these immigrant settlers. Reci­
pients of these holdings gave away sub-holdings to 
other immigrants out of lands which they could not 
themselves cultivate. Until 1886 these lands continued 
to be regarded ss kipat. In that year the Govern­
ment introduced legislation which in effect allowed 
non-Limbu settlers to convert into raikar tenure all 
kipat lands which had been or would in future be 
granted to non-Limbus by their Limbu owners^. Thus
1. Order Regarding Restoration of Kipat Lands in 
Pallo-Kirat, 1881. See M.C. Regmi, 1965, pp. 88-89; 97.
2. The term 1soranni1 is a contraction of 1sora anna1 meaning 
sixteen annas or one Indian Rupee. Most Limbu informants 
insist that their fox’efathers gave their lands to 
immigrant settlers for this meagre amount.
3. M.C. Regmi, pp. 97-98.
st s time when land shortages were beginning to be 
felt by the Limbus the Government effectively dissolved 
whatever rights still remained' to the Limbus in the 
soranni holdings they had given away. These conversions 
were regarded by the Government as immutable. Once 
registered as raikar, land formerly held under kipat 
tenure could not be made kipat again. On several 
occasions Limbus petitioned the Government suggesting 
that any kipat lands which had been converted into raikar 
and later re-purchased by Limbus should be occupied 
again under kipat tenure. The argument was that in
'I
any case the land had once been kipat , These requests
were turned aside by the Government which would
entertain no reversal of the kipat-into-raikar trend
they had initiated.
Other aspects of Government policy designed to
reduce the area under kipat tenure concerned the
appointment of Bubbas and the registration of land
titles. An official Subba, on appointment by royal
2decree was required to pay an initial fee of Rs 52 ,
1. Petition of the Subbas of Ilam, 1951* Uso, Report 
of the Muluki Office, 194-7*
2, One Nepali Rupee equals approximately one shilling.
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which represented s considerable sum in the past. He 
was also required to surrender sixty muris of paddy 
land to the Government as raikar. If the claimant 
could not afford this amount he could choose a lesser 
title (rai) which would be granted after the surrender 
of half the amount taken from a Subba. Although these 
regulations still exist, the dearth of land to convert 
in this way makes the creation of new Subbas an extremely 
rare thing. In the Indreni settlements the only 
Subbas who surrendered land in this way (and are thus 
'official1 Subbas) were the three original grantees of
2
royal decrees in the first quarter of the 19th century .
Government insistence on documentary evidence 
of title to kipat land provided the climate for further 
conversions of kipat into raikar tenure. iit first the 
Government allowed that actual possession and the 
concurrence of local dignitaries would suffice fox1 
proof of ownership in the absence of documentation.
But in the 1888 edition of the Legal Code, and, indeed, 
in all subsequent legislation, failure to produce evidence
1. One muri is equivalent to 1J69 sq. ft. It is also 
a volumetric measurement equal to 2.40 bushels.
2. See Chapter II,
of title was decreed tantamount to an admission that 
the kipat owner had encroached on raikar land. In 
such an event the kipat land would have to be converted 
to raikar tenure.
This led to further losses of kipat since, in 
most instances, documentary evidence was either totally- 
lacking or at best vague and open to conflicting inter­
pretations. Although in some cases Subba's had received 
royal decrees stipulating the exact boundaries of their 
domains, in most cases, certainly in Ham, the decrees 
merely confirmed that the Subbss could go on using the 
lands of their forefathers. In one such decree given 
to the Kambo grantee in the Indreni Cluster, for example,
it is merely stated that 1 you may use your ancestral
property, whatever your forefathers used 1
With such manner of evidence to title, it is 
obvious that kipat owners have always been vulnerable 
to accusations of encroachment on raikar land.
In other ways, too, Government policies led to 
a retreat of kipat boundaries. Revenue settlements, 
postal services and army maintenance were partially 
financed by the surrender of kipat lands, but the sub­
sequent reliance on alternatives for raising such 
revenues did not result in the restoration of the kipat
lands. Their conversion to raikar was judged to 
be irrevocable .
Likewise, concerning the manner of expiation for 
offences of caste pollution, after surrendering 1000 
muris of kipat land as raikar the Subbas of Limbuan 
were assured by the Government that they could deal 
with such offences themselves. Yet at the same time 
the Government imposed a tax for the very same purpose, 
and the courts ruled that the Subbas had 310 authority 
to expiate these offences. The land, however, remained 
raikar.
The courts and administrative offices in Limbuan 
apparently did little to redress the balance in favour 
of the kipat owners. On the contrary, they tended to 
find against Limbus even when the lav; appeared to be on 
the side of the latter. V/hen the owner of a plot of 
kipat land dies heirless his nearest co-heirs are 
entitled to claim the land. This is the law, Lven 
if the land has been given under usufructuary mortgage 
to a non-Limbu creditor, the death of the kipat owner 
confers no special rights on the person holding the 
usufruct as against the co-heirs. nevertheless, in
1. Report of Leva Man nngdembe to the Shahi Commission,i960,
cagfcs where the non-Limbu creditor sued for full 
ownership rights, the courts often found in his favour,
'I
and of -course the land then became raikar . In 
addition, the basis of the contractual system of tax- 
colleetion is that any homesteads built or lands 
brought under cultivation by the Limbus need not be 
reported to the authorities until a revenue settlement 
is held. But complaints of land or homestead conceal­
ment were continuously being entertained by the courts 
and government offices between the holding of such
settlements and the 'guilty* party would have his land
2confiscated and converted to raikar tenure .
By the turn of the century the rate of kipat 
conversions into raiksr had reached alarming proportions. 
Limbus could not rely on land mortgages to meet growing 
demands for credit, since their non-Limbu creditors 
insisted on outright purchase of Limbu lands. The 
Government therefore executed a partial reversal of 
their policy and in 1901 banned the permanent alienation 
of kipat lands to members of other castes. They 
decreed that henceforth no Limbu could give his kipat
1. Report of the Muluki Office, 194-7*
2, Ibid.
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by grant or sale to a non-Limbu. Two years later 
the decree was modified to include under the ban only 
those kipat lands under cultivation. But since by 
that time there was little wasteland the legislation 
had the effect of freezing the distribution of land in 
Limbuan. Kipat lands ceased to come under raikar 
tenure through contractual arrangements between Limbus 
and members of other castes. Conversions did occur 
on a small scale, however, as a result of court decisions 
or by occasional Government directives aimed at specific 
areas of Limbuan. Although the turn of the century 
S8w the growth of an ever more cautious kipat policy 
in Kathmandu, where the Government felt that it had 
little to fear from the Limbus, anti-kipat measures 
continued to be bold.
Between 1912 - 1917 H a m  district, where the Limbus 
no longer formed a majority of the population, was the 
locus of a concerted effort on the part of Kathmandu
-i
virtually to abolish the kipat system . The circum­
stances which gave rise to this severe course concerned
1. Since Ilam was the most vulnerable part of Limbuan due 
to its smaller proportion of Limbu population, Kathmandu 
would often test its kipat proposals there to gauge the 
reaction before applying them in other kipat
areas.
the widespread pledging of kipat lands. The 
restrictions of 1901 on permanent alienation of kipat 
had intensified an already growing practice by Limbus 
of giving their kipat lands to creditors of other 
castes under usufructuary or possessory mortgages.
The creditors assumed the rights of usufruct for a 
specified period of time or, under other forms of 
agreement, until such time as the mortgage could be 
repaid. But the Limbus continued to sink further into 
debt and as they did so, they were forced to allow more 
and more land to come under mortgage. In circular 
fashion, as they lost access to their kipat, their 
chances of earning enough to repay the mortgages 
and repossess their lands grew dimmer, L'ven those 
diminishing waste lands brought under cultivation by 
the Limbus had to be mortgaged almost as soon as they 
were reclaimed.
As a consequence, the Government in 1913 sought 
to freeze the amount of kipat land in H a m  by ruling 
that any new lands brought under cultivation by Limbus 
between the revenue settlements of 1890 and 1912 would 
be converted into raikar tenure, The rule was then 
amended to allow that IQyo of these reclaimed lands
could remain under kipat tenure and the amount in 
excess of that figure would become raikar. The Limbus, 
alarmed at the new proposals, suggested that the key to 
the whole problem lay in those types of mortgages which 
prevented the Limbu debtor from re-possessing his kipat 
lands until the stipulated period of the mortgage had 
expired, even if the monies for repayment were available 
before that time. They then offered to refrain from 
mortgaging their lands, and take back those already 
pledged if the Government would alter the regulation 
on fixed periods for mortgages and also agree to abandon 
its scheme to convert lands reclaimed between revenue 
settlements into raikar.
These somewhat bizarre negotiations reached a 
climax in 1917 when the Government introduced legis­
lation ruling that the conditions offered by the Limbus 
were to be accepted provided that they redeemed all 
kipat mortgages within six months. Failure to do so 
would result in the lands under mortgage and any lands
A
pledged in future being registered as raikar ♦ If
1, Order regarding Kipat Land in Ilsm and DasMajhia, 1917* 
This attempt to do away with agricultural indebtedness 
by threats assumed that the phenomenon was a Limbu device 
to embarrass and annoy Kathmandu, In the same vein,
Lord Hailey cautioned Colonial governments concerning 
the problems they would call upon themselves if they 
allowed ’the misuse by inexperienced peasants of the 
power of transfer or encumbrance of land,1 (Lord Hailey, 
1952, p.7 0
the pattern in the Indreni settlements was anything 
like typical of the situation in Ilam, it is unlikely 
that less than half of all kipat lands were under 
mortgage at the time. The enforcement of such a lav; 
would have virtually abolished the kipat system in Ilam. 
Although the order was promulgated in 1917 stud re-stated 
as late as 1934-? there was no attempt to enforce it in 
Ilam. Indreni informants suggest that local officials 
realized that if they had tried to enforce such regul­
ations, there would likely have been widespread unrest 
in the district.
The underlying motives behind the Government's 
kipat policy, as I have already suggested, were mainly 
political. But fiscal considerations undoubtedly were 
of great importance as well. By increasing the amount 
of lend under raikar tenure the Government could 
increase its income considerably. -when the Govern­
ment was contemplating the conversion into raikar of 
kipat lands brought into cultivation between the 1890 
and 1912 revenue settlements, it was estimated that over 
rls 60,000 would accrue in increased revenues. This 
figure represented over half the district's income from 
land taxes at the time.
The Government has more than once made explicit
its concern that whatever moves it makes in regard to
kipat should not result in any loss of revenues. bhen
the Limbus suggested that raikar land purchases by a
Limbu should be convertible into kipat tenure, the
Government refused on the grounds of the decreased
1income from taxes which would result * Again, as a 
prelude to the introduction of the 1917 legislation to 
turn kipat lands under mortgage into raikar the Govern­
ment called on Limbus to offer their opinion and advice 
on Government proposals to a touring commission. The 
only caution was that whatever the Limbus proposed 
'should not result in any loss (of taxes) to the 
Government1.^
The need for funds to finance Government in the 
Limbu areas of the country was a constant problem.
And taxation from kipat land contributed little to the 
general income. In Ilam, for example, although 39•7$ 
of all paddy lands in the district are under kipat 
tenure, tax revenues from kipat owners constitute only 
10.6^ of the total land revenues. Moreover, because 
of the peculiar characteristics of the taxation system
1. Beport of the Muluki office, 19zl-7*
2. Order to the Officers and Clerks of the H a m  
Administration, 1913.
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as it applies to kipat, a decrease in the proportion 
of kipat lands brings no corresponding decline in 
revenues from kipat owners»
Still, despite the obvious importance of fiscal 
considerations it is doubtful if they were of paramount 
importance in determining the Government's kipat policy. 
It would appear that the main concern of the admini­
stration all along has been the reduction of Limbu 
hegemony in East Nepal and the control and decrease, 
not to say abolition, of kipat tenure was the first 
priority in effecting such a goal. Successive 
governments felt themselves compelled to reverse those 
policies adopted by the early Gorkha kings granting 
Limbus a large measure of autonomy and security on their 
lands. The initial policy of support for the kipat 
system soon changed to one of encouraging a reduction 
of land under kipat tenure and a corresponding increase 
in raikar lands. But the process was gradual and 
characterized by a series of seemingly petty encroach­
ments often accompanied by minor Government concessions 
to the Limbus . Generally specking, kipat was nibbled 
at, not swallowed whole. Even the prohibition on the
  - ir_ - — T       _ !  n.-i ■11.^ ..nnrrr rnn- in m- - -t ti   -    ■ ■■ "   ■ , iii.m — i. - ■  . i — ..i i ■ ■ » H
Of. M.C. Begmi, 1965, pp. 125-5*
permanent alienation of kipat land must be seen as 
an attempt to check the too rapid loss of kipat lands 
which had resulted from the Government's earlier 
course.
Kathmandu had to take into account Limbuan*s
strategic location on the borders of Tibet, Sikkim
and India. The Government's policy, therefore, while
clear and consistent, was continually subject to the
mitigating considerations of a volatile area which,
because of its location and distance from Kathmandu,
could prove difficult to control . The authorities
were aware that, in their own words, 'Far Kirat
(i.e. Limbuan), a distant and extensive territory,
2must be governed through a conciliatory policy.'
1, In some parts of Limbuan the Government has been unable 
to hold a revenue settlement since 1893 because of the 
intransigence of the Limbu population.
2. Order to the Dhankuta District Court, 1880. Quoted 
in M .C , Regmi, 1965.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE HOUSEHOLD
Composition
By a 'household* I mean a group of relatives 
sharing a common kitchen and budget* The same word - 
ghar - is used to refer both to this group and to the 
dwelling it occupies. Although the tendency is for 
e8ch household to occupy a separate dwelling not all, 
in fact, do so. In the Cluster there are two examples 
of more than one household sharing a common roof. In 
one instance, the widow and children of a Limbu whose 
father had settled uxorilocally in Chitok live on the 
verandah of their host's dwelling, which has been 
partitioned off to allow for privacy. In the other, 
two brothers, after separating from their father's 
household, reconverted an old house on the far side of 
the courtyard. Each lives with his spouse on a separate 
floor* A special door and staircase was built so that 
the occupants of the top floor could have direct access 
from the outside.
The great majority of Limbu households ~ 90.6?£ - 
can be classified as of 'simple' type. By this is 
meant that the core is an elementary or simple family.
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Such households may consist only ox a core and include 
no other persons. Over half of all Limbu households 
are of this latter kind (see Table 7)* Others may 
include widowed mothers or unmarried brothers of house­
hold heads. Because of the stress on virilocality and 
patrilineal inheritance, households tend to be composed 
of agnatic kinsmen along with in-married women. Just 
over a. tenth of Limbu households, however, include 
other kinds of relatives as well. Table 6 notes their 
relationships to the household head and the reasons for 
their residence in the Cluster.
t a b l e  6
Attached members of Limbu households
Numbers
a . 2 women
b. 1 boy
c. 1 woman
d. ± boy
e . 1 girl
f . 1 man
6- 2 women
h . 1 woman
i. 1 boy
Relationship to 
household head
Sister's daughters.
Wife's brother's son.
Sister's daughter.
Life's son by previous 
marriage.
Wife's daughter by 
previous marriage. 
Sister's daughter's son. 
Wife's sister and 
mother.
Sister's son's daughter. 
Class, maternal grandson.
Reasons for 
residence
Raised from childhood. 
To attend school in* 
Bazaar.
Separated from husband. 
Brought by mother.
Brought by mother.
Came for support.
Came for support.
Esther recently 
emigrated.
Rather recently 
emigrated.
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In six of the nine cases above, the attachment 
of affinal or matrilateral kinsmen is regarded as a 
temporary expedient until the persons involved join 
their husbands (in the cases of women a. and e.) or 
their agnatic kinsmen outside the Cluster (cases b, 
d, h and i). By and large, economic difficulties rule 
out the permanent incorporation of non-sgnatic kin.
fable 7 lists six kinds of simple type house­
hold found in the Indreni settlements. 1 Joint' type 
households are those which include a married couple or 
widower and at least one of their/his married sons and
'i
spouse . As the Table shows, 9.4# of Limbu households 
containing 13.7# of the population fall into this latter 
category.
1. I have classified as 'joint type’ two households 
headed by widowers because in both cases the senior 
male is still able to work and to direct the activi­
ties of the group.
TABLE 7 1 
Ho usehoId conrao s_iti on
Popu-
,! Simple1, type Number lation
a. Husband and wife and their child(ren), 43 208
b. Husband and wife and their child(ren), 4 22
and husband1s widowed mother,
c. Brothers, one married with child(ren)5 3 15
other(s) unmarried or without wife
(wives) with them.
d. Brothers, one married with child(ren), 4 23
other(s) unmarried or without wife
(wives) with them, and brothers* 
v;idowed mother.
e. Widow or widower and unmarried children. 9 28
f. Men or woman living alone, 4 4
g. Other kinds of simple type household. 10 33.
77 555
(Joint* type
h. Husband and wife or widower and their/
his married son(s) and spouse(s). J8 _56
Total' households - 85 409
It is to be noted that simple type households 
contain an average of 4.5 persons while the number for 
joint households is seven persons. The Limbu household 
thus tends to be a small unit.
The low proportion of joint type households 
among the Limbus might be compared with the proportion 
among other castes. -as Table 8 shows, of the six
1. Bee Meyer, I960, p.180.
Brahmin households in the Indreni Cluster, four are of
joint type. Two contain married brothers and their
widowed mother, one a husband and wife and their two 
married sons and spouses, and another a husband and
wife and one married son and his wife.
TABLE S
Non-Limbu household composition 
(Indreni Cluster) _
Type1 Caste Number of households Popula*
a. Brahmin 1 12
Magar 1 8
Blacksmith 1 5
b. Jaisi 1 7
M a gar 2 12
e. Blacksmith 1 3
Brahmin 1 11
h. Brahmin 4 35
Magar 1 4
Blacksmith 1 5
15 100
This tendency among Indreni Brahmins towards a 
higher proportion of joint households is supported by 
figures from the Syawa Panchayat area. Of 153 Brahmin
1. Refer to Table 7.
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households in other parts of the Village 17*6# are of 
"1
joint type . Jaisi households, too, show a similar
distribution of joint and simple types, with 19*3#
being of the former kind. Among the other caste
groups only Chetri and Gurung households based on
extended families exceed 10# of the total. The latter,
whose numbers in the Village are small, nevertheless
control large landholdings, and the wealthiest Gurungs
maintain large joint households.
There is, then, a correlation to be discerned
between wealth and household type. . As I will show in
Chapter V, there are a number of non-Limbu households,
both within and in the immediate environs of the Indreni
settlements on whom the Limbus rely for a substantial
portion of their credit. Of the fourteen most
important non-Limbu creditor households, nine are organ-
2laed on the basis of extended families .
This correlation, however, appears to be borne 
out only partially when applied to the Limbu joint
1. These household figures for the Village are based on 
census data gathered by Panchayat representatives.
I accept their usefulness in indicating trends or 
tendencies, but would not vouch for their complete 
accuracy•
2. See p. 176.
households in the Cluster. Geven of the eight rank 
among the wealthiest 30# (23) of Limbu households, 
host other households in this economic bracket, 
however, including several of the wealthiest in the 
Cluster, are based on elementary families, even though 
there are married sons who might have remained under a 
single head. They chose not to do so.
The absence of this kind of correlation points 
up the need to distinguish between division of land 
and separation of hearth and budget.
Separation and Inheritance
Separation from the main household (mul ghar) 
is generally sequential, with the eldest son leaving 
first, followed by his younger brothers as they marry 
and bring wives to join them. It is not unusual for 
youngest sons, after marriage, to remain with their 
parents cr widowed mother once their elder brothers 
have separated. In the three cases of widows having 
more than one married son in the Cluster these women 
live together with their youngest.
At the time I conducted a census, there was not 
a single Limbu household in the Indreni settlements 
containing two married brothers and their wives. This
was true for joint households as well. In each case 
where there was more than one married brother in a sibling 
group, the elder brother(s) did not reside with 
his/their parents or widower father and younger brother 
in a joint household.
There is evidence to suggest that the incidence 
of joint-type households was higher in former times.
Some older informants state that in their youth young 
men remained in their father's household until their 
own children approached the age of puberty. Several 
insist that in only rare instances would a son seek to 
separate from the main household before his father*s 
death. It would, appear certain that the partition of 
households occurred at a later stage of the developmental 
cycle since young men, who were married around the 
age of puberty, could not hope to establish new house­
holds until they ana their wives were sufficiently 
mature. This process would also correlate with the 
greater economic viability of households before the turn 
of the century, and with the absence of alternative 
sources of income for the young men, so that the older 
men wielded greater sanctions to keep the household 
group intact than is the case today. Unfortunately, 
my data is insufficient to support these speculations
in any concrete fashion.
The tendency towards early partition is usually 
rationalized in terms of the strained relations among 
the wives of brothers within a single household. One 
informant, two of whose sons had recently established 
their own households described the process of separ­
ation in these words: ’When our eldest daughter-in-
law first came to the house seven years ago she was 
quiet and obedient. She did her work as her mother- 
in-law told her to do. Then two years later the 
second son was married and the two daughters-in-law 
were brought together. They worked without troubling
each other for a time. Then the younger one had a
child, and she had to stay home and take care of it.
Bo she did less work, but she needed the best food, 
jit first the eldest daughter-in-law -understood, but 
soon she complained to her husband that she worked 
too much, and that her sister-in-law did nothing.
When another child was born to the younger one, the 
daughters-in-law quarrelled often, and then even their 
husbands began to h3ve bad feelings. The eldest son 
repeated the words of his wife that the younger brother’ 
family was getting more to eat even though they 
contributed less to the household. 'So last year they
both said they wanted to build separate kitchens 
(chulo) and we did this. It is better now, they do 
not fight anymore.'
This description traces the growth of separate 
nuclear units within the larger group, and the strains 
between these units which lead to the partition of the 
household.
Although household partitions are most frequently 
attributed to disputing daughters-in-law, another, not 
uncommon, explanation is the tension arising out of the 
co-residence of wives and married sisters. The latter, 
since they are not co-parceners in the household's 
lands, are not structurally opposed to their male 
siblings. Moreover, since they go to live in their 
husbands' settlements shortly after marriage, they do 
not represent a threat to the status of their brothers' 
wives. However, when women leave their husbands and 
return to reside, sometimes permanently, in their natal 
homes - a not infrequent practice - conditions are 
created which can lead to strains between sisters and 
brothers' wives and, ultimately, to the break-up of a 
household. Daughters are indulged to a much greater 
extent by their parents than are the letters' daughters- 
in-law. It is commonly admitted that a woman, however
kindly she may be disposed to here son's wife, will 
invariably favour her own daughter in any intra- 
household squabble. Arguments often arise when 
married daughters living in their natal households 
are allowed the customary privilege of earning a 
private income over which their fathers can exercise 
no claim. As will be explained below, although 
in-married wives also have certain rights to possess 
property outside the household estate, it is not until 
they are mistresses of their own households that they 
can fully exploit their rights. As long as their 
activities continue to be controlled by their mother- 
in-law, little time is available for personal business. 
a s  s result, daughters-in-law see themselves as contri­
buting their time and energies for the benefit of all 
household members, while their husbands' sisters are 
free to spend much of their time accumulating a private 
equity, and thereby neglecting obligations to the 
household unit. In such circumstances, the pressures 
for partition are strong. It was generally acknow­
ledged, for example, that when the only son of a 
Bharapa man established a separate household in the 
spring of 1964, the determining factor was the constant 
quarrelling between the young man's v/ife and his two
married sisters who were living in their natal house­
hold.
finally, in addition to the disputes among 
brothers' wives and between the latter and their 
husbands' sisters, the strains inherent in mother- 
in-law - daughter-in-law relations also contribute to 
household partitions. Indeed, the belief in the 
inevitability of hostility among the women of a single 
household occasionally leads the parents of a recently 
married girl to refuse to allow her to join her husband 
until arrangements have been completed for the establish­
ment of a separate household by the young couple.
The creation of a new household usually, but 
not invariably, implies its independence as a land­
owning unit. The rules of inheritance practised by 
the Limbus resemble those prescribed by the Mitsl-c- 
shara system found in north India. Under this system, 
a household estate is conceived as being shared 
equally by a man and his descendants - in the case of 
the Limbus his male descendants - and each male off- 
spring secures his rights at the time of birth .
1. Vijnaneshwar, who expounded the Ilitakshara. system, spoke 
of 'the principle of ownership by birth'. This is the 
opposite of the Dayabhags principle whereby rights are 
acquired by the sons only on the death of their father. 
Thus, 'the principle of ownership by death*. Of. Karve, 
1965, p.344,
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In effect, this means that a man's sons can claim their 
share of the property at any time, although in practice
A
such claims are pressed only after marriage . then
the partition of a household is accompanied by a final
property settlement, the son who sets up a separate
household renounces any claims on property accumulated
at a later stage by his father's household. His
rightful inheritance may be augmented after the death
of his parents by a portion of the property (piuni)
which a father puts aside for himself and his wife to
sustain them in old age. A father can determine who
is to inherit this property after his death and that of 
p
his wife . Generally, it is decided to share it out 
equally amongst the sons, but if the youngest son 
lives with and helps to support his parents in their 
old age, he may get the entire jiuni after their death.
The exercise of inheritance rights by Indreni 
Limbus occasionally proceeds by stages, so that the 
separation of a son from the main household may not
1. According to Ksrve, under the Mitskshara rules 'the 
proper time for the division of property was any time 
the co-sharers in the property wished to effect a 
partition* 1 Ibid, p.34-5•
2. Claims to piuni constitute a frequent cause of 
quarrels among brothers. See for example, pp. 327-28.
coincide with s final division of property. He might 
take only a temporary settlement pending; the marriage 
of his younger brothers. Frequently, only sons 
establish households away from their parents. The 
heads of four households in the Indreni settlements 
are only surviving sons whose parents are still alive.
In such cases the son takes only that amount of property 
necessary to provide an adequate living, since the 
entire inheritance will, in time, come to him.
Occasionally, the partition of a household result 
in the division of only certain kinds and limited 
amounts of property, with the rest left undivided and 
under the supervision of the head of the main house­
hold. This arrangement satisfies the desire of a 
young couple for a separate household and yet the unit 
remains only partially independent in terms of property. 
In this, as in all stages of the process of division, 
the kitchen and budget of the new household are quite 
separate from the main household. All income remains 
the property of the household and its expenses and 
debts are its own responsibility. Nevertheless, in 
the early stages of separation, especially where certain 
types of property (such as cattle, for example), are 
left undivided, the amount of cooperation between the
main end the new household cen be extensive. The 
two households maintain a continuous interdependence 
and an interest in each other's affairs not usually 
found between households where the division of property 
is more complete. Indeed, in many respects they 
continue to act as a single unit. In the Indreni 
Cluster this kind of relationship tends to exist between 
the agnatically related households of the few wealthiest 
Limbus. In other words, the wealthier households can 
be seen to prolong the division of property more so than 
the less affluent Limbu households. In the case of 
the latter, the household head can apply no sanctions 
to forestall the early division of the group's estate, 
so that household separations usually coincide with 
the division of household property.
But the sons of wealthy men are reluctant to 
force a division of what may 'be an expanding estate.
In questions of inheritance, no rigid distinction is 
made between ancestral and self-acquired property, 
since a household head is not expected to maintain a 
private estate separate from that of the household.
This is especially true of wealth which has been 
converted into land. Thus, for example, when the 
sons of a Chitok man who enjoyed a regular cash income
from non-agricultural sources received s partial 
settlement upon a partition of the main household, each 
son was given land which had been pledged to their 
father against loans made with the letter's cash 
income. As long as the income remains in the form of 
liquid assets, however, the sons could not demand a 
share during their father's lifetime. By holding out 
the prospect of a larger inheritance in the future, 
a man can hope to delay the final division of his 
property despite the partition of his household.
The term 'separate' household thus disguises the
various kinds of relationship which can exist between
a new household and the main unit. When this is
recognized we note that the ties among some - usually
the wealthiest - households liken them to a joint type
household. In this regard, the correlation between
wealth and type of household tends to follow the pattern
found among Brahmin and other csste groups. Stated
differently, the wealthiest Limbu households in the
Cluster are either of joint type or cooperate as if 
ithey were .
1, In this regard it is worthwhile noting a remark by 
Freedman: '...Co-operation between closely related 
households of a kind to make them seem to resemble one 
household was more likely to occur among the better-off. 
(Freedman, 1953, p.50).
Although, as pointed out, a division of the 
estate can he arranged on a variety of bases within 
the household, a final property settlement, to be valid 
in the eyes of the community (and the lav;) must be 
effected in the presence of several respected elders.
Such settlements generally occur after all the sons of 
a man have married end established separate households, 
and occasionally it is delayed until after their father's 
death. At this time, a written document is usually 
prepared, setting out the terms of the agreement, and 
it is then signed and witnessed by the elders. Fifty- 
eight of the 85 Idmbu households in the Cluster have 
made what can be regarded as a final property settle­
ment, and 57 of these have prepared documents attesting 
to the agreement, while the rest have relied on verbal 
settlements, backed up by customary knowledge of 
boundaries. Manj7 in the latter category suggest that 
a written agreement will someday be made.
But even a final settlement may leave some lands 
undivided so that more than one household head would 
have a stake in the seme fields. The inclusion of 
tracts of undivided property in a settlement is a 
function of the heavy mortgaging of kipat lands to obtain 
credit. Lands to which the Limbu owners have long lost
usufructuary rights are passed cn from fathers to 
sons, sometimes with only cursory attempts to define 
the boundaries of each parcel. Thus, it is not 
entirely uncommon to find sons of one father sharing 
some undivided lands, and descendants of a common grand­
father sharing others. These questions are usually 
clarified at the time of a revenue settlement when 
households and their irrigated fields are registered, 
and the boundaries of the latter defined.
The definition of the household group is also 
influenced by the system of tax collection on kipat 
land. As mentioned earlier, the contractual system of 
tax-collection prevalent in Limbuan requires that kipat 
owners pay taxes according to the number of households 
and not in relation to the amount of land owned or 
cultivated. But households ere counted and registered 
only at the time of a revenue settlement, and no amount 
of increase or decrease in the number of households 
between settlements need be reported. The last 
revenue settlement in Ilam in 1936 registered thirty- 
nine households in the Indreni settlements. Today there 
are 75 kipat-owning household units. The taxes 
assessed on a registered household are shared amongst 
those households which separate off and divide the lands
of the former after the revenue settlement. Thus, 
in the case of Chongbung Lineage (5)* twelve house­
holds share the tax burden on six registered house­
holds in the manner indicated in Figure 4-.
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Fig. 4.
The tax burden on Chongbung Lineage (5) 
households are distributed as follows: households
1 - 6  share the tax on A; households 7 - 9  share the 
tax on B, C, and D ; households 10 - 11 share the tax 
on E; household 12 pays the tax on F. Within each
section the distribution is not necessarily equal as 
between households of different generations. Thus, 
for example, the tax on a would be distributed in the 
following manner: household 2: household 1 : 1/6;
households 3 and A : 1/12 each; households 5 sncL 6 : 
1/12 each, And so on.
Alternatively, where the existing households 
now outnumber the registered units, the tax burden on 
the former is proportionately greater. In the case 
of one Ksmbo lineage, for instance, the household 
population has decreased due to a number of household 
heads dying heirless. As a result, two existing house­
holds must pay the taxes assessed on five households 
registered at the time of the last revenue settlement.
It would seem that traditionally the method of 
taxing kipat-owning households might have put a brake 
on the partition of households. Because all house­
holds registered at the time of a revenue settlement 
would have been taxed without regard for the size of 
the estate, a conflict arose between the desire to 
establish an independent household and the realization 
that such a step would mean a heavy tax burden for the 
household. Since the turn of the century, however,
with the drop in the value of the rupee , taxes no
p
longer represent a significant expenditure and so 
this is no longer a serious consideration in the 
calculations of potential householders. Even so, I 
have been told that at the time of a revenue settle­
ment some households ’merge* together in order to 
avoid being registered .
rfhe system of kipst taxation also serves to 
stress the links among closely related households 
within the same agnatic lineage or lineage branch.
Despite the tendency towards early partition and the 
fragmentation of estates, the very persons who are the 
protagonists in such divisions are potential heirs of 
one another’s property. The eclipse of a household 
whether through emigration or the absence of male 
heirs results in the transmission of its tax assessment 
to the nearest agnatically related household, which 
also assumes ownership rights in the former's estate,
1 . Since 1914, the price of paddy has risen approximately 
fourteen-fold in Ham.
2. See p .224.
3. During s Panchayat-instigated household count in 
1963, the census-taker, a Brahmin, was astonished 
when he was told that the only Limbu households in 
the Cluster were those registered by the revenue 
settlement of 1936.
In Figure 4 the heads ox households B and C died without 
sons to inherit their property and obligations, which 
then passed to the nearest collateral line, represented 
in the Cluster by the patrilineal descendants of their 
father's brother.
Women's Rights in Land
The foregoing discussion of property division 
has suggested not only a stress among Limbus on the 
patrilineal transmission of land but on the exclusive 
inheritance rights of males. Even the word 1aputaliT, 
which indicates one who is childless, is used to refer 
to a man who has daughters but no sons and implies 
that he is without heirs. What rights, we might ask, 
do women have in kipat lands?
On marriage, a woman forfeits all rights to the 
lands of her natal household. As I suggested in 
Chapter II, when land was in greater supply uxorilocal 
residence was & not infrequent practice. Until about 
fifty years ago daughters or sisters whose husbands 
settled in the Cluster were occasionally given small 
plots of land as part of their dowry, which lands were 
then inherited by their sons. But these grants were 
never regarded as a customary or legal right of lineage
women to a share of the patrimony, When 0 married 
woman or widow resides in her natal household she expects 
to receive support, but can exercise no claims to land.
In the case of an elderly woman who returned to the 
Cluster after the death of her husband and chose to 
live alone in a separate household, she was allowed to 
live on and cultivate a small plot belonging to a Syeling 
man, although she was a Chongbung, Her lineage 
agnates were under no obligation to provide her with 
land.
Unmarried daughters, however, on reaching the 
age of thirty-five, have a claim to a share in the 
estate, equal to one-half the inheritance of each male 
sibling. In the event of the woman being an only 
child she assumes rights in the entire estate following 
the death of her father. These rights, however, are 
hedged by three main stipulations. In the first place, 
a daughter can only press her claims if she establishes 
a separate household. long as she resides with her
father or brother her status is similar to that of an 
unmarried brother, and her share remains in the custody 
of the household head. Spinster daughters, in fact, 
seldom urge their prerogatives since the difficulties 
of managing a household and an estate alone are
considered formidable. besides, property divisions 
among sons take no account of the possibility that a 
female sibling might remain unmarried. By the time a 
woman reaches the age of thirty-five the estate has 
usually been allocated ta her brothers and she could, 
only with the greatest difficulty, obtain her rightful 
share. I have heard of no cases of such a redistribution 
to accommodate an unmarried sister actually taking 
place. In the Indreni settlements there wei^ e three 
spinsters in this age bracket and one, an only child, 
inherited rights to the lands of her father, from which 
she maintained a separate household. The other two 
were residing with their brothers.
A second condition concerns rights of trans­
mission. The land cannot be gifted or in any way
transmitted, permanently to anyone other than the male
1agnatic heirs . .vhen the spinster mentioned above 
died in the early part of 1965 her mourning rites were 
performed by three agnates of the nearest collateral 
line who were to divide her lands. A young married
1. Before 1901, when kipat was alienable by sale, a
spinster daughter could not sell the lands. Simil­
arly, if land, is raikar it cannot be sold by 
unmarried women.
woman, who was the descl person’s sister's daughter, 
and who had been living in the same household, was 
regarded as having no claims whatsoever to the spinster1 
lands.
Even to pledge lands to a third party, an 
unmarried women must have the permission of the 
potential male heirs. Her rights, by and large, are 
restricted to the use of the land during the course of 
her lifetime provided - and here a third condition 
applies - she remains unmarried. On marriage her 
rights would be forfeited.
In some respects, the rights of a wife to land 
are similar to those of an unmarried daughter. While 
she remains part of her husband's household she is 
entitled to support, but cannot demand a separate share 
of the estate. Nor can she choose to establish a 
separate household without her husband’s permission.
If a man takes a second wife, however, the first then 
has the right to claim half his estate and to establish 
a household for herself and her children, if she has 
any. There is some disagreement about the pattern of 
inheritance following on such a division, *iome 
informants maintain that land would be divided equally 
among all a man’s sons, while others suggest that the
sons of each wife would inherit only that portion of 
the estate held by their mother. Although the two 
contradictory ideals exist side by side what in fact 
appears to happen when a man has sons by more than one 
wife is that the wife who establishes a separate house­
hold is allocated an amount of property according to the 
number of her male heirs. In one instance I was able 
to record, the four sons of a man by his first wife each 
inherited an amount of property equal to that given a 
fifth son born to his second wife.
The existence of contrary notions about inheritance 
is partly a. reflection of the lack of precedents in such 
matters due to the low incidence of polygynous unions .
Men seldom marry for the second time while their first 
wife is still alive unless she has produced no sons, 
goes away with another man, or returns to live in her
1, I was surprised to learn that the lack of clarity about 
the rights of half-brothers did not lead to a spate of 
quarrels. In addition to the dearth of polygynous 
unions, it is probably due also to the fact that most 
kipat lands have been pledged away (see Chapter V) 
so that half-brothers would have only titles to 
quarrel about, unless of course the household was 
rich and had managed to retain full use of its lands.
In one dispute, however, the descendants of a.n only 
son by a first wife did claim half the lands of her 
husband. See pp. 75 ff«
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natal home because of failure to get along with her 
husband or other members of the household. Only eight 
Indreni men have two wives. In four cases a second 
wife was married because the first was barren; in 
one esse because she had borne only daughters; in 
another case an only son had died after his mother was 
beyond the age of child-bearing; and in two cases 
because the first wives, neither of whom had had any 
children, returned to their natal homes shortly after 
marriage and had no intention of returning to their 
husbands»
Certainly, an important reason inhibiting 
multiple marriages relates to their high costs . On 
the other hand, prestige does not attach to a men with 
more than one wife, and the wealthiest Limbus in the 
Cluster are monogamous. Indeed, a man with two wives 
is often regarded with a mixture of pathos and amuse­
ment. bhile co-wives remain together (two Indreni 
households contain both wives) quarrels are considered 
inevitable, and a husband who must mollify his spouses 
is little envied, rIhe quarrels almost invariably lead 
to separation, with one of the women, usually the senior
1. dee ppt 24-0 ff«
wife, either leaving the cluster and returning to her 
natal home - as did the wives of two men - or moving 
into a separate homestead within the Cluster and becoming 
custodian of part of her husband's estate. Such a 
division has been effected in two cases where first wives
A
have moved away from their husbands . When a wife 
claims her rights to a part of her husband's lands, she 
becomes, in effect, the head of a separate household,
Che controls the income and expenditure of the unit, 
and directs the labour of its members. Although her 
husband continues to en^oy sexual rights, he does not 
command her labour or that of her household, and can 
assert no claims to its income. But he does retain a 
veto over the transmission of hrs lands by his wife 
to third parties. He also continues to take a strong 
interest in the affairs of her household, and a husband 
would be considered remiss in his duties if he did not 
try to help in every way he could. The husband of one 
woman who had established a separate household with her 
daughters arranged a lucrative tenancy agreement for his 
wife and agreed to act as guarantor of the rent,
1. There have been instances of a husband continuing to 
reside with his first wife and alloting a separate 
homestead and estate to his junior wife but this happens 
raj?ely.
Borne informants suggest that the division of a 
man's estate does not merely confer rights to a portion 
of his lands on the wife who separates, but leaves the 
remainder of the estate under the control of the other 
wife. Thus, it is said that 'when a man has two wives 
he has nothing*. The husband in such a situation is 
viewed as a pauper dependent on the goodwill of his 
spouses for his subsistence, and discussions of polygyny 
often include a joke about 'the man who starved to death 
between the homesteads of his two wives'. In fact, 
a husband resides permanently with one of his wives, and 
is the effective household head, in control of its 
estate and in complete charge of its personnel.
The point has been stressed that the right to 
establish a separate household accrues to a woman only 
if her husband takes another wife. But it is also 
contingent upon her continued residence in the Cluster.
If a woman resides in her natal household she forfeits 
her claim and if she leaves after having already established 
a separate unit, her husband re-assumes control of her 
portion of the estate. The fact that this usage is' 
sanctioned by both custom and law, however, did not 
prevent one wife living in her natal home from pressing - 
successfully - for half her husband’s lands. The case
is worthwhile recounting because it presents a good 
example of norms being enunciated and clarified at the 
very time they are being disregarded.
In 1953, s wealthy and much respected ex-army 
serviceman of Chitok arranged the marriage of his eldest 
son to the daughter of s man of similar status resident 
in a settlement cluster about fifteen miles west of 
the Indreni settlements. About a year later the young 
woman came to live in the Cluster, but unable to get 
along with her husband, returned to her natal home after 
a few months. Her husband made no attempt to persuade 
her to return, and in 1958 he married for the second time. 
In 1963, he established a separate household and received 
a partial property settlement. In January, 1965, 
the first wife, her mother, father's brother - her 
father had since died - and several other kinsmen came 
to Chitok to demand a divorce. They accused the young 
man's father of allowing his son to marry another wife 
without first using every possible means of persuasion 
to have the first wife rejoin her husband. The boy's 
father end his supporters (with the latter carrying the 
burden of the discussions) reminded the girl's family 
that it was not contrary to Limbu custom for a man to 
take a second wife, but that they still i*egarded the
girl as their daughter-in-law. a s  such, she had every 
right to claim the prerogatives of a wife and demand a 
half-share of her husband’s estate. The girl's 
representatives were adamant in their demands for a 
divorce, but the young man's side were equally firm in 
their refusal to grant one* Although the reasons were 
never made explicit, it was clear to everyone that to 
acquiesce in a divorce would mean waiving their rights 
to recover at least a portion of the mar3?iage expenses 
if and when the girl re-married. After about two days 
of conversations, the girl's family agreed to accept 
the offer of half the husband’s estate, but on condition 
that the women would continue to live in her natal home. 
This shocked the Indreni men (and the many women who 
had gathered to enjoy the spectacle; even more than 
the demand for a divorce. In the end, however, after 
protesting that such an arrangement was contrary to all 
custom, the young man, with the support of his father, 
agreed to the condition of their in-laws* An agreement 
was reached whereby the husband would cultivate those 
lands over which his first wife now had usufruct, and 
pay her a fixed amount as rent.
Privately, the boy's father and other observers 
rationalised the decision by surmising that the girl's
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family had really come to ‘raise their prestige1 and 
that sooner or later the young woman would marry another 
man, whereupon her Indreni husband would receive compen­
sation and at the same time resume full rights in his 
lends again.
Finally, the rights to land of widows without 
sons should be mentioned. Following the death of a 
man who leaves no male heirs his property is inherited 
by his nearest agnatic kinsmen. Their claims, however, 
are held in abeyance during the lifetime of his widow. 
Like spinster daughters and wives who have separated 
the widow enjoys rights to the usufruct of the land, 
but cannot alienate or pledge it without the expressed 
permission of her husband's potential heirs.
Thus, we have seen that certain women have well 
defined rights to land and its products during their 
lifetime, subject to specific restrictions on their 
freedom to dispose of these rights. The categories 
for which these prerogatives are prescribed include 
women who for a limited phase of their lives are faced 
with a loss of economic support from their husbands or 
fathers and brothers* The rights granted these women 
thereby enable them to achieve a measure of security 
when it is most needed, yet maintains the patrilineal
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pattern of land ownership and inheritance practised 
by the Limbus.
Relations within the Household
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the
Limbu household tends to be a small unit based on a
simple family. In effect, this means that relations 
within the household are synonymous with those between
members of sn elementary family.
I may have given the impression earlier that the 
Limbu household is a scene of continuous squabbling as 
younger members press their claims to independence.
In fact, these stresses emerge gradually and undramatically, 
and characterize a particular phase in the developmental 
cycle of the group. For the greater part of its 
lifetime, relations within the household are amicable 
and co-operative. To govern these relations a body 
of traditional rules offer guidelines for behaviour.
A father's attitudes towards his male offspring 
cannot be summed up by a single term. They can be 
seen to change through time as a son proceeds through 
the various stages of the lifo cycle. A man without sons.
Is much pitied. 'A man must have a son to inherit 
his property and mourn him when he dies' is how the
Limbus invariably explain the desire lor male children. 
The remarks of one Limbu following the birth of his 
first son after twelve years of marriage had given him 
only daughters illustrate the depth of a man's feelings 
about male offspring. 'The birds were sleeping 
previously. Now they are awakened. They are chirping 
and flying to and fro. All living beings are awakened. 
Now the sun is risen. All the rivers, streams ana. 
fish are awakened. Trees and hills are awakened.
All are awakened now,!
The early 3/ears of a child's life are free of 
any responsibilities. He is regarded as an infant 
(balalc) and indulged by his parents end other members 
of the community. At this stage, he is an object of 
affection and fathers are frequently to be seen walking 
or visiting others with their young sons in their arms 
or on their shoulders. There is no shame attached to 
such display of fondness for a small boy.
A gradual change in the character of a father-son 
relationship occurs when the child is reckoned old 
enough - around six or seven years of age - to assist 
in various tasks outside the homestead. When the boy 
begins tending cattle and helping in the fields his 
father assumes the role of instructor and disciplinarian.
The affection ancl familiarity of the early years 
dissolve as the relationship becomes more formal.
When asked to state the w33^ s in which a youth 
should behave towards his father Limbus usually refer 
to the dominant pattern evident amongst their Brahmin 
neighbours. They suggest that a son must be reticent 
in the presence of his father, must not share the same 
bench or sit on a level above the letter, must speak 
quietly and with respect, and never interrupt or contra­
dict his father. In practice, however, Limbu behaviour 
falls short of these ideals. Certainly, a father is 
treated with deference and it would be a rare Limbu 
son who joked with or behaved towards the former with 
disrespect. But after heeding the degree of restraint 
in a Brahmin household, the observer cannot help but 
remark on the comparative lack of inhibition which 
characterizes the father-son tie in a Limbu family.
Limbu sons, for example, smoke freely in the presence 
of their fathers, join In their conversations with 
others, express opinions without hesitation and behave 
in ways which no Brahmin father would countenance from 
his sons. This permissiveness does not alter the 
superordinate-subordinate principle underlying the 
father-son relationship among the Limbus, but mitigates
considerably its implications for behavior.
Although puberty is not marked in any formal 
way, it is recognized as the phase during which member­
ship of the community is attained in the sense that 
full mourning rites would be performed by members of 
a youth's household and lineage in the event of his 
death . Formerly, a pubescent boy was thought to be 
near ready for marriage, but nowadays little thought 
is given to finding a wife before the age of seventeen 
or eighteen. Even so, new sexual awareness and a 
growing sense of independence encourages s youth to 
spend a good deal of his spare time away from his 
parents, usually in the company of age mates of the 
same sex. Often, they do not sleep in their own 
dwellings, but circulate amongst those homesteads in 
which there are no males of the next ascending i.e. 
their father's generation.
^s a boy approaches the age of marriage, tensions 
between he and his father increase. He senses his 
growing importance in the economic activities of the
1 . Some informants state that these rites are often 
performed after a boy cuts his second teeth, but 
that at this stage it would not be obligatory to 
do so.
household. ns his father grows older, heavy agri- 
cultural tasks are increasingly assigned to the young 
man and he regards himself as the mainstay of the unit. 
He is also able to earn a cash income from agricultural 
labour and a variety of other sources both within and 
to an extent outside the regjion of the Indreni settle­
ments, But as long as he is part of his father's 
household, his labour is at the command of the latter. 
And whatever cash income he earns by his own efforts 
must be channelled into the household budget over which 
bus father retains complete control . home young men 
find the situation intolerable end run away from home, 
usually to a town in Vest Bengal where they attempt to 
find work. Occasionally they try to join the army. 
While I was in the Indreni Cluster four young men left 
home without informing their parents where they were 
going; all four returned within eight months. When 
they were asked their reasons, each indicated a desire 
to 'see the world', but two then pointed out that 'here 
we work and in the end have nothing'. Hie fact that 
they almost always do return, however, reveals the
1. There are certain exceptions to this rule in the 
case of the salaries of young men serving in the 
army. See Chapter VI.
other side of the young men's dilemma. For, despite 
the strains in the relationship with his father, there 
is the realization that he is dependent on the latter 
not only for day-to-day support, hut for the means to 
enable these tensions to be resolved. In other words, 
he is beholden to his father for the monies to make a 
marriage, which first step must be taken before a 
separate household can be established and a division of 
property effected. Since the costs of marriages are 
borne entirely by the household, it is only by fulfilling 
his obligations to this unit - which include the 
acceptance of a father's authority - that he can hope 
in time to win his rights.
Until they marry and become full co-parceners in 
the patrimony, brothers live amicably within the house- 
hold , As children, they play together and except for 
the fact that the eldest is usually made responsible 
for the safety of his younger siblings, no special 
importance attaches to age differences. As they grow
1. It is sometimes eaid that the eldest son belongs to 
his father, and the youngest to his mother, but 
few parents would admit to having favourites.
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older, however, each develops friendships with others in 
his own age bracket, so that the intimacy of the early 
years gradually diminishes. Although ideally an elder 
brother is his younger’s master, in practice the relation­
ship is marked by a lack of obsequiousness on the part 
of the latter. If a father should die before his sons 
have all separated, the eldest son living in the 
household succeeds to his father's position and 
authority as household head, pi'ovided he is married 
and provided his mother is advanced in years. In such 
circumstances the importance of seniority is stressed, 
and an elder brother dominates the affairs of the 
household and controls the same sanctions as did his 
father.
Throughout this analysis the patrilineal bias 
of Limbu descent, succession and inheritance has been 
stressed. It is obvious that the sons of a marriage 
are incorporated fully into their father's lineage.
The status of a daughter, however, is less clear.
Until her marriage she too is considered a member of an 
agnatic group which exercises full control over her 
person. Are these rights, we might ask, ever surrendered? 
VJhat claims over a woman are retained by her agnates 
after she is married, and. how do they compare with the
prerogatives of her husband*s group?
husband has undisputed sexual rights in his 
wife, and if these rights are violated, he is entitled 
to compensation, which transaction signifies the
A
dissolution of the marriage , But a man's death 
leaves his widow free to re-marry. If she chooses 
to do so, the bridewealth and other marriage payments 
demanded of the new husband are given not to her late
p
husband's agnates, but to her natal kinsmen , 'a 
widow is a virgin (kanya) «, explain her agnates, and 
bridewealth must be paid anew for sexual access.
When the widow of a Chongbung decided to leave the 
Cluster in 1965 to marry another man, the father of 
her late husband made no attempt to dissuade her since, 
on her husband's death, his group retained rights 
only to her children - although it still had the 
obligation to support the widow while she remained 
in the hotrsehold. In this sense then, marriage can 
be seen to confer on the husband rights to the repro- 
ductive powers of his wife, but does not transfer to
1 . bee Chapter VII, pp. 513 ff.
2. 'A test of the married woman's absorption into her 
husband's group was her fate on widowhood....when 
....she chose to get or was given another husband the 
rights over her in second marriage lay largely with 
her first husband's people.' Cf. Freedman, 1956, p. 31
him or his agnates complete ar.d permanent rights to
her person^.
a woman’s attachment to her agnatic group is
also symbolised in the custom of putting aside a token
quantity of the production of each paddy field for the
daughters and sisters of a household, including those
who have married out. This custom is said to please
the deities controlling rainfall and to assure an
abundant monsoon in future*
The obligation to perform the mortuary rights
for a woman resides with her own agnatic kin unless
and until a special payment - called 1saimondri’ -
is made by her husband or sons to her natal household.
This payment transfers the mourning obligations from
the woman’s lineage to her husband’s group. I have
heard it said that a woman is not a wife until
o
saimondri is given'"'. The decision about when to pay
1. Leach speaks of procreative rights to a Lakher woman 
being ’rented5 by her husband. (19618 , p.119).
2. The traditional implications of saimondri might very
well have been significant. One of the Limbu texts 
(undated) in the dodgson Collection at the India 
Office Library states that the children of a divorced
- Limbu couple would be ’illegitimate* if the fee were
not paid. A Limbu informant in the Cluster suggested 
that formerly failure to pay saimondri would give s 
woman’s agnatic kin the right to claim the children 
of her marriage.
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the fee rests with the husband, and it cannot be 
refused by the woman's agnates. But it is almost 
never offered until the woman has had children or 
until she receives a dowry, and the belief exists 
that if it is given too soon after marriage it will 
hasten a wife's death. Occasionally, saimondri is
delayed until after a woman has died. If this is 
done her agnates are not bound to accept the offer, 
although in practice they seldom refuse. Thus, for 
example, when the wife of a Kembo man died her parents, 
who had come to visit during the final stages of her 
illness, agreed to accept saimondri which had not 
previously been paid and arrangements were quickly 
concluded for the amount to be handed over by the dead 
woman's husband.
Failure on the part of a husband to pay 
saimondri - which is only a nominal amount - leaves 
with the woman's natal group not only the obligation 
to perform the mourning rituals, but the right to 
reclaim her personal possessions. These are of two 
kinds: her dowry and other self-acquired property
Cpewa). Some years following the marriage of a woman
her lineage must provide a dowry. The obligation 
falls most heavily on her natal household which
149.
furnishes the major share - usually jewellery, or money 
or, less frequently, cattle - while lineage members 
who received a part of the marriage payments contribute 
a variety of household utensils. With her dowry as 
initial capital, she might then make interest-bearing 
loans or earn other income from petty trade.
Generally, the women who engage most actively in 
earning a private income are married or elderly spinster 
daughters living in their natal households. lives, 
on the other hand, spend most of their time working 
around the homestead or in the fields, and so have 
little opportunity to pursue private interests.
Besides, a woman who neglected her household obli- 
gations to increase her personal property would be 
upbraided by her husband and much maligned by other 
members of the community. Nevertheless, over the 
years, many wives manage to accumulate some private 
property in addition to their dowry, and a husband 
has no legitimate rights to this wealth. A woman 
often allocates some of her belongings - in particular 
jewellery - to her daughters and less often, distri­
butes cash or cattle to her sons. After her death, 
however, that portion which has not been allocated can
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be claimed by her natal kin - unless saimondri, has 
been paid .
In sum, then, what emerges from the foregoing 
outline of differential rights to women enjoyed by 
agnatic and affinal households is a picture of a weak 
marriage bond and, alternatively, of an enduring link 
between a woman and her natal group. Such a 
structural representation, however, must be balanced 
by a description of the affective aspects of the 
marriage relationship,
Relations between a husband and wife, like 
those between a father and son, undergo changes over 
time. Following the wedding, the new bride spends 
several weeks in her new household - at this juncture 
this would mean the household of her father-in-law - 
during which time she is introduced to her duties and 
begins to know the members of the group. The young 
couple would scarcely speak to one another out of 
shyness, and it is unlikely that they will have sexual
1. Consequently, some limbus weigh the costs of funerary 
rites, which are quite high, against the value of 
the possessions their wives have accumulated before 
deciding whether or not to pay saimondri.
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relations. At the end of this brief period the girl 
returns to her natal household where she remains for 
about one year, although the husband would visit her
'I
on one or two occasions during this time . When she 
returns to live with her husband, the relationship is 
still tentative, and depends for its success on a number 
of factors. I have already suggested that ties between 
a wife and her husband’s mother and brothers* wives can 
lead to strains and disputes. But the marriage tie 
itself can be affected by the attitude of a husband 
in these matters. A husband has always to balance 
the obligations towards his parents against his 
interests in the nuclear family in which his wife 
will play an essential role. Several Indreni women 
have returned to their natal homes in the Cluster 
because their husbands would not support them against 
their mothers- and/or sisters-in-law,
nfter a wife becomes mistress of her own house­
hold the ties with her husband become less fragile, 
but a man who is inconsiderate to his wife risks driving
1. This is true only for arranged and ’theft' marriages, 
when a man abducts another's wife, the latter would 
not return to her natal household after the wedding 
rite. Bor & detailed account of marriage, see 
Chapter VI, pp. 258 ff.
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her hack to her natal household. '.jomen not infrequently 
take refuge in their natal homes, where they are always 
welcome, and if her husband is the cause of her flight, 
he will have to face an angry group of affines when 
he comes to fetch her back. If the pattern is 
recurrent, a woman may be persuaded to remain perman­
ently in the household of her birth, and even be 
encouraged to run away with another man.
The birth of a child, particularly if it is a 
boy, gives the wife new status, and puts the conjugal 
relationship on a firmer basis, thus increasing its 
chances of persevering.
^ woman is said to regard her husband as her 
master, and to clothe her every attitude towards him 
in respect. Although a wife’s behavior in public 
would not belie this ideal, the situation inside the 
household can be quite different. Some men are 
known to be ’henpecked’ and snide anecdotes occasionally 
circulate to point out the victims. But in the 
majority of instances, a husband is recognized, as the 
authority figure, and a woman will seldom dispute her 
husband's decisions. Bven so, a wife exercises a 
strong influence on these decisions by virtue of her 
relationship with the children. n woman's role
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includes the instruction and disciplining ox her 
daughters, but she is also their closest confidante 
before they marry, and few ties are considered as 
close as that between a mother and daughter. But 
mothers feel no less affection for their sons.
Oince a boy seldom discusses, matters of a personal 
nature directly with his father, he will reveal his 
feelings, address complaints or make requests through 
his mother, who is then counted on to intercede on 
his behalf to her husband. Thus, a wife and mother 
is the dominant object and source of affection, and 
this enables her to exercise a not inconsiderable 
influence on household decisions.
By the time a married couple approaches middle 
age, and the vicissitudes of the early period have 
been successfully overcome, their relationship has 
settled down to a comfortable routine, and is charact­
erised by affection, informality and mutual dependence.
One theme which might be isolated from this 
discussion of the household thus far is that the group 
acts as a self“Contained economic unit. Through the 
custom of early property division it assumes, almost 
from the moment of its establishment (with the notable 
exception of the wealthy few) primary rights of
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ownership in lend. ^1though oilier groups may have
some residual and/or potential claims, a household 
is essentially master of its own estate. Thus, it 
controls its own income from agriculture and other 
sources, is responsible for meeting the expenses 
of sons' marriages and daughters' dowries, as well 
as recurrent expenditures. It also maintains a jealous 
hold on its labour resources. Because of the nature 
of relations within the simple family, the father 
assumes responsibility for household decisions and 
his authority serves to underline the corporateness 
of the group.
Household as a Ritual Unit
The household is also the most important rdtual 
unit among the Indreni Limbus. The deities whose 
annual worship is regarded as obligatory are propi­
tiated by, and for the benefit of, a household group* 
Roughly, they can be classified into two categories: 
domestic and forest gods.
The numbers and identity of the former vary 
from one household to the next, but at least four are 
worshipped universally. The Grandmother goddess
i.
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(Yuma-samang)^ is regarded as the mistress of all 
Limbu deities, and the most ubiquitous and powerful
p
of supernatural beings A second, the Grandfather 
god (Theba-ssmang) is thought of as a kind of consort 
to the Grandmother goddess. Although the implication 
of affinity seems obvious, not all Limbus regard him 
as the husband of the former. Some hold the view 
that he is unrelated, while others suggest that the 
two are sister and brother. & third domestic deity 
(Misek) is worshipped as a Hunter god, responsible for 
the protection of and the procuring of food for all 
the other domestic deities, while the fourth, (Him- 
samang), is described as the Caretaker of all the lesser 
domestic gods or, in the words of one ex-soldier, 'a 
sergeant major'.
1. She is sometimes called 'Meharani' (Queen) and 
propitiated under this name by members of other castes.
2. Despite her primacy in the Limbu pantheon the Grand­
mother goddess is not generally credited with the 
creation, fhe majority of Limbus employ the Nepali 
term for God (Bhagwen) when referring to the creator.
A few articulate Limbus state that one deity, lagera 
Ningma-phuma, was responsible for creating the world 
of nature, while another, Puromi-Yambabi, created all 
living beings. In a Limbu text in the Hodgson Collec­
tion a reference is made to the former as the 'mine
of knowledge' and to another deity, Porok-miha (which 
may be the same as Puromi) as the 'instrument of 
creation1, deriving its power from the former.
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Domestic deities are associated with women.
'Men have no gods' say the Limbus. 'Just as a man 
inherits his father's lands, a woman inherits her 
mother's gods.1 Thus, when a woman marries and comes 
to live with her husband she brings her deities along, 
and these become recognised as the gods of the house­
hold in which she resides. But because the anger of 
the gods affects men, women and children equally, the 
welfare of the household is believed to depend on the 
assiduousness with which the group propitiates its 
deities.
If a woman bears no daughters, then her eldest 
son should worship her gods after her death, although 
these would not be inherited, in turn, by his daughters. 
In practice, few Indreni men without sisters do so, 
claiming as their excuse both the expense and the fact 
that the household is well enough protected by the 
worship of their wives’ gods. then the gods of more 
than one woman inhabit a homestead, each set is propi­
tiated separately, although generally on the same day. 
Thus, for example, if a household includes e woman 
and her daughter-in-law, two separate rites will be 
conducted. excluding the four principal deities, 
every woman is vulnerable to the influence of several
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lesser gods in the pantheon, end so the total set 
she worships is likely to differ from that of any 
other woman.
Like humans, gods require nourishment and propit­
iation consists in offering a variety of foods, 
including blood sacrifice, depending on the preferences 
of any particular deity. The Grandmother goddess is 
especially partial to pork, and one of any litter 
born to a sow should be offered to the goddess. There 
are a number of occasions on which domestic gods should 
be worshipped, but one annual ritual is obligatory.
Most Limbus perform this rite in early November, at 
the commencement of the paddy and millet harvests, 
when they offer the first fruits of the harvest to 
the gods. At one ritual offering (nowangi) I 
witnessed, two sets of deities were worshipped, since 
the household included the second wife of a Kambo man, 
and his daughter by an earlier marriage. The wife’s 
gods were dealt with before those of the latter, 
first to be propitiated were the Hunter god (Misek) 
who was offered rice, flowers and an egg, and a lesser 
goddess, given millet and a cock. This part of the 
ritual was held in the courtyard, since it is believed 
that these deities I'eside outside the dwelling.
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Inside, the first to he propitiated was the Grand­
mother goddess, who was offered cooked rice, millet 
and fish. The Grandfather god was then given rice, 
millet, fish and a cock, followed by an offering of 
the same ingredients to a lesser goddess with whom 
the woman was associated. finally, the Caretaker 
deity (Ilim-sainang) received a similar variety of food. 
The process was then repeated, although the second 
woman’s lesser deities were substituted for those of 
the first.
Despite the relationship of domestic gods to 
women, men play a key role in these rituals. In 
addition to the ritual specialist (phedangma) who 
conducts the rite and who is always a male, any 
sacrifice must be performed by one of the men in the 
household, since women are prohibited from ritual 
slaughter. Thus, if a household contains only women, 
a neighbour, usually an agnate of the woman's husband, 
will be asked to participate in these rites. Ordinar 
ily, however, aside from the ritual specialist, only 
household members are present when domestic gods are 
worshipped. Other persons are not invited to parti­
cipate. The exclusion of outsiders is represented in 
the rule that after a homestead has been purified for
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the offering - hy re-plastering the floor with a 
mixture of earth and cow dung - no one other than 
the household members may enter the dwelling.
Although the household worships as an independent 
unit, it must still take account of its place in a 
wider agnatic group. Harmonious relations among 
members of a lineage are deemed necessary to ensure 
the efficacy of household worship. If a man has 
caused ill-feeling to exist, whether intentionally 
or otherwise, it is said that he is considered by the 
domestic deities to be in a state of impurity (fjhutto) 
and until he is purified he cannot properly effect 
their propitiation. One ritual specialist explained 
that 'the bad feelings and disputes of the (lineage) 
brothers must be driven away, or the deities will 
not heed the ritual1. For this reason, each occasion 
for the placation of domestic gods is preceded by a 
ritual 'to wash sway bad feelings' (sarap bagaunu) in 
the lineage. Prior to the commencement of the nowangi 
rites referred to above, members of the household 
recited the names of their liambo lineage 'brothers', 
while the ritual specialist poured water on the ground. 
Morsels of various foods to be offered were then buried 
to symbolize the end of the state of impurity, and
i
thereby enable the homestead deities to be worshipped.
In addition to domestic gods there is also a 
complex of forest deities who require annual propit­
iation. These are thought to inhabit the area 
permanently and to have no special association with 
women. Nevertheless, their appetites are similar, 
and the manner of their worship is the same as for 
domestic gods, except that the rites are conducted in 
a field away from the dwelling. Here, too, each 
household worships as a unit and assumes that its 
offerings will benefit only the household group. 
Alternatively, it is this group alone which will 
suffer the consequences of a deity made angry by 
neglect. Indeed, the rationale of worship is to 
ward off the malevolence of dissatisfied gods. Lach 
is believed to bring several kinds of misfortune, 
most frequently in the form of illness, and to strike 
only when a household ignores its demands or is 
stingy in its offerings. Propitiation is not 
necessarily considered to bring good fortune, but at 
best to postpone or mitigate bad fortune. The 
attitude of Limbus to their deities (domestic and 
forest) is suggested by the following legend. 'Some 
gods were angered by men and set out to kill them.
But they were met by God (here the Nepali term 
'Bhagwan' was used to imply the creator) who said:
"If you kill people what will you gain? If you want 
to be respected by them bring them illness and trouble. 
Then you will be respected. They will give you 
offerings; they will perform rites; they will always 
fear you." Bo the gods did this and now people 
placate them,'
The range of homestead and forest gods does 
not exhaust the realm of the supernatural* There are 
other deities which possess malevolent powers, but are 
conciliated only if they victimize a household. Bor 
example, all Limbu women are said to 'own1 a monkey 
god, a potentially violent deity, but that these are 
only 'active1 in rare instances, and when such a one 
exists, a permanent shrine must be erected and offerings 
made annually by the household.
Limbus also share a number of deities with 
members of other castes. One, the River goddess 
(Thakurani) is usually given an offering in gratitude 
for special favours received. Thus, when the daughter- 
in-law of one man was ill he promised the River goddess 
a pigeon if she recovered, which promise was fulfilled 
several months after the woman regained her health.
Although Limbu ritual specialists are called to 
officiate at these rituals, concessions are made to 
the Nepali character of the Goddess by conducting the 
rite in the Nepali language, and by not offering 
sacrifices (e.g. pigs) which are thought will offend 
her susceptibilities.
Hindu gods, too, are worshipped by some Limbu 
households, but for these rituals, Brahmin priests 
are called.
In addition, a variety of evil spirits inhabit 
the supernatural world, and pose a constant threat to 
the well-being of all inhabitants of the area. To 
a lesser extent witches (boksi) intrigue to bring 
about misfortune, and even the most innocent people 
can fall victim, to their powers. The propitiation 
of these malevolent forces, however, is not effected 
as a matter of course, on a regular and obligatory 
basis. Their implication in a household’s misfortune 
must first be determined by divination, and only then 
can steps be taken to put the matter right.
Again, the point to be noted is that the 
conciliation of the various deities and spirits is 
the task of a household group, which seeks to protect 
its members from the harmful forces of the super­
165.
natural world. Since these forces are seen to affect 
households, it is the letter end not any wider unit 
which sets as a corporate group in these ritual 
contexts.
There are circumstances in which s household may 
join with others to worship particular deities. 
Occasionally, a goddess is 'discovered* (usually by 
divination) to inhabit the banks of a stream or a 
small wood near some paddy fields. Just prior to 
harvest time, to ensure a successful crop, those 
cultivating the surrounding fields make offerings to 
the goddess individually or in concert. /it one such 
offering I observed, eight men - one an Angu, the rest 
members of four different Chongbung lineages - contri­
buted a total of Rs 20 to purchase s goat for the 
sacrifice. None of the individuals was obliged to 
contribute or to take part in the ritual, and it is 
most unlikely that the same men would join together 
the following year for the same purpose since, for 
one thing, cultivation rights to at least some fields 
would probably change hands.
On the morning of the full moon of Baisskh 
(npril-May) Indreni inhabitants gather1 at five shrines 
in the Cluster at each of which resides a different
goddess. Angbung, Gb.it; ok and do rumba each contain 
one, while two are found in Enarapa. Although these 
are conceived as settlement deities in fact their 
worship does not crystallise permanent ritual groups. 
Each household is free to worship at the shrine of 
any of these deities and though most participate only 
in the rite of the goddess nearest their homestead, 
some households attend two or even three rites, while 
others choose to propitiate a different goddess each 
year. The itinerant worshippers explain that several 
of the goddesses were revealed in the recent past and 
so are not believed to possess the same powers as the 
more established deities. Others, with dry fields in 
more than one area of the Cluster, attempt to please 
the goddesses who are most likely to affect, by reason 
of propinquity, the fertility of their lands. home 
commend the healing powers of certain goddesses. A 
Limbu of Borumba, who regularly attends the rite in 
Angbung, pointed out that his wife had recovered from 
a serious illness after he had brought a sacrifice to 
the goddess in Angbung, A few households without 
means to contribute to these sacrifices simply opt out 
of the propitiation rites altogether.
In sum, then,even rituals performed on behalf
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of large collectivities do not constrain the house­
hold to regard itself or act as part of a wider ritual 
group.
The Limbu household, despite its 1 encapsulation1 
in a lineage, has been shown to be a self-contained 
unit in certain economic and ritual contexts. The 
’individuation' of the household, in economic terms 
at least, is partly the result of land pressure and 
Government policy which, as pointed out earlier, led 
to the virtual disappearance of the lineage as a cor­
porate group in respect of land, and a corresponding 
emergence of the household as the group with the 
greatest interests in that land. But self-containment 
and individuation do not imply self-sufficiency. The 
universe of social relationships does not begin and end 
with the household. This will become evident in the 
remainder of this essay. One theme I have been 
concerned to emphasize in this chapter is that the 
decisions Limbus make in the course of their daily ' 
lives are affected not so much by the interests of wider 
structural groupings as by those of the household 
itself.
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CHa PTLB V 
THE ECONOMY: CPLDIT .,HD TLNaPCY
As I showed in Chapter III, Government policy 
resulted in the reduction of the amount of land under 
lcipat tenure. At the same time, population pressures 
were increasing on those lands still under Limbu 
control. By the turn of the century the majority of 
Limbus found it impossible to maintain their level of 
consumption and meet minimal social obligations 
without resort to borrowing from the immigrants to 
whom they had originally granted a portion of their 
lands. These latter, whose numbers had increased, 
were in need of additional lands and demanded, as 
security for their loans, that the kipat lands of the 
Limbus be given them under possessory mortgage. In 
other words, the creditors assumed the rights of usu­
fruct pending repayment of the loan. The circle
was as cumulative as it was vicious. As they went
further into debt the Limbus were forced to mortgage 
more and more land; and as they lost access to their 
lands, they could not earn enough to repay the mortgages.
i
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Mortgages
There are two types of mortgage. The first -
bhog bandhaki - leaves unchanged the amount of capital
and enables the mortgagor to repossess the land upon
repayment of the amount. The second type (masikatta)
reduces the mortgage capital by a specific sum each
year. This latter type, which applies to 8 5 ox all
mortgage transactions in kipat land, derives from a
kind of mortgage prevalent until 1914-, when it was
abolished by the Government. *Such mortgages enabled
the contracting parties to stipulate a period of time
during which the amount of the mortgage would be reduced
by an agreed sum annually, and at the end of which the
mortgagor would resume the land without further payment.
However, such agreements did not allow the mortgagor
to repossess the land before the end of the period,
which could extend for as long as 100 years or more.
The masikatta mortgage enables the kipat owner to
repossess the land at any time upon repayment of the
p
original capital less the fixed annual reductions .
1. See pp.100-02.
Masikatta has certain features in common with the 
kanam system prevalent in Malabar, Of, Mayer, 1952, 
pp. 79-81; Kumar, 1965, pp. 23-25.
Iii both, kinds of mortgage agreement the mortgagee 
exercises rights of usufruct in the land ss long as the 
loan is outstanding. If the mortgagor repays the loan 
after the seed has been sown he must allow the mort­
gagee to take the harvest of the land. Bor his part, 
the mortgagee may not charge interest on the capital.
The former is prevented from taking the land back 
piecemeal, by paying back the capital in installments.
Once pledged, a field is regarded as a unit, which can 
only be returned as a unit when the entire capital is
'i
repaid as a lump sum . Only when the field has been 
sub-divided among the heirs of the mortgagor, each of 
the latter can repossess his own share individually.
Of the kipat owned by the Limbus in the Indreni 
settlements, 68,2$ is under mortgage. The percentage 
of irrigated land pledged is much higher than that of 
dry lands. 82.8$ of the former, which comprise two- 
thirds of all Indreni lands under kipat tenure, have 
been mortgaged; only 38.6$ of dry lands have been 
pledged. This is due mainly to the fact that a fair
1. This practice does not derive from any mystical notion 
about the unity of a field, but relates to the increasing 
costs of cultivating a field which is diminishing in 
size as a result of piecemeal repossession.
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proportion of dry lands are homestead plots which are 
not mortgaged.
Ki
Type of land
Irrigated 
Dry
Total
Vie see from the figures in the above table that 
Limbus in the Indreni settlement's have unrestricted 
rights of usufruct to just under one-third of their 
kipat lands. The extent of mortgaging varies from one 
lineage to the next (see Table 10).
TABLE 9
A
Do. of units
91,4-62 
4-5,222
136,684-
Amount 
lort ^ai
75*790
17,4-90
93,280
Percentage 
m(
82.8
38,6
68.2$
1, Lee Appendix.
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Table 10
Kipat mortgages by lineage
Lineage
Chongbung Lineage (l)
Chongbung Lineage (2)
Chongbung Lineage (3)
Chongbung Lineage (4-)
Chongbung Lineage (5)
All Chongbungs
Kambo Lineage (1)
Kambo Lineage (2)
All Kambos
hembekes
Phatras
Syelings
rnnong the Chongbungs the comparatively high
percentage of lands pledged by Lineage (4-) can be
explained by the loss of almost half the lineage's
a
paddy lands in a court case half a century ago .
Lineage members were forced to mortgage a good part of 
their remaining lands to meet the heavy fines imposed 
at the time, and to maintain subsistence since. The 
relatively low figure of mortgaging by Chongbung Lineage 
(3) is largely the result of repossession of lands which 
were in fact previously mortgaged. The repossession
1.See Chanter VI.
60.3
66.5
56.3 
76.9
62.7 
62.4-
90.2
96.5
92.7
61.0
7.5
84.5
has been made possible by the importation of monies 
from outside the ^luster, By and large, however, 
the fact that land mortgaging is a cumulative process 
which has been going on since the late 19th century, 
makes impossible any precise explanation of the 
differences in extent of mortgaging among the various 
lineages *
TABLE 11 
Kipat mortgages by household
Percentage of 
Kipat Lands 
Mortgaged
None
1 - 9  
10 - 24 
25 - 49 
50 - 74 
75 - 89 
90 - 99 
100
No. of Kipat- 
0wiling Households
r?
1
16
19
16
8
1
68
Percentage of 
Kipat-Owning 
Households
10.5
1.4
25.5 
28.0
25.5 
11.7 
1.4 
9978
Table 11 shows us that almost two-thirds of
1. I include here only households which are potential 
mortgagors of kipat. This excludes by definition 
households which own no kipat. But also excluded are 
households which, though kipat-owning, are not in a 
position to mortgage these lands. Two household 
heads have not yet inherited their kipat lands, but 
have been given, as their (as yet incomplete) inher­
itance lands taken under mortgage by their father.
Three other households are headed by women who have been 
granted the use of kipat during the course of their life­
time but cannot transfer these rights to others. I have 
excluded these five households from the table.
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ki pat-owning Limbu households (64-. 7/-') have pledged 
more than half their kipat lands, The figure of only 
one household having mortgaged all its kipat lands 
stresses the tendency for Iambus to hold on to home­
stead sites. Since the figures are for all kipat 
lands, they obscure the fact that 39 households 
(57.35*5) have pledged all their irrigated lands.
Distribution of Mortgages
To whom do the Limbus pledge their kipat?
By far the great majority of mortgaged lands (?2$) are 
held by non-Limbus. Thus, the first point to note is
"i
that kipat landowners and landholders are, to a large 
extent, members of different caste groups. a second 
point to note is the residential spread of the land­
holders. Just under two-thirds (64-.6$) of mortgaged 
lands are in the hands of landholders resident outside 
the Cluster. Settlement boundaries, then, do not define 
the spatial limits of mortgage relationships. Never­
theless, only a few landholders live beyond a radius of
4. Henceforth, 1 use ’ landholder1 to refer to the
mortgagee or pledgee and distinguish this person from the 
’landowner’ and the ’tenant', or person who actually 
cultivates the land.
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two miles of the mortgaging household. In this 
category are several kinsmen of Indreni Limbus. One 
is a shopkeeper living in Ilam Bazaar, who is the 
sister of a non-kipat owning resident of the Cluster; 
another is the brother of a woman married into the 
Cluster from a settlement across the river to the 
west. a third is a wealthy Limbu from the district 
of Panchthar in the north, who has interests throughout 
east Nepal. But these rank as exceptions in that 
Limbu kipat owners prefer to have their landholders 
nearby. Indeed, as I point out below, mortgage ties 
tend to be formed within ‘neighbourhoods* - even if 
these extend beyond Cluster boundaries.
IABLE 12
Distribution of mortgages among Limbu landholders
Limbu Landholders Percentage of Kipat
   _ Land mortgaged
Kipat-owning Limbus resident in Cluster 
Non-kipet-owning Limbus resident in Cluster
Limbus resident outside the Cluster ____
nil Limbus 28.0
Table 12 gives the distribution of mortgaged 
lands among Limbu landholders. It is shown that 21.3$ 
of all kipat mortgaged is pledged to Limbus resident in
the Indreni settlements. this leaves just under 
four-fifths in the hands either of Limbus resident 
outside the Cluster or members of non-Limbu groups* 
Turning to this latter category, it is to be 
noted that members of non-Limbu groups resident in 
the Cluster hold 14.2°/o of mortgaged lends, while 
57.8^ are pledged to non-residents* Table 13 gives 
the distribution, of mortgaged lands among non-Limbus.
TABLE 13
Distribution of mortgages among non-Limbu landholders
Non-Limbu Landholders
Brahmins resident in Cluster 
Jaisis resident in Cluster 
Others resident in Cluster 
Brahmins and Jaisis resident outside
Cluster
Others resident outside Cluster 
All non-Limbus
Percentage of Kipat 
Land Mortgaged
11.5
2*9
These figures illustrate several points. The 
first is that members of the highest twice-born castes 
(Brahmins and Jaisis) have taken by far the largest 
proportion of kipat lands under mortgage. Brahmins 
and Jaisis between them hold half of these lands, while 
members of other castes hold slightly over one-fifth. 
Becondly, Brahmins and Jaisis resident in the Cluster
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have a much higher proportion of landholdings in relation 
to their numbers than those resident outside the Cluster, 
Whereas Brahmins and Jaisis in the Cluster represent 
only 3% of the total number of Brahmin and Jaisi house­
holds in the Village area, they have Id.2% of the kipat 
landholdings, Finally, none of the other non-Limbu 
households in the Cluster - there are seven: four
Megar and three Blacksmith - have taken any kipat under 
mortgage.
I proceed now to consider by the use of 
quantitative date the linkages formed between Limbus 
and those to whom they pledge their lands. My focus 
in the discussion will be the individual kipat-owning 
Limbu household and the pattern of mortgage relation­
ships in which it is involved.
The majority of kipat lands pledged are concen- 
trated in the hands of less than a score of landholders . 
These (nineteen) 'Main Landholders' - as I shall call 
them - who have taken 68,8# of all lands mortgaged, are
1, I ignore the fact that several of these landholders 
outside the Cluster may have spawned a few households 
of sons or younger brothers. The landholding households 
within the Cluster, however, are households in terms 
of my earlier definition of the word.
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resident mainly in the Cluster or in its immediate 
environs. Of the nine Indreni landholders, six are 
Brahmins, one is a Jeisi, and two are Limbus. Five 
of the Main Landholders living outside the Cluster are 
Brahmins, three are Limbus - the only ones living at 
some distance from the Cluster - while one is a 
Gurung and one a rlewar.
TABLE 14
Distribution of mortgages among Main Landholders
Main Landholders Residence
Brahmin a. 
Brahmin b. 
Brahmin c. 
Brahmin d. 
Brahmin e. 
Brahmin f. 
Jaisi g. 
Limbu h. 
Limbu i.
Brahmin J 
Brahmin k 
Brahmin 1 
Brahmin rn 
Brahmin n 
Gurung o 
Newer p 
Limbu q 
Limbu r 
Limbu s
in Cluster
Dorumba 
Dorumba 
Chitok 
Bharapa 
Chitok 
Chitok 
Dorumba 
Chitok 
Chitok
ex-Cluster
Percentage of
Mortgaged
Lands
1.6
1.1
2.9
1.0
2.6
2.5
1 mi. 
1 mi.
1
E of Angbung 
JE of Angbung 
S of Angbung 
S of ungbung 
7 of Chitok 
/ of Dorumba 
S of Angbung 
H a m  Bazaar 
5 mi. 7 of Cluster 
Panchthar district
~k' mi * 
| mi. 
■J mi. 
1 mi. 
1 mi.
2.6
6.2
3-9
2.7
3.6
4.7
9.6 
2.4
10.6
3.6 
3.2
1.8
 2«4
68.8#
No, of Link 
ages to 
Landowners
c
3
2
6
5
7 
16
8
3
13
13
17
4 
17
9
4
3
3
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Table 14 shows that the Main landholders are 
linked in mortgage relationships with an average of 
7.2 Limbu households , although the range extends from 
a minimum of two to a maximum of seventeen households. 
Landholders with the greatest amount of pledged land 
tend to be tied to the largest number of kipat land­
owning households. I have given the residential 
location of each of the Main Landholders because geo­
graphical propinquity appears to be a factor in the 
formation of mortgage relationships. The kipat owning 
households tied to the three Dorumba landholders (Brahmins 
a. and b. and Jaisi g.), for example, ere confined to 
Dorumba and that area of Chitok adjacent to Dorumba. 
Similarly, the landholders resident to the east and 
south of xngbung have mortgage ties almost exclusively 
with Limbu households in that settlement and Bharapa, 
its neighbour to the north. Only two landholders 
(Limbu h. and Gurung o.) have links to kipat-owning 
households in all four Indreni settlements, while 
another four (Brahmins e,, f., and 1. and Limbu i.) are
1. I am forced to ignore what might be called the relative 
weight of each linkage. A landowner may give one 
field or several to a landholder; the mortgage 
capital may be great or small. 'Linkage1 obscures 
these differences.
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linked to households in three settlements. The 
majority of thirteen hold lend owned by Limbus whose 
residence is localised in one or two (adjacent) 
settlements.
Limbu landowners, for their part, are linked to 
an average of four landholders. This includes linkages 
to others as well as to the Main Landholders. The 
range of ties per household is shown in Table 15.
Table i5
Linkages to landholders 
No. of Linkages Limbu Kipat-owning Households
To: 1 landholder 18 households
2 landholders 6
3 landholders 6
4 landholders 8
5 landholders 10
6 landholders 3
7 landholders 2
8 landholders 2
9 landholders 1
10 or more landholders 4
The tendency is for Limbu households to disperse 
their mortgages, especially if they are heavy, among 
several landholders. The eighteen households which 
are linked to only one landholder (see Table 15) ore 
those which have pledged few lands or conversely, have 
only few lands to pledge. These eighteen households,
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while they represent 30£ of Limbu households which 
have mortgaged kipat, account for only 5.6°,q of all 
lands pledged. Twenty-five of the sixty Limbu house­
holds pledging land have concentrated their ties among 
the Main Landholders and have formed no mortgage ties 
with others. Alternatively, only three households 
have 110 links at all to these Main Landholders, but 
these are among the households which have only single 
mortgage links. An additional twenty-five households 
have links with landholders other than the Main Land­
holders resident outside the Cluster. Moreover, twenty- 
two households have mortgaged lands to other Limbu 
households in the Indreni settlements, excluding the 
two Limbu Main Landholders resident in the Cluster.
Some of these latter landholder households may at the 
same time pledge their own kipat to other landholders.
Taking the total number of linkages (236) 
between Limbu households and their landholders, we 
find that 59• 4-/' (138) are with the Main Landholders,
2 1 . ( 5 0 )  are with other non-Limbu landholders, and 
199* (M8 ) ere with other Indreni Limbus.
The picture, then, is of a series of prongs 
emanating out from Limbu kipat-owning households, 
linking them to a wide assortment of landholders.
Most households have ties to several landholders, 
others to a single one. Many have ties to Limbu 
landholders who are themselves mortgagors of kipat. 
These linkages can be expressed diegrammatically as 
follows:
Landholders
Limbu land-owners/ 
holders
Limbu households
Lig. 5
Is the pledging of l3nd the only means whereby 
Limbus can obtain credit? It is necessary to consider 
this question in order to discern the range of 
credit choices available, and the relative importance
A
of mortgage credit as compared with loan credit .
1 . To avoid confusion in terminology, ’loan’ will imply 
interest-bearing loans only, end not loans against 
which lands are pledged, and usufruct transferred to 
the creditor.
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The discussion will also attempt to indicate the 
extent to which loan credit linkages 'converge' with 
those formed 011 the basis of mortgages.
Loan Credit
Loans can be obtained without the necessity of 
transferring rights of usufruct to land. Short-term, 
non-interest bearing loans of small amounts (sapat) are 
occasionally given to close kinsmen or neighbours*
They require no security and generally no documents 
are written to attest to the loan. However, these 
loans account for only a minute-proportion of loan 
credit given or received, and for the purposes of this 
discussion, this type of loan can be ignored.
Generally, land or other property is put up to 
secure a loan, but unlike possessory mortgages, the 
borrower retains possession ox the property, forfeiting 
it (if kipat lend, its usufruct) only if he defaults 
on the payment. Loans (rin) of this sort bear interest 
at anywhere from 15 ~ 55/^> although the law stipulates 
a maximum of 10$. A substantial proportion of loans 
are made in grains, and both interest and capital would 
generally be repaid in kind, .even where cash loans 
are made, creditors almost always state the interest
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and require its payment in quantities of grain. This 
has tended to work against the interests of the debtor, 
since grain prices have been rising steadily, so that, 
for example, a loan negotiated ten years ago at 20$ 
interest on the basis of a stipulated quantity of grain, 
would now bear 30-55$ interest at the present xorice of 
the same grain.
The amount of loan credit available is obviously 
limited by the property which Limbus can put up as 
security. Other than land only jewellery and cattle 
ai"e available to secure loans. Jewellery usually 
enters a house as part of a dowry at the time of or 
soon after a new wife joins her husband in his 
settlement. Later, if the husband can afford it, she 
may receive an additional gift of gold or silver ornaments. 
But any jewellery given a woman by hex' natal household 
remains her personal possession and her husband exercises 
no claim to this property. The rights of the husband 
to gifts given by him to his wife is less clear. Most 
informants suggest that once given, a gift of jewellery 
could not be taken back during the wife's lifetime.
But they add that a good wife would allow the jewellery 
to be put up as security if the household were in
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serious economic difficulty. However, a men’s 
prestige would suffer if it were known that lie 
offered his wife's ornaments to secure 3 loan.
In any case, few Limbu households manage to 
store any substantial wealth in the form of jewellery. 
All women would possess silver bracelets; a few 
would have silver anklets; but only the v/ealthiest 
are able to afford a splendidly carved silver charm 
box. fhe value of silver ornaments in the Indreni 
settlements amounts to an average of approximately 
Rs 80 per household. Ownership of gold jewellery 
averages about Rs 200 per household although perhaps 
half the Limbu women have no more than a gold nose 
ring and a nostril piece worth about Rs 50 together.
Loans are frequently obtained by offering 
cattle as security. In Larch, 1964- a Subba, after 
collecting taxes for submission to the tax office, 
flitted away the money during a trip to the plains.
In danger of losing his title, he borrowed Rs 115 
against the security of his bullocks. He was given 
until November to repay the loan, and when he was 
unable, the lender added another Rs 100 and kept the 
cattle. A fully grown pair of draught animals can
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fetch up to Its 500 on sale, and a milch cov; is worth 
in the region of Rs 350. -The- paucity of csttle, 
hov/ever, partly s function of the dearth of grazing 
land in the area of the Indreni settlements, limits 
the amount of credit available on such security.
Despite the fact that draught cattle are essential 
for farming in the Indreni settlements, only 56 out of 
85 Limbu households (65*lf0 possess a pair of bullocks. 
Sixty-one additional head of cattle are distributed 
among 35 households, while eight households share 19 
buffaloes. Thus a total of 192 head of cattle are 
available in the Limbu community, the majority of 
them already offered as security.
The Limbus have outstanding interest-bearing 
debts of approximately Rs 28,000, hhen compared 
with the value of mortgages which total about Rs 516,400, 
it is seen that loan credit is a very small proportion 
(8#) of the total outstanding debt^.
1. Ten households of non-kipet-owning Limbus have
outstanding debts of Rs 2980, but since, by definition, 
they have no kipat land to mortgage, I have omitted 
these figures for purposes of comparison.
Chongbung 
Lineage (l) 
Lineage (2) 
Lineage (3) 
Lineage (4) 
Lineage (5)
Kambo 
Lineage (1) 
Lineage (2)
if embeke
Byeling
Phatra
Interest-bearing loans 
(aver, per household)
.Mortgage loans 
(every per household)
Rs 760 Rs 6160
518 4302
238 2090
150 2328
511 5590
493 10048
328 15616
553 5405
50 3298
160 24
Table 16 compares average mortgages outstanding 
with loans outstanding by households in each lineage. 
These figures convey little meaning in themselves 
without being set against annual incomes per household. 
Por the present purpose what is significant is the 
ratio of the two categories of debt. In no case is 
the average credit obtained from interest-bearing loans 
more than 10.%' of the average household's total credit 
(this in Chongbung Lineage (l)). Pox1 the Syeling 
households the figure is as low as 1.5% Clearly, then, 
mortgages are by far the primary means of raising 
money in the Indreni settlements. I hove suggested
that a scarcity of security other than land may he 
pert of the reason for the rather lopsided proportions 
of mortgage and loan credit. But another factor might 
be mentioned os well. Once land has been mortgaged, 
a Limbu can continue to obtain mortgage loans on the 
security of the same land, thus obviating the pressures 
to seek credit elsewhere. This will be discussed in 
greater detail at the end of this chapter. The next 
step in the analysis, to which I now turn, is a 
consideration of the linkages formed by loan credit, 
and the extent to which they are convergent with those 
based on mortgages.
It has been shown that only Qyo of all out­
standing credit in the Cluster is based on interest- 
bearing loans. be would expect, then, that the 
average number of ties between a borrower household 
and its lenders would be fewer than its ties to land­
holders. The fact that the borrowing household has 
an average of 2.5 linkages to lenders bears this out. 
Table 17 gives the 'breakdown 01 linkages.
187.
TABLE 17 
Link ages to lenders
Number of Linkages Limbu Borrower Households
To: 1 lender
2 lenders
3 lenders 
d lenders
5 lenders
6 lenders
13 households 
15 households 
12 households 
d households 
d households 
2 households
To whet extent do linkages made with creditors 
providing interest-bearing losns converge with those 
formed on the basis of mortgages? A comparison of 
the distribution of the sources of these two kinds of 
credit gives us an indication of the degree of overlap. 
From Table 18 we note that Brahmins resident in the 
Cluster provide almost no credit unless it is secured 
by land mortgaging. This suggests that Limbus must 
seek loan credit outside the Cluster, especially from 
members of other castes to make up for the lack of 
non-Limbu lenders in the Indreni settlements.
5UBLE 18
Comparison of mortgage and loan credit distribution
Percentage of Mortgage Percentage of
Credit Provided Loan Credit
_________      Provided
Limbus in Cluster 15*5 16.9
Limbus ex Cluster 6.9 6.1
Brahmins in Cluster 12.1 .3
Jaisis in Cluster 2.4 2.8
Brahmins/Jaisis ex Cluster 41.3 44.3
Others ex Cluster 21.8 29*6
Since Brahmins in the Cluster are part of the 
Main Landholder category distinguished earlier on, it 
is essential to know how the category as s whole, 
which holds approximately 70# of all kipat mortgaged, 
fares as a source of loan credit. l/hereas the nineteen 
Main Landholders provide 71*1# of all mortgage credit, 
the same category yields only 40/ of loans to Limbu 
borrowers. Nine of these Mg in. Landholders, who 
together provide 20.7# of the mortgage credit, supply 
no loans whatsoever. Six of these persons ™ five 
Brahmins and. one Limbu - are resident in the Cluster,
Ihe impression given by these figures is that the two 
kinds of ci’edit sought by Limbus are available only to 
a limited extent from the same sources. The impression 
is borne out by an examination of the total number of
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linkages formed between Li mbu households end borrows a 
supplying losn credit. Only 59-3^ of these linkages 
are with Main Landholders. This is to be compared 
with 59.4# of mortgage linkages formed with the same 
category. Linkages with other Limbu lenders in the 
Cluster account for 19.6!# of the total - which compares 
favourably with 19*0# of mortgage ties. Ties to non- 
Limbus (other than the Main Landholders) account for 
40,9# of all loan credit linkages, while only 21,6# 
of mortgage ties were with this category of creditor.
There is some convergence of the two kinds of 
credit ties with those Mein Landholders who provide 
loan as well as mortgage credit. Of 50 loan credit 
linkages formed with these Main Landholders, almost 
40# converge with those formed for mortgage purposes.
Put another way nineteen Limbu households are related 
to some Mein Landholders both as kipat mortgagors and 
as borrowers of interest loans. Outside the Main 
Landholding category, convergences of this sort occurred 
in only two cases between Limbu households and other 
Limbu lenders. In brief, given s small area of 
overlap between the two sources of credit, providers of 
mortgage credit and of loan credit are essentially
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different sections of the population in and surrounding 
the Indreni settlements. The credit links emanating 
from a limbu household might be represented &iagram­
matically as below.
handhold ers/Lend ers
Limbu landowners/borrowers 
landhold ers/lend ers
Q
Limbu household
Solid line represents links to landholders 
Broken line represents links to lenders
Fig. 6
I began the chapter by a consideration of 
social relationships crested by the mortgaging of kipat 
land. To determine the relative importance of other 
forms of credit it was then necessary to discuss the 
sources of and linkages based on loan credit. The 
next part of this chapter returns to the examination 
of social ties created by other rights in land.
Mortgages transfer rights of usufruct from the land­
owner to the landholder. But there still remains 
the question of who cultivates the land?
Tenancy
The person to whom land is pledged may choose 
to cultivate the land himself, or transfer the rights 
of cultivation to a tenant in return for a share of 
the crops. Two kinds of tenancy arrangement can be 
made. The first is an agreement to share equally 
all the production of a field, including any subsidiary 
crops. On an irrigated field, for example, the 
contracting parties would divide not only the paddy 
crop, but the lentils which are usually grown in the 
levees of the terraces. They would even share the 
straw of the paddy. with such an arrangement, the
1 mlandlord provides at least hali the seed. The 
second kind of tenancy, which is the one more commonly 
practised, is the stipulation of a fixed rent to be 
paid by the tenant at the time of harvest. The rent 
is generally a part of the main crop, but where a
1. I use ’landlord' as a generic term for the person 
who transfers the rights of cultivation to a tenant. 
He may be the landowner, or the landholder.
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tenant cultivates a dry field, the agreement nay 
specify payment in either millet or maize. The 
landlord has no claim on subsidiary crops or straw, 
although he has first right to the produce of the land, 
so that he has a measure of insurance against s poor 
harvest. The landlord does not provide the seed, but 
he normally pays the costs of transporting the rent 
from the field to his home.
.diether or not a landholder cultivates a field 
he takes under mortgage depends on a variety of factors. 
If the land is near his homestead, the time saved in 
going to and from the field, and the ease with which 
manure can be transported to, and the harvest brought 
from the field will likely make it worthwhile for
A
the landholder to cultivate the land himself . As 
well, if the land is adjacent to a field he is already 
cultivating he will almost certainly cultivate it 
himself. The additional expenditure of resources 
required to encompass the adjacent field is considerably 
less than the commensurate gains he can expect. One 
factor likely to weigh, in favour of giving the land to
1 . There is also the problem of guarding dry fields, 
especially against monkeys who sometimes destroy 
a substantial portion of the maize crop.
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8 tenant is the shortage of available labour in the 
household. But a wealthy man, especially a Brahmin, 
even with adequate labour resources at his command, 
is reluctant to send the women in his household to 
the fields. In either of these situations, agri­
cultural labourers would have to be hired. In such 
circumstances, the landholder might decide to transfer 
the cultivation rights to a tenant.
If a landholder chooses to give the kipat land 
he has taken under mortgage to a tenant, the Limbu 
kipat-owner is considered to have the right of first 
refusal. The kipat owner may waive these rights 
or may accept the tenancy and then transfer culti­
vation rights to a sub-tenant. The latter pays the 
kipat-owner a small part of the crop over and above 
the agreed rent payable to the landholder. Nowadays 
this practice is rare, and I have recorded only a dozen
A
instances involving such double tenancy ,
Occasionally, the kipat owner's right of first 
refusal is reaffirmed in the mortgage document. In 
most instances the landholders honour the rule and, as
1. To avoid confusion, in any statistics on tenancy 
which follow, the person actually cultivating the 
land will be regarded as the tenant.
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I shall point out presently, the kipat ov/ner is often 
in a position to enforce his claim. Landholders are 
seldom reluctant to allow the kipat ov/ner to cultivate 
the land as a tenant unless he is slow to pay the rent.
Some informants state that kipat-owners usually
pay less rent when cultivating their own land as 
tenants than when cultivating land belonging to some­
one else. My own data on rents do not bear out this 
statement. Nents vary considerably from as 'little1 
as one-quarter of gross production to as much as 
one-half, and the range applies equally to owner- 
tenants and stranger-tenants. No single reason can 
explain the variation. One Limbu explained that he 
had accepted to pay s rent amounting to 50# of the main 
crop because the field was adjacent to another he was 
already cultivating. There is also the personal 
factor to be considered: some landholders are known
to charge higher rents than others, and tenants of 
those charging lower rents seldom give up their 
contracts. Ulien it is found that a Limbu kipat- 
owner is in fact paying a low rent as tenant on his 
own land, the explanation may lie in the size of the
mortgage. A Limbu may be forced to pledge a field to
meet an unexpected obligation, end accepts far less 
than the actual land value in the hope of repaying 
the amount quickly and resuming his land. In such 
a case, the rent would probably be & comparatively 
small proportion of the harvest. The evidence 
indicates that rents will have the same variation 
whether the contracting parties are both Limbus or 
members of different castes. But the relationship 
of the individuals can affect the rent. In the only 
three cases in which the Limbu landlord and tenant 
are siblings or father and son, the rents have been 
in the range of 25#, and in two of these cases the 
tenant was not in fact cultivating the land he owned.
How are cultivation rights to land mortgaged by 
Indreni Limbus distributed? Over half (52.5#) 0ne 
being worked by the landholders themselves, while the 
remaining 47.5# have been let to tenants. The 
distribution of mortgaged kipat land among various 
categories of tenants is shown in Table 19. Just 
over 15# of mortgaged lands are being cultivated by 
their owners as tenants. Approximately the same 
amount is being share-cropped by kipat-owning Limbus 
who are not, however, the owners of the land they work 
as tenants. Limbus who are not kipat owners and other
Indreni residents (Msgars end Blacksmiths) are 
tenants on 5.1# of mortgaged lends. The remainder - 
15%' ~ ore worked by non-Limbu tenants resident out­
side the ^luster.
TABLE 19
Distribution of cultivation rights 011 mortgaged lands
Cultivators Percentage of 
Mortgaged Land 
Cultivated
Limbu landholders .15*1
Non-Limbu landholders 37-4
The kipat-owners as tenants 14.3
Other kipat-owning Limbus as tenants 15•!
Non-kipat-owning Limbus as tenants 1.3
Non-Limbus x'esident in Cluster, as tenants 1.8
Non-Limbus resident outside Cluster, as tenants 15.0
100.0#
To complete the figures on tenancy, we must 
also mention how cultivation rights to unmortgaged 
kipat are assigned. It will be recalled that 31*7$ 
of all kipat lands are unmortgaged. Of these, 5*2# 
are given to non-Limbu tenants outside the Indreni 
Cluster, while kipat-owning Limbus cultivate 4.2# 
as share-croppers. The remaining 90.6# are worked 
by the kipat-owners themselves.
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te might now examine the linkages based on 
tenancy, i'ifty kipat-owning Limbus cultivate kipat 
land as tenants, Table 20 shows how many landlords 
they are linked to,
TABLE 20 
Linkages to landlords
Iso, of linkages No. of Limbu Tenant Households
To: 1 landlord 24- households
2 landlords 19 households
3 landlords 5 households
4 landlords 2 households
Limbu tenant households are linked to an average 
of 1,5 landlords. Again, the greatest proportion of 
linkages between tenants and landlords are with Main 
Landholders (76,4$) while 12,9$ with other kipat- 
owning Limbus in the Indreni Cluster and 10,7$ with 
other non-Limbus. These figures can be compared with 
those of linkages formed on the basis of mortgages and 
loan credit mentioned earlier.
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TABLE 21
Comparison of distribution of mortgage, tenancy and loan 
_____ .     credit linkages_     ___
Linkage Type Percentage with Percentage with Percentage with
 ______ Main Landholders other KO Limbus other. non-Limbu
Mortgage 59.4 19.0 21.6
Tenancy 76,4 12,9 10.7
Loan Credit 39.3 19.6 40.9
The comparatively low figures for tenancy linkages 
with landlords other than the Main Landholders suggests, 
on the one hand, that the latter, who are by definition 
the wealthiest landlords, cannot cultivate themselves 
all the lands they have taken under mortgage. On
the other hand, the remaining landlords, to a much
greater extent, take lands under mortgage in order 
to cultivate these lands themselves, and so are not 
as able to transfer cultivation rights to Limbus,
A high proportion of tenant households - 
thirty-three out of fifty - cultivate as tenants 
lands which they own themselves, and which have been 
mortgaged to Main Landholders. As well, eleven of 
these households have borrowed monies from these same 
landholders. In such instances, we might speak of 
double and triple ’convergences', since these house­
holds are linked to the same individuals as landowners
to landholders, tenants to landlords, and in some 
cases as borrowers to lenders.
another kind of linkage might be mentioned.
It is that between a kipat owner and the tenant 011 
his land which has been pledged to a landholder.
I have shown in Table 19 that 33.2$ of mortgaged 
kipat is cultivated, by tenants other than the kipat 
owner himself. In such cases a tie is created between 
the kipat owner and the tenant working the land.
There are 34 linkages of this nature between kipat 
owners and other Limbu tenants on their land, and a 
similar number with non-Limbus, The tie is not a 
direct one in the sense that no payments are made by 
one to the other. The relationship is based on 
different interests in the same land.. For one thing, 
since the kipat owner is considered to have prior 
claims to tenancy, the rights of a tenant who is not 
the owner are dependent to a considerable extent on 
the kipat owner's desire and. ability to exercise his 
claims. for another, any change of landholder can 
influence the security of a tenant, and., as I shall 
show presently, the Limbu kipat-owner is in a position 
to effect such a change.
In the foregoing paragraphs I have attempted 
to use quantitative data on mortgages, loan credit 
and tenancy to illustrate the complex pattern of 
relationships which links Limbu households both to 
each other and to members of other castes in the Indreni 
settlements and the surrounding area. It was found 
that for mortgages and tenancy the Limbus are linked 
to a wide range of landholders and landlords. Many 
of these linkages are concentrated within a small 
wealthy class - whose members represent under 4$ of 
the total Village household population - and most of 
whom are Brahmins. l?or credit other than that 
obtained by pledging; land the Limbus rely on this 
class to a lesser extent, casting their net wider, as 
it were, and creating other linkages to obtain the 
loans they require.
The Limbu household has been viewed as the 
central point from which emanate several series of 
linkage S. j-j ach series relates to a specific context
or purpose. The Limbu household establishes relation­
ships with one or more households from which it obtains 
loan credit: this is one series. It establishes
another on the basis of mortgages, and a third when it 
contracts tenancy agreements. There is yet another
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series created out of the latter two: that between
owners and tenants. i/hen superimposed on one 
another these series of linkages give a picture (at 
one moment in time) of the range of a household's 
relationships in, let us say, an economic context.
The superimposition reveals a certain amount of 
convergence in the linkages, so that some kipet-owners 
are mortgagors, tenants and borrowers to the same 
individuals. Some are tied to landlords as tenants, 
and at the same time to other tenants as landlords.
The point 1 am concerned to establish here is 
that the basic unit in Indreni society - the household - 
is the focus for a number of linkages each of which 
arises in a pax'ticular context (mortgage, tenancy) 
by means of dyadic contracts between the focal house­
hold and the individuals or households which compose 
the series. Some Limbu households are liable to have 
the same terminal points in a particular series as 
have other households. Even where the series are not 
identical there is bound to be a continuous overlapping 
of linkages emanating from the various Limbu households 
because of the concentration of much wealth in few 
hands. Etill, it is unlikely that the totality of 
relationships based on a number of linkages around any
one household would be identical with those of any 
other.
hoes the totality of linkage series, once 
formed, show signs of becoming a persistent entity?
The question might be directed primarily to series 
based on mortgage links, since the crucial relation­
ships, from which those of tenancy and loan credit 
follow, are based on mortgages. It has been 
established that few Limbus ore able to repossess 
their mortgaged lands. Most have Inherited kipat 
already pledged to landholders, and as I will.show in 
the next chapter current income is barely enough to 
meet ’normal1 obligations, let alone provide enough 
to repay heavy mortgages. The majority of Limbu 
households remain permanently indebted and their lands 
permanently under mortgage. Given such conditions, 
the above question might be phrased in another way: 
is the relationship between landholder and kipst-owner 
one in which power resides overwhelmingly with the 
former at the expense of the latter?
The Manipulation of Ties
Since 1901 kipat land has not been alienable 
by sale. Members of other castes with monies to invest
in land can purchase only raikar land, which is in 
short supply. As a result its costs have been driven 
to almost prohibitive heights. Lor many, taking 
kipat under pledge is the only practical alternative. 
But since most kipat land is already pledged, the 
potential landholder is forced to offer the kipat 
owner a higher mortgage than that given by the existing 
landholder. 1Kipat is like a goat1, Brahmin land­
holders remark, 'it goes to the highest bidder'.
Since the kipat owner can repossess his lands upon 
repayment of the mortgage capital, the new landholder 
supplies this amount, and an increment (bard) for the 
owner. The increment is not a gift, but is added to 
the mortgage capital. Rights of usufruct are trans­
ferred to the new landholder, where they remain - 
until the process is repeated. In this way, many 
kipat lands change hands every few years, so that the 
security of kipat landholders is at best tenuous.
This process can be documented by several examples.
a) In 1954, Loftene pledged a kipat paddy field to a 
Brahmin in a nearby settlement outside the Indreni 
Cluster. The mortgage capital was Rs 980, In 1958, 
the land was repossessed by the Limbu end re-pledged to
a Rai landholder who had added another Rs 980 bard 
bringing the mortgage capital to Rs 1920, In 1983, 
the first Brahmin landholder offered to let Loftane 
have another Rs 980 bard for the right of the usufruct 
on the same land. The latter took the field back from 
the Rai and re-pledged it to the Brahmin. The mortgage 
capital is now Rs 2880,
b) Bire mortgaged s paddy field to a Brahmin from a 
nearby settlement outside the Cluster in 1955- Live 
years later a Jaisi offered Bire bard of Rs 240 more 
than the mortgage capital. The land was taken from 
the first landholder and transferred to the second.
c) In 1928 Suk Bahadur, a Ksmbo, mortgaged a paddy 
field for Rs 80 to a Cobbler. Six years later, the 
younger brother’s widow of the deceased Suk Bahadur 
repossessed the land and transferred it to a Brahmin 
who gave her bard of Rs 50, bringing the capital to 
Rs 130. Live years later the landholder was again 
changed to a Chongbung Limbu, who offered Rs 70 bard, 
thus bringing the capital to Rs 200. The present 
landholder, a Jaisi, took possession 15 years later by 
adding Rs 200 to the capital in the form of bard given 
to Suk Bahadur’s heir.
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The decision to transfer kipat from one land­
holder to another Is taken only after the kipat owner 
is satisfied that the existing landholder will not 
meet the new offer. Since all mortgage holders 
recognize the potential threat to their security of 
tenure, the practice has taken root in the Cluster 
whereby landholders accede to Limbu requests for bard 
on a regular basis, without waiting until another 
potential landholder forces their hand.
The Limbus are thus able to use the ownership 
of land and their rights of repossession as a wedge 
to obtain interest-free loans. The Limbu who owns 
kipat long since mortgaged relies on periodic visits 
to his landholders for bard to meet contingencies.
The most common reasons cited for asking bard are 
household expenses which generally means food, require­
ments. Funerals, weddings and compensation demands 
from aggrieved husbands are also occasions for 
requesting bard. For example, we might follow the 
history of one mortgage on land given to a Brahmin 
in 1958 for Rs 128 to cover household expenses. For 
the next ten years two Limbu brothers took an average 
of Rs 90 per year for similar expenses. In 1948 the 
elder brother died and Rs 80 bard was taken to help
meet the costs of his funeral. During each of the
five years following an average of Rs 40 was added to 
the mortgage capital for household expenses. In 1953 
the son of the younger brother was married and Rs 144 
was borrowed, the amount added to the capital. An 
average of only Rs 32 was taken each of the following 
five years for the household and in 1959 the widow 
of the elder brother died. For her funeral expenses 
Rs 80 was added to the mortgage. During the next 
five years, until 1964, an average of Es 63 per year 
was taken for the household. The total value of the 
mortgage is now Rs 2009•
Limbus attempting to keep mortgages to a 
minimum in the hope of repossessing their kipat, of 
course do everything they can to avoid running up the 
debt. In such cases mortgage capital may remain level 
for years, and no attempt is made to play off land­
holders for the purpose of obtaining bard. But these
Limbus represent a very small minority of the Indreni 
population.
For most, bard represents an important source of 
capital to close the gap left by insufficient agri­
cultural production. One Limbu, for example, an 
old Subbs, collected Rs 576 from seven landholders in
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1965 and, in addition, transferred s large paddy 
field to a new landholder wlo.o gave the Limbu bard 
which increased the mortgage capital by Rs 1600,
The example is atypical of the amounts usually obtain­
able from landholders; but it is representative of 
the despairing attitude on the part of most kipat- 
owners towards ever reclaiming their lands. Lew 
entertain the hope of repaying their mortgages, but 
realize that in their ownership rights lies the only 
opportunity to benefit from kipat, a variety of 
practices have been devised to exploit these rights.
Limbus with more than one field pledged to a 
single landholder might request one of these fields 
as bard, and distribute the capital on this field among 
the mortgages on the remaining fields. Lome who are 
tenants on kipat lands they own will withhold the rent 
and regard it as bard to be added to the capital.
Others desirous of becoming tenants on their kipat 
will use the threat of repossession and transfer in- 
order to pressure an otherwise reluctant landholder.
Placed in such a position, landholders must 
balance the demands of the Limbu kipat-owner against 
the benefits they derive from continuing to hold the 
land under mortgage. Unlike the Limbu owners, many
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of whom ore unaware of the extent of their indebted- 
ness and hence unable to establish a rational basis 
for their continued demands, most landholders determine 
approximate limits beyond which additional payments 
would bring diminishing returns. Even so, the ’cut­
off point is constantly changing as pressures on 
land increase. In a sense, bard can be seen as a 
built-in cost index for kipat land. For as its 
value rises the landholders recognize the increase by 
giving the kipst-owner these additional loans against 
security of the land they have already taken under 
mortgage.
An analysis of 75 kijjat histories based on land 
documents reveals the pattern of increases in mortgage 
capital due to bard increments. faking the initial 
mortgage capital as index 100, twelve histories show 
that during the first five ^ears a mortgage is held 
the capital increases by an average of between 20 - 30$ 
(median value 5 - 10$). Another eleven histories of
1. This is partially due to the traditional practice of 
making only one document which is kept by the land­
holder. .For three years now both parties have been 
required to keep a copy of mortgage agreements, but 
bard receipts are still kept only by the landholder.
kipat land held between 6 - 1 0  years indicate that by 
this period the capital has risen to an average index 
of 140 - 150 (median index 120 - 130). Eighteen 
histories indicate that the mortgage capital will have 
risen- to an average of just over double the initial 
capital between 11 - 15 years after the lend was 
mortgaged (median index 140 - 150). Between 16 - 
20 years after the initial transaction the average 
index will be 310 - 320 (median 190 - 200) - based on 
thirteen histories. Twenty-one histories of land held 
for the unusually long period of over 20 years shows 
lqajrd to have driven the capital up to an average index 
of 470 - 480 (median index 330 - 340). Table 22 
summarizes the data.
TABLE 22
Mortgage capital increases due to bard
Period After Initial
_____ pj.ortgage   A v e r a g e  Index Median Index
Within 5 years 120 - 130 105 - H O
6 - 1 0  years 140 - 150 120 - 130
11 - 15 years 200 - 210 140 - 150
16 - 20 years 310 - 320 190 - 200
Over 20 years 470 - 480 530 - 340
Based on 75 mortgage histories
The practice of herd is made possible by the 
nature of the kipat system of land tenure. Because 
kipat land is inalienable by sale, the Limbus retain 
the final right of repossession of lands however trans­
ferred to others* By retention of this right the 
kipat owner is able to play off competing interests 
for scarce lands to his own advantage in a kind of 
institutionalised extortion. It is not surprising 
that on more than one occasion I was told that If it 
were not for bard the Limbus would have to leave the 
Indreni Cluster and emigrate to India.
In this chapter I have attempted to show how 
the Limbu household is the focus of several series of 
relationships based on mortgages, loan credit and 
tenancy. Each linkage represents a dyadic contract 
entered into between the Limbu household and a partner 
it has chosen from a fairly wide range of possibilities. 
Because of the nature of kipat tenure the persistence 
of these contractual ties depends on the balance of 
advantage to be gained by both parties to the contract. 
In other words, despite the fact that Limbus usually 
fill the subordinate roles in these economic linkages, 
they are not trapped in the vice of clientage by those 
with whom they are linked. The linkages formed around
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8 household are thereby changing or poised to change. 
This can be attributed to Limbu ownership of kipat 
land.
I have stressed the element of choice in the 
contracting of mortgage relationships, and as a by­
product of the latter of loan and tenancy ties as 
well. But I do not want to create the impression of 
the Indreni settlements as an open market place v;here 
land is freely bid for and continuously transferred in 
response to market factors. J-'here are, of course, 
restrictions on the freedom of choice to sever existing 
and form new linkages. The most obvious of these 
limitations is the fact that the Limbus are an econom­
ically depressed group and as such, depend for a 
large part of their subsistence on these relationships. 
The second limiting factor has already been touched on: 
it concerns the fact that of the wide range of linkages 
formed by any household, many are convergent. But 
another way, it might be suggested that the more 
multiplex the linkages, the less freedom of choice 
for the kipst-owner to manipulate relationships 
based on land. hhen the range of relationships is 
extended to include those of kinship, neighbourhood and
politics, the number of convergences multiplies, 
ns the Limbu household becomes 'hemmed in' by these 
relationships, of contract and status, its capacity 
for choice is curtailed.
Before discussing the nature of some of these 
other ties, still another aspect of the Limbu house­
hold's license in contracting social relationships 
must be considered. It pertains to the extent of 
the household's independence of the agricultural 
economy and, alternatively, its dependence on outside 
sources of wealth.
The growth of new opportunities for earning 
wealth outside the traditional agricultural economy 
affects social relationships within the Cluster in two 
ways* In the first place, it has given rise to a 
small class of wealthy Limbus who, to the extent that 
they invest this wealth in land, are displacing Brahmins 
and members of other castes as landholders, Becnndly, 
the exploitation of opportunities outside the agricultural 
system serves further to weaken the ties of dependency 
on all landlords, which ties, are, as I have shown, in 
any case mitigated by the prerogatives of kipat ownership. 
In the beginning of this chapter I consider whether the 
agricultural economy meets the basic food requirements 
of the household. The various recurrent and contingent 
expenses which it must meet are then discussed.
Finally, the sources of 'commercial1 income are reviewed 
and compared with income from agriculture.
Paddy, maize and millet are the principal crops
A
grown in the Indreni settlements . Paddy - there are
*1. According to one economist 80.4# of the total cultivated 
area in the country is given up to these crops.
(Pant, 1965, p.12).
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as many as twelve varieties grown - is planted in 
irrigated fields along the terraced slopes of mountain­
sides, mainly in the lowlands close to river valleys.
A comprehensive system of irrigation channels directs 
the mountain streams into the paddy terraces which 
store the water. During the first two weeks of May, 
prior to the commencement of the monsoon rains, seed 
beds are ploughed, inundated, and levelled after which 
they are seeded and fertilized with green leaves.
Five to six weeks later, when the seedlings are about 
12" high, they are transplanted into the paddy fields 
which have in the meanwhile been prepared as were the 
seed beds. During September, the fields are weeded 
and the paddy is ready for harvesting in November.
Indreni Limbus, like most cultivators in the district 
grow only one paddy crop a year. There is little 
attempt to plant winter crops for fear of its effects 
on the paddy yield. A few wealthy Limbu households in 
Ghitolc follow Brahmin neighbours in planting small 
quantities of wheat in paddy lands at higher elevations. 
But they have been able to do so only because of adequate 
livestock holdings which enable them to manure the 
fields.
Maize is the chief crop grown in dry fields 
generally situated on higher ground, and mainly on plots
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surrounding homesteads. The fields are first ferti­
lized with a mixture of straw, leaves and manure, which 
is then ploughed into the soil. In March, with the 
onset of the brief and intermittent spring rains the 
seed is broadcast. About eight weeks after planting 
and again four or five weeks later the fields are weeded. 
The maize is ready for harvesting in late august or 
early September.
Millet, the third most important crop grown in 
the Indreni settlements is sown in dry seed beds in 
July, and transplanted about four weeks later, Borne 
cultivators plant the seedlings in the shade of the 
maize stalks, while others prefer to clear a small 
plot beforehand. One weeding, in September, is 
sufficient, and the crop is reaped in November.
Households also reserve a small section of their 
homestead sites to grow mustard seed, potatoes, squash, 
cabbage, cauliflower, spinach, pumpkin, cucumbers, 
tomatoes, etc. Bananas are the most commonly kept 
fruit, while two households have small mandarin groves.
Are Limbus able to depend entirely on the pro­
duction from the fields they cultivate to meet food 
requirements? By this term is not meant an objective 
measure of minimal demands of nutrition. Instead, it 
emerges from the estimates given by household heads of
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the quantities of grain required daily to feed their 
families. Of course, this does not mean that the 
Limbu household is always able to provide for its 
members what it recognizes as their requirements.
When stocks are running low, especially during July 
and August, before the maize is ripe, they may be 
forced to cut down their food consumption. On the 
other hand, since the period of greatest shortage 
comes in the midst of the most demanding agricultural 
season, the household will usually borrow if necessary 
to see itself through the few weeks to the maize 
harvest. As a result, the estimates of food require­
ments are a fairly accurate reflection of what the 
household actually consumes.
The statements about food requirements made by 
informants vary little. Adults (aged 14 and over) 
consume one unit per day or 365 units per year#
Children from 10 - 13 years are half-consumers, while 
those between 2 - 9  quarter consumers. The 
requirements of children under two years are insigni- 
ficsnt and can be ignored .
The 85 Limbu households in the Indreni Cluster 
require 102,600 units of grain per annum or an average
1. These consumption figures accord almost exactly with 
those given by Bailey (1957, pp. 277-78)#
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of slightly more than 1200 units per household.
Kipat lands in the Cluster have a productive capacity 
of approximately 136,860 units, more than enough to 
meet food requirements. In addition, Limbus own raikar 
land with a productive capacity of 8290 units. However, 
as was shown, a large proportion of kipat land has been 
mortgaged. Lven so, many of these lands are being 
cultivated by Limbu tenants. To arrive at the total 
of agricultural income from lands owned or cultivated 
by Indreni Limbus, we must add together production 
figures from (a) unmortgaged kipat lands cultivated by 
the owners; (b) rsikar lands owned and cultivated by 
Limbus; (c) mortgaged kipat lands cultivated by Limbu 
landholders; (d) mortgaged kipat lands cultivated by 
Limbu tenants; (e) rsikar lands cultivated by Limbu 
tenants. To these figures must then be added (f) 
the rent received by Limbu landlords from non-Limbu 
tenants. Finally, from the total of all these we 
subtle ct (g) the rent paid by Limbu tenants to land­
lords other than Limbus resident in the Cluster.
Table 23 gives the appropriate figures.
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T.-BLE 23 
Agricultural, income
a) from unmortgaged kipat lands cultivated
by owners
b) from rsikar lands cultivated, by Limbu
owners
c) from mortgaged kipat lands cultivated by
Limbu landholders
d) from mortgaged kipat lands cultivated
by Limbu tenants
e) from reikar lands cultivated by Limbu
tenants
f) rent received by Limbu landlords from
non-Limbu tenants
g) rent paid by Limbu tenants to other than
Indreni Limbu landlords
Agricultural income (after rent)
Leaving aside the costs of cultivation, agricultural 
income after rent amounts to 84.9$ of the food require­
ments of Limbu households. This is an aggregate figure 
for the whole population in the Cluster. The degree to 
which each household produces its own food requirements 
varies considerably. Twenty-two (25.9$) households 
produce more than their minimal food requirements.
Another eight households (9.5$) produce just enough to 
meet these requirements, while the remaining fifty- 
five households (64.6$) produce less than they require. 
Table 24 gives the breakdown of households in the 
latter category.
Units
41,150 
7*522 
14,096 
28,752 
2,425
95*664
87,157
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TABLE 24-
Production of food, requirements by 'deficit* households
Percentage of Pood No, of Percentage
Requirements Brodue e d Households of Households
Under 25$ of requirements 5 5*9
25 - 4-9$ of requirements 19 22,5
50 - 74-$ of requirements 22 25*9
Over 75$ of requirements 10,5
55 64-, 6$
By way of comparison, of the non-Limbus in the 
Cluster, all six Brahmin and one Jaisi households 
produce more than their food requirements. The four 
Magar and three Blacksmith households, on the other hand, 
like the majority of Limbus, produce less than their 
requirements. Two Blacksmith households produce just 
over a quarter, while a third yields slightly more than 
half. One Magar household produces 58$, another 52$, 
a third 65$ and a fourth 89$ of household food require­
ments for consumption purposes.
Aside from feeding its members, the Limbu 
household must meet other expenditures. Beginning 
with recurrent obligations, some of these expenditures 
are considered in the following paragraphs.
Recurrent Obligations
Before considering the household budget and 
the kinds of consumer items imported into the Cluster,
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it will be worthwhile noting the number end variety of 
retail facilities in the area, and the kinds of goods 
they offer for sale. The two shops situated on the 
main road to the west of the Cluster are hardly to be 
considered major commerical ventures. Their combined 
inventory of under Rs 500 only allows for a few items 
of stationery for local schoolchildren, religious 
articles, kerosene, tobacco and paper, sweets and a 
few staples such as spices, sugar and. salt. They 
are visited by Indreni Limbus only to replenish unex­
pected shortages and then usually by persons living in 
the settlements in the immediate vicinity. Host people 
prefer to combine their shopping with the excitement 
of market day in Ilam Bazaar*
The Bazaar is only a one hour walk - about three 
miles - south along the main road from nngbung, the 
southernmost settlement in the Cluster and just under 
a two hour walk from the northernmost - Dorumba,
On Thursdays, and to a lesser extent Sundays, hundreds 
of petty traders from the surrounding settlements set 
up 'shop* in the main square, squatting on blankets and 
bamboo mats, to sell their wares. Shoppers can buy 
from these small traders as well as from the permanent 
shops and stalls situated along the main street of the 
Bazaar. There are about ninety such shops and stalls
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offering 0 wide variety of consumer items - imported 
mainly from India - and services.
Table 25
Shops in Ilam Bazaar
28 cloth shops, most carry other goods, such as 
kerosene, sugar, metals, as well,
21 tea stalls, most sell cigarettes and sweets; 
some also sell liquor clandestinely.
29 general shops carrying both western and i.yurvedic 
medicines, stationery, toys, torches, lanterns, 
batteries and food staples.
1 hardware shop, selling various copper, iron end 
aluminium cooking vessels.
1 shoe shop.
1 watch and toi'ch repair shop.
1 1 pharmacy', carrying mainly western patent medicines.
12 stalls for shoe repairs, tailor, smith, barber, 
laundry, etc.
It is sometimes argued that exposure to western- 
type consumer goods will create an immediate demand for 
these articles. To find the means of acquiring these 
'targets', the argument goes, potential consumers will 
bring about profound changes in their work and invest­
ment patterns. This is certainly not true of the Limbus. 
r.n inventory of homesteads attests to their indifference 
to the great variety of merchandise on display each 
week in the Baza ax1. There are perhaps three torches and 
the same number of hurricane lanterns in the Cluster, 
kedicines, Ayurvedic or western, are not bought, 
umbrellas are only infrequently seen, cosmetics are
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never used. The apparent disinterest in acquiring 
these goods is undoubtedly related to their costs 
and/or costs of upkeep. Still, even the wealthiest 
men seem to prefer investing their monies in land and 
other socially valued perquisites*.
I should not give the impression that all goods 
available in the Bazaar have gone unnoticed by Limbus. 
Copper and aluminium cooking vessels hove replaced 
the earthenware of their forefathers. The women have 
taken to the brightly coloured beads and glass bangles 
sold in the Bazaar. Moreover, in all the household 
budgets I collected a number of non-durable goods 
appear regularly. Kerosene, for one thing, is a 
standard item of expenditure. This fuel is used in 
the crude lamps - a small tin can containing a wick - 
which provide the only source of indoor lighting.
Since few households produce their requirements of 
mustard seed, cooking oil must be purchased regularly 
in the Bazaar. Some of the poorest households gather 
discarded nuts from the tea plantation on the outskirts 
of the Bazaar and crush them for oil. But the amount 
obtainable in this way is slight and the taste very 
bitter. Tobacco and paper count as regular expenditures 
for most households, home of the old men remember when 
they smoked earthenware water pipes, but nowadays all
roll their tobacco i::; small strips of paper. Spices, 
soap and tea, only the latter item grown in Ham, are 
regularly purchased 011 market day*
Since large quantities of salt are required 
both for cooking purposes and for cattle, households 
which can afford the cash outlay for bulk purchases 
go as far as ^anisere, a market town in the Terai about 
two days’ walk from the Indreni Cluster* Several 
household heads, who spent part of the winter of 1965 
labouring in the ferai, each purchased out of earnings 
their annual needs - 0 maund (80 lbs*) - of salt for 
Jls 16, thereby saving themselves as much as 4-0# on the 
retail price in the Bazaar.
Meat is the most expensive item in the food 
budgets of most households. Pork is purchased at 
least twice 0 month, and by some, weekly. At the time 
I conducted a census, four-fifths of all households 
had at least one pig, so that part of the demand can 
be satisfied from within the Cluster, The sacrifice of 
a pig to the domestic gods is usually accompanied by 
the sale of its meat to neighbours. But such sacri­
fices are intermittent, so that a regular supply is 
available only from traders who sell meat on market day.
Pood items constitute one category of expenditure 
by the household. Bor those with children in school
there are fees and other school expenses to pay*
Fifteen Limbu children from twelve households were 
enrolled at the primary school situated between Angbung 
and Bharapa. These represent about one third of Limbu 
boys aged 6 - 1 5  years* No Limbu girls have as yet 
attended school. Most boys who were registered in 
fact attended sporadically, when they were not 
required to mind cattle or work in the fields. During 
March, 1964, for example, only ten of these children 
appeared at all at the school and only half that number 
attended with regularity, otill, enrollment requires 
the payment of fees which range from As. 0.80 per 
month for students in their first year to Rs 1.60 
for those in the fifth (and highest) class. Additional 
expenses for the parents of school children are for 
copy books and pencils, and the contribution of a bundle 
of thatch and a day’s labour for re-roofing the school 
house each year.
Households require cash to pay taxes, Limbus 
in the Indreni settlements pay a total of Rs 527 in 
kipat taxes each year, which means an average of 
Rs 4.35 per lcipat-owning household. Nine households 
pay Rs 29 on raikar lands owned, an average of Rs 3*25* 
Kipat ovners who have mortgaged some of their lands, 
however, are entitled to claim a proportion of their
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taxes (damasahi) from the landholders. The amount is 
determined at the time land is pledged and is written 
into the deed. The greater the amount of land mort­
gaged and the more numerous the number of landholders 
to whom it is given the larger the damasahi collected* 
Many Limbus with lands mortgaged have thus not only 
had their tax burden eased, but have in fact been able 
to turn a profit from this regulation. Eight house­
holds with taxes of up to Rs 5 pay receive more 
than Rs 10 in damasahi payments, one as much as Rs 18.4-0. 
vtfith total taxes of Rs 527 assessed, Limbus collect 
approximately Rs 380 in this way. On an aggregate basis, 
then, taxes do not constitute an expense. But not all 
households receive damasahi, and the amounts received 
by those who do, are not equally divided. In all, 35# 
of Limbu households must set aside cash to meet annual 
tax obligations.
Budgets allow for substantial expenditure on 
clothing. Each member of the household expects to be 
provided with a new set of clothing at least once a 
year, generally at the time of the Dasain festival in 
autumn. Although many Limbus in the northern parts of 
the district, and in Panchthar, still weave much of their 
own cloth by hand, Indreni Limbus purchase Indian made 
cloth in Ilsm Bazaar. Respite the appearance of some
ready-made western style clothes in the Bazaar, Limbus 
still wear the traditional costume of the hill peasants. 
To sew their clothes they engage members of the Tailor 
caste.
Traditionally, the Tailor's service was supplied 
within the context of a relationship of interdependence 
between client and craftsman. The latter received a 
fixed amount of grains (bali) at harvest time in return 
for the services he provided. Moreover, the relation­
ship between Tailor and client was permanent in that it 
was transmitted from one generation to the next.
Nowadays, all but two Limbu households engage 
Tailors from settlements in the surrounding area or 
Ilam Bazaar on a piece-work basis, and pay in cash for 
the services received. With such an arrangement, the 
household is free to shop around for a Tailor whose 
craftsmanship and prices are most suitable. Two house­
holds prefer to pay their Tailors annually in fixed 
quantities of grains. But even here the relationship 
between client and craftsmen is unlike the traditional 
one in that it must be renewed each year and the 
payments determined on the basis of the estimated 
requirements of the client. In one esse, the relation­
ship is maintained because it is to the financial
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advantage of the client who has a very large household. 
Another Limbu client severed such 0 tie with a Tailor 
two years ago because he preferred the craftsmanship 
in the Bazaar to that of his erstwhile Tailor in a 
neighbouring settlement.
Households also require constant repairs to 
and replacement of a variety of farming implements 
and other metal wares. This work is reserved to 
members of the Blacksmith caste. As with Tailors, the 
traditional relationship between Blacksmith and client 
was one of interdependence - a proportion of the harvest 
in return for services provided. Nowadays, the majority 
of households engage Blacksmiths 011 a cash for piece- 
work basis . This even applies to the nine clients of 
one of the Blacksmiths resident in the Cluster.
But whereas only two households retain tailoring 
services in return for a fixed amount of grain, ten 
households enter this kind of arrangement with Black­
smiths. The reasons given by the households for 
preferring an annual payment in grains vary. Some state 
that payment in a lump sum at harvest time precludes the
1. Relationships with service castes are similar to 
those described by Harper for the Malnad area viz. 
the alliances are easily broken; payments are mainly 
in cash; the prices of services fluctuate, (Cf. Harper,
1959).
necessity of finding ready cash which may not he 
available on each of the occasions when a Blacksmith’s 
services may be required. One informant insisted that 
it was less expensive to pay s fixed quantity of grains, 
while several others admitted that the expense was 
probably greater, but that it was worthwhile if the 
craftsman gave good service. The insistence of some 
Blacksmiths on this form of payment and the dictates 
of tradition were other reasons offered.
It is the wealthiest households which tend to 
maintain a relationship based on payment in grains.
This is to be expected since only these households 
are able to commit in advance a fixed quantity of 
agricultural income. There is, too, a question of 
prestige involved in maintaining the traditional type 
of relationship. It does not escape the Limbus that 
all Brahmin and Jaisi households in the Cluster prefer 
this kind of arrangement with both Tailors and Black- 
smiths . Why more Limbu households have such ties 
with the latter than with the former is difficult to
1. Gould points out that 'the capacity to retain tradit­
ional ties with (service castes) marks a household 
as socially important.' (1964, p.18).
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explain. It may be that the Tailors themselves prefer
to be paid cash for specific work done, for I have heard
that Tailors who accept an annual grain allotment are
difficult to find.
To the extent that a relationship based 011 grain
payments do©s exist, it is not akin to the Jajmani tie
found in most multi-caste villages of India, For one
thing, in a society with only two operative service
castes it seems impossible to speak of a 'jajmani
system'. Secondly, the alternative to payment in
grains is everywhere available, and by and large
adopted. This latter factor makes even the relationship
based on'grain payments one of contract, since it can
2be broken with impunity by either party . Finally, the 
establishment of a client-craftsman relationship does 
not radiate out into other spheres. Rights and obli­
gations begin and end within the context of the specific 
contract. The relationship is single-purpose.
1. There is a third caste of untouchable Cobblers, but 
their services, when required, are paid for on a. 
cash basis only,
2. ’Beidelman reminds us that both Marx and VJeber 
pointed out the importance for the jajmani system 
of the lack of outside markets for labour or 
products.1 (Eolends, 1965, p.18).
2*30,
In the foregoing paragraphs some recurrent 
expenditures of Limbu households have been considered* 
Wealthier households may spend more on a wider assort­
ment of commodities or services, but all allow for the 
purchase of essential consumer needs, The budgets of 
two households are given in Table 26. Household fA f 
contains two adults and produces only 57/^  of its food 
requirements. Household 'B1 contains three adults and 
six children aged 1 - 1 4  years. It produces 152$ of 
its annual requirements of food.
TABLE 26 
Two annual household budgets
Household L-i1 HousehoId 1 B 1
Kerosene Rs 20 Rs 52
Salt 10 16
Cooking oil 54 80
Soap 5 4
Tobacco and paper 20 36
Spices 10 16
Tea 40 52
Me at 75 150
Cloth 60 160
Tailor services 6 (cash) 16 (cash)
Metals 10
(cash)
12
Blacksmith services 15 52 (grains)
School expenses 6
Taxes 1
Rs 314
2
Rs 634
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Contingent Expenditures: Mortuary Rites
There are a number of contingencies which arise, 
inevitably, in the lifetime of a household. Those 
which involve the greatest expenditures are marriages 
and mortuary rites.
The death of a Limbu renders lineage members 
ritually polluted for a period of three days if the 
deceased is a woman, or four if a man. During this 
period they are required to refrain from eating foods 
cooked in oil or seasoned with salt. At the end of 
the period a ritual of 1 touching oil and salt1 (nun 
tel chunu) is performed to remove the pollution, ^t 
this time the principal mourner (kiriya putra) must 
give a feast for those who assisted in the burial rites. 
However, neither the mourning sequence nor the expense 
ends there. Lineage members are prevented from pro­
pitiating household deities or making marriages until 
a second ritual is held to signify the cessation of 
further intercourse between the living members of the 
lineage and the deceased, and to indicate the return 
to normal relations between the lineage and the rest 
of the community. This latter ritual, which is also 
accompanied by a feast for as many people as the 
principal mourner cares to invite, may be held at any 
time from nine days to a year following the death.
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To avoid the costs and inconvenience of holding two 
rituals some Limbus prefer to combine them by refraining 
from eating prohibited foods for only one meal following 
the death and then observing the period of pollution 
from the seventh to the ninth day after the burial.
Both rituals are then held at one time.
The quality and variety of food served at 
mortuary feasts varies little, being confined to buffalo 
meat, rice and millet beer. Thus the precise costs 
of the rites depend mainly on the number of guests. 
Participation in these rituals is a function of spatial, 
kinship and status distance between the principal 
mourner or host and his potential guests. The inter­
play of these three factors becomes evident on consid­
eration of those to whom invitations (ninito) are given 
and their response, measured by attendance.
Persons resident in the same neighbourhood as 
the host are invariably invited to attend mortuary 
rites and feasts. The host of a rite to be held in 
Angbung, for example, would expect other residents of 
the settlement to attend, as well as some from the 
adjoining settlement of Bharapa. Inhabitants of the two 
northernmost settlements would not be invited on the 
grounds of propinquity.
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The spatial proscription on. attendance at .mortuary 
rites is, however, mitigated by kinship ties. Since 
lineage members are required to be present for ritual 
reasons the degree of their spatial separation from 
the host is irrelevant. 'Thus, a rite held following 
the death of the wife of a Kambo man living in Bharapa 
was attended by neighbours in Bharapa, most of whom 
are Chongbungs and Angus. But his lineage mates, all 
of whom reside in Chitok and Borumba also attended, 
even though members of other groups living in' the 
latter settlements were not invited. Ties of agnation 
outside the lineage are of some importance in deter­
mining the range of invitees. Other than lineage 
mates, those who share membership of a local clan 
segment are not ritually affected by a death. Never­
theless, many recognize the loss of an agnate (or his 
wife) by refraining from eating ritually relevant 
foods for a single meal. The tie is generally 
recognized by the invitation of at least some 
agnates who live beyond the immediate neighbourhood 
of the host, provided, of course, he can afford it. 
jx wealthy Chongbung man of Angbung, for example, 
extended invitations to a mortuary rite as far as Chitok, 
the northernmost limits of Chongbung residence in the 
Cluster.
2 3 4 .
Other kinds of ties within the Cluster may be 
acknowledged as well. These result from the practice 
of taking wives from groups with which affinal ties 
have already been established. Of the 145 women married 
into the Indreni Cluster, 62.7# belong to 30 different 
local clan segments from 19 settlement clusters within 
a radius of six miles. The result is that few women 
marrying into the Indreni Cluster are not already 
related agnatically to at least some wives of Indreni 
men. For example, six women of the same local clan 
segment from one settlement cluster three miles away 
are married into four Chongbung and one kambo lineages. 
The death of an Indreni woman, therefore, obliges the 
host to invite the dead woman’s agnates resident in 
the Indreni settlements, even if ties of agnation do 
not already exist between the host and the husbands 
of these women.
Are members of other castes invited to attend 
Limbu funerary rites? Aside from a prohibition on the 
handling of a dead body by non—Limbus, there are no 
ritual restrictions preventing the attendance of other 
castes at such rites. At the three rites I witnessed 
the only non-Limbus present were a fev; Blacksmiths 
from the neighbourhood who had come, uninvited, to 
enjoy the feasts. At one rite, in Bharapa, only
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Limbus were present, although the settlement contains 
one Brahmin and four Hager households, then questioned, 
the host explained that no Brahmins or Magars were 
invited because they would not accept cooked food from 
a Limbu. Other informants state that members of other 
castes, excepting Brahmins, have been known to show up 
at mortuary rites if the Limbu is s close neighbour 
with whom they have friendly ties. Brahmins will 
attend, however, only if the Limbu is a man of comparable 
status. This suggests the existence of what might be 
called a status barrier to certain kinds of social 
intercourse, fortifying the existing cleavage along 
caste lines.
Bo distinctions of status similarly affect 
relationships within the Limbu community? Wealth 
differences alone have little bearing on social ties 
among Limbus. These differences are irrelevant to 
the formation of work gangs for cultivation, or 
friendships, or in attendance at one another’s rites.
This may be due to the realization that wealth differ­
ences are ephemeral and that the fortunes of a house­
hold can change, figuratively speaking, overnight.
But it also accords well with the view which Limbus 
have of themselves as an egalitarian people. However, 
where wealth is seen to be more than temporary, and,
236«
moreover, where it is accompanied by other qualities 
which are universally hailed and which lead to recog- 
nition of the wealthy person as a 'Notable’ (bhaladmi) 
the status differences which emerge can produce a 
'discontinuity' in social ties.
Status distinctions are expressed in the absence 
of a social superior from the mortuary rites of his 
inferiors. Attendance implies recognition of the 
superiority or equality of the host. The conflict of 
this principle with that of egalitarianism is resolved 
by excluding women from the conceptual hierarchy.
Thus, one Limbu who would not attend any of the feasts 
to which he was invited because the hosts were 'small 
men1 would allow his wife and daughters-in-law to 
participate while he remained away with his sons. In 
sum, the greater a man's status the higher the numbers 
likely to attend the rites he sponsors.
The participation of affinal relatives is 
essential for both.prestige and ritual reasons. The 
consent of affines is required to remove the pollution 
of death from a lineage. In addition, whereas no 
other Limbu ritual enjoins the ritual specialist to be 
related in any special way to the host, rites following
i. Bee pp. 325 ff.
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a death are thought to he more efficacious if the 
person officiating is an affine. The Limbus say that 
'with an affine (officiating) we are certain that the 
mourners will be ifld of their pollution. 1
The essential expenditures for a mortuary rite 
are the costs of the feast and a new set of clothing 
for the principal mourner. One household spent Rs 73 
to purchase a young male buffalo which was sufficient 
to feed 100 - 125 people adequately. The guests 
consumed 65 units of rice at a cost of Rs 76. An 
additional Rs 20 were expended on rice to feed eight 
affines who attended the ritual and were the guests of 
the host for two days. Oince two of the guests were 
related as elder sister's husband to the host, it was 
also expected that a goat would be sacrificed in their 
honour. This cost the host an additional Rs 18* The 
expenses for beer were only Rs 35 since guests brought 
gifts of fermented millet, thus providing a substantial 
proportion of millet needs for the ritual. A new set 
of clothing for the host, which is put on following the 
removal of pollution, cost Rs 18. Rinally, a member 
of the Tailor caste was paid Rs 1.60 to provide music 
for the occasion. The total expenditure on the mourning 
rite was in the region of Rs 250.
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another rite, attended by about half the number 
of guests cost the host Rs 203, while a third, which 
attracted the same number of guests as the first cost 
Rs 298, mainly because the host did not have time to 
search around for a smaller buffalo and so ended up 
buying one larger than he in fact needed. In the 
latter two instances the entire costs were borne by 
the household head whose daughter-in-law, in one case, 
and wife, in another, had died. The expenses in the 
first instance were shared among three brothers whose 
classificatory sister, a spinster, had died.
Since the pattern of mortuary rites is standard, 
costs tend to vary only moderately In accordance with 
the number of guests attending. This is apparent from 
the examples above, where the cost of the second rite 
was only 17# less than the first, despite the fact that 
half the number of guests attended. Expenditures on 
marriages, on the other hand, display a much wider 
range due to variations in the kinds of marital unions 
effected.
Contingent Expenditures: Marriage
Limbus marry in three ways: by arrangement
(magi biha); by the 'theft' of an unmarried girl 
(chori biha); or by absconding with another man's
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wife (jiari). No stigma is attached to the latter too 
forms. Children of arranged, theft or jari marriages 
inherit equally. Nevertheless, arranged marriages are 
the most prestigous and consequently the most frequent.
Of 172 virilocsl marriages in the Indreni settlements, 
58,7# were by arrangement, 21.5# were by theft, and
✓1
19*8# were ,jeri marriages . Two-thirds of all married 
men in the Cluster have been married only once. Their 
marriages are shown in Table 27.
TABLE 27
Distribution of marriages involving; men married once
By arrangement 66.6#
By theft 20.0#
By ,jari 13.3#
The following Table gives the distribution of 
marriages involving twenty-eight men who have married 
more than once,
TAu LE 28
Distribution of marriages involving men married more than
once
Lirst Marriages Subsequent Marriages
By arrangement 68.A# AA.O#
By theft 18,A# 25.5#
By .lari 13.2# 30.5#
1. I count only those marriages of which at least one 
spouse is still alive.
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Clearly, what emerges from these figures is 
that a significant majority of Limbus marry their first 
wives by arrangement, but that subsequent marriages are 
more frequently effected by theft or jari. There is no 
indication that the proportion of first marriages by 
arrangement is higher among eldest sons than among their 
junior siblings. Of 33 eldest brothers (excluding only 
sons), 63.7# married their first wives by arrangement, 
while of 39 younger brothers the proportion is 6A.1#.
Altogether of 113 married men in the Cluster, 
twenty-two have married twice, eleven men have had 
three wives and five men have married four times. But 
despite the fact that one third of Indreni men have had 
more than one wife, only four men have more than one 
wife living with them in the Cluster, Four others 
have two wives but in each case one has separated and 
is living in her natal settlement.
The low incidence of polygamous unions can be
A
related directly to the high cost of marriages .
Arranged marriage is the most expensive of the three 
forms. Traditionally, because marriage took place at
an early age, the task of finding a wife had been the
responsibility of the boy’s guardian, usually his father. 
However, during the lifetime of a single generation the 
average age at which young men tend to marry has
1. See also p 0 133*
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increased by about four years - to eighteen. This 
has resulted in greater pressure by the young men on 
their elders to negotiate for partners they have already 
seen and chosen for themselves. Young men frequently 
have occasion to visit the settlements of their 
relatives and at such times mix freely at dances with 
the local girls. In 1964 a young Chongbung man was 
married to a girl he had first seen in 1962 when he 
attended the wedding of his father's brother's wife's 
brother. Since that time he had made a number of 
visits to her settlement in the company of other Indreni 
boys. '/hen it came time for him to marry he informed 
his father of his choice. The latter agreed and set 
in motion the machinery for marriage negotiations.
The elders tend not to disagree with the preferences 
of the young men so long; as the household of the 
prospective bride is of approximately equal status to 
that of the groom. According to the wealthiest Limbu 
in the Cluster: 'The character of a big (i.e. rich)
household differs from that of a small one, since there 
is much housework to do, many guests to feed, visitors 
who must be given tea, and so on. For these reasons 
the people of a big household do not like to take a 
daughtei’-in-law from a small household. And a boy from 
a very poor family does not come to ask for the daughter
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of & rich, man, since he could not rnske the necessar3r 
payments or provide for her in the way she has known 
before. She would soon run away.*
Before taking any formal initiative in marriage 
negotiations the boy's side will make discreet approaches, 
often through persons related to both sides, to deter­
mine the attitudes of the girl's family to the proposed 
union. Having ascertained what amounts to a tentative 
agreement from the other side, the young man's repre­
sentatives travel to the home of the girl to conduct 
the formal, detailed negotiations.
It is considered proper for the marriage of 
a young man to be made by his agnates, more specifically, 
the senior agnate in whose household he resides. This 
is not always what in fact happens. Circumstances may 
lead to a boy being brought up in his mother's natal 
home. In such cases, the costs of the marriage will 
be borne by the mother's brother, althougjh this tends 
to compromise the young man's prestige, and that o:f his 
close agnates. Because of this a young man brought up 
in his mother's natal home will strive in every way 
possible to find the monies needed for the marriage 
himself. In one instance, outside sources of income 
enabled an Indreni man raised by his mother's brother
to provide the costs of his own marriage, 8 fact he 
was most anxious to stress.
Bridewealth (sunauli) is paid to the girl’s 
household immediately the marriage proposal made by the 
groom's representatives has been accepted. The size 
of the payment depends on two main factors. The first 
pertains to the wealth and status of the groups being 
united. The average of bridewealth payments made during 
the past decade by households in the lower half of the 
economic scale amounts to Rs 110 which is approximately 
68/0 of the average payments - (Rs 160) - made during 
the same period by those in the top half of the scale. 
Although I could not bear this out statistically, it 
appears that if a young man succeeds in his proposals 
of marriage to a girl from a household which is far 
better off economically than his own, the bridewealth 
he will be obliged to pay will be at least as high as 
that demanded of a household on the same economic level 
as the girl's. In the only two instances of this nature 
which I was able to document, the bridewealth payments 
were Rs 192 in one case and Rs 224 in the other. Thus, 
in both cases they were above the average paid by 
households in the highest economic bracket. This would 
suggest that where the bride belongs to the economically
better off household, bridewealth payments are related 
to the wealth of her household and not the groom's.
The second determinant of the size of bride­
wealth payments relates to whether or not the bride 
has already been married, Limbus allow widow remarriage 
and there is no difference in status within the house­
hold or community between a wife married as a virgin 
and one taken in widowhood. The natal household of 
a widow, however, receives a smaller bridewealth. One 
wealthy Indreni resident paid Rs 128 in bridewealth for 
a widow who four years earlier had been given as a virgin 
to her first husband for Rs 176. toother was married 
for the first time to a nubile girl for whom bridewealth 
of Rs 150 was paid. Later the same year he was married 
again,this time to a widow for whom Rs 80 was asked.
If a widow wishes it, she may, but is not obliged 
to marry her late husband's younger brother. If she 
does no bridewealth need be paid by the second husband 
although certain other marriage payments (rit) would be 
demanded (see following pages). There were two such 
cases of widow inheritance in the Indreni settlements.
The rule applies only to real and not classificatory 
younger brothers who would have to pay bridewealth anew*
Marrying a dead wife's younger sister is also
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permitted. However, there is no obligation on the part 
of the woman's group to provide another wife following 
the death of the first. The first marriage of a Chong- 
bung man in 1935 came to a rapid end when his wife died 
only a month after he had paid Rs 40 bridewealth to her 
father. He could neither claim the return of the money 
nor her replacement by another woman from her natal 
household. Still, some groups seek to reinforce their 
fledgling relations by arranging for the provision of 
a younger sister of the dead woman as a new wife. In 
such cases, bridewealth is paid for the second wife, 
as well, although the amount demanded by the woman's 
household for the second would be less than for the 
first. Two Indreni men married their dead wife's older 
sisters, which is considered to be an unsavoury 
practice. To neutralize the 'sin' (pap) a special 
payment, regarded as a fine, is given by the groom 
to her household.
Apart from paying bridewealth, the groom is 
required to make a number of other payments (rit) in
'i
cash, meat and liquor • Some of the rit payments, like 
bridewealth, are retained entirely by the household of
1 . For reasons of convenience I distinguish, as do the 
Limbus, between bridewealth (sunauli) and other 
payments (rit).
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the bride. The remainder is shared among her lineage 
mates and their wives, while the tie to her mother's 
brother is also recognized. These payments are sent 
to the bride's home the day following the wedding 
festivities which are held in the groom's settlement. 
The quantities transported require three or four 
young men to carry them and the journey can take up 
to two days. To present the payments an elder must 
accompany the party and act as its spokesman on their 
arrival at the bride's home. The groom's father 
must undertake to pay the road expenses of the entire 
party. Table 29 records the rit payments made by an 
Indreni groom in 1965*
TABLE 29 1
Rit payments at one marriage
a) Fee to bride's father on arrival at his home Rs 1.60
b) V/hole pig for bride's father, plus Rs 1.60 81.60
c) One thigh of buffalo for bride's paternal
grandfather 10.00
d) One thigh of buffalo for bride's father 10.00
e) For bride's father's brother 1.40
f) For bride's father's mother 1.40
gQ For bride's grandfather's sister 1*40
h) For bride's mother's brother 1.40
i) For Oubba of bride's lineage 2.00
j) For four other lineage agnates 4.00
k) For wives of above lineage agnates 1*60
1) Fee to bride's father on entry of groom into house 2.40
m) Costs of meat (perengo) 12.00
n) Costs of liquor 40.00
o) Costs of transporting rit 15.00
______________________  Costs of rit Rsl85«S0
Each of payments Cc~-k) T s ^accompanied by a small wicker 
purse (perengo) containing about one-half pound of pig 
meat. The equivalent of about one pint of liquor (raksi) 
would also be added to each payment. The bride's house­
hold received twenty pints. The costs of meat and liquor 
appear as separate items (m) and (n).
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The rit payments recorded in the above Table 
are about average. The range is from Rs 150 to Rs 225.
Marriage payments extend over © period of three 
years. The Limbu husband returns to the bride’s natal 
settlement each year during the festival of Dasein to 
make obeisance to his wife's father and his lineage 
mates. On each of these occasions he brings meat -
a whole pig plus perengo - and liquor 011 a scale equal
to the initial rit payments made at the time of the 
marriage. The fees to lineage agnates and their wives 
need not be paid again, although these relatives 
continue to receive perengo and liquor. The expenses 
of transporting the payments are of course recurrent.
The costs for each of these three annual payments for 
the husband whose expenses are listed in Table 29 would
thus amount to Rs 168.60 (items b, c, d, m, n, 0) or a
total of Rs 505.BO over the three year period. This 
would mean that all rit payments amount to Rs 691,60 
(i.e. Rs 185.80 plus Rs 505.80),
Bridewealth and rit payments for a theft marriage 
follow the same pattern as those in arranged marriages 
and amount to approximately the same. The husband of 
a woman married without the prior consent of her guardian 
also continues payments over a three year period. One
248.
additional and non-recurring payment is made to the 
bride's household at the time bridewealth.is transferred. 
Theft of a wife calls for a fine of Rs 10 - 20 because, 
say the girl's kinsmen, 'our roof has- been broken'.
Marriage by theft eludes the costs of wedding
festivities, which constitute the heaviest item of
1.expenditure m  arranged unions , As with mortuary 
rites, attendance and hence costs are related to 
factors of residence, kinship and status. Members of 
other caste groups do not, as a rule, attend Idmbu 
weddings. At one wedding witnessed in Dorumba only 
Limbus were present, although Dorumba runs into a 
settlement which is heavily populated by other castes.
At another, in Angbung, a Newar, the ritual friend 
(mit) of the groom's father was the only non-Limbu 
present. The host in the first instance was a poor 
man; in the latter a man of above average wealth.
Only in Chitok, at the wedding of the grandson 
of the Cluster's richest Limbu, were all castes, 
including the area's most distinguished Brahmins, in 
attendance. Their presence attested to the prominence 
of the host, not merely because of his wealth, but 
because his status transcended both caste and
1. Almost without exception, men give as their reason for 
stealing a bride the high cost of wedding festivities.
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settlement boundaries. He is recognized as a ’notable* 
in the wider community.
To feed his 500 Limbu guests from every part 
of the Cluster and the dozen or so specially invited 
kinsmen from other settlements necessitated the 
slaughter of a buffalo costing Rs 288. The presence 
of about 25 members of other castes who do not eat 
buffalo meat required that a goat priced at Rs 30 be 
slaughtered. Rice and millet beer added another 
Rs 285 to the expanses. Fees totalling Rs 4-5 were 
given to the musicians and the Tailor who prepared 
the bride’s clothes and whose blessing (asjLk) is thought 
to be suspicious for the couple. The cloth he sewed 
for the bride, which was ® gift from the groom, amounted 
to Rs 55? while the new tunic required by the latter 
cost another Rs 30.
A variety of minor payments were also made to 
the twelve women accompanying the bride to the wedding. 
These women (lokanti), who are both agnates and lineage 
wives, represent the bride’s household and kin group 
and must be treated with great deference throughout 
the festivities. The initial hostility of the two 
groups being united isqymbolized in the spatial 
separation of the bride and her party of women from 
the groom's house on their arrival. They spend their
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first night in 0 specially constructed shelter (dera) 
out of sight of the house where the wedding is to 
take place. Here they are fed and entertained and 
indulged their right to insult the groom and his 
relatives in a highly formalized manner, which brings 
only abject pleas for forgiveness from the latter. 
Entrance to the shelter demanded a payment of Rs 3? 
and on their removal the following day to the groom's 
house fox* the wedding rite an additional payment of 
the same amount was given. Following the wedding rite 
the women, now classed as affines, were entitled to 
the respect relatives by marriage must be given. In 
lieu of a special feast for the women, they received 
Rs 8 in addition to a payment of Rs 12 for their 
expenses on the return trip.
The actual wedding rite (lagan) necessitated the 
sacrifice of a cock and hen (Rs 8) and the presentation 
by the groom of Rs 2 in cash and a necklace of glass 
beads (Rs 5) to the bride. Another Rs 3 was given to 
the officiating ritual specialist who was the groom's 
clsssificatory grandfather.
Immediately following the wedding rite the 
deity which watches over the welfare of the household 
must be placated. This is effected by men beating on
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goatskin drums in a set rhythmic pattern while 
circumambulating the main post of the groom's house, 
at the base of which the deity resides. These drummers,
-I
who are Limbus , come, uninvited from settlements as 
far as eight to ten miles away, to express the interest 
of all Limbus in the union of the young couple and 
their respective kin groups. Seven drummers from as 
many settlements appeared at the wedding in Chitok.
Lor their attendance a fee totalling Rs 10 in cash and 
meat was paid. The itemized costs of the wedding 
festivities were thus as follows:
TABLE 30 
Costs of wedding festivities
Buffalo Rs 288
Coat 30
Rice 175
Millet 110
Lees to Tailor (and musicians) 45
Bride's clothing 55
Groom's clothing 30
Marriage rite 18
Payments to Limbu drummers 10
Payments to women escorting bride 26
Total Rs 787
Because of the status of the host the number of 
guests attending was far higher than the average for
1. They are to be distinguished from the Tailors who are 
musicians (and drummers) hired to provide entertain­
ment at weddings.
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Indreni weddings. Consequently, the costs of wedding 
festivities in this esse were shout 20$ higher than 
the average expenditure. Still, once an arranged marriage 
has been decided upon, there is a minimum standard of 
largesse expected from the host, however humble his 
means or status. The lowest cost I have recorded for 
wedding festivities during the past decade is Hs 335? 
for the marriage of an Angu of less than average wealth 
and with a narrow range of kin ties, thus making 
possible a comparatively low attendance figure of just 
under 100 guests.
To help meet the costs of wedding feasts, guests 
bring contributions of cash (chanda). The amounts 
are recorded and reciprocal donations are expected 
from the host when he is invited to attend the weddings 
of his guests’ sons and brothers. Eighty-three house­
holds contributed Rs 240 to the costs of the wedding 
in Chitok. This is slightly higher than the average 
volume of contributions, which normally cover about 
15$ of the expenses.
The least expensive way of obtaining a marriage 
partner is by absconding with another man’s wife. The 
costs of a ;jari marriage are, b3^ and large, confined to 
the amount of compensation (jarikal) the new husband pays
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to the cuckolded husband. Compensation must be paid 
for violation of a man’s monopoly of sexual rights to 
his wife. A husband can, of his own accord, dispose 
of these rights by taking part in a ceremony in which 
he symbolically removes the red powder (sidur) from the 
forehead of his wife , and thereby signifies an end to 
the marriage. In the only case of this nature in the 
Cluster, the woman was barren and her husband was 
anxious to be rid of her so that he could take another 
wife. He wrote a document in the presence of witnesses 
claiming that if she became another man* s wife he would 
make no demands for compensation, divorce is extremely 
unusual since it involves renunciation of sexual
d
rights and the companion rights to claim compensation .
Compensation rates are to a large degree deter­
mined by the negotiating skills of those representing
2the offended and offending husbands . The former try 
to recoup as large a proportion of the marriage costs 
as they can. a Limhu who had spent a total of its 1280 
on his marriage was able to get only Rs 480 when his 
wife went off with another man three years later. In 
another instance a woman married by <)ari left her Indreni
1. ±!‘or the case of a woman who attempted - unsuccessfully 
to obtain a divorce, see pp. 136 ff.
2. See pp. 313 ff •
husband two years later to live with another man,
The Indreni husband, who had paid compensation of Rs 640 
in 19595 collected Rs 400 when she left him in 1961.
This process of 'devaluation* of women is recognized 
in compensation claims. The greater the number of men 
with whom a woman absconds the lower the compensation 
that need be paid for her. Indeed, the old Law Code 
stipulated that a woman who absconds for the third time 
is considered a whore (besye) and no compensation can
A
be claimed by the last cuckold . The least amount of 
compensation paid for a woman married by pari into the 
Indreni Cluster amounted to Rs 40. The Indreni men 
is her third husband, and the second, she has married 
*by fi&ri. The average amount of compensation paid by 
Indreni men for their cjari marriages duxdng the past 
ten years amounts to Rs 435.
After compensation has been paid, the new husband 
makes token obeisance to his ether-in-law by presenting 
the latter and his lineage mates with some meat and 
liquor, the costs of which seldom amount to more than 
Rs 40 - 50. He does not pay bridewealth or other rit 
payments. Nor are visits to his in-laws during Dasein 
obligatory for the three year period, although most
1. Lav/ Code (Muluki Ain), 1955 edition. This has been 
replaced, by a revised Code introduced in 1963#
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Indreni Limbus do make the trip along with small
offerings at least once.
TABLE 51
Comparative marriage costs
Type of Marriage s
Arranged Marriages 
Theft Marriages 
Jari Marriages
Rs 950 - 1400 
650 - 950 
500 -  500
In sum, then, ,1ari is the least expensive form of
Limbu marriage. Roughly, its costs amount to one-third 
of those for arranged marriages and half those of theft 
marriages (see Table 51)• lhe considerable costs of 
marriage are made evident when we note that the average 
annual income from agriculture of the lowest 50/^ of 
Indreni Limbu households amounts to Rs 500, while the 
figure for the top 50$ is Rs 1900* The new Law Code, 
introduced in 1965, in an attempt to discourage rjari 
practices, sets a compensation figure of up to Rs 1000 
or five years* imprisonment if the cuckold chooses to 
bring charges. So far, Limbu reluctance to use the 
courts in dealing with compensation claims has left 
unaffected the amounts transferred. But this law is 
one of the few in the new Code with which the Limbus 
are conversant and the threat of court action could yet
become a potent weapon in the hands of the aggrieved 
husband.
One other kind of marriage expenditure, the 
dowry given married daughters, should be mentioned.
A dowry (daijo) is usually given several years following 
a marriage, after all the marriage payments have been 
completed, and when one or two children have been born. 
In the case of a wealthy household several hundred 
rupees or their equivalent in cattle or jewellery may 
be given. Mostly, however, dowries to Indreni women 
are small, consisting of some household utensils and 
between Rs 25 - 50 in cash. Since lineage agnates 
receive a share of marriage payments given for a girl, 
they also contribute to the cost of her dowry, thus 
relieving what little burden there is on the girl’s 
household. In consequence, the marriage of a daughter 
is regarded not as an ecomomic disaster, but as an 
event bringing the household temporary but much 
welcomed gains. M/e Limbus', they say, 'sell our 
daughters in order to eat.1
The costs of a son's marriage, on the other 
hand, must be borne entirely by the household in which 
the boy resides. Only the contributions of wedding
In contradistinction, a Brahmin with many daughters
is a much pitied man.
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guests relieve the burden slightly. The lineage, or 
even the sibling group - unless it constitutes s single 
household - does not share in the expenditure, .as 
with mortuary rites, marriages of sons emphasize the 
independence of the household as an economic unit.
In the preceding section 1 have discussed a 
few of the obligations which a household must be 
prepared to meet during its lifetime. Some are recurrent, 
to be discharged weekly, monthly or annually. Others, 
like mortuary rites and marriages, are contingencies, 
and impose a temporary but considerable financial 
burden on the Limbu household. To meet these expen­
ditures and to fill the gap between agricultural 
production and food requirements, the great majority 
of Limbu households must rely on income from sources 
other than the fields they cultivate themselves.
Wealth can be earned locally, from 'commercial’ 
sources both within and in the vicinity of the Indreni 
Cluster, and externally, through military service.
Commercial Sources: within the Cluster
A primary source of income within the immediate 
area of the Indreni settlements is agricultural labour 
for wages. To determine the need for this kind of 
labour it is first of all necessary to inquire into the
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ability of the household to manage its cultivation 
tasks unassisted.
'The household can handle most stages of maize 
and millet cultivation on its own. bince the fields 
are usually within easy reach of the cultivator's 
homestead, the work can be done at a leisurely pace.
The growing of maize and millet is further simplified 
by the fact that men and women can perform the same 
labour, except ploughing. Only if the household possesses 
no bullocks for ploughing or if it works many lands 
does it require more than a few outside hands to help 
in the various tasks. The typical scene between March 
and June, when maize is planted and weeded, and again 
in late august and early September, during the maize 
harvesting and millet planting season, is of household 
groups working with only a minimum of assistance in 
their separate fields.
The picture changes radically in June and July, 
and again in November, for the cycle of paddy culti­
vation. Because of the pressures of a limited planting 
and harvesting season, a great many tasks must be per­
formed in a short span of time. During the days 
prior to a planting, the field has to be ploughed and 
the terrace walls cleared of grasses and weeds so that
259.
they will attract no insects or mice, end so that the 
grasses act as fertilizer, since no other is used.
The latter work is performed mainly by women. 'When 
it is completed the terraces are flooded. On the day 
prior to the planting, women remove the paddy seedlings 
from the seed bed and tie them in bundles which can 
be easily carried or thrown to the planters.
At planting time, the ploughmen first turn and 
level the flooded terraces. They are followed by men 
whose job it is to complete the levelling of the 
mudded terraces with hand-hoes and repair and reinfoicce 
the levees broken by the ploughs and levellers.
Women then plant the seedlings, working in clusters 
of two or three to a terrace. Several other women 
are required to keep them supplied with seedlings.
At hardest time, a fairly rigid division of 
labour is again evident. Members of both sexes share 
the job of cutting the paddy stalks which are left to 
dry in the sun for about four days. The stalks are then
bundled by men and carried, mainly by women, to a terrace
which has been cleared and levelled for threshing.
The stalks are piled in a mound and left to dry for
about a week. The job of threshing and winnowing is 
left to the men, who are assisted by the women in
bringing the grain to their homes. Transporting the 
bundles of straw is left mainly to the women.
In view of this elaborate division of tasks and 
the pressures of time, the household requires a labour 
force which it is unable to provide from its own 
resources. To produce the 790 units of paddy which is 
the average for the 63 Limbu households cultivating 
this crop requires approximately 4-6 male and 50 female 
labour days for planting and harvesting alone. The 
household obtains the assistance it needs to cultivate 
its fields through the recruitment of labour gangs.
Each of the gangs is formed for the performance of a 
particular task and dissolves upon its completion. 
Planning in advance is necessary because commitments 
to join a gang on a specific date are on a 1 first 
come first served1 principle, and no man can claim 
prior rights to command the labour resources of any 
other household than his own. Since there is a potential 
Limbu work force of only 257 persons (12 - 60 years) the 
need for coordination is evident*
The great majority of these gangs are recruited 
on the basis of mutual exchange of labour 
The system is preferred by all who have labour to 
exchange since it obviates the need to transfer scarce 
cash. Labour exchanges are strictly reciprocal, however,
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and each household keeps its account of the number of
"i
labour days it is owed and owes 0 There is a recognized 
scale of job equivalents, so that, for example, a 
household without draught animals will have to exchange 
three days of planting for one day of ploughing.
These equivalents, however, relate only to jobs and 
not to the ability of the individuals performing them.
So that a young girl can be sent to repay the labour 
given by a strong young man, as long as the jobs are 
considered on a par with each other. Labour exchanges 
need not be immediate: a labour debt incurred at the
time of paddy planting may be repaid at harvest time.
The sanctions for fulfilling labour obligations are 
the need to depend on others for similar assistance 
and failure to meet labour debts would mean no further 
help for the recalcitrant household.
Despite the fact that paddy fields are scattered 
and situated at some distance from homestead sites, 
labour is exchanged not with those who cultivate 
adjoining • fields, but with settlement neighbours.
Only seldom are the tv/o coincidental. Linkages among 
households exchanging labour only occasionally extend 
far beyond the boundaries of settlement. So that labour
1. In times of illness or other crisis neighbours will help 
each other without expectation of an equivalent return. 
But the practice (guhar) occurs infrequently.
gangs formed in Angbung, for example, are recruited mainly 
from households in the settlement and partly from 
adjacent households in Bharapa.
The restricted radius of recruitment also tends 
to exhlude members of other castes from Limbu work 
gangs. Only a handful of households in Bharapa 
exchange labour with Kagars and a few poor Brahmins 
living in an adjacent settlement, and a similar practice 
is followed by some households in Dorumba. Labour is 
never exchanged with wealthy Brahmins in the Cluster.
This is mainly due to the reluctance of the latter, 
for reasons of prestige, to send members of their house­
holds to work on the fields cultivated by others.
The labour pool on which households can draw is 
limited not only by factors of settlement and neigh­
bourhood, but by considerations of kinship as well.
One brother tends not to participate in another’s 
labour gang. The reason is seen by Limbus as relating 
to the fact that male siblings inherit from a single 
source. In one instance, relations between two brothers 
were strained to the point of a complete severance of 
day-to-day ties. In others, structural strains were 
expressed largely in avoidance of one another's work 
gangs, There relations among brothers are amicable,
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exchanges of labour will involve members of their 
households, but the brothers themselves will not join 
the gangs. This does not prevent them, however, from 
working together in the labour gangs of third persons.
Of 27 such gangs observed working on the fields of men 
with married brothers in the Cquster, only one gang 
contained a male sibling group.
Seventeen Limbu households do not partake of 
mutual labour exchanges because they cultivate insufficient 
lands to require help from other households. The work 
they have to offer, therefore, is for payment only.
Along with 57 other households, which combine exchanges 
with labour for wages, they form a pool of labour for 
wealthy Brahmins within and surrounding the Cluster as 
well as for a number of Indreni Limbus. The eight 
Limbu households regularly hiring labour are compelled 
to do so because the hands they require to cultivate 
their lands are not obtainable through mutual exchanges 
alone. The labour gangs recruited by these households, 
then, are apt to contain both paid and exchange labour.
But whereas the recruitment of the latter type is 
confined to neighbourhoods, agricultural labour for wages 
Is sought from within a wider circumference. Residents 
of Angbung, for example, who never exchange labour with 
Chitok Limbus, do work for wages on the fields of the
latter.
It is impossible to speak of s free market for 
labour in the region of the Indreni settlements. Limbus 
can earn more by working for Brahmins in settlements 
to the south of the Cluster than by labouring for Limbus 
or Brahmins in the Cluster. For hoe work the daily 
rate in the Cluster is Rs 0.80, while Brahmins outside 
offer up to Rs 1.20. Similarly, a ploughman receives 
Rs 1.60 if he works on Indreni fields, and up to Rs 2.40 
if he ploughs for outside Brahmins. Limbus, of course, 
do work for the latter, but not at the expense of with­
drawing their labour from the former. Here again, 
explanation must be sought in the multiplicity of 
ties within the Cluster binding labourers and those who 
hire them.
How important is agricultural labour for wages?
It would be impossible to estimate the amount of 
income earned by Limbu households from this source.
Of 74 households engaged in casual labour of this S(ort, 
six rely only on this source to supplement income from 
fields they cultivate. 'They earn an average of about 
Rs 250, but most other households depend only perfunc­
torily on agricultural wage labour. This is because a 
number of other opportunities for earning cash are 
available. Some of these, like agricultural labour, can
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be exploited within the Indreni settlements.
Fishing provides four households with an average 
annual income of Rs 105. Only one man uses a net, 
while the rest must employ cruder techniques to make 
their catch, n series of stone dams are first erected, 
jutting out several feet from the river bank. A 
grass is then spread over the slowly moving pools 
created by the blockage and this has the effect of 
stunning the fish so that they can be caught by hand.
A number of wicker baskets are also placed at the foot 
of the dams and some fish are caught in this way. The 
process is labourious but between October and harch an 
assiduous fisherman can trap up to ten pounds a week.
These sell in the market and the Cluster for Rs 2 per 
pound.
Two households have mandarin groves producing about 
7500 fruit a year between them. The mandarins are 
transported to Lanisare, a market town about 25 miles 
away in the Terai where they fetch more than double the 
local price. The two households earn an average of Rs 310 
annually from this source.
Five Indreni household heads earn a regular 
income by performing ritual services in the Cluster.
A Limbu ritual specialist (phedangma) discovers his
powers through dreams or, as is more often the case, 
by becoming possessed. He then seeks the guidance of 
a teacher from whom he learns the secrets of his 
calling. Households choose their phedangma. on the basis 
of utility. Some try and discard several before 
finding one they believe to be efficacious. Others 
alternate between two or more phedangma. Kinship is 
not a serious consideration in the choice of a ritual 
specialist.' The two most popular phedangma in the 
Cluster have among their clients representatives of 
all the main lineage groups. Nor is neighbourhood an 
important criterion of choice. Three phedangma have 
clients in three different settlements and a fourth 
in all four of the Indreni settlements.
Fewer than one third of all Limbu households 
ever utilize the services of a Brahmin priest. For 
those that do - and they are mostly the better-off 
households - the occasion is an annual Satya Narayan 
ritual. Limbus choose this particular rite because 
for one thing it is brief and relatively inexpensive 
and for another, because Satya Narayan is the Hindu 
deity which is believed more than others to affect the 
fortunes of a household. But the employment of Brahmins 
stops there,
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It Is the phedangma whom all Limbus employ to 
officiate at the important rites de passage, at the time 
of birth, marriage and death. A phedangma is also 
required to conduct the worship of domestic deities 
end in addition, is one of a variety of specialists 
who may be called to treat illness. Since the household 
propitiates its deities on an average of three times 
yearly, the phedangma1s minimum annual income from this 
source can be estimated. The fee generally paid for 
the performance of a ritual is Rs 1.60, a pint of 
liquor (Rs 1.) and enough rice for a meal (Rs 0.60).
The phedangma can thus expect to earn a minimum of 
approximately Rs 10. per client per year. One 
specialist, with twenty-seven household clients, relies 
only on his income from this source to supplement his 
meagre production from a household plot. The most 
popular specialist, with thirty-three clients, combines 
his work as phedangma with agricultural labour. At 
a minimal estimate, then, eighty households pay Rs 800 
annually for ritual services, which monies are divided 
among five phedangma.
Four extremely poor households earn small 
incomes by providing more affluent households with 
’domestic service'. The most common practice is for
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young boys from poor families to live in wealthier 
homes. They are treated like members of the new 
household and, as with other members, their labour is 
at the disposal of the household head. They are 
referred to as herdboys (gothalo) although they work 
in the fields as well as tend cattle, for these 
services they are fed and clothed, and paid an annual 
salary of from Rs 15 - 50. The relationship seldom 
persists over a lengthy period, the herdboys generally 
returning to their own homes after a year or two.
Three households earned an income of Rs 100 from 
providing this kind of service . In another instance, 
the wife of a poor Chitok man did domestic chores for 
a wealthy, neighbour whose own wife was chronically ill. 
The arrangement enabled the former to spend only a 
few hours each day at her chores, returning daily to 
her own home. For her assistance she was paid about 
Rs 40 over the year.
Finally, one household earns Rs 110 a year from 
the sale of clarified butter to a Jsisi in the area 
who markets it in Ham. The son of another household 
head, although only a fifth former himself, earns 
Rs 420 as a teacher In the local primary school*
269 *
Commereis 1 oources: outside the Cluster
Since the turn of the century, and especially 
during the past two decades, Indreni Limbus have been 
turning to income sources outside the Cluster. These 
opportunities come under three main headings: govern­
ment service; portering and petty trading; and casual 
labour.
The Government has been a potential employer 
since the establishment of an administration in Ilam. 
Indreni Limbus have been employed for years as minor 
functionaries in Government offices in the Bazaar.
Three household heads spent a total of thirty-six 
years in the local militia, while three others served 
for two to four years in regular army units stationed 
in Ilam. At present two household heads are in Govern­
ment service. One is a policeman, earning Rs 7^0 per 
annum while another is in the militia with a salary of 
Rs 580. The former is able to return home regularly, 
but the latter, since he Is posted to a border station 
about fifteen miles away, can visit only during his 
leaves.
Opportunities for petty trading and portering 
have grown apace with the commercial development of 
Ilam Bazaar. At the turn of the century, the Bazaar
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contained only half a dozen shops, enough to cater for 
the few resident Government employees as well as those 
visiting the to'wn on market day. By 1964 there were 
ninety shops and a resident population of approximately 
5000 , The size of the market, too, has grown* On 
any Thursday upwards of 2000 inhabitants of the surrounding 
area make their way to the Bazaar, and provide a sub­
stantial buying public for the permanent shopkeepers 
and petty traders.
Women of the Indreni settlements distill liquor 
(raksi) from millet and sell this to ’tea* stall owners 
in Ilam Bazaar who retail it on market day. Some of 
the women also sell liquor on the main road through 
the Cluster to persons going to or returning from the 
market. Three households situated beside the main road 
offer hospitality to trading expeditions, providing 
cooking utensils and sleeping arrangements free of 
charge, and profiting from sales of liquor. Despite 
a Government ban - never enforced - on the sale of 
spirits without a licence, thirty-seven households earn 
an annual profit of about Rs 6840 from this trade. It
1. Under lanchayat regulations, to qualify as a 'town' 
there must be a -population of 10,000. Ilam Bazaar 
has thus absorbed a number of surrounding settlements 
to make up the difference.
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is the most important commercial source of income 
earned locally by Indreni Limbus.
Indreni women also regularly bring for sale in 
the market a kind of yeast loaf (marca) used in the 
preparation of liquor. Prom this trade, eleven house­
holds clear Rs 2195 annually. Another household head 
has a permanent stall set up each Thursday in an area 
of shops at an important crossroads between the Cluster 
and Ilam Bazaar, Prom the traffic generated by market 
day he is able to earn a profit of Rs 160 over the 
year from the sale of meat, beer and liquor.
Since the revolution of 1951» H a m  Bazaar has 
enjoyed an unprecedented growth. The expansion of 
existing and establishment of new Government services 
(including two secondary schools and a college) and a 
growing population have led to a surge of building 
activity. Since road communications in the district, 
as in most hilly regions of Nepal, are extremely primitive, 
goods can only be transported by horse caravans, or on 
the backs of men. For residents of the Indreni settle­
ments, this has meant new opportunities to porter the 
increasing volume of raw materials required for building. 
Chief among these is wood.
Over the past five years alone the amount of wood 
coming Into the Bazaar has increased fourfold. During
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the dry season from November to kay, the porters carry 
planks from the forests south of Ilsm Bazaar, where the 
wood is cut and trimmed, to the district capital0 
Indreni men usually work in teams, contracting to carry 
up to 10001 at an average rate of Rs 192. Some men 
carry six days a week throughout the season, others 
porter only occasionally, as their cash needs demand 
or strength allows. The twenty households engaged in 
portering earned a total of Rs 5300 in 196^-65.
Another three household heads, who are skilled sawyers, 
contracted to cut some of the timber carried by the 
porters. They brought home a profit of Rs 350 Tor a 
month's work.
Portering wood is confined to households in the 
two southernmost Indreni settlements, Angbung and 
Bharapa. This is partly because these settlements are 
closest to the forests. By leaving their homes in the 
early morning, the porters are able to return, after 
carrying a timber load, the same evening. But the 
confinement of this enterprise to households from one 
section of the Cluster also attests to the strength of 
neighbourhood ties. Porters like to travel in company 
with others, and neighbours are preferred company.
Tin sheets for roofing, water pipes, cement, 
kerosene - indeed a whole range of capital and consumer
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goods needed to sustain the Bazaar's growth - are also 
carried by porters. Bor these items, however, the men 
must go to Sanisare, s market town in the Terai to the 
south. But unless they can carry a load both ways, 
the journey is not worthwhile. Porters therefore 
transport mandarins to Sanisare from groves north of 
the Indreni Cluster. Some accept a fixed rate - about 
Rs 3.20 per 100- to porter the fruit. Others assume 
the role of middlemen. They purchase the mandarins 
from the orchard owners and transport them to Sanisare, 
where they can fetch from two to three times the hill 
price. The capital required is small and the profits 
earned are re-invested in consumer and capital goods 
needed in Ilam Bazaar. The profits from these trading 
and portering ventures, which take up to five days, can 
be substantial. The eight households - again all from 
Bharapa and -^ngbung - engaged in this enterprise earn 
abouit Rs 900, most of it during the six week mandarin 
season.
Another source of income is casual labour in 
the Terai or in bordering areas of India. The agri­
cultural lull around January and February, before the 
maize is planted, finds a number of Indreni residents 
working for wages out of the district. During the
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winter of 1964-65 eight household heads spent from 
two to six weeks employed as unskilled labourers on a 
variety of building projects in the Terai and Darjeeling 
district. The eight brought home a total of Rs 1150.
The head of another household is a skilled carpenter 
and relies regularly on work in the Terai - and, when 
he can find it, in and around the Cluster, His annual 
earnings amount to approximately Rs 300.
Military Service
The most lucrative source of income for Limbu 
households is service in foreign armies. The history 
of military service by Indreni men goes back to the 
establishment, in the first decade of this century, of 
two Gurkha regiments composed exclusively of Rais and 
Limbus , Prior to this time members of the two groups 
had been admitted to various para-military forces 
stationed in Burma and Assam. But their service in the 
Gurkhas, created a century and a half ago, had been 
limited. The Limbus, particularly, were considered to 
be inferior soldiers, apparently having acquired a
p
reputation for lack of discipline , Following the
1. To avoid confusion with previous references to 'Gorkha1, 
I spell the term for servicemen as 'Gurkha1.
2. Jackson, 1940, p. 434.
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creation of the two eastern regiments, however, an 
average of 221 Limbus were recruited annually from east 
Nepal. As the prejudice against them gradually 
receded, their numbers rose. During the next decade
'I
an average of 283 were recruited each year •
The acceptance of Limbus into the Gurkha forces 
coincided with the growth of large-scale mortgaging of 
kipat lands in the Cluster. The Limbus were compelled 
to find other sources of income. Possibilities were 
limited, since Ilam Bazaar was still in its infancy 
and could not offer opportunities for trading and 
portering described above. After the first tv/o Indreni 
men were enlisted in the Gurkhas prior to the ^irst 
World War, military service was seen to be a viable 
means of earning income lost as a result of land mort­
gaging. During the War, when recruiting was intensified 
and standards of induction considerably relaxed, eleven 
Indreni men were accepted in the army. Since then, a 
substantial proportion of the Cluster’s male inhabi­
tants has served in the Gurkhas^.
1. Vansittart, 1915, p.8.
2. By and large, Brahmins do not serve in the Gurkha regi­
ments; nor are they encouraged to do so. Although 
members of other castes, such as Aagars, are recruited, 
none resident in the Indreni Cluster is in the army.
2?6,
The reason most often cited for joining the 
army is the need to earn money because of economic 
hardship (dukha). Linked to the financial inducements 
is the respect accorded a returning soldier, especially 
one who manages to rise above the ranks. Prospective 
volunteers speak of 'making a name' (nam kamaunu), and 
each of the recruiting forces is graded according as
A
how it is believed to allow for promotion , Young men 
also admit to an urge to travel and, occasionally, to 
the fact that personal squabbles within the household 
may drive them away from the Cluster. Still, economic 
motives must be seen to underlie the widespread attach­
ment to military service. Despite the fact that flam
2district has never been a prime source of recruits ,
4-3*S°/o of all living Indreni Limbu males aged eighteen 
or over either have served or are at present serving 
in the army. Those in the forces at present constitute 
11,5# of the adult male population.
1, In 194-7, the Gurkha regiments were divided between 
the Indian and British armies, each of which now 
recruits separately. There is also the Assam Bifles, 
whose recruiting efforts are closely coordinated 
with those of the Indian Gurkhas, Por convenience
I include the Assam Bifles with the Gurkhas.
2. Apparently, it still is not. Out of approximately 
180 Limbus recruited in 1964- at Dhsren, the British 
recruiting depot for eastern regiments, only 16 
were from Ilam district.
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a s might be expected, the more depressed 
sections of the community turn most frequently to 
Gurkha service. Members of groups without ownership 
rights to kipat in the ^luster are a case in point.
In Chapter II it was shown how the accommodation of 
’outsiders' by Indreni kipst-owners varied in accordance 
with the availability of land. Once the shortage had 
reached a critical stage, affinal or cognatic kinsmen 
who settled in the Cluster could not expect to receive 
kipat grants. At best, they were able to occupy small 
plots of kipat belonging to their hosts or, as in some 
instances, to purchase some raikar land. But these 
lands were invariably insufficient to support their 
descendants. Whereas impoverished Limbus with owner­
ship rights to kipat had first refusal on tenancy 
offers, in addition to rights of bard, non-kipat owners 
could claim no such prerogatives. In consequence, 
males of the first succeeding generation of outsiders 
tended to join the army. A few examples will illustrate 
the pattern which repeated itself almost without 
exception.
A man from the district of Panchthar settled 
uxorilocally in the Cluster after marrying the sister 
of a Chongbung man. During his lifetime he culti­
vated a small piece of kipat land taken under mortgage
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from his father-in-law, 'The land was not sufficient 
to support two additional families which his sons 
would soon create. On reaching adulthood, both joined 
the army.
In a replica of this instance, all four sons of 
a man who married the daughter of the Nembeke 8ubba 
joined the army.
Sometimes, the process is delayed a generation. 
The first Indreni iingu settled in the Cluster after 
marrying a Chongbung woman. Since he was a Government 
servant posted to Ilam, he had an income with which he 
was able to purchase some raikar land in Bharapa.
There was sufficient land to divide among his three 
sons, although one fell on bad times and enlisted in 
the Gurkhas. When the lands were divided again among 
the grandsons, the estates proved to be inadequate.
Four of his six grandsons served in the Gurkhas.
A similar train of events follows on those who 
are raised in the Cluster through matrilaterai ties.
When a Kambo absconded with the wife of another man, 
he also brought along the woman’s son from her first 
marriage. When the boy grew up he chose to remain in 
the Cluster rather than return to where his kipat rights 
lay. To accumulate the capital necessary to obtain land
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he joined the Gurkhas.
The army is still the most important income 
source for Limbus without ownership rights to kipat 
land, Six of the twelve men in the army at present 
are members of non-kipat-owning households. They 
account for 42.8$ of Limbu males without kipat between 
the ages 18 - 40 years. The six who own kipat, on the 
other hand, represent just over 11$ of kipat-owning 
males in the same age bracket.
Military service, of course, is not entirely a 
matter of the individual’s own choosing. Firstly, 
acceptance into the army depends on physical and intel­
lectual criteria over which the volunteer has no control. 
Secondly, his chances vary in accordance with the 
annual quotas accepted by the various forces. Thou­
sands of hopeful candidates are turned away each year 
at the recruiting camps or by special recruiting 
agents in the hills. But once accepted into the army, 
a number of factors may still militate against long 
service. During both World Wars, for example, standards 
were lowered to allow for maximum enlistment. But at 
the conclusion of hostilities, most of the wartime 
recruits were discharged. Sixteen of the thirty Indreni 
men who have completed their service were wartime
volunteers who spent an average of 5*4 years in the 
military. Most were released at the end of their 
service, others chose not to re-enlist. Some, like 
four Indreni men who were in the Gurkhas between the 
Wars came home on leave and never returned.
The need to return home to manage an estate is 
a common reason for the failure of Indreni men to com- 
plete the minimum service required for a pension .
Those who are away rely on. fathers and brothers to 
protect their interests during their absence. The 
death of such a person, then, might require a man to 
leave the service. Quarrels over division of property 
are also causes of premature resignation from the army. 
But personal inability to adjust to army life also 
counts as an important reason for leaving. The early 
years are the most difficult, and desertions or resig­
nations occur most frequently in the formative years. 
None of the Indreni servicemen, however, left the army 
after serving eight years without first qualifying for 
a pension. The investment of so much time is thought 
to be worthwhile only if it leads to a pension, so that 
during the latter half of the period of service, the
1. The^period of service required to receive a pension 
varies. By and large, to receive s private’s pension 
15 years of service is mandatory.
pressures of obligations at home are resisted more 
assiduously than during the first years.
Fight of the thirty ex-servicemen are receiving 
long service pensions totalling Rs 6110 per year.
Two others, who were discharged on medical grounds, 
are paid Rs 1250. Three households receive pensions 
paid to immediate descendants of servicemen killed in 
action. These amount to Rs 710 each year. The total 
income from pensions therefore amounts to Rs 8070 
each year.
Service salaries account for a substantial 
proportion of current income. Twelve soldiers earn 
a total of Rs 14,250 annually in pay. Based on past 
remittances and on estimates of average savings, it can 
be assumed that about 60$ of a soldier1s pay eventually 
reaches the Indreni settlements. This would mean a 
net income of Rs 8550 from army service. Not all these 
monies enter the Cluster on a regular basis. No 
arrangements exist for the transfer of funds to homes 
in the hills. Remittances can be sent to the recruiting 
centres and fetched from there, much as pensions are 
collected. Servicemen returning on leave often bring 
monies for the families of soldiers with whom they are 
serving.
There is little pressure on unmarried sons or
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brothers to send money. Fven when they return on 
leave they are not expected to hand over all their 
savings to the household head. An unmarried soldier 
who had saved close to Rs 2000 brought home only Rs 500 
on his first leave. Fven though the serviceman who 
is not formally separated is a part of his father’s 
or brother's household, and recognizes his membership 
by token remittances, his position is somewhat ambi­
guous. Throughout his army career he enjoys a special 
status, not entirely consistent with membership of a 
household. This is best understood by considering the 
typical sequence of goals to which his army savings 
are applied.
The young man who enters the army as a bachelor 
first of all saves for his marriage. Following his 
marriage, for as long as he remains part of a joint 
type household, he contributes to it a part of his 
savings, but holds back the greater proportion for the 
time he decides to establish a separate household.
This usually comes several years later when he has 
saved enough for a small estate. Occasionally, he puts 
off sex^sration until completion of his service. One 
Gurkha soldier who was pensioned off in late 1965 
separated from his father's household three months later.
He used monies accumulated over a number of years to 
obtain land, build a house, purchase cattle, and so 
on. These monies, strictly speaking, should have been 
turned over to his father while he was a part of his 
father's household. The extent of remittances will 
depend somewhat on the size of the soldier's nuclear 
family. As its numbers grow the greater the obligation 
to aid in their support. There is also the matter of 
residence. If they are part of his father’s or 
brother's household, or remain in the wife's natal 
settlement as part of his father-in-law's household 
the serviceman is expected to contribute accordingly.
On the other hand, now that facilities exist for wives 
to join’their husbands for at least part of the period 
of service, some soldiers do bring their families with 
them, and correspondingly reduce their remittances. 
Clearly, the serviceman who remains part of a joint 
type household retains a special status unlike that of 
other household members. He tends to act as if he were 
the head of an independent household even if he is in 
fact nominally part of a larger unit. Just as clearly, 
members of the latter have little power to coerce him 
into placing his entire earnings at their disposal.
When a soldier becomes the head of a household, 
the situation changes drastically. He assumes not only 
the responsibility for his own wife and children, but 
for younger siblings as well. Here, too, there is 
discernible a set pattern of priorities in the expen­
diture of monies earned from army service. Firstly, 
food shortages must be made up and recurrent or 
contingent debts met. For example, in 1965 a soldier 
returned on leave with Rs 1500 designated for the 
marriage of 0 younger brother. Following his own 
marriage, his savings had been deployed towards the 
repayment of interest-bearing loans and the purchase 
of food. When his brother approached the age of 
marriage, monies were set aside to meet these costs.
Investment in land generally occurs only after 
these initial obligations are met. For this reason, 
short term service seldom has any real effect on the 
overall!- economic position of 0 household. It is only 
the cumulative effect of long service which allows for 
an alleviation of the poverty which may have driven 
the Limbu to enlist in the first‘place. Those who 
remain in the army for long periods stand a better 
chance of promotion with its attendant pay increases, 
and of course derive the financial security provided 
by a lifelong pension.
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Long service provides the opportunities to 
accumulate savings which can he invested in land.
The procedure described In Chapter V is repeated, but 
bidding for kipat are no longer only members of other 
castes, but Limbus with funds earned by military service. 
The following examples will illustrate the process*
s. Between 3948 - 1961 a Limbu of Chitok without
ownership rights to kipat took under mortgage four 
different kipat fields, now valued at Rs 4560. Two 
fields had previously been pledged to Brahmins living 
outside the Cluster, one field to a Blacksmith of Chitok, 
and the fourth to a Limbu widow living alone in Bharapa. 
The Chitok man was only able to become a landholder 
because an annual pension of Rs 425 was being paid to 
his mother following her husband's death in Burma during 
the Second world War.
b. In 1962, a Chongbung of Bharapa with eight
years of service in the army returned on. .leave from the 
Assam Rifles with Rs 960 which he had saved to repay a 
mortgage on a paddy field. The land,his own, had been 
pledged . by his grandfather to the father of a Newar 
resident in a neighbouring settlement. The members of 
his household, which included his mother, brother and 
sister repossessed the field and resumed its cultivation,
which added 4-00 units to their paddy income,
c. In 19^4, s non-kipat-owning resident of Bharapa,
in his tenth year with the Gurkhas, came home on leave
and took under mortgage a paddy field which had previously 
been pledged to and worked by a Brahmin from outside the 
Cluster, The mortgage capital was Rs 1280 which he had 
saved during the last two years. Since his household 
contained only his wife and a young daughter, he gave
the land to his mother’s brother on tenancy for an annual 
rent of 190 units.
d. An Angu of Bharapa, without ownership rights to
kipat recently completed fifteen years of service in the 
army. With Rs 3200 of his savings over the last three 
years, he paid bard to the kipat owner (like those in the 
first and third cases above) and took under mortgage
a field producing 1200 units of paddy. The field had 
previously been pledged to a Brahmin who had cultivated 
it himself.
These cases have two things in common. In the 
first place they involve monies earned from army service 
being used to gain, or regain, landholding rights to kipat. 
Secondly, virtually all the lands repossessed or taken 
under mortgage with these funds had previously been
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pledged to members of other castes, mostly to Brahmins 
resident outside the Cluster. This is of course inev­
itable since these other castes have been the main 
source of mortgage credit for the Limbus. What is sig­
nificant is that only during the past twenty years or so 
service in the Gurkhas has made it possible for Limbus 
to obtain and regain landholding rights to kipat which 
for decades has been in the hands of these other castes.
From the point of view of the owners of kipat, 
the inflow of monies earned in military service provides 
added opportunities for them to obtain bard in the process 
of transferring landholding rights. However, it has 
already been suggested that the freedom to manipulate 
rights of land ownership can be restricted by the pattern 
of multiplex ties. This would certainly apply to relations 
between Limbus - more especially, between neighbours, 
a dispute which arose following the transfer of a 
kipat mortgage from one Limbu to an ex-soldier neighbour 
suggests the kind of reaction forthcoming upon an attempt 
to disregard these ties.
In I960 Kabir Hang borrowed Rs 600 from his 
classificatory brother’s son Ram, Kabir Hang in return 
gave the latter a small plot of unirrigated land to 
cultivate under possessory mortgage until the loan could 
be repaid. The plot adjoined one of Ram's own fields
near his house so he could cultivate the entire stretch 
of land at one time. In 1964, Kul Bahadur, an Angu, 
and a recently retired soldier (see above, case d.) 
offered Kabir hang the mortgage price and an additional 
increment (bard) of Rs 350. The landholding rights to 
the plot which Ram had been cultivating were then trans­
ferred, The maize was sown by Kul Bahadur in March but 
Ram said nothing at the time. In August, shortly after 
Kul Bahadur had transplanted his millet seedlings, Ram 
confronted Kabir Hang in a rage and demanded to know 
why the latter had allowed Kul Bahadur to plant his 
millet on Ram's land, a boundary dispute then ensued 
although the total amount in question was perhaps thirty 
square feet. The matter was composed by a number of 
onlookers who had heard the shouts, the most instrumental 
being a Newar ritual friend (mit) of Kul Bahadur, who 
happened to be passing by. Kul Bahadur did not appear 
himself. The disputed area was divided in equal parts.
When I asked Ram about the dispute, he did not 
refer to the disagreement over the boundary, but instead 
was vexed about the fact that Kul Bahadur had offered 
Kabir Hang bard. He was equally annoyed with Kabir Hang 
for taking the land away from a neighbour and an agnate 
and giving it to Kul Bahadur, an affine who has no 
kipat (but who is also a neighbour ). Ram then went on
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to say how being in Malays (where a large contingent 
of British Gurkhas are stationed) and earning a lot of 
money had gone to Kul Bahadur’s head. He cited a number 
of examples of the letter’s impertinent and haughty 
behavior, what had begun as a boundary dispute was in 
fact a grievance over having lost landholding rights to 
a plot of land. It was also a general statement about 
the fact that servicemen are at a distinct advantage 
in bidding for lands pledged to others. Ram was giving 
vent to his anger, and since Kul Bahadur is not only an 
ex-serviceman but a member of a group without rights 
to kipat as well, he chose to attack along the lines of 
an already existing structural cleavage.
Such a dispute is atypical insofar as the great 
majority of lands taken under mortgage by soldiers and 
pensioners were previously pledged not to Limbus, but 
to Brahmins and other castes. 1 did not learn of any 
instance where a soldier attempted to bid for lands held 
by Brahmins resident in the Cluster. The people most 
affected by the growth of this formidable source of 
income have been those landholders of Brahmin and other 
castes resident outside the Cluster.
How much of this movement of kipat lands away from 
members of other castes and into Limbu hands can be 
attributed to Gurkha service? In Chapter V it was shown
that 21.3$ of all mortgaged kipat lands have been taken 
up by Limbus resident in the Cluster. Of this amount, 
14.8$ has been pledged to ten ex-army pensioners.
This represents an investment of Rs 37*800 during the pa 
fifteen years and a transfer of just under 14,000 units 
to Limbu landholders and away from those of other 
castes. These figures do not represent the entire 
picture since they exclude monies expended by kipat- 
owning soldiers and pensioners to repay mortgages and 
repossess their own lands. Thus, six of the seven 
Limbu households which today enjoy the unimpeded 
usufruct of their own kipat lands can attribute their
A
position to monies earned from service in the Gurkhas . 
In addition, men serving in the army at present have 
invested close to Rs 8000 to take over 1000 units of 
kipat land under mortgage (1.2$ of mortgaged kipat) and 
purchase 500 units of raikar land.
In some measure, this tendency for funds earned 
in the army to be reinvested in land is to be explained 
by reference to alternative opportunities. There is no 
industry in H a m  which might attract investment funds. 
Nor is there any other outlet which could offer the 
prestige and security that land provides. The only
1. See Table 11, p. 1?1
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likely alternative is the provision of interest bearing 
loans. This is in fact exploited and four pensioners 
between them provide Rs 2000 in loans, equal to 48$ of 
the credit provided by all Limbus in the Cluster.
But lack of alternatives is only part of the 
explanation. The system of kipat tenure, which ensures 
that rights to land can never be alienated, provides 
a strong incentive for men serving in the army to main­
tain their ties to home ana land. For as long as they 
are away, ownership rights remain intact. The system, 
moreover, benefits not only those who own kipat. The 
fact that kipat is inalienable means that Limbus without, 
ownership rights themselves, but with sufficient funds, 
can always obtain lands through mortgage, by employing 
their ties of kinship and neighbourhood to keep open this 
avenue of investment, and of course by their ability to 
provide bard to the owners.
The effect of the inflow of pensions and salaries, 
therefore, has been to improve the agricultural economy 
of those households benefitting from external income source®. 
It is worth noting that four of the seven Limbu house­
holds with the largest income from agriculture are headed 
by ex-servicemen receiving the largest pensions in the 
Cluster.
Does income from local sources provide an
investment fund for land in the same way as do pensions
and army salaries? As I have shown, opportunities for 
earning cash have increased substantially over the past 
fifty years in the areas to the south of the Cluster. 
Sixty-five households regularly engage in a variety of 
commercial activities. The available opportunities are 
not, by and large, mutually exclusive. About half of all 
Limbu households earn income from more than one of these 
sources. Even a household whose head is in the army 
can add to its revenue by petty trading, since it is
engaged in mainly by women.
Earnings from commercial activities in the area, 
however, serve only to maintain the status quo.
Hotiseholds which do not have sufficient agricultural 
production to meet their varied requirements, recurrent 
and contingent, rely on alternatives available locally 
to fill the gap. Others with adequate agricultural 
resources sustain their viable economic positions by 
availing themselves of the opportunities for earning 
extra cash. In general, the inflow of cash from sources 
around the Cluster enables Limbu peasants to hold the 
economic line. But these injections of cash, unlike the 
monies earned by military service, are not adequate to 
bring about any lasting improvement in the overall
economic position of the Limbu households which exploit 
them.
Nevertheless , certain advantages are seen to 
attach to economic activities in the area. Such acti­
vities, unlike army service, do not require a man to be 
away from his home and family for long periods at a 
time. Certain kinds of trading are confined to weekly 
market days. Others, like wood portering require the 
adoption of a commuter schedule. Come long distance 
portering involves absences of only a few days at a 
time. Moreover, the commercial activities can be taken 
advantage of without neglecting the demands of agri­
culture, so that a household can manage its tasks in 
both sectors with a minimum of conflict.
There is an indication that as local opportunities 
for earning cash have expanded, fev/er Indreni Limbus 
are turning to military service. This is especially 
noticeable among those Limbus who have ownership rights 
to kipat land. Whereas 71*8$ of living males over 40 
years of age who own kipat served in the army, only 14.8$ 
of those between 18 - 40 years have served or are doing 
so ab present. The corresponding figures for Limbus 
without kipat are 75$ snd 50$, which is to be expected 
for reasons already cited. The figures are undoubtedly 
biased since the over-40 category subs.1’.mes those who
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joined during the tv/o world wars when recruiting was 
less selective. Still, the trend away from military 
service appears evident, when it is noted that seven of 
the eight kipat-owning servicemen in the lower age cate­
gory are resident in Dorumba and Chitok, the northernmost 
Indreni settlements, where local cash earning opportunities 
outside the Cluster are of only incidental importance.
None lives in Angbung, and only one in Bharapa, from 
which settlements the local sources of income are most 
fully exploited.
How do earnings from all other sources compare 
with income from subsistence agriculture? Translating 
the net income from agriculture into monetary terms at 
the current rate of Rs 1*20 per unit of paddy and maize, 
and Rs 0.80 per unit of millet, the value of net agri­
cultural income is Rs 99,420. Earnings from commercial 
sources are detailed in Table 32. The number of house­
holds engaged in each activity appears in the column on 
the left.
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1TABLE 32Earnings from commercial sources
2Local Sources: within Cluster ho,, of HonsehoIds Annual Income
Domestic service 
Pishing
Sales of mandarins, butter 
Ritual services 
Teaching
Local Sources: outside Cluster
Government service
Sale of liquor in market
Trade in liquor, meat
Sale of yeast bread in market
Portering wood, wood-cutting
Trading, portering mandarins, etc.
Labour in Terai, India
External Sources
Pensions *
Army salaries, remittances
4 Rs 140
5 420
5 730
5 800
1 420
2510
2 1320
39 5950
1 160
11 3085
23 5650
8 900
9 1100
18165
13 80?0
12 8550
16620
Total Rs 57295
The above Table shows that commercial sources 
provide an income equal to approximately 38# of net agri­
cultural income. Table 35 gives the proportions for
1, It is necessary to stress that some of these figures 
are only estimates.
2. Income from agricultural labour proved impossible to 
estimate and is omitted here. It should also be 
remembered that bard provides another source of 
unearned income.
3* As I explained, remittances from servicemen are not 
made regularly or in full. The figures, then, are for 
potential, not actual, income.
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individual Limbu households. The breakdown is given 
by settlement, since proximity to local sources of 
income is a determining factor in their utilization.
TiiBLE 33 
Income from commercial sources 
(expressed as a percentage of agricultural income)
Number of Households 
Angbung Bharapa Chitok Borumba Total
None 1 2 5 3 11
1 - 4-9 % 
50 - 99$
13 12 12 5 4-2
4- 3 1 11
100$ or over 9 8 5 1 21
27 25 23 10 85
Eleven households earn no income from commercial 
sources. Most of these households (eight) are in the two 
settlements situated farthest from H a m  Bazaar. Seventy- 
four households, therefore, have some income from 
commercial sources. The majority (4-3 households) 
earn funds amounting to less than half their income 
from agriculture, while another eleven households have 
commercial incomes which amount to between 50 - 99$ of 
their earnings from agriculture. Approximately one 
quarter of Indreni households earn more from commercial 
than from agricultural sources. Again, it is worth 
noting that seventeen of the twenty-one households in 
this category are resident in ^ngbung and Bharapa. Hour
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of the eight households in Bh&rapa ere in the category 
because of remittances from men presently serving in 
the Gurkhas. But the four remaining households, like 
the nine in hngbung, earn their commercial income from 
local sources. Two Chitok and Borumba households are 
in this category because of pension earnings, while 
the other two have local sources of commercial income.
The growing commitment to commercial sources 
of income can be seen to affect social relationships 
within the Indreni settlements in two ways. In the 
first place, the agricultural system no longer repre­
sents the sole means of livelihood for the Limbus. To 
be sure, the origin of, and, indeed, the motive sustaining 
their reliance on commercial activities turns on 
economic necessity. But as opportunities for earning 
wealth outside the agricultural system have expanded, 
the household continuously reappraises its own alter­
natives and makes new choices based on economic self- 
interest. The effect, evidenced in the fact that 25% 
of all Limbu households earn more from commercial than
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from agricultural activities, has been to confer on 
the Limbu household a greater freedom to opt out of 
relationships of dependence on those who tend to 
dominate access to the land.
In the second place, that wealth earned outside 
the Cluster which is reinvested in land redounds to 
the benefit of the Limbus and, conversely, to the 
detriment of the chief landholding castes. Thus,
Limbu exploitation of commercial income sources poses 
a constant threat to the economic ascendance of these 
other castes. The kipat system of land tenure, by 
guaranteeing Limbu ownership rights in perpetuity, 
keeps ajar the portal of economic change. Bo that 
while agriculture is less important in the overall 
economy of the Limbus, land is still the basis of 
Limbu security, and the Cluster stillthe focus of their 
social ties.
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CHAPTER VII 
POLITICS IN TEC SETTLEMENTS
In this and the following chapter I consider 
the political configuration in the Indreni settlements. 
Any description of political life in the Cluster must 
take into account the factor of Government presence.
Since the absorption of H a m  into a national polity in 
1774, Kathmandu, first through the militia, and later 
through the civil administration, has exercised a 
monopoly of coercive force. Settlements, however 
remote, have been encompassed within a wider political 
system.
The influence of the Centre is evident at the 
lowest political levels. Government-approved headmen 
exercise leadership roles, the definition and scope of 
which are largely delineated by the national authorities. 
The first task, then, is to describe the role of Subba. 
This is done by outlining the hierarchical framework 
of leadership which existed until the latter part of 
the 19th century, at which time the hierarchy collapsed 
as a result of both Government policy end changes in 
the pattern of landholding described earlier. I then 
consider contemporary contexts of leadership and relate 
these particularly to the settlement of disputes in which
Indreni Limbus are involved. The emergence of new 
leaders who derive power not from traditional ascriptive 
criteria but from wealth and status earned through 
military service is noted. Finally, the nature and 
composition of factions formed around two Brahmin 
residents in the Cluster are described. The question 
which underlies the latter analysis asks whether or 
not factional strife mitigates the freedom of alignment 
maintained by Limbu households in other contexts already 
noted?
The leadership Hierarchy
In Chapter III I pointed out how Subbas gave 
grants of kipat land to non-Limbus immigrating into 
Limbuan from the west of Nepal. The recipients of 
these grants were appointed by the 3ubbas as political 
underlings (Thsri)^. These latter, were, in turn, 
encouraged to settle their own Holdings by offering 
land to the immigrants who followed. In the region 
of the Indreni Cluster, for example, the extent of land 
grants was considerable. The Chongbung and Nembeke 
Subbas between them granted fourty-four Holdings out of
1. Although there would seem to be no logical reason why 
Limbus could not be made Tharis, in fact this did 
not happen. All Tharis are non-Limbus.
301.
which, further allotments were made by the recipient
Tharis . The Holdings encompassed an area of some
twelve square miles and included, by the time of the
last revenue settlement in Ilam in 1930, approximately
1000 registered households.
Thus, a political hierarchy was created which
mirrored the hierarchy of land Holdings. This was
symbolised in the annual payments of tribute made by
dependents (raiti) to their Tharis, and by the latter
to his Subba. During the festival of Dasein Tharis
were obliged to bring gifts of parched rice, curd and
fruit, and in return received a tika from their Bubbas.
x^gain, at the beginning of the Nepali year, during the
lunar month of Baisakh (Apri1-May), Tharis were constrained
to bring further offerings of cash (Rs l) as well as
clarified butter and curd, at which time they would
request the renewal of their land grants for the coming 
2year . Tharis were also expected to provide five days 
of unpaid labour or their equivalent in cash. This was
1. I was unable to ascertain the exact number of grants 
made by the Ksmbo Bubbas, though they were probably 
fewer than either the ‘Nembeke or the Chongbung grants.
2. It is unlikely, however, that Subbas could evict their 
Tharis without sufficient cause. See below#
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usually obtained from among their own dependents, who 
owed their Thari a similar tribute. The Limbu dependents 
of the Subbas, most of ivhom were his lineage mates, 
offered similar quantities of tribute. The Subbas 
also had the right to demand a percentage of the price 
of land sold by those settled on the Holdings he had 
granted. The fee usually amounted to about 10$ of the 
sale price, and was shared with the Thari concerned*
Chief among the duties of the Subbas was tsx- 
collection. This role placed him in a position from 
which certain economic advantages could be derived.
Due largely to administrative problems in the far corners 
of the country, a contractual system of tax-collection 
was established in Limbuan. Under this system the amount 
of tax due was determined during the course of a 
periodic revenue settlement. Moreover, Limbus were 
taxed not on land holdings but 011 the basis of a flat 
rate per kipat-owning household. Although new house­
holds established between settlements were not liable 
for tax, Subbas were prone to collect taxes from these 
unregistered households and appropriate the revenue for 
themselves. The use of both Nepali and Indian currency 
in 11am also enabled some Bubbas to assess the taxes in 
Indian currency and pay the revenue in Nepali coinage,
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thereby pocketing the difference in exchange.
Another feature of the tax-collection system 
accrued to the advantage of the Subbas. Once registered, 
a Limbu household was liable to the tax fixed at the 
time of the settlement. The tax was payable even if 
the kipat-owner died without heirs or emigrated. In 
such circumstances, if no other co-heir came forward 
to assume the liability of the vacant homestead, the 
obligation fell on the Subba, But the law, by obligating 
the Subba to pay taxes for lands vacated by his lineage 
mates, also recognized his right to re-allocate or 
keep for himself such vacated lands. These rights 
enabled the Subba to accumulate more lands than his 
lineage agnates. In Table 3^ landownership by the 
Subbas is contrasted with the average landownership 
of households in his lineage - taken as a basic index 
of loot
1. Chongbung Lineages (l) and (2) pay taxes to the same 
Subba, Phatras, Syelings and Kambo Lineage (2) are 
omitted because in the first two cases they pay taxes 
to Chongbung Subbas while in the latter instance, 
there are only two households in the lineage.
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TABLE 34
Ownership of kipab ] bas
Lineage 
Chongbung Lineage (l)
Ownership of Lend 
by Subba*
Karabo Lineage 
Nembeke
270.0
298.9
378.1
239.0
174.0
435.1 
213.4
* The average landownership per lineage household is 
taken as index 100 in each case.
owned by the Subbas and the average for households in 
their lineages are evident in the above Table. These 
figures, of course, refer to present-day ownership and 
do not necessarily reflect with accuracy the ownership 
ratios almost a century ago., since they take no account 
of inheritance patterns. But the trend indicated by 
the figures seems more than coincidental. Moreover, 
it is likely that the differences in landownership 
between headman and dependent arose before the turn of 
the century, since after that time land shortages 
encouraged co-heirs to press strongly their claims to 
vacated lands so that fewer lands accrued to the Subbas 
unless they were related as co-heirs themselves.
The differences between the amount of land
Tharis collected taxes from the dependents on
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their own Holdings and passed these on to the Subbas 
for submission to the land revenue office in Ilam 
Bazaar. If the Tharis attempted or, indeed, were 
implicated in attempts by their dependents to avoid 
taxes, the Subbas were entitled by the Government to 
’fine (the Thari) one year’s production and eat (i.e. 
keep) the fine.’ In cases of persistent attempts to 
avoid tax obligations, a Thari could be dismissed by a
A
Subba, acting in council with other Limbu headmen .
By and large, however, as long as the Tharis submitted
their taxes, behaved fairly to their dependents, and
respected their Subbas, they enjoyed security of tenure
on their Holdings. The Subbas could not arbitrarily
evict either the Tharis or their dependents once they
had been granted land.
The Subbas were the main channels of Government
control in the settlements. A judicial council of
Subbas (amal) acted as a court of original jurisdiction,
with 'Tights to hear cases of a civil nature involving
damages not exceeding Rs 100, and with authority to impose
2fines of up to Rs 25 • Their responsibility for the
1. Order regarding failure to register lands and home­
steads in Far Kirat, 1868.
2. The amal was not authorised to hear certain kinds of 
cases, called 1panchkhat1: broadly speaking, those 
relating to caste or offences punishable by death or 
life imprisonment. (See Regmi, 1965, p. .118).
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maintenance of law and order extended even beyond the 
boundaries of their Holdings, when granted their titles, 
Subbas were instructed to 'arrest any person who crosses 
the border (into Ilam) without our (Governmental) 
permission.'
Subbas were also held accountable for the 
maintenance of the main roads through their territory 
and all dependents were required to contribute labour, 
usually after the monsoons , to keep the roads in good 
repair. They recruited the porters required by the 
administration for the transport of essential foods 
and other materials. The Subbas were the earliest 
foresters and their permission had to be requested 
before anyone in the area under their jurisdiction could 
cut down heavy timber. They rounded up buffaloes and 
goats from the herds of their dependents for the dasein 
sacrifice at military headquarters in Ham, Obligatory 
contributions were imposed on the population at the 
time of such special occasions as the marriage of a 
princess or a royal coronation, and the Subbas were 
charged with the responsibility for administering the
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collections .
The first chink in the political hierarchy 
which had evolved from the system of land grants 
appeared in 1886. In that year, the Government decreed 
that all Holdings granted to non-Limbus out of kipat 
land could be converted to raiker tenure by the Tharis.
In consequence, the Subbas lost all rights in these 
lands. A dispute In 1954- illustrates the immutability 
of this regulation.
Shortly after 1912 the Hembeke fcubba Indra 
granted some kipat lands as a Holding to a Jaisi 
neighbour and appointed him a Thari. During the revenue 
settlement of 1936 the Jaisi registered the lands within 
the Holding as raikar. In 1954- Jshare, the son of Indra, 
sent his son Dharam to cut some leaves for their cattle 
from a nearby wood which was within the Holding given by 
his father to the Jaisi. When the sister of the present 
Thari (the son of the original grantee) saw Dharam she
1, Sometimes, the Subbas were called upon for assistance 
of a more personal nature. Found among some old papers 
belonging to a resident In the Cluster was a note, 
written in 1876, and addressed to a oubba from a member 
of the administration in Ilam Bazaar. The correspondent, 
who was building a house, requested a few bundles of 
thatch for his roof, which he suggested, might be forth­
coming from the Subba1s dependent households*
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became angry and told him he had no right to cut the 
leaves in this wood without her brother’s permission.
The young man cursed her and it is alleged that he 
struck her. v/hen the Thari heard the commotion which 
ensued he came running and asked what had happened. 
Dharam told him that he was only a 'cowherd1 (gothelo) 
on the land and did not own it since it belonged to 
the Subba who had made the grant. As such, Dharam 
insisted that he had every right to cut the leaves of 
the trees. V/hen the matter was brought before a 
mediation panel Jahare was held to be at fault for 
sending his son into another man's wood, Lven if the 
land had once been kipat, they pointed out, it had 
become railcar and. the Subba or his descendants who 
made the grant no longer had axiy rights in it. Jahare 
was made to promise that in future he would seek the 
permission of the Jaisi if he wished to cut leaves from 
the wood.
Jahare had set out to test the immutability of 
the grant which his father had given the Jaisi. He did 
this by sending his son to cut leaves without asking 
permission of the Jaisi, since ownership rights are 
recognized by requests for such permission, when Dharam 
used the term 'gothalo1 he was repeating a word used 
frequently by Limbus v/hen referring to the relationship
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of the Tharis to the Holdings granted them by the Subbas.
^ gothalo tends the cattle of his master, but does not 
own the cattle. Likewise, the Tharis were supposed only 
to mind the lands entrusted to them by the Limbus and 
take their products. The Limbus insist that the grants 
were given in good faith, and only the treachery 
of the recipients led to the conversion of these lands 
to raikar tenure.
Another development followed from the regulation 
of 1886: Tharis began to rely directly on the Government
for their security of title. The Government, which 
had previously only guaranteed the Tharis a measure of 
security after appointment by the Subbas, began to take 
a direct hand in their assignment. Although succession 
to the title by primogeniture was usually accepted, the 
authorities reserved the right of confirmation. If a 
Thari died without heirs or emigrated, leaving his 
Holding without a headman, the Government and not the 
Subba would make a new appointment, usually after consulting 
the dependents. Lor a brief period, Tharis were even 
allowed to sell their Holdings, subject only to the
"I
approval of the new Thari by the Government .
The rights and responsibilities of the Tharis
i. This right was abolished in 1911.
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no longer devolved from the Subbas. Channels of 
communication led straight from the administration to 
the Tharis. The latter became answerable directly to 
the Government. The final collapse of the leadership 
hierarchy came at the turn of the century when the 
Tharis of Ilam began paying the taxes they collected 
from their dependents to the revenue office instead of
1 nto the Subbas . ihus the Subbas were left to collect 
only the taxes assessed on their own Holdings of kipat.
This rearrangement of the tax-collecting system relieved 
the Tharis of traditional financial obligations to the 
Subbas, They were no longer bound to make mandatory 
contributions of labour to the Subbas, even though they 
retained the right to demand this labour from their own 
dependents. The fee payable by a purchaser of land, 
which had previously been shared with the Subbas, became, 
the sole prerogative of the Tharis. Such income bol­
stered their economic position, not only vis a vis their
\
dependents, but vis a vis the Subbas as well.
Even so, these new advantages only strengthened 
the trend towards the economic ascendancy of the Tharis 
which had begun even before the conversion into raikar
1. I v/as unable to discover the exact year when this
regulation came into effect. In other areas of Limbuan, 
Tharis still submit their taxes to the Subbas.
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of Holdings granted by the Subbas. I have already 
shown how Government kipat policy and population 
pressures had combined to bring about large-scale mort­
gaging of kipat lands. The Tharis, because of the 
singular advantages gained through their position, 
were those most likely to provide the mortgage credit 
and become landholders of kipat pledged by Limbus.
Thns, for example, all fourteen non-Limbus who are 
among the llaln Landholders of mortgaged kipat, are
A
Tharis . It seems possible to project this correlation 
back to the last decades of the 19th century, and to 
infer that the leadership hierarchy initially based on 
the system of land grants was already on shaky economic 
foundations when the raikar regulations of 1886 were 
introduced. The lack of coincidence between the 
political status conferred on the Subbas by the hierarchy 
and their economic status is demonstrated by a consider­
ation of their land mortgages. Table 35 shows the 
percentage of lands owned by Subbas which have been 
mortgaged. The figures have changed little since the 
turn of the century.
1. See p. 176.
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table 35
Kipat mortgaged by Subbas
Percentage of .band
Lineage
Chongbung Lineages (l) & (2)
ICambo Lineages 
Nembeke
91$
30
63
60
98 
97 
87
These figures support the contention that the
economic base on which the leadership hierarchy was 
originally built was eroded by the turn of the century. 
The Government's restructuring of the tax-collection 
system was fundamentally a recognition of this fact*
on kipat holdings remains unaltered, and constitutes 
the basis of his formal authority, But most of his 
other traditional duties have been usurped either by 
the Tharis or, more recently, by new administrative 
bodies such as the Panchayat Committee, described below. 
Still, the Subba remains a much respected figure among 
the Limbus, and the fact is recognized even by the 
Panchayat Committee which channels many of its instruc­
tions to the Limbus through their Subbas. Thus, for 
example, when each \^ard in the Village was required to
1. The Village is divided into nine wards, each of which 
chooses a representative to the Panchayat Committee.
The Suhbefs role as Government tax-collector
provide labourers for a road-building project, it was 
the Subbas and not the ward representatives who were 
asked to prepare a list of 'volunteers' from those 
wards containing the Indreni settlements.
There are two main reasons for the continued 
prestige enjoyed by the Bubba. The first, which I 
consider in the next chapter, concerns his role as symbol 
of the unity of Limbus in their opposition to 'the 
outside* The second relates to his dual role as 
mediator in minor disputes between Indreni Limbus and 
as a leading figure in negotiations over compensatory 
claims arising out of jari marriages. I consider the 
latter context first.
Disputes over Compensation
In an earlier chapter I alluded to the high rate 
(almost 20$) of marriages by abduction of other men's 
wives. Such marriages precipitate crises on three counts-, 
firstly, they give rise to the possibility of violence. 
Secondly, they involve the severance of existing 
linkages between affinal groups which is potentially 
disruptive since the groups in question are often 
related in a number of ways. Finally, they require the 
settlement of compensation claims and so have economic
314*.
consequences which seriously effect the fortunes of the 
households involved.
Although the use of force by e cuckolded husband 
is no longer recognized in law, attempts to employ 
violence to gain redress for marital grievances are not 
unknown. V/hen a Limbu of Bharapa abducted the wife of 
another man, the letter's attempts to take revenge on 
the adulterer led to an outbreak of fighting between 
supporters of both men and resulted, in the words of 
one participant, in a number of ’broken heads1. Such 
occurences are rare since steps are taken to ensure 
that the new husband and the cuckold do not meet. Thus 
a Ksmbo man of Dorumba spent the best part of three 
days in hiding while the man he hadcuckolded conducted 
negotiations for compensation with the former's repre­
sentatives. The explanation for the disappearance was 
that 'if the cuckold meets the man who has seduced his wife 
he must "cut1 the latter. '
However, in the great majority of cases r.ompen- 
sation is sought directly from the nev; husband only if 
the woman has been abducted from her marital home. This 
is an uncommon eventuality since both a husband and his 
kinsmen keep a close watch on the woman's activities and 
woebetide the man who is discovered attempting to seduce 
the woman under their very eyes. Most abductions take
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place while a woman is at her natal home. I have shown 
that the ties between a woman and her natal group 
remain strong after marriage, with sisters and daughters 
visiting frequently and for long periods of time, and 
with many marital separations leading to permanent 
residence of women in their natal settlements. This 
situation provides both the climate and the opportunities 
for the formation of liaisons with married women. V/hen 
a woman is seduced while resident at her natal home, 
the aggrieved husband generally seeks compensation from 
her natal household, which then reclaims the amount from 
the new husband.
To negotiate the terms of compensation and, in 
general, to effect the severance of existing or the 
establishment of new marriage ties are the tasks of 
representatives chosen by the households directly 
involved. I have been told, though this is impossible 
to verify, that traditionally this role fell to lineage 
groups led by the Subbas. The latter continue to justify 
their right to claim a special portion of any bride­
wealth in terms of the obligations they are prepared to 
accept on behalf of lineage mates during negotiations 
over compensation. The Subbas indeed play an essential 
part in the discussions, although more in their role as
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figures of influence within the community than in their 
capacity as lineage headmen. The lineage group, if it 
ever was, is no longer s corporate unit in so far as 
negotiations over compensation are concerned. The house­
holds involved in these disputes must mobilize supporters 
on principles more varied then, although including, 
lineage agnation. It is important to stress that the 
strength of a household's support depends not on the 
number of persons it is able to recruit, but on what 
might be called the strategic qualities of those recruited. 
Although the numbers taking part in discussions vary 
from instance to instance, indeed, from hour to hour 
during a single case, the effective supporters of a 
household seldom number fewer than four or more than 
eight for any compensation dispute.
What are the chief criteria for recruitment?
Of first importance is seniority. Although young men 
and women are invariably the partners in j^ri marriages 
the responsibility for dealing with the consequences 
of their actions falls on their elders. Young men may 
observe the deliberations of their elders, or answer 
questions of fact if asked, but none would presume nor 
be invited to participate in the talks. Seniority 
implies a number of qualities. To wrangle over compen­
sation and to handle the delicate task of severing old
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affinal links requires patience, and a facility for self- 
expression, which latter suggests 011 ability to converse 
in the idiom of Limbu tradition and customs. Such 
qualities come only with age and experience. The 
importance of seniority is highlighted by an instance 
in which an Indreni Limbu found himself negotiating 
for compensation without the benefit of support from his. 
elders. When a young Chongbung man went to fetch his 
wife who had been visiting her natal settlement for a 
few months, he discovered that she had gone off with 
another man several days before his arrival. Instead 
of returning to the Cluster (a three day walk) to 
muster support he allowed himself to be persuaded by 
the girl’s father to settle compensation immediately.
His only supporter was another young man from the 
Cluster who had come along for the trip. He was able 
to collect Rs 300 but he would have received much more, 
he insisted, if there had been some older men with him. 
fWe were two babies (balak) against their elders (burdo).?
Not all elders possess the qualities usually 
associated with elderhood. In the Cluster men with 
the required talents are few and much sought after. In 
information obtained about twenty-eight cases of compen­
sation disputes, the names of eight men appear constantly
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among the supporters recruited by households from every 
part of the Cluster. All but one - who is 65 years old - 
are between 45 - 60 years and possess the ability to 
present an argument . forcefully and tactfully. They 
are all of above average wealth, although the richest 
Indreni men are not amongst them. These men command 
considerable prestige and influence among the Limbus.
During talks, one supporter on each side acts, 
as chief spokesman, carrying the main burden of the 
discussion. Although any elder with oratorical talents 
can assume this role, ideally it should fall to a Subba, 
since it is felt his title alono commands respect.
'All men talk but a Subba must be listened to.1 In 
70$ of the cases recorded a Subba did 'act as spokesman, 
although in the majority of instances the household for 
which he spoke was not a dependent (raiti). In those 
cases where households were, by virtue of owning kipat 
land, linked to Subbas as dependents, only 40$ were 
actually represented by their own Subbas. Because most 
Limbu headmen were either too young or did not have 
the necessary qualifications to be spokesmen another 
40$ of these households were represented by a Subba other 
than their own. In one case, for example, a Kamho man 
whose elder brother was a Subba, but still young and
inexperienced, invited a Chongbung Subba to be his 
spokesman.
The Subba performs another important function 
in providing uhe channel through which negotiations 
can be inaugurated. The residents from another settle­
ment cluster who arrive to negotiate for compensation 
are expected to make the first formal statement of 
their intentions to a Subba. If this is neglected, as 
it sometimes ±u, the Subba could refuse to allow 
discussion© to begin and certainly threaten to withhold 
his participation. By adhering to this custom, which 
includes the payment of a bottle of liquor to the Subba, 
the visitors ensure that the discussions will commence 
with haste and in an atmosphere of cordiality.
Neighbourhood is another important consideration 
when gathering support, since neighbours are first of all 
dependent on one another in a number of contexts and 
therefore thought to be reliable allies, Secondly, 
neighbours are expected to know the intimate details 
of the circumstances they are beings called upon to di&cuss. 
Since most Limbus are neighbours to at least some of 
their lineage mates, we might distinguish between the 
latter and neighbours who belong to other lineage groups. 
Thus, 60$ of the households in the cases recorded mobi­
lised non-lineage neighbours to support them, while 75$
included lineage kinsmen. This latter figure is of some 
significance since it indicates that one quarter of the 
households did not muster their lineage agnates even 
though such were available. Most households recruited 
both categories of neighbour.
Glose to half the households recruited non­
lineage supporters from other neighbourhoods in the 
Cluster and even from settlements outside the Cluster 
area. These persons were brought in to negotiate for 
one of two main reasons: either they fulfilled some
of the criteria already discussed, or because they could 
trace links in the opposing camp. If neighbours or 
lineage mates had similar links the need for 'outside1 
recruitment would have been unnecessary. The importance 
attached to the inclusion of supporters with matrilateral 
or affinal ties to the opposition is illustrated by the 
following examples.
After Alahang, a Kambo of Chitok had seduced the 
wife of another man and brought her to be his own wife, 
the woman's father and his supporters came to demand 
compensation , Of the four supporters recruited by
1. It is not uncommon for the father of a woman who has 
gone off from her natel settlement to seek compen­
sation from the new husband before the cuckold comes 
to claim from his ex-father-in-law.
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Alahang one, another Kambo belonging to a different 
lineage, was related affinally, through his third wife, 
to the father of ^lahang's new wife. A second supporter, 
a Chongbung of Bharapa, was also mobilized partly because 
he had matrilateral ties in the same settlement cluster 
as the woman's father. By continually stressing the 
importance of these ties, Alahang's supporters were 
able to dispel the initial hostility of the woman's 
father and his allies caused by Alahang’s abrupt 
abduction of their daughter, and to reduce a first demand 
for Rs 1500 compensation to a final figure of Rs 600.
In another instance, the married daughter of 
Sandu, a Chongbung, disappeared after a dancing party 
in Angbung which was attended by some young men from 
the district of Psnchthar. Her husband, whose home was 
about four miles away, heard of her disappearance and 
came with his father and two other supporters to demand 
the payment of compensation. Here again, two of 
Sandu's supporters traced affinal links to Sandu's 
in-laws. The first two wives of one had come from the 
same settlement cluster, and the present wife of the 
other was s lineage sister of the opposition spokesman. 
Since Sandu could not pay the compensation, it was 
essential to postpone the discussions for as long as 
possible to give him the time to look for his daughter
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end her abductor, who had indeed disappeared, and to 
raise the compensation payments from his new in-lav/s. 
After a number of refusals, the husband’s supporters 
agreed to a postponement of one month on the basis of 
a personal guarantee from the husband of their lineage 
sister (and a supporter of Sandu) that at the end of the 
stipulated period the compensation would be paid*
Persons linked to both camps, even when not 
taking as crucial a part in the discussions as those 
in the two cases cited, do tend to bridge the gulf 
between the negotiators and so ameliorate the bad 
feelings which fjari marriages can cause, while exerting 
a strong force for compromise.
Since virtually all tjari marriages are between 
partners in different settlement clusters there are no 
universally recognized mediators such as there would be 
in intra-cluster disagreements. To an extent, the 
presence of Subbas and the common vocabulary of tradition 
and custom provide a framework within which discussions 
can proceed. But it is unlikely that any compromise 
could result' from such negotiations without the inclusion 
on each side of supporters with interests in maintaining 
their links to both sides. Still, this is not the stated 
purpose for their recruitment. The household means to
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mobilize supporters and not mediators. One householder 
involved in such a dispute remarked: 'we want men who
will carry us, not men who will compromise,1 In this 
sense, the household musters an 'action-set* - to help 
it achieve a specific goal viz. the settlement of compen-
'i
sation on terms favourable to itself .
In the process of their confrontation, however, 
these sets are gradually 'tie nsformed* into a; panel of 
mediation because of their interests in maintaining 
relationships which transcend in importance the 
immediate subject of their dispute. This becomes 
evident when it is noted that once recruited, a set will 
negotiate without the direct guidance of the household 
it is meant to represent, and will reach decisions which 
the members of both sets feel serve their own or the 
general interest. In the latter case cited above, for 
example, Sandu was entirely without control of his 
supporters, and did not wholly concur in the compromise 
they reached.
The inclusion in the household's set of Subbas 
and elders who are men of influence thus ensures that 
its case will be well represented, and at the same time 
guarantees that compromises reached will be respected.
1. For a discussion of 'action-set' see Mayer, 1966.
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Even the most powerful Limbu households, although able 
to exert a greater measure of control over the sets 
they recruit and thus in a better position to influence 
the final decision of the mediation panel, would be 
reluctant to disregard this decision for fear of alienating
'i
the support of the Subbas and elders in future .
Intra-Cluster Disputes
Informal Mediation
'The Subba's statutory authority no longer
extends to the maintenance of law and order. The
council of Subbas (amal), which existed until about 50
2years ago, is now defunct. In consequence, most disputes 
between Limbus within the Indreni Cluster are mediated
1• These mediation panels are unlike the 1 councils of
reconciliation1 described by Cohen in that the mediators 
are not chosen by each side because they are neutral. In 
the sense that the sets which ultimately reach agreement 
regard themselves, at least in the initial stages of the 
discussions, as opponents representing different sides 
of a dispute, they resemble what Bailey refers to as an 
'arena council1. (Bee Cohen, 1965? PP. 142-45 and 
Bailey, 1965, pp. 9-15-)
2. This Is due partly to the fact that Subbas have lost 
much of their traditional power and partly to the 
spread of Government courts which usurped many of the 
functions of the smal.
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informally by men who are regarded as Notables (bhaladmi)■
A man achieves notability with age, wealth and, increas­
ingly, with literacy. He is expected to be fair and 
impartial when hearing disputes, and to possess the 
influence to make his decision acceptable to both 
parties. Still, the term is a vague one and depends 
not only on the context in which it is being used, but 
on the identity of the disputants. One man's Notable, 
so to speak, may not be another’s. We might distinguish 
two categories of Notable. On the one hand there are 
the local variety, men who are regarded as Notables in 
each settlement or neighbourhood and who invariably help 
to compose minor quarrels between their neighbours. The 
Subbas and elders referred to above, for example, are 
regularly called upon to mediate in disputes involving 
individuals who recognize the higher status of the farmer.
To deserve the appellation of Notable on a 
Cluster-wide basis, however, demands validation by a 
status recognized in a wider context than the neighbourhood 
and even the Cluster. It accrues only to individuals 
with high status in the wider community. Eor reasons 
mainly connected with their economic impoverishment, none 
of the Subbas today enjoys the status of Notalfole in this 
sense; and to avoid confusion, it is in this latter 
sense only that I will employ the term.
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In the Cluster today those who are regarded 
universally as Notables are army pensioners, more 
particularly, pensioners who combine literacy, age and 
wealth with 'high’ military rank. Of these qualities 
it is only wealth, of course, which once attained, can 
be dissipated and lead to a loss of Notable status.
To sustain a viable economic position over the years 
requires a combination of skill in managing a farmstead 
and a favourable balance of good fortune. That this is 
not always achievable can be illustrated by reference to 
one Chongbung ex-serviceman. As a result of the eighteen 
years he spent in the army he was able to repay a number 
of debts incurred prior to enlistment, to repossess his 
own mortgaged kipat lands and to take some other lands 
under mortgage. During the first three years following
A
his return to the Cluster with the rank of a Havildar 
and a pension of Rs 40 per month, he invested in more 
land. Within ten years, however, by a combination of 
unfortunate circumstances, ehief among which were eight 
young children and a penchant for drink, the Havildar's 
household was among the poorest in the Cluster. The 
status he imported from the Gurkhas is irrelevant in the 
context of Indreni leadership because of his present
1. h Havildar is roughly equivalent to sergeant
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economic circumstances.
Another ex-soldier, a Nembeke, who attained the 
same rank and pension, has been ©Lie to maintain a 
viable estate, although with increasing difficulty 
because of his own involvement in expensive litigation. 
Nevertheless, now in his early sixties, he is recog­
nized as a Notable in the Cluster, and disputes are 
frequently taken to him for mediation. Thus, a quarrel 
between two brothers over the division of property 
retained by their widowed mother (.jiuni) prior to her 
death was brought before the Havildar even though he 
was a Nembeke of Dorumba and the disputants Chongbungs 
of Bharapa. The brothers threatened to take the matter 
to court but were assured by the Havildar that a fair 
solution could be found which would be satisfactory to 
both and moreover, which would save them undue time 
and costs. The procedure, as in most instances of media­
tion was informal, with each disputant presenting his 
argument in turn and answering questions put to him by 
the mediator. Others joined freely in the talks and 
witnessed the signatures on the document setting out the 
terms which were finally agreed upon - the division of 
the land into equal shares. The return to harmonious 
relations was signified when everyone present was 
invited to share a bottle of liquor.
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The dispute did not require the attention of a
gifted mediator. The solution was obvious at the
outset and could have been foretold by any Indreni man
with an average amount of experience in these matters.
Why, then, was it brought to a Notable? When the question
was put to one of the disputants he replied: * Why
should we bring it to a Subba? He is no bigger than
we are. If there is any quarrel about the decision in
future, then others will tell us: "this is the work
(decision) of a Notable; why do you quarrel about it?"1
The acceptance of mediation by men who are universally
recognized as Notables thus ensures that the decision
is not likely to be disregarded.
The most widely acknowledged Nttahles in the
Cluster are two ex-soldier brothers of Ghitok. Both
are known and addressed by their ranks: the elder,
Lajahang, was a Lieutenant; the younger, Parsade, a
Subedar . Their pensions amount jointly to Rs 2280
annually. Between them they have taken under mortgage
210.1a? of all kipat lands pledged by Indreni Limbus .
1. Under the system of ranking in the Gurkha Brigade prior 
to 194-7} a Gurkha Lieutenant was referred to as an Indian 
Commissioned Officer, while a Subedar was a Viceroy C.O. 
The latter ranked slightly below the former,
2, They are among the Main Landholders (h. and i.) disting­
uished in Chapter V. See Table 14-, p. 176.
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Lajshang also owns raikar lands in the T'erai, purchased 
with his earnings during service, and from which he 
derives an income of approximately Rs 2500 per year.
Both are considered to be among the wealthiest men in 
the area* Since their return from army service in the 
early 1950s their assumption of leadership has seemed 
both inevitable and welcome* As the most important 
Notables they have to mediate in the greatest number 
of disputes* One quarrel, involving a Subba's son, 
is worth recounting since it illuminates the established 
trend sway from mediation and, more generally, from 
poiLitiosl leadership by the Subbas, in favour of that 
provided by Notables who have achieved status as a result 
of army service*
A  -Ow
j Lajahang j Parsade
Kabir Hang jCx
Kanak 
!
&  Khem Bahadur
Big* 7°
In October, 1964 Kanak, the brother’s son of 
Lajshang and Parsade loaned Rs 1 to Khem Bahadur, the 
son of oubb8 Kabir Hang, so that Khem Bahadur could remain 
in a game of cards some boys were playing. The following 
January, Kanak asked for the return of the money* It is 
alleged that Khem Bahadur refused, and that there ensued
an argument during which the Subba’s son was beaten.
When Kabir Hang heard what had taken place he discussed 
the matter with another Subba and both decided to hold 
a moot (in their 1amal1, as they put it, using the term 
for the traditional Subba's court). Both Kanak and his 
father's brothers - but not his father, who is a poor 
man without influence - were summoned to the house of 
Kabir Hang where the moot was to be held. After some 
time a representative arrived saying that both La^ahang 
and Parsade preferred that the meeting be held at the 
former's house. Those who had gathered in Kabir Hang's 
courtyard then walked the half mile to the new meeting 
place.
Kabir Hang regarded the beating as a deliberate 
insult to the dignity of a Subba. He insisted that 'the 
Subba is a king, and to beat the son of a Subba., is to 
beat a king's son' (and future king). The purpose of 
the moot fox* him was to seek redress for this affront.
The incident was regarded in quite different terms by 
the ex-army li eutenant. He pointed out that it is against 
the law to gamble and that both bo3^ s were wrong to do so. 
He then reminded Konak that it is also against the law 
to beat another, and that e court would deal severely 
with such an offence. Kanak was then mode to present a
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bottle of liquor to the oubba, and to signal his apology 
by making obeisance to the latter and to his son.
Two points are worth noting. Firstly, Lajahang, 
by insisting on holding the moot in his own homestead, 
established his own right to mediate as against that 
of the Subbas. Secondly, the different value frameworks 
within which each interpreted the misdemeanor illustrates 
the divergent bases of the two kinds of leaders.
Stated crudely, it is the distinction between, on the 
one hand, ascribed leadership founded on traditional 
norms and, on the other hand, achieved leadership validated 
by the norms of the wider society.
Although it is often said of Limbus that their 
disputes are never aired before members of other groups, 
in fact mediation is sometimes provided by another cate­
gory of Notables who are not Limbus. The status which 
most often leads to the recognition of a non-Limbu as 
a Notable is headmanship on raikar Holdings i.e. the 
title of Thari. Until recently it was unlikely that a 
non-Limbu could achieve the qualities demanded of a 
Notable without the status and prerogatives enjoyed by 
a Thari. In rare instances, a local Brahmin or other 
high caste man could rise to a position of prominence in
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tlie administration in Ilsm Bazaar. 'then this happened, 
the prestige he imported into the settlement would 
generally be supplemented by the grant or purchase of 
a raikar Holding, thus providing him with a base from 
which to sustain his externally-derived wealth and 
influence. Nowadays, in theory at least, a man can 
gain prominence through the new administrative structures, 
such as the Panchayat Committee. But in fact, as I 
wi31.show, this is highly unlikely. In the region of the 
Indreni settlements, while not all Tharis are Notables, 
there are no non-Limbu Notables who are not also Tharis.
The nature of the relationship between a raikar 
headman and his dependents relates, to a large extent, 
to the spatial distance between the Thari and his Holding. 
Because of the early practice of sale and purchase of 
Holdings as well as the introduction of a category of 
Government-appointed headmen, a Thari1s residence often 
does not coincide with the location of his Holding.
Of the six Tharis resident in the Indreni Cluster, only 
one, a Jaisi of Dorumba, actually resides on his own 
Holding. The other five Tharis - all Brahmins - have 
their Holdings anywhere from one to six miles away from 
their homes. As can be seen from the following Table, 
three of the Tharis resident in the Indreni settlements
have more than one Holding,
a?ABlE_36 
Holdings of indreni ‘Tharis
Thari
Brahmin (l) 
Brahmin (2)
Brahmin (3) 
Brahmin (4)
Brahmin
Jaisi
Thari's 
Residence
Bharapa 
Chitok
Ohitok
Ohitok
Borumba 
Borumba
Location of Holding 
(distance from residence)
(8
(b
(s
(b
(a
(b
1 mile 
6 miles
miles 
6 miles 
6 miles
2 miles 
1 mile 
Borumba
3 miles
The raikar lands within the Indreni settlements 
are divided amongst four Tharis, three of whom - the 
Jaisi being the only exception - live outside, but 
within a three mile radius of the Cluster,
Bue to the nature of raikar land, the Thari is 
separated from his dependents in more than a spatial 
sense. Other than the fact that Holdings could be trans­
ferred by sale, raikar lands themselves can be alienated 
so that, over time, the composition of the Holdings' 
residents may change substantiality, Thus, in contra­
distinction to the Subba, the Thari is unlikely to be a 
kinsman to more than a few, if any, of his dependents.
The result is a relationship between dependents and Tharis
quite distinct from that between Subbas and their 
dependents.
For s number of reasons it is to a Thari1s 
advantage to keep in close touch with his Holding, Bor 
one thing, he is able to exact the traditional five days 
of labour, despite the fact that such exactions are now 
outlawed. For another, he can ensure that dependents 
turn up at Dasein with their tributary payments.
Thirdly, since a fee following the sale of any land 
within his Holding is still paid to the Thari, it is 
in the latter's best interests to be in touch with all 
developments, so as to know if the price mentioned in 
the documents of sale is in fact the real sale price, 
&till, it is not in a Thari!s interests to 
emphasize his prerogatives to the exclusion of his 
responsibilities, A Thari should be ready to offer 
financial and other kinds of assistance to his dependents 
during times of distress. He should also be prepared 
to help his dependents in their occasional dealings with 
the administration. And he must be ready to offer his 
services in mediating disputes. The Jaisi headman in 
Dorumbe, for example, has on several occasions attempted 
to seek a solution to a bitter antagonism existing 
between two Kambo brothers and their wives, who reside
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on the Jaisi*s raikar Holding, In the most recent 
incident, the wife of the older brother was severely 
beaten during a drunken quarrel by the younger brother 
and his wife. Since the case was one of assault, it 
was cognizable by the court, but the Thari convinced 
the injured party that an official complaint would only 
involve everyone In endless appearances in court and 
untold; expense, and stressed that 'brothers should not 
show their quarrels in public'. He then held a moot 
where it was decided that the aggressors would pay the 
injured woman Rs 1.60 to 'raise her head* i.e. prestige 
(sir uthaune).
A Thari who is known to be fair in his demands 
and generous in his assistance earns not only the accord 
of his dependents but of his peers and neighbours, even 
if the two categories of persons are spatially quite 
distinct. Thus the reputation earned by a Thari through 
his relationships with his dependents gives him Notable 
status in the area of his Holding as well as in the 
settlement region where he resides.
Two cases serve to illustrate the foregoing
remarks•
A poor Brahmin from a settlement just west of 
Bharape, had asked a Limbu widow of Angbung if he might 
take some bamboo from a small wood belonging to her son.
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While he was cutting down s tree he wes apprehended 
by the woman’s son who threatened to beat him* At 
that point a Brahmin Notable returning home from the 
Bazaar heard the two men quarreling and suggested that 
they explain the matter to him, The three retired to 
the courtyard of the Limbu’s mother where the matter was 
clarified. The Notable exacted an apology from the 
Limbu for his hasty accusation and a promise from the 
Brahmin that in future he would seek the Limbu’s per­
mission directly if he wanted to cut bamboo from the wood* 
The Notable, a Brahmin Thari of Ohitok, had no 
specific kin or political relationship with either of the 
disputants. His Holding was situated about six miles to 
the north of the Cluster, but his status in the Indreni 
area derived from his reputation as a man of wealth and 
influence, and his mediation attempts were both welcome 
and effective.
In another instance, the mediator was a man 
with similar Notable status, who was headman of a raikar 
Holding; within the Indreni settlements, though he was 
resident several miles away from the Cluster* The 
dispute involved a Chongbung of Ohitok who had cut off 
the ear of a goat belonging to a Brahmin from a neigh­
bouring settlement because the animal had come unattended
into the Limbu's potato field and destroyed part of the 
crop. The Thari, who was asked by the owner of the goat 
to settle the matter, upbraided the Limbu for not 
tying up the animal and then claiming compensation for 
the crop damage. It was decided that the Limbu would 
pay the owner Rs 32 and keep the goat. The owner 
demanded a promissory note from the Limbu, but the Thari 
insisted that this was unnecessary and that he would 
guarantee the payment, since both men owned a plot of 
raikar land in his Holding,
Thus Notable status within the Cluster can 
accrue, on the one hand, to Indreni Tharis who exercise 
at least a part of their leadership roles in Holdings 
removed from the Cluster, and, on the other hand, to 
Tharis resident outside the area but whose political 
base, as it were, is within the boundaries of the 
Indreni settlements.
In sum, then, there are a variety of informal 
mediators available to settle disputes in which Limbus 
are involved. The decision as to which category of 
mediator to choose depends partly on who a man is 
quarrelling with, and partly on the disputants’ personal 
assessment of their own status. The first is of import­
ance because Limbus prefer, but as is obvious from some 
of the examples cited, do not 8lwajrs succeed, in having
338.
their quarrels mediated by other Limbus, The second 
determines the ’level* at which mediation will be sought.
The higher an individual perceives his own status, the 
higher will be the level to which he turns for mediation. 
Thus, 'small* men turn to Subbas and other men of 
influence in their neighbourhoods; 'bigger' men seek 
mediation from one of several categories of universally 
recognized Notables. This explains the tendency for 
the decisions of informal mediators to be respected.
The acceptance of their superior status is at the same 
time the strongest sanction of their mediation.
But informal mediation is only one area of choice 
open to disputants. There are also formal bodies to 
which men can turn for the redress of their grievances.
They are the statutory Panchayat and the various admini­
strative offices, including the court, in Ilam Bazaar.
The Panchayat
The first attempts to introdiice statutory Panchayats. 
in Nepal date back to 1926 . In that year, experiments 
in local government were carried out in the region of 
Kathmandu Valley and in 1930, were expanded to include
1. For a good discussion of Panchayats in Nepal see ^ose, 
1963s.
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four districts in both the hill areas end the ferai.
It was not until 19d8, however, that legislation was 
introduced allowing for the establishment of Village 
Panchayats throughout the country. At that time a 
Panchayat Committee was formed of representatives from 
settlements in the llam-Darda sub-division of the 
district, which was constituted as a single 'village1. 
However, the revolution of 1951 aborted the Panchayats 
before they could begin functioning properly.
In 1953 the system was re-introduced, but this 
time Ilam-Darda was divided into three 'Villages',
All Village inhabitants over twenty-one years of age 
became members of a Village Assembly (sabha) which met 
twice annually to approve the budget and discuss the 
development programmes before it. The members of the 
Assembly also chose nine men to represent them 011 a 
Panchayat Committee, and the latter in turn, selected 
their own chairman and vice-chairman. The Government 
appointed two prominent men of the area to act as 
president and vice-president, responsible for the proper 
conduct of the Panchayat Committee's business and, 
generally, to oversee its functioning, Additional 
supervision was provided by a District Panchayat and a 
specially created Government department which audited the 
accounts of the Committee, approved its programme and had
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the power to suspend, the body or any of its members.
The main aims of the Panchayat, as set out in 
the Panchayat Law, were to implement Government pro­
grammes for welfare and development, collect essential 
census records and maintain law and order. The greatest 
emphasis was placed on the latter responsibility, and 
a Panchayat 0Ourt was established whose jurisdictional 
boundaries were defined by a special Act, The Court 
was empowered to settle cases involving damages up to 
Rs 100 and for which fines of up to Rs 23 or imprison­
ment for up to three months could be meted out. In 
addition, it could offer mediation facilities for all 
cases regardless of the amount of damages involved, 
provided they were not cognizable by Government courts. 
The Panchayat Court consisted of five men chosen by 
the chairman of the Panchayat Committee, two of whom 
had to live in or nearby the settlement of the litigants 
and so be familiar- with them. ^embers of the Court had 
also to be rotated on a regular basis, with no member 
serving more than one month at a time. The chairman 
or vice-chairman of the Committee was required to attend 
all sessions of the Court.
In the four year period during which the 
Panchayat was in existence, the Court entertained
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approximately 200 cases. It seldom used the powers 
given it by the Law, Instead, the Court sought to effect 
a cooling of tempers and to promote compromises. 
Acceptance of Court mediation of one dispute did not 
necessarily mean that the same litigants would not 
reappear before the Court under a different pretext.
Where factional issues were involved Court mediation 
afforded only a temporary lull in the storm of liti­
gation.
Indreni Limbus tended not to bring their 
disputes to the Panchayat Court. In three of the cases 
in which a Limbu was involved, the litigation was 
initiated by a member of another caste. In one 
instance, a Kambo man was accused of beating a Brahmin 
over an irrigation dispute. In another, a Chongbung 
was alleged to have deliberately damaged a Blacksmith's 
crops, while a third case involved a Limbu who had 
purchased a bullock given as security to a third party.
In only one case did a Limbu prefer charges; against 
a Brahmin whom he alleged had cheated him over repayment 
of a loan. The reluctance of Limbus to bring their 
quarrels to the Panchayat Court is explained partly by 
their preference for informal mediation by other Limbus, 
as I have pointed out, and partly by their opposition to
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the Panchayat system in general .
The present Panchayat Committee, established
in 1962 under a reconstituted system of Panchayat Raj,
retains many of the structural features of the previous 
2body . But the area under its jurisdiction i.e. the 
Village - called Syawa - has been reduced to about one- 
third of its former sisre. The Village has been divided 
into nine wards, The settlements of Bharapa and Ohitok 
together constitute a single ward, while households in 
Angbung and Dorumba are bunched together with those 
in neighbouring settlements to form two other wards.
The posts of president and vice-president have 
been abolished so that the effective head is now the 
Chairman chosen, as in the past, from among the members 
of the Panchayat Committee.
Under the present system, the emphasis is laid 
on the encouragement of 'self-help' development schemes, 
and involvement in judicial matters is actively 
discouraged. Not only has a Panchayat Court not been 
established, but a Panchayat Committee which seeks to 
utilize the powers previously held by the Court must
See Chapter VIII.
2. Another Panchayat Act was introduced in 1956, but no 
measures were taken in H a m  to set up Panchayat 
Committees.
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request special authority from the Government. The 
Panchayat Committee, however, retains the right to 
offer its good offices to effect compromises when both 
disputants voluntarily seek mediation. Obviously, the 
distinction between Court and mediator is not as 
finely drawn in practice as in the Panchayat Law.
The main result of the emphasis 011 development work, 
however, has been to shift the mediation platform from 
the Committee meetings to the courtyard of the Committee 
Chairman where, sometimes alone, and occasionally 
together with other representatives, disputes are 
heard and composed. The mediation is not informal 
because the Chairman acts with the full authority of his 
position, and there is all but the force of law in his 
decisions. This will be evident from the following 
examples.
In 1963, following the death of his wife, 
Budibal, a Nembeke of Dorumba, brought an Angu woman 
of Bharapa to live with him. The woman was separated 
from her own husband, whose whereabouts were not known, 
and so since Budibal had paid no compensation, he did 
not consider her his wife, although she was referred to 
as such by everyone in the Cluster. The woman was 
subject to periodic moods of depression and sudden
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outbursts of violence. After one incident, during 
which she threw a khukuri knife, narrowly missing 
one of Budibal's young children, he decided that he 
could no longer allow her to stay in the house.
Budibal and his two brothers met with several Angu 
men to seek a solution to the dilemma. The Angus 
insisted that this was a domestic quarrel and should 
be settled within the household. If a wife is trouble­
some, they pointed out, a man cannot send her away, 
but must take the good with the bad. The Nembekes, on 
the other hand, stated that a wife is brought to make 
a house happy, and if she is unable to do so, she must 
be sent away, or at least another house must be built 
for her to live in. Budibal, however, was adamant 
about being rid of her, and based his determination on 
the danger to his children, thus shifting the nature of 
the dispute from a domestic quarrel to a public offence. 
Several representatives from each side were chosen to 
present the case to the Chairman. At this point, Budibal 
enlisted the support of Lajaheng, the ex-army officer, 
who was the father of Budibal's late wife, and the 
grandfather of Budibal's children who were alleged to be 
in danger from the uncontrollable anger of the woman.
The Chairman agreed that the woman constituted a danger 
to the children. He suggested that she be given Rs 50
34-5*
to 'lift her prestige* end that she return to her natal 
home in Bharapa. This is in fact what was done.
The case provides an interesting contrast 
between what might be called the 'domestic1 dimension 
of the dispute, in terms of which the supporters of both 
the husband and wife sought a solution, and the 'legal­
istic' dimension, which approach Budibal adopted, 
probably in anticipation of the Chairman's own view.
This is not to suggest that the first is a traditional 
approach, while the second a modern, since the presence 
nearby of police and court has long ago brought the law 
into the Indreni Limbus1 perception oJT their surroundings. 
But it does indicate a more immediate and effective 
presence, in the form of a Panchayat Committee, of the 
force and authority of Government. Indreni Limbus are 
increasingly encouraged to take advantage of this stress 
by the Committee mediators on the legalistic dimension 
of disputes.
A Chongbung of Bharapa, for example, had borrowed 
Rs 180 and agreed to pay interest of 20# per annum.
When it came time to collect the interest the creditor, 
a Brahmin from a neighbouring settlement approached the 
Limbu but the latter refused to pay, claiming the interest 
was too high, and suggested the matter be brought to 
the Chairman. The latter scolded the Limbu for refusing
to meet his obligations, but conceded that the law set 
a limit of 10# on interest payments. The initial 
document was torn up, and a new one made stipulating 
the legal rate, and the Limbu was instructed to pay 
the amount within a month.
The Administration
The administrative offices in H a m  Bazaar 
provide additional avenues for settling disputes. In 
addition to the Government court, both the treasury 
department (mal) and the office of the Governor have 
traditionally provided facilities for the settlement 
of disputes. This is partly due to the blurring of juris 
dictional boundaries between various branches of the 
administration and probably also a manifestation of the 
jockeying for power among the top officials. Other 
reasons are the high costs of court litigation as 
compared with disputes taken to the Governor or treasury 
and the relative speed with which these branches dispose 
of cases as compared with the time taken by the courts. 
Decisions from all these sources have the force of law.
In consequence, inhabitants of the settlements of Ilam 
view the administration as undifferentiated. Dealings 
with the Governor or his representatives, with the
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treasury officials or the court are seen as dealings 
with the 'office' (adda). And it is not uncommon to 
seek redress for grievances concurrently in more than 
one branch of the administration.
I was not able to discover what proportion of 
disputes brought to Ilam Bazaar go to each branch, or 
what was the nature of the disputes submitted. From a 
perusal of court records since 1951* however, several 
facts emerge . Firstly, the majority of disputes taken 
to court are over land. Of forty-eight cases involving 
litigants resident in the Indreni settlements, twenty- 
three cases concerned land disputes. Another ten were 
complaints about assault. Secondly, Limbus were litigants 
in only five of the court cases; three of these dealt 
with assault on other Indreni Limbus, while two were land 
disputes with Brahmins. Thirdly, in forty-two of the 
forty-eight cases, at least one member of a single Brahmin 
lineage in the Cluster was implicated. This latter 
fact relates to the existence of factional cleavages in 
the Cluster, the nature and leadership of which are now 
considered.
Factions
For most Notables, the display of leadership
1. Most records of the court prior to 1951 were destroyed.
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qualities is confined to contexts of mediation. Some, 
however, become political leaders by gathering about 
themselves a core of followers whose ranks are augmented 
on particular occasions by additional supporters.
The immediate purpose for their recruitment is generally 
the waging of a dispute, but the underlying goal is 
the pursuit or maintenance of power or influence by 
the leaders. The followings such men muster will be 
called factions .
Factional divisions bearing on the Indreni 
settlements are not confined to the Cluster, but extend 
throughout and, to an extent, beyond the Village area.
The activities of factions, however, will be considered 
only insofar as they concern political alignments within 
the Indreni Cluster. The background to factional 
struggles will be discussed, first,
Factions in the Indreni settlements are based on 
a schism within a single Brahmin sibling group. The 
origins of the split can be traced to 1925 when Loka 
Nath (see Big. 8) purchased some raikar land in Chitok
1. The definition of faction which I prefer is eclectic: 
a leader-based quasi-group, recruited on diverse 
principles, and operating in the political field.
This combines the definitions of factions given by 
Nicholas (1965) and Firth (1957) with Mayer's use of 
the term 'quasi-group1 to indicate an egocentred, non­
corporate collectivity of individuals. (Mayer, 1966),
and Bharapa and moved with his wife and four of his 
five sons into the Cluster* The eldest son remained 
in the house where he and his brothers had been born, 
and which was situated in a settlement on the outskirts 
of Ilarn Bazaar* The move corresponded with a division 
of property among the three eldest brothers Ham Chandra, 
Narad Muni and Gobindra and their establishment of 
separate households. Gobindra came to Bharapa, while 
Narad Muni and his father Boka Nath built their homes 
on neighbouring plots in Chitok* The two youngest sons, 
Bishnu Prasad and Tunka Nath, who were only 17 und 12 
years, continued to live for a time with their parents*
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As is customary, not all the property was 
divided amongst the sons, a portion (jiuni) was kept 
by the parents to guarantee their own security in old age.
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^ le iTuni consisted mainly of forest and grazing lands 
as well as title to a Holding on other cultivated lands, 
all of which, were situated about six miles north of the 
Cluster. The lands and headmanship had all been 
acquired by Loka Nath as a result of his attaining a 
high position in the district administration. ;vt the 
time the division of property agreement was prepared, 
it was stipulated that following the death of both 
parents, Narad Muni would succeed to the title of 
headman and receive the income from the Holding. The 
remaining forests and grazing lands were to be divided 
amongst Narad Muni, Bishnu Prasad and Tunka Nath. But 
a further stipulation required that the son who cared 
for his parents in their old age would, following their 
death, receive a larger share of these lands than the 
others.
In 19311 I'oka Nath died. Shortly after, Bishnu 
Prasad established a separate household in Chitok.
Loka Nath!s widow lived with her youngest son Tunka 
Nath until her death about ten years ago.
The death of Loka Nath set the stage for a series 
of disputes among the sons stemming initially from 
disagreements over the division of the .,1 iuni, and then 
becoming generalized in a wide range of contexts, b'ithin 
the sibling group, the brothers formed a series of
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temporary alliances which dissolved with the settlement 
of a particular dispute or series of disputes, or upon 
the death of one of the brothers. Still, over a period 
of time, alliance patterns are discernible. The earliest 
disputes, following the death of Loka Nath, concerned 
mainly Ram Chandra and Narad Muni, Bishnu Prasad 
and Tunka Nath were still young men, while Gobindra 
spent most of his time in the Terai where much of his 
inheritance was situated, and so was never involved in 
his brothers1 disputes, nt the time of the revenue 
settlement of 1936, Narad Muni succeeded in registering 
in his own name all the ,jiuni lands which he was to 
share with his brothers following their mother's death. 
This led to prolonged court action which eventually 
ended with a Supreme Court decision in favour of .Ram 
Chandra, who had pleaded the case on behalf of his mother 
and his other brothers.
Prom 19hO~1950 Narad Muni was aligned against 
each of his brothers in turn, although occasional 
disputes broke out between Ram Chandra and Bishnu Prasad 
as well. By this time, the contexts for strife were 
not only their own disputes, but quarrels concerning others 
as well. Thus, when Narad Muni's first wife brought him 
to court for selling her own private property, she was 
supported by Bishnu Irasad.
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After the death of Ram Chandra, in 1950, both 
Bishnu Prasad and Tunka Nath quarrelled separately with 
Narad Muni and, on occasion, allied themselves against 
him. By this time, moreover, the sons of Narad Muni 
and Bishnu Prasad has become protagonists as well.
In one case of assault, each accused the other of 
instigating a beating because of a dispute over rights 
to an irrigation channel.
In 1956, following the death of Narad Muni, the 
only two remaining brothers, Bishnu Prasad and Tunka 
Nath, became the principal protagonists. When I 
arrived in the field, these two men were the leaders 
of factions which ramified throughout the area of, 
and, to an extent, beyond, Syawa Village.
How were factions composed? Each faction had 
established a 'core1 of adherents, who tended to support 
their faction leaders whether the immediate dispute 
concerned them directly or not. The core included, 
first of all, the members of a leader's household.
This is not as obvious a statement as it may seem. The 
ethic which exhorts a father to distribute his property 
(and his love) equally amongst his sons is occasionally 
ignored in practice. Fathers.-.often favour particular 
sons or the sons of a particular wife. Since property
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divisions are frequently determined before the sons 
establish separate households, such practices can result 
in a disenchanted son joining an opposing alliance against 
his father while still a member of the latter1s house­
hold. Thus one of the sons of Narad Muni became an 
adherent of his father1s elder brother Ram Chandra 
because of grievances against the former over property 
division.
As long as an estate remains undivided, a 
father can count on the support of members of his 
household. Both Bishnu Prasad and Tunka Nath head 
joint-type households, with two sons and one son 
respectively, who constitute part of their factional 
cores. One son in each household plays a key role 
both as advisor and as a highly important link with 
the administration where the two are employed*
Aside from household members, factional cores 
also include men who, in the furtherance of their own 
cmbitions, find it expedient to seek the support of 
faction leaders. Absorption into factional cores may 
also have a basis in a history of disputes. Those led 
by Bishnu Prasad and Tunka hath included two brothers 
of a collateral line in the same lineage who had been 
at loggerheads for almost fifteen years. The initial
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antagonism developed at the time of their division of 
property. The elder, Dharma Raj, alleged that his 
younger brother fadmalal had received a larger share of 
the estate than he did. The hostility between the 
brothers was exacerbated by the fact that their father, 
Sekar Nath, lived, during his old age, with his youngest 
son and was commonly known to favour the latter. Align­
ment with the primary faction leaders came about in 
1952. At that time W0S discovered to have
impregnated the wife of an older brother who had emi­
grated to India. To cover up the scandal one of the 
dependents of Sekar Nath, who was a Thari, was paid 
handsomely to take the woman away from the area. The 
arrangements were made by Tunka Nath in return for 
support given by Sekar Nath during an earlier dispute. 
Dharma Raj refused to retain commensal relations with 
his younger brother, as did a number of other men in 
the area. Padmslal, to save caste, was forced to distri­
bute much of his wealth in the form of bribes, and had 
to sell a number of his lands to meet the costs. Tunka 
Hath was one of those who agreed to interdine with him 
(even if at some profit to himself) and since that time 
the latter has supported, and been supported by, the 
faction leader. In consequence, Dharma Raj was brought,
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somewhat inadvertantly, into the core of Bishnu Prasad's 
faction.
when Sekar Nath died in 1961, the two brothers, 
after observing a mourning period of one year, began 
campaigning for their father's title of 1'hari, along 
with Sekar Nath's younger brother, Kapil Muni. Each 
had in fact been sharing the income from a designated 
number of households within the Holding, but the title 
itself could not be shared i.e. the Holding could not be 
formally divided. The treasury office, which makes 
the formal appointment, decided at one point to seek 
the 'advice' of the dependents on the Holding. In 
preparation for the visit of the treasury representatives, 
each candidate enlisted the support of the faction 
leaders. Although Bishnu Prasad, by this time a 
Panchayat Committee executive, could not campaign openly 
in favour of Dharma Raj, his support was commonly known 
and another member of his faction core conducted the 
campaign. Tunka Nath himself spoke in favour of 
Padmalal and, in an attempt to impress the treasury office 
of the strong opposition to Dharma Raj, who was the 
favourite by virtue of being the eldest son, Tunka Nath 
encouraged another member of his faction core to bolster 
the claim of the third candidate, Kapil Muni. The 
meetings only ensured that each candidate would have the
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support of those households alresdy paying taxes to 
him, since no dependent attended the meetings of his 
rivals.
In the end the treasury office heard only a 
few mild speeches in favour of each candidate without 
bringing the matter to a vote. Although nothing had 
been decided when I left the field, the general 
consensus was that the contest was a facade since the 
authorities generally follow custom in choosing the 
eldest son - in this case Dharma Raj - to succeed to a 
headman’s title. The campaign continued behind the 
scenes by intermittent visits to the treasury office 
made by the competitors and their faction supporters.
Two other men resident in the Cluster belong, 
t-ogether with Dharma Raj and Padmalal, to the core of 
the factions recruited around Bishnu Prasad and Tunka 
Nath. Here again, alignment on a regular basis has 
resulted from the growth of intense hostility between a 
^aisi and a Nembeke of Dorumba. The rivalry stems from 
a dispute over rights to land which the father of Jahare, 
a Bubba, had granted as a Holding to the father of the
A
Jaisi, Bhagi Rath . The latter allied himself with 
Bishnu Prasad, who had already been at odds with Jahare 
in a number of minor squabbles.
1. Bee above, pp* 307 ff.
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The first major test of the coalition came in 
1961 when Jahare attempted to claim the title of Subba 
after the death of his brother's son, Dolpe, who had 
inherited the title while Jahare was in the army.
Although both customary and legal rules stress succession 
by primogeniture, Jahare challenged the right of the 
late Bubba's son to succeed on the grounds that the 
latter was a minor. With the help of Tunka Nath he 
was able to convince the treasury office that the 
dependents on the Holding should be allowed to decide 
the issue. They then went on to 'pack1 the hearing by 
recruiting seventeen supporters from all parts of Byawa 
Village, including five Indreni Limbus, to appear before
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the treasury representatives, who subsequently ruled 
in Jahare’s favour.
Bishnu Prasad and Bhagi Rath then persuaded 
Harake, the late Subba’s brother, and also a dependent 
on Bhagi Rath’s raikar Holding, to appeal against the 
decision. They pointed out that the hearing, on which 
the treasury office decision was based, could be shown 
to be illegal, since most of Jahare*s supporters who 
appeared before the hearing were not in fact dependents 
on the kipat Holding, but men resident on other Holdings. 
They then suggested that Harake emphasize that a minor's 
rights had been violated by the decision. If Harake 
would agree to act as the boy's regent until he came 
of age, the responsibilities of tsx-collection on the 
Holding would be properly dis charged. Harake agreed to 
appeal and documents were prepared by the faction leader 
and his core adherents. Capital to fight the case in an 
appeal court in Kathmandu was supplied by Bhagi Rath, 
who took some of Harake*s kipat lands under mortgage.
The original decision was eventually reversed, and the 
boy appointed Subba, with the stipulation that Harake 
would act on his behalf until he came of age.
In addition to their own households, Bishnu 
Prasad and Tunka Nath can count regularly on the support
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of four other households (between them) within the 
Cluster end perhaps another six in settlements outside 
the Indreni area. Factional cores, then, are small,
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, unless 
a man has political ambitions, the risks involved in 
commitment to a faction core are too great. These 
risks are mainly financial. A core adherent may have to 
invest substantial sums of money in long drawn out 
struggles without any certainty of success. The costs 
to Jahare of his battle for the title of Subba, for 
example, were in the region of Bs 1200. Hence few 
men are able or prepared to commit themselves to a 
faction leader unless they are regularly in need of 
support. There are circumstances when a politically 
ambitious man has no choice but to align himself with 
the core of a faction leader: as, for instance, when
a traditional enemy gives his support to one leader, 
and forces his opponent to seek the security of the 
other.
A second reason for the limited size of cores 
is that faction leaders seek adherents who are more 
than mere syncophsnts. Core supporters must possess 
attributes which redound to the benefit of a faction.
In. addition to wealth, literacy is an essential criterion 
of core membership. Literacy in this context refers
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especially to a capacity to comprehend the Legal Code,
a formidable document of immense complexity, and a
total mystery to all but a few. Since most disputes
involving substantial amounts of property or other
wealth find their way to court, someone with a facility
for supplying legal stratagems is a major asset to any 
ifaction . Ken with ability to comprehend the written 
word and to prepare petitions and counter-petitions 
based on legal arguments are of prime importance to a 
faction leader1. Indeed, these are essential qualifi­
cations for faction leadership itself.
The term core suggests, of course, that a faction 
leader does rely in his political activities on other 
occasional supporters as well. Both leader and core 
adherents generally possess the means to recruit 
supporters through relationships established in other 
contexts. Dependents on Holdings are one such source. 
Faction leaders Bishnu Prasad and Tunka Nath are both 
Tharis, as is Bhagi Hath; while Dharma Raj and Padmalal, 
who were disputing over their father's title, had never­
theless established headman-dependent-like ties with a 
number of households within the Holding of their father.
1. Until recently, court officials were political
appointees without legal training, so that the court 
itself was less than capable of coping with the 
highly complicated law.
When Bishnu Prasad and Bhagi Rath opposed the claims 
of Jahare to the title of Subba, Bhagi Rath was able to 
bolster his faction's case by recruiting several of his 
dependents to sign as witnesses 011 the petition 
presented to the appeal court*
Mortgage and loan credit, as well as tenancy 
provide additional ties which faction leaders and core 
adherents can manipulate to recruit supporters. All, 
for example, are among the Main Landholders listed in 
Table 14 (p. 176 ) . When the sons of Narad Muni and 
Bishnu Prasad accused each other before the Panchayat 
Court of assault each presented a number of 1 eye-witnesses1 
to the event testifying to their opponent's guilt, 
oeveral of these witnesses were Limbus dependent on the 
faction leaders for credit or tenancy rights who were 
recruited to the factions for the duration of the case. 
Relationships of kinship, occasionally of 
agnation, but more frequently of affinity, provide 
another fund of potential recruits. Because Brahmins 
and Jaisis comprise the majority of the population in 
the region, members of these castes, especially wealthy 
families, are able to find spouses in nearby settlements, 
and so tend to have at least some of their affines and 
matrilateral kinsmen close at hand. Moreover, ties to 
certain kinds of relatives are bolstered in a ritual
context since, for example, sisters’ husbands or sons, 
fathers' sisters' sons or daughters' sons can perform 
services as ritual priests (purohit). At one 3hiva 
ritual sponsored by a core adherent of Tunka Nath, 
eleven relatives in the category of purohit to the host 
were invited to participate in the ritual, and were 
appropriately fed and paid. Buch men constitute an 
additional fund of occasional faction support.
Finally, the status of Notable enjoyed by 
faction leaders places them in a position to do a variety 
of favours for others which accumulate as political debts 
to be collected at some future date , Thus, a Limbu 
who had been accused of injuring a Brahmin in a quarrel 
sought advice from Bishnu Prasad who prepared his counter­
petition to the Panchayat Court. Borne time later, a 
witness was required by Bishnu Prasad to attest to the 
letter's presence in a particular location and at a 
particular time to belie a charge that the faction leader 
had instigated an assault 011 a member of the opposing 
faction. The debt owed by the Limbu was collected, and 
the charge against the faction leader was dismissed.
1. Faction leaders act both as 'patrons', when allocating 
favours to clients directly, and as ’brokers', when 
obtaining these favours as intermediaries. (Cf. Mayer, 
1965).
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Notables also accumulate a store of favours because of 
their role in mediating disputes. ^ man who has sought 
and received justice at the hands of a Notable would be 
reluctant to refuse his support when called upon.
On the other hand, those from whom support is 
sought by faction leaders are often placed in a dilemma 
by overlapping claims to their allegiance, 1 debts' based 
on economic, political or kinship ties often link 
potential supporters to both faction leaders#
When a man finds himself in such circumstances 
he attempts to disengage completely from factional 
struggles. The dispute over the title of Bubba provided 
one such occasion. Several of Jahare1s affines were also 
dependents on Bhagi Nath's raikar Holding in Dorumha, and 
efforts by both sides to enlist their support were 
assiduously and successfully avoided. Where this is 
impossible, however, a man tries to shif't support from 
one faction to another as personal advantage or short­
term obligation dictates.
Faction leaders usually search out, or even 
instigate disputes and make them a context for factional 
strife. In six of the nine cases involving Indreni 
residents which were brought before the Panchayat Court, 
faction leaders supported opposing litigants. The
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motives are often personal gain fox4 the faction leaders 
and their core adherents, who charge for their various 
'services’, such as preparing petitions, and hope too 
share in the proceeds of any victory. Faction leaders 
themselves are quick to point this out, at least of their 
opposition. Thus, when a Limbu brought a petition against 
one faction leader the latter, in his counter-petition, 
noted that the Limbu was being 'carried* (boknu) by the 
opposing faction leader whose ’tactics are to seek out 
two persons who are quarrelling and incite one side; 
and by this he hopes to gain something.1 Support may be 
offered gratuitously only when failure to do so could 
result in economic or political loss to one faction or, 
alternatively, gain for its rival.
To what extent are disputes involving Indreni 
Limbus absorbed by factional rivalries? The bulk of 
cases in which Limbus are the disputants concern matters 
from which little profit is to be gained. This is to 
be expected because of the poverty of most Indreni Limbu 
households. But when a Limbu, especially one who is 
poor and illiterate, becomes implicated in a dispute where 
the stakes are high, allies with the necessary contacts, 
knowledge of law and court procedure are required to 
ensure any chance of success. To refuse the support
of a faction in any important dispute would be to court 
defeat and financial loss. Major disputes are thus fed 
into the existing factional cleavage.
The process is best illustrated by documenting 
a dispute over kipat land which has been smouldering 
for almost a half century and which has exercised two 
generations of faction leaders.
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Following the death in 1922 of lilbir, a Kambo 
of Chitok, Chinde, his son by his first wife and Chinde1s 
own three sons opposed the right of Punja to inherit a 
portion of Tilbir's lands. Although Punja's mother had 
become Tilbir’s second wife, it was widely believed that 
the woman had come to the Cluster in early pregnancy,
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and that Tilbir was not in fact Punja's genitor.
Chinde and his sons were successful in their dispute and 
so, without adequate means to get a living, Punja 
migrated to ^ssam in 1923, where he worked on a tea 
plantation, Pie continued to return on occasion to the 
Cluster, since he had married the sister of Chakre, a 
Nembeke of Dorumba.
On one of his visits in 194-5» was approached 
by Ram Chandra, who was at the time leading a faction 
against his brother Rarad Muni, and urged to prefer 
charges against the latter for illegally encroaching on
'I
kipat land * Punja realized that if he could prove the 
case against the Brahmin, then he might finally get the 
lands he had been denied as a young man. Moreover, there 
would be no-one to contest his right since by 194-5 the 
sons of his half-brother Chinde had died, as had all 
their sons but one, Eimal, who was in any case in India 
at the time. Of all those with rights to rfilbircs lands, 
only Dil Maya, the wife of Chinde's youngest son Soade, 
was resident in the Cluster, and she was old and sick.
In any case, Ram Chandra pointed out, Dil Maya would not
1, See Pig. 8, p. 34-9. According to informants* Ram Chandra 
probably knew that Punja had returned from ^ssam with 
Rs 500 in savings and hoped to get some of this money 
for preparing the case.
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stand in his way since she had herself been victimized 
by Narad Muni 011 several occasions. Ram Chandra was 
certain that Punja could win his case, and offered to 
prepare the necessary documents.
In his petition to the court, Punja argued:
'When 1 came back (from Assam) I found that my old 
house, and the house of my brother's sons were no longer 
there. And there was a large house and there was Narad 
Muni. I said to him: "What is the matter that you
have built a house on our kipat, and who gave it to 
you? You are a wicked person." Then I went to Nil 
Msya and asked her*. She said that Narad Muni had 
driven away all the descendants of Chinde by his 
treachery. Narad Muni, she said, called her time and 
again to sign papers which he then displayed to prove 
that the land was raikar and not kipat. Dil Maya had 
been afraid to refuse so great 0 man and anyway she is 
simple, so she signed.'
Narad Muni's reply to the accusation was brief.
He challenged the plaintiff to show that any of the 
transactions he had engaged in over kipat was illegal.
He also brought up the fact of Punja's uncertain parentage 
and stressed that since Punja had not received an 
inheritance of kipat land he had no business inquiring 
about the lands. Narad Muni then spent the greater part
of his defence attacking Ram Chandra and Tunka Nath who 
was at this time aligned with his eldest brother. He 
accused them of bringing Punja back to the Cluster just 
to bring a case against him, ’They seek to destroy my 
property, and when they are through, they will send 
Punja back to Assam,f
Beside this explicit statement of the manner in 
which faction leaders instigate disputes, the alignment 
of support behind each faction leader throws some light 
on the pattern of faction formation. Ram Chandra 
recruited his support for Punja on three bases. The 
first was hostility to Narad Muni. A father and son of 
the same Kambo lineage had recently quarrelled with Narad 
Muni and could be counted on to support a grievance 
against the latter. It should be noted, however, that 
the two were from an 'adopted1 line and so had no claim 
on Tilbir's lands. Consequently, Punja represented no 
threat to their own interests. A second basis was affinal 
ties. Three Nembeke men, among them the brother of 
Punja’s wife, lent their support to the faction leader 
for the sake, as one put it, ’of our sister'. Thirdly, 
and to an extent this criterion subsumed the other two, 
was the feeling of hostility shared by all kipat-owning 
Limbus towards landholders of other castes. The kinds
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of accusations thrown at Narad Muni by Ram Cliandrs and 
Tunka Nath through the mouth of Punja, echoed the common 
Limbu experience. On this basis four Chongbung elders, 
one of them a much respected Subba, joined in support 
of Ram Chandra's faction.
Narad Muni recruited the kind of support which 
was meant to achieve two main purposes. The first 
was to attest to his status as a Notable, and mutatis 
mutandis his reputation as an honest man who accomplished 
his ends by legal means alone. This required several 
'character1 witnesses, whose own reputations were 
immaculate. To this end eleven Notables were recruited 
from every corner of the Village area. Three were 
affines, while another six, all Brahmins and Jaisis, 
were themselves landholders of kipat and undoubtedly 
saw in this case the threat of a precedent which could 
affect their own economic positions.
Of perhaps greater importance was the necessity 
for Narad Muni to present his opponents with a denial 
of Punja's right to kipat, and this could best be 
effected by recruiting the support of Himal, who was at 
the time working in India. The latter was sent for 
and brought to the Cluster where he confirmed the denial 
of Punja's rights to kipat, and hence protected his own 
inheritance. On the basis of this latter evidence, and
the lack of firm proof to hack up Ram Chandra’s 
allegations of dishonesty, the case was decided in 
favour of Narad Muni.
Another dispute over the same lands erupted in 
1964, shortly after Himal's resettlement in the Cluster 
after a long residence in India. To build a house and 
re-establish an estate in Chitok, Himal required capital, 
only some of which he could supply from savings 
accumulated during his residence abroad. He proceeded 
to raise the money by taking interest-free loans .(bard) 
from those to whom his lands had been pledged and adding 
the amount of the loan to the initial mortgage capital. 
The kipat lands of Tilbir which Narad Muni had taken 
under mortgage had been 'inherited' after his death by 
his son Rungalal. When Himal came to request bard from 
Rungalal, the latter refused. At first Himal sought to 
transfer landholding rights from Rungalal to someone else 
willing to take these lands under mortgage. But the 
mortgage capital was out of proportion to the value of 
the lands, and Himal could find no takers . In a rage, 
Iiimal requested the support of Tunka Nath, who suggested
1. Informants, including Rungalal, agree that the figures 
on the documents did not coin?espond with the amounts 
actually paid by Narad Muni.
a re-opening of the esse which had defeated Himal1s 
classificatory grandfather, Punja. Tunka Nath welcomed 
the opportunity to involve his brother's son in expen­
sive litigation since the latter had recently been 
making some embarsssing accusations about Tunka Nath 
to Government officials and furthermore, had established 
good relations with the opposing faction of Bishnu 
Prasad.
The matter was brought to court but before a 
decision could be reached several influential men in 
the district, all resident outside the Village area, 
succeeded in convincing both disputants that by becoming 
involved in factional strife, they were courting 
financial disaster. Subsequently, a compromise was 
reached out of court - and against the wishes of the 
faction leaders - which enabled Himal to repossess some 
of his lands.
This case indicates how attachment to faction 
leaders is temporary and lasts only as long as there is 
advantage to be gained. A Kambo man who had supported 
Ram Chandra and Tunka Nath in the earlier dispute, found 
himself urging mediation in this one because of dual 
ties to both Himal, as classificatory brother, and next 
door neighbour and to Rungalal, as tenant on the letter’s 
land. The case also shows that it is possible to transfer
alignments from one faction loader to another* Himal, 
for example, first allied himself with Narad Muni 
against Ram Chandra and Tunka Nath who were supporting 
his classificatory grandfather Punja and later joined 
forces with Tunka Nath against the son of Narad Muni.
The basis for alignment in both instances was Himal's 
own interests.
The great majority of Limbus are able to avoid 
involvement in factions. The sanctions which a faction 
leader can bring to bear on those whose support he 
solicits are mitigated by several factors. One is the 
nature of the land system which, as I pointed out in 
Chapter V, enables Limbus to manipulate land rights and 
so retain 9 measure of economic and political independence 
Thus the 24 Limbu households which are linked by ties of 
mortgage or loan credit or tenancy to faction leaders 
and their core adherents are not conspicuous supporters 
of factions. Another factor is the nature of homestead
/'l
and settlement dispersion . The inhabitants of Bharapa
and Angbung, in particular, seldom have occasion to
meet faction leaders and so are easily able to avoid
becoming involved. It is not surprising that the few
1. Residence patterns also bear on faction formation in 
Indian settlements in Fiji. See Mayer, 1957 5 p«324.
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Limbus who on occasion have supported factions have 
been resident in Chitok and Dorumba where faction 
leaders and their core adherents reside.
But important as land tenure and environmental 
factors may be in explaining the ease with which Limbus 
can opt out of factional strife, they are peripheral 
to a third factor: the nature of the political arena.
By this I mean the contexts within which factional 
struggles are waged. By engaging in disputes, their 
own, and those of others, faction leaders compete for 
economic prizes as well as power and influence. To 
wage disputes, supporters are of course essential, but 
their effectiveness is not in numbers. As I have shown, 
faction leaders solicit core adherents who possess 
specific qualities which can be utilised in the furtherance 
of their interests in disputes. Similarly, other 
supporters are mobilized to lend credence to an argument, 
act as witness to an event, sign documents or attest 
to firmness of character.
There is no context, however, in which the 
numerical strength of a faction is relevant. Although 
physical assault may lead to or result from factional 
strife, it is confined to two or three individuals, 
and does not lead to large-scale violence between 
factions. In brief, leaders do not attempt to employ
coercive force as a means of achieving their ends, a 
practice which if followed could lead to the importance 
of sheer numbers as a measure of faction strength.
Both i^ayer and Benedict suggest that an emphasis 
on numbers might result from the establishment of an 
arena, defined by statute, within which elections for 
office can be held . The inclusion of the Indreni 
settlements within an administrative Village and the 
creation of a statutory Panchayat Committee has 
provided a new context for factional activity, but has 
not, as yet, brought about a concentration on numbers.
The Panchayat Committees established in 1953 snd 
again in 1962 did not, strictly speaking, absorb the 
existing factional conflicts. The first Committee 
administered an area and a population considerably 
larger than that within which any faction leader could 
exert his influence effectively. Also, the purpose and 
authority of the Panchayat system could not be readily 
understood at the time of its inception. It was, and to 
an extent still is perceived as an instrument of 
Government, created not to innovate improvement schemes, 
but to implement the instructions of district and Central 
authorities. The appointment by the Government of a
1. Mayer, 1957? P* 322 and Benedict, 1957? p. 340,
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president to oversee the day-to-day workings of the 
first Panchayat Committee further served to prevent 
the use of the Committee as an arena for factional 
dispute. The man chosen to fill the position was a 
Brahmin Pandit highly respected for his learning and 
impartiality in mediating quarrels. He and the vice- 
president, another Brahmin of similar status, were 
largely responsible for the formation of the nine man 
Committee, although in theory the choice was that of 
the adult population. One faction leader, Tunka Nath, 
was chosen to be a member of the executive, but being 
only one Notable among many on the Committee, most of 
whom were neutral to any faction, he had little oppor­
tunity to transform the Committee into an instrument 
for strengthening his faction.
Circumstances connected with the establishment 
of a new Panchayat system in 1962 changed the attitude 
of faction leaders to the Committee. Por one thing, the 
area under its jurisdiction came withinthe purview of 
their own circumference of influence. Secondly, the 
post of Government appointed president was abolished so 
that the choice of the Committee would be entirely an 
internal matter. Thirdly, those who had controlled the 
previous Committee were either outside the new Village,
too old to assume the responsibilities of running the 
Committee, or refused to participate on the grounds that 
the responsibilities were not matched by commensurate 
gains. All these factors weighed on Bishnu Prasad's 
decision to represent his ward composed almost entirely 
of households in Bharapa and Chitok. No attempt was made 
by Tunka Nath directly to oppose the candidacy of his 
brother. Informants I asked about this stressed the 
fact that Tunka Nath had been on the previous Committee 
and so 'had his chance'. Also, the idea that elections 
should be held to choose a representative was felt to be
A
bad as they would * show our quarrels' . Tunka Nath, 
however, tried to persuade one of the ex-army pensioners 
to join the Committee, knowing that if he did Bishnu 
Prasad would stand down. Although there was some feeling 
in the ward that it should be represented by a Limbu, the 
ex-servicemen refused and deferred in favour of Bishnu 
Prasad. Once it was known that the latter was to enter 
the Committee it was a foregone conclusion that he would 
be its Chairman. He was able to ensure that the 
majority of representatives were men of no consequence, 
and that they were either his own supporters or men not 
attached to any faction. The notion that the Committee
1. No elections were held in any of the wards.
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should reflect a cross-section of the various castes 
resident in the Village limited the choice somewhat.
It was felt, for example, that at least one represent- 
ative should be a Limbu. Since Bishnu Prasad was 
himself from a Limbu-dominated ward, Jahare was chosen 
to represent the ward which includes Norumba. This 
was the only successful attempt by Tunka Nath’s faction 
to place one of their adherents on the Committee.
When the Committee came to elect its Chairman, 
Jahare suggested that he might seek the office. It 
was thought that a contest would leave bad feelings 
and Jahare, realizing that he would have no support in 
any case, made no attempt to carry out his threat.
Bishnu Prasad was then chosen by acclamation. Shortly 
thereafter, Jahare became involved in a court case with 
the district administration - which, he alleged, was 
instigated by Bishnu Prasad - and ceased attending 
Committee meetings. He was replaced by another Nembeke 
of Dorumba, considered an occasional supporter of Bhagi 
Path and Bishnu Prasad in their factional disputes.
Thus Bishnu Prasad succeeded in packing the 
Panchayat Committee with men who would not oppose his 
will and who are, by and large, ready to rubber stamp 
his actions. But the fact that ono faction leader mono­
polizes the statutory authority which resides in the
Committee does not preclude the existence of opposition 
on the level of policy making. This is because 
decisions are arrived at by consensus of a body wider 
than the Panchayat Committee*
Meetings are seldom held, and important issues 
never broached, without the participation of at least 
some Notables who are not in fact members of the nine- 
man Committee, Except during the rainy season, meetings 
are held regularly, so that anyone interested in 
attending knows where and when to come. Although the 
Committee has the authority to initiate a wide range 
of actions, when an important decision is to be taken, 
invitations are sent to influential men in the area 
requesting them to be present. Committee deliberations 
thereby take on the character of informal gatherings of 
Notables. This 'comprehensive committee', as Mayer 
calls a similar body in Ramkheri, is not given formal 
recognition and has no fixed membership or existence 
outside the framework of Committee decision-making . It 
is also to be distinguished from a formally constituted 
sub-committee, with an executive and determinate member­
ship which may be established to deal with special
1. Mayer, I960, pp. 116ff. The ' Compi'ehensive Committee1 
in Ramkheri, however, was a more formal body, itself 
having officers.
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projects. Thus, for example, when it was decided to 
build s Panchayat House, s sub-committee consisting of 
twenty-four of the wealthiest residents in the Village 
area was set up to collect monies.
The Panchayat Committee, then, is subsumed by 
a plenary body composed of men who are traditional 
leaders. Members of the former, other than Bishnu 
Prasad and one or two other articulate persons, voice 
no opinions in the presence of these men of influence.
In such a setting, members of the faction opposed to 
Bishnu Prasad - who attend meetings regularly - parti­
cipate in decision-making and are able, on' the whole, 
to neutralize the possible advantages Bishnu Prasad 
could derive from control of the Panchayat Committee,
There is room for factional hostility to be expressed 
in opposing views of various Committee projects, but 
a middle way can be sought under the guise of working 
for 'national development’. Matters are never taken 
to a vote. Discussions which cannot be resolved at 
one meeting, are carried over to the next until a suitable
-i
compromise is reached . Often a decision taken at one
1. Commenting on the nature of consensus in a committee, 
Bailey states: ’....everyone knows that If the
decision is not the result of an agreed compromise, 
then it cannot be implemented.' (1965? P*8)«
meeting is countermanded at the next, when nev/s of the 
decision reaches the ears of Potables who were not 
present at the previous meeting. Minutes are kept, 
but they mention only those in attendance, and what the 
Committee eventually decided.
Thus the established procedure of seeking 
consensus achieves the dual purpose of containing 
factional strife and enabling the Committee to carry out 
its tasks of local government. V/hen the Committee attempts 
to ignore the wider consultative body on important 
matters it risks bringing factional opposition out into 
the open. This happened when Bishnu Prasad attempted 
to win the approval of the Village Assembly - which must 
ratify the Committee's annual budget - for a tax plan 
which had been prepared without the prior approval of the 
plenary body. The faction opposing Bishnu Prasad gathered 
sufficient support to stage a walkout and so broke up 
the meeting before the required number of signatures 
could be gathered to legalize the proposal.
There are signs of a growing realization on the 
part of faction leaders that control of the Committee is 
an essential prerequisite for building a strong political 
following. Iiathmondu's emxohasis on the development of 
a viable Panchayat system has meant that Government 
officials at the district level are especially sensitive
to anything they regard as an attempt to hamstring the 
work of the Committees. Opposition to proposals of 
the Committee, or to its manner of implementing Govern­
ment programmes, thus tends to he equated with opposition 
to the Panchayat system. i\ faction leader in control 
of the Committee can increasingly disregard the tradit­
ional methods of achieving consensus and pressure 
others to conform to his policies under the veiled 
threat of denunciation as 'opponents' (birod.hi) of the 
Panchayat system. Several men who have been vocal in 
their disagreement with certain Committee proposals have 
been called to H a m  Bazaar for a browbeating by various 
Government officials.
Ultimately, of course, a determined Committee 
could exercise its statutory powers to take all necessary 
decisions without reference to a more comprehensive body. 
Thus, a new coercive weapon has been added to the 
arsenal of the faction leader entrenched in the 
Committee, and could lead to a shift in the delicate 
balance between the two factions. Given the continued 
development of this trend, it is possible to foresee 
the Committee becoming the principal arena for factional 
strife. In such circumstances, formal election procedures 
could replace the hitherto consensual methods of choosing
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representatives. It would then follow, logically, 
that new emphasis would be placed on the large-scale 
recruitment of factional following and, alternatively, 
on the need for residents of the Village area, including 
Limbus, to take sides to a greater degree than they now 
need to do. Until such time, however, there is no 
circumstance in which it is necessary for a faction 
leader to measure his strength in numerical terms.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CULTURE A IIP ill PAT s 
THE EXTERNAL DIMELSIOx^ OF POLITICS
In the previous chapter I described certain kinds
of political choices open to Indreni Limbus, There is,
however, another aspect of the political configuration - which
might be termed its 'external dimension® - to be considered.
This has to do with the cultural distinctiveness of the
Limbus and the manner in which the kipat system of land tenure
is fused with and articulates the culture. Many Limbus
believe that 'kipat' is a term in the Limbu tongue and,
having been granted only to Limbus, is symbolic of their
exclusiveness. Thus, 'our social, cultural and religious
beliefs, way of life, and administration under the kipat
system are completely different from those prevalent in
2
the rest of the country.*
Indreni Limbus see themselves as part of a 
historical cultural unit with a special relationship to 
land, and which unit is both exclusive and in opposition to 
the outside. Such a relationship tends to define the nature 
of Limbu social contacts outside the immediate area of the 
Cluster and absorbs them in political activities on behalf 
of the wider group. Inevitably, their apartness also 
affects and is affected by relationships both to non-Limbus
1. For a description of some cultural differences between 
Limbus and Brahmins see Chapter I.
2. B.B. Chemjong, 1957 (quoted in k.C. Regmi, 1965, p.131).
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ixx the area of the. Cluster as well as to other Limbus 
within the Indreni settlements.
Ties outside the Area
Exclusiveness is fostered by the dual regulation 
of caste endogamy and clan exogamy which envelops Indreni 
Limbus in a widespread web of kin ties beyond the Cluster. 
These links are strengthened and expanded through a con­
tinuous process of interaction demanded by the norms of 
kinship. For one thing, the custom of visiting during 
Dasein provides the occasion for a renewal of ties between 
daughters and sisters who have married out and their natal 
kinsmen, as well as between the husbands of these women and 
their affines. During the three years following a marriage, 
a son-in-law is expected to pay his annual respects to his 
father-in*-law. Since a variety of payments in meat and
liquor must be transferred on each visit the couple is 
accompanied by anything from three to six young men from 
the husband's settlement cluster who carry the payments.
Such visits, obviously, not only discharge the obligations 
of kinship but enable fledgling affinal ties to be bol­
stered. The presence of so large a number of guests also 
requires the provision of hospitality which absorbs the 
attentions of a circle of affines wider than members of 
the bride's household alone.
Marriage and mourning rites are other important 
occasions for the renewal of ties. The former rites, in
particular, bring together large numbers of kinsmen not 
normally resident in the groom's settlement area. The 
marriage of a son carls for invitations to be sent to the 
groom's mother's brother and other close matrilateral kins­
men, to the groom's sisters and their husbands, and to the 
sisters of the groom's father and their spouses. In 
addition, the bride is accompanied to the wedding by a num­
ber of women from her settlement area, some of whom may 
already be related to residents in the settlements of the 
hosts.
There are also lass formal contexts for the main­
tenance of external kin ties. Visiting among relatives 
is encouraged and requires little prompting. A man knows 
he is always welcome at the home of his mother's brother, 
and often takes the opportunity provided by a slack agri­
cultural period to pay a visit. When a woman is ill her 
father or brother are usually notified and someone from her 
natal household will be despatched to report on her con­
dition. If the illness is traced to supernatural causes 
which cannot be treated by local specialists a ritual 
expert from the woman's naval settlement, 'who knows her 
deities' might be summoned to treat her.
But kinship provides only one channel through
which Indreni Limbus establish a widely ramifying range
1of ties to other Limbus beyond the area of settlement.
1. T n ’~one“ sense7~ an^YejIa?Tionship between Limbus canH5e"~ 
subsumed within a framework of kinship. A superficial 
inquiry about clan membership enables two complete 
strangers to establish a pseudo-kinship tie.
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Shared culture and the notion of common identity is another
basis. Language forms an instant bridge between all
Limbus, just as it provides a barrier which can be erected
at any time between themselves and members of other groups.
Language serves to overcome the initial reserve with which
any strangers are regarded. Moreover, the situations in
\
which Limbu strangers are apt to come together possess 
certain structural attributes which contribute to ease the 
establishment of rapport. For example, the market in Ilam 
Bazaar provides a regular occasion for Limbus from settle­
ments in the area to come together. Limbu petty traders 
tend to occupy one section of the market square and mix 
little with members of other castes except to engage in 
fleeting commercial transactions. The social concomitants 
of market day - renewal or creation of friendships, exchange 
of gossip, flirtation - take place within a geographically 
and socially distinct area. Limbus frequent certain 'tea 
stalls' selling liquor, thus demonstrating their preference 
for the company of other Limbus and easing communication 
with those who are unfamiliar.
A number of annual fairs held in various parts 
of the district bring together large numbers of mainly 
young Limbu men and women. Here again, the pattern of 
separation is evident. At two such events I witnessed, 
attendance was not confined to Limbus, but brought together 
a large mixed population for as many as four days at a time.
387.
In each instance, Limbus segregated themselves in one 
section of the grounds and had virtually no contacts with 
members of other groups. Through the medium of Limbu 
mixed dances, Indreni residents, dispersed easily among the 
crowds,renewing old and establishing new friendships.
Members of other groups who sought to join the dances were 
not turned away, but neither were they made welcome. 
Embarrassment at not knowing the dance steps or the language 
of the songs soon encouraged them to return with their 
friends to another area of the fair grounds.
Long distance trading ventures provide another 
context in which nimbus from the Indreni settlements make 
contact with others from various parts of Limbuan. Luring 
the mandarin season, in particular, the main road leading 
to the town of Sanisare in the Terai carries a heavy traffic 
of porters bringing the fruit from areas to the north.
Since the trip takes several days, Limbus make camp at 
night in one of a number of shops where they can buy beer 
or liquor and find a place to sleep. Here they pick up 
the latest gossip and exchange information on prices with 
those returning from Sanisare. In the town itself, they 
seek out the company of other Limbus, share drinks and make 
up parties to return together to the hills. On their 
return to Ilam nimbus from settlements to the north of the 
Cluster are often invited to spend a night in the Cluster, 
where a dancing party is organised in their honour.
3 8 8 .
Friendships created in this way are sustained beyond the
portering season and a pattern of mutual visiting may endure
for years, or eventually reed to the formation of affinal 
1links .
When Limbus travel long distances for any pur­
pose, be it trade or visiting, they invariably seek out 
Limbu households or wayside inns run by Limbus at which to 
spend the night. When I trekked for several weeks in parts 
of Limbuan my Limbu travelling companion would speed up or 
delay the daily journey in order to arrive at dusk in an 
area of Limbu settlement so as to be certain we would 
receive hospitality.
In a variety of ways, then, Indreni Limbus 
recognise their exclusiveness as a culture group. In a 
sense, this group is more important than any local community 
which includes members of other castes. Opposition to 
the outside is conceptualized not merely in local terms 
but in the context of wider group membership. When an 
Indreni man refers to 'we Limbus* he identifies with all 
Limbus, not only those in the Cluster.
Cultural identity becomes political identity in 
the context of the confrontation over kipat land. Insofar 
as the land tenure system is included under the rubric of
1. The persons involved in these friendships do not become 
ritual brothers (mit) since this would eliminate the 
prospect of affinal links being created between members 
of their immediate families.
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culture, any assault on kipat is seen as a threat to the 
very existence of the Limbus as a separate unit within 
Nepal society. The struggle for kipat has therefore pro­
vided the framework for common action against those forces 
threatening Limbu hegemony over their lands.
Since at least the late 19th century there have 
been sporadic attempts to organize opposition among the 
Limbus to stem the tide of kipat conversions to raikar 
tenure and to redress the balance of power which weighed 
heavily against the Subbas as a result of the Government's 
kipat policy. There is no indication that any permanent 
political association to represent Limbu interests was ever 
set up. Instead, ad hoc committees of Subbas and elders 
on a district- and even Limbuan-wide level were established 
from time to time,usually to protest against adverse legis­
lation or the threat of such legislation. Thus, in 1913f 
when the Government was contemplating the conversion into 
raikar of all kipat lands in Ilam mortgaged to members of 
other castes which could not be redeemed within six months, 
it invited the opinion of the Limbus to this proposal. 
Meetings were held in settlements throughout the district 
and 330 men, most of them Subbas, were delegated to present 
the Limbu case to the district officials who were conducting 
the inquiry. The Government was apparently impressed 
by the intensity of Limbu opposition to the proposals and 
withdrew them after receiving vague promises - which it 
must have known could not be fulfilled - that kipat lands
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would in future not be mortgaged to members of other castes.
Disparities between the Legal Code and special 
regulations enacted to deal with the problems of Limbuan led 
to the formation of another ad hoc committee of Subbas in 
1946. Several Ilam headmen, including one from the Cluster, 
were invited to join the committee, consisting of forty- 
five members, to make recommendations for the avoidance of 
contradictory rules pertaining to kipat land. The Subbas 
pointed out that in cases where the law of the State con­
flicts with laws relevant only to kipat the courts tended 
to ignore the latter. They urged that a Subba familiar 
with the 'customary rules' be attached to the court as a
consultant, since the officers of the court were not always
1
aware that differences in the laws did exist. They
2
also urged that a special law be written for Limbus.
None of the latter suggestions was adopted but the authori­
ties did issue an Order (sanad) reaffirming many of the 
regulations issued in the past and promising to resolve 
some of the discrepancies in the law. “Whether any concrete 
action was in fact contemplated is doubtful since similar 
promises had been made in the past. Shortly after the 
issuance of the Order the Government released its plans 
for a Panchayat system which the bubbas regarded as inimical 
to their interests. .Before the plan could be effected,
however, the Rana Government was swept out of office.
T7 The ® cfi"s't"omary ruies'9 they'spoke of were in fact the
special regulations dealing with the problems of Limbuan,
which were introduced by the Government over the years.
2. This was not as bizarre as it might seem, since the old 
Law Code had a special section applying to Newars.
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In the interval of several months between the 
collapse of Rana authority and the firm establishment of the 
new Government the Limbus sought to organize themselves for 
more effective political action. A meeting (chumlung) was 
held to which representatives from all areas of Limbuan were 
invited. The more moderate voices felt that the meeting 
should limit its purpose to the formulation of proposals 
for presentation to the incoming Government. They sought 
only firm guarantees for the maintenance of the kipat 
system and a greater voice for Limbus in the affairs of 
Limbuan. This was to be assured by the appointment of 
Limbus to senior posts in the administrative bodies in the 
area.
More extreme .elements, however, taking cognizance
of the temxoorary hiatus of power in the region, demanded
1
the establishment of an independent Limbu state.
Several Indreni Subbas who were present at the meeting stated 
that these elements spoke of storming the administrative 
offices in the Limbuan districts and establishing inde­
pendence forthwith. Some of those m  attendance are even 
alleged to have set about designing a Limbu flag. In one 
area of limbuan where relations between Limbus and local 
Brahmins had been particularly strained there were some 
outbreaks of violence, and it appears that a number of 
Brahmins were killed and much property destroyed. That
l.One author claims that in January 1951 a 'Free Kirat State® 
was actually declared; none of my informants could confirm 
this and I have seen no documents to back up this statement.
See Driver, 1963, p.85.
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these acts of violence were in any way connected with the 
meeting is very doubtful.
There is no evidence to suggest that even the mild 
proposals suggested by those responsible for organizing the 
gathering ever got beyond the talking stage. 'They drank 
and boasted of what they were going to do* was how one 
Limbu who had been present summed up the meeting.
In Ilam, following the transfer of power which 
was swift and uneventful, a number of Subbas sought to test 
the attitude of the new regime towards kipat by drawing up 
a list of demands. It is worthwhile listing them here since 
they are, by and large, typical of those presented to the 
authorities over the years. They illustrate how kipat 
tenure has been the focal issue in all these rather diffuse 
and on the whole abortive attempts at political pressure. 
There were seven proposals prepared by 195 delegates - 
including three Subbas and two elders from the Indreni 
settlements - from thirty-five settlement clusters through­
out Ilam. Two Chongbung Subbas in the Indreni Cluster 
were in the special committee of three chosen to present 
these demands to the district Governor. The proposals were 
as followss
1. Most of our kipat lands have been pledged to landholders. 
One-third of these lands should be returned to their 
Limbu owners (without repayment of the mortgage capital).
2. At present, a kipat owner must repay the mortgage in full 
before he can repossess his land. Landowners should
be allowed to repay mortgages piecemeal and repossess 
their lands piecemeal.
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3. Any raikar land purchased by a limbu should be converted 
to kipat tenure and the tax on the land included within 
the household tax already paid by the kipat owner,
4. At present, when a new household is registered at the 
time of a revenue settlement, it must pay a fixed tax 
assessment. But the number of households increase while 
the amount of tax remains the same. Henceforth, the 
amount of tax paid by newly registered households separa­
ting from one main household should not exceed in total 
that paid previously by the main household.
5. At present, Tharis submit taxes collected from their 
dependents directly to the treasury office. Henceforth, 
they should be made to submit these taxes to the Subbas 
who would then pass them on to the office.
6. The Subba's court (amal) should be given the right to 
hear disputes (and to collect fines).
7. If these proposals are introduced we will accept res­
ponsibility for the maintenance of law and order in our 
areas.
8. Limbus are 'backward9. Something should be done to 
bring them up to the level of the other castes.
Seven of the eight proposals are concerned directly 
with kipat land and the special position of the Subbas as 
a consequence of their traditional relationship to that 
land. Numbers 1 - 3  suggest ways of altering the balance of 
control of land, while the fourth proposal seeks to 
alleviate the tax burden on the land. Numbers 5 - 7  aim 
to re-establish the power of the Subbas which grew out of 
their initial roles as custodians of kipat, as grantors of 
estates to immigrant settlers ana as the principal 
channels of administration at the settlement level. Pro­
posals 6 and 7 e-re aiso veiled attempts to forestall the 
establishment of Panchayats in the area, which were regarded 
as additional threats to the few remaining prerogatives of
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the Subbasc The last proposal, is meant to refer to the 
specific educational needs of the Limbus and, more generally, 
reminds the G-overnment that Limbus are a distinctive group 
requiring special consideration.
In Ilam, this was the last organized attempt to 
bring pressure on the G-overnment to alter its kipat policy, 
although attempts to organize opinion on a Limbuan-wide 
basis continued. When a series of demands similar to 
those prepared by Ilam Subbas were presented to King 
Tribhuvan in 1951> & statement was issued reminding the 
Limbus that east Nepal was inhabited by many castes and that 
only the wishes of all the people could be taken into 
account in determining policy. This represented not so 
much a change in the Government’s attitude to kipat as 
the adoption of a more blunt method of treating Limbu 
demands for special consideration. The Limbus continued 
to make representations to Kathmandu and at least one more 
major effort to co-ordinate political action was attempted 
in 1958. It is significant that of the seven organizers 
of this meeting, two were Brahmins and another a Ohetri.
This was not merely an attempt to give voice to all sec­
tions of the population, as the Government had recommended, 
but an expression of the interests which rich non-Limbu 
landholders of kipat had in maintaining the kipat system.
Hor as providers of mortgage credit, they had access for 
lengthy periods of time to lands on which the taxes were 
minimal and at a cost considerably less than that required
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to purchase raikar land.
The outcome, however, was similar to that of 
previous meetings: proposals were put forward and pro­
mises were received that they would be considered.
At the approach of elections in 1959 kipat 
threatened to become an issue when the Congress Party came 
out in favour of abolition while another party^. the Gorkha 
Parishad, supported its retention. Perhaps it is an 
indication of the numerical strength of non-Limbu residents 
in Limbuan or a reflection of the tactful exclusion of its 
kipat plank from the Congress campaign in the east that the 
Congress party won all eight seats it contested in the 
region.**" In any case, the threat of abolition was not 
implemented even after Congress formed a Government. In 
December, I960, after only fifteen months of rule, 
parliament was dismissed and the Monarchy resumed control 
of the Government. The ’traditional rights and privileges' 
of the Limbus were again guaranteed by a royal decree, 
although again this meant no basic alteration of the Govern­
ment's kipat policy.
Por more than half a century then, Limbus have
attempted to protect their interests in land. Their
political activity, by and large, has been unco-ordmated
and ill-organized. Their demands have often been
1. None of the Limbus in the Cluster was aware of the
Congress attitude to kipat, and apparently did not hear 
of it from the opposition candidates.
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unrealistic, occasionally irrelevant and, more recently 
at any rate, far from effective. But by circulating peti­
tions, holding mass meetings and sending delegations to 
present their views to Government, the Limbus have culti­
vated a widespread awareness of their special position vis 
a vis the rest of the population^ The land tenure system 
thus blends with and adds a structural dimension to the 
fact of cultural exclusiveness.
Ties Within the Area
The Subba
The development of a strong Limbu identity has 
affected the position of the Subba within the local commu­
nity. I showed earlier how the Subba9s traditional role 
as custodian of lineage land gave him certain powers over 
his lineage mates. Additional authority, of course, 
devolved on him in his role&s tax-collector and represen­
tative of the Government. In a sense, the Subba expressed 
not only the unity of the lineage, but the importance of 
this group m  the ownership and allocation of land resour­
ces. It efunity was bolstered by ritual functions vested 
in the Subba and his position was recognized by members 
of the lineage through the system of tributary payments.
His role has changed as a resuxt of two linked 
devexopments. First of axi, the land shortages which 
developed at the end of the 19th century brought about
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an emphasis on the rights of the household against those 
of the lineage. As the importance of the household, based 
on elementary-type families, increased, the lineage 
structure ceased to function as an economic or political 
unit.*. The role of the Subba as head of a land-owning unit 
correspondingly declined. Secondly, the collapse of the 
leadership hierarchy, evolved through the system of land 
grants to immigrant settlers, and the subsequent usurpa­
tion of many of the Subba9s powers by the Tharis and the 
Government (including, more recently, the Panchayat bodies) 
further eroded his traditional powers as Government represen­
tative to the lineage.
Yet despite the removal of the bases of his
power, the Subba remains a figure of importance in the 
1community. This is especially evident during the festi­
val of basein, when tributary payments are made and the 
Subba discharges certain ritual functions. Although 
Subbas no longer have the authority to exact tribute, few 
Limbus make any attempt to avoid what they regard as 
obligations. In October, 1964? approximately 80fo of
kipat-owning Limbus visited their Subbas during Dasein, 
bringing gifts of -Liquor, meat and Rs.1.60 which latter, 
it was explained, replaced the traditional labour exaction 
to which Subbas were entitled. In one presentation I 
witnessed, the Subba sat m  the middle of his room and as
1 .Headmanship apparently still carries sufficient prestige 
to have brought about a dispute over succession to the 
title among two Nembeke men. See pp. 357 ff.
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each dependent approached, the gifts were placed on the 
floor beside the headman, following which the dependent 
bowed to the other’s feet and received a tika on the fore­
head. The liquor was then shared among' those assembled. 
Only members of Chongbung lineage (3) did not honour their 
Subba, since the latter was still a young man in his late 
teens. Even so, some gave their tribute to one of the 
other Chongbung Subbas, explaining that it was necessary to 
honour a Subba, and that it mattered little if he was the 
headman of another lineage.
This same attitude manifested itself on the 
ninth day (naumi) of the Dasein festival. This was the 
occasion for a ritual display of the Subba9s diacritical 
trappings of power as weil as of his generosity. Since 
each Subba is believed to hold his title by direct appoint­
ment of the king of Nepal, he is entitled to surround 
himself with the accoutrements of office. These are a 
sacrificial post which stands in a fixed spot near the 
homestead of the Subba and which attests to his ’rule9 
in the areas a drum, traditionally beaten to warn people 
in the area of impending danger £ and a sword, which 
symbolized the Subba9s concern for the defence of his 
followers.
On the morning of naumi each Subba combined 
the ritual display of office with the practice of blood 
sacrifice. Following the rituai, the Subbas gave tika
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to those attending and the meat, provided by the Subba 
himself, was then cooked and eaten.
Of particular interest was the pattern of atten­
dance at these rituals. Lineage was only an incidental 
criterion, despite the fact that the Subba is traditionally 
associated with a lineage. For example, a number of 
Chongbungs and members of non-kipat-owning groups from 
neighbouring homesteads attended the rite at the sacrifi­
cial post of the Kambo Subba in Chitok and shared in the 
feast. One of his lineage mates from Bharapa also attended, 
but several others resident in Dorumba attended the ritual 
of the Nembeke Subba in that settlement. No division 
of followers took place at rituals conducted by three 
Chongbung Subbas whose sacrificial posts were situated 
in Bharapa and Angbung. There the three rituals were 
held consecutively, enabling all participants, some of 
whom came from Chitok and some of whom were not owners of 
kipat land, to move from one rite to the next, thus 
honouring ail three Subbas equally.
By cutting across lineage boundaries, these 
rituals stress the point that the Subbas have come to 
symbolize a wider collectivity. In other words, there 
is a shift 111 emphasis away from the bubba as represen­
tative of a lineage towards the notion of him as a symbol
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of the unity of the local community.
The nature of his role emerges more clearly in 
the context of the' Limbu struggle to preserve the kipat 
system. I pointed out how the bubbas were in the fore­
front of the activity to protect Limbu interests in land. 
Locally, this has added to the prestige of the headmen
as a category, even though of the seven Subbas in the
Cluster, only two have engaged in these activities on a
district- or Limbuan-wide level. The Subba is also
seen as the embodiment of Limbu tradition and exclusiveness, 
and as a force of conservatism against the likelihood of 
change. Since 1952, Subbas have led the opposition to 
the establishment of a Panchayat system. When the dis­
trict authorities invited the Subbas to organize support 
for Panchayats among their dependents, several Indreni 
Subbas were instrumental in the preparation of a letter 
calling on the Government to withdraw its intentions to 
establish such a system. Indeed, Subbas are often given 
credit for the fact that the Panchayats were abolished 
in 1956.
Luring the time I spent in the field the issue 
which most exercised their antagonism to the Panchayat 
was a project to erect a building for the Panchayat
1. Among a number of African peoples, the chief performs a 
similar function. Among some, as for example, the 
Mambwe, he also retains his traditional rights to 
allocate land. Cf, W. Watson, 1958.
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Committee. About 80f> of the finaleing was to be raised 
from Village residents. For the purpose of apportioning 
contributions, members of the Committee placed everyone in 
one of four categories on the basis of impressionistic 
(though fairly accurate) assessments of wealth. Although 
about 90fo of Limbu households were placed in the two 
lowest categories (contributions of Rs. 20 and Rs. 6) 
the consensus was that the level of contributions was too 
high. For months, whenever Limbus gathered in some numbers, 
the topic of conversation turned immediately to the Pan­
chayat Committee and the financial burden it had imposed. 
Resentment at having to pay what for most amounted to a 
considerable sum was directed mainly at the Panchayat 
system as such. The Committee was seen to have replaced 
what for the Limbus was a far superior system based on 
the traditional ties between Subba and dependent. At 
one funeral rite, an eider, (who had been placed in the 
Rs 20 category) spoke at some length about how the 
Committee oniy makes demands for money, but never seems 
to accomplish anything. ’What kind of Committee is this 
which takes monies from the Government - (which contribu­
ted 20$ of the costs) - and from the people, but shows 
nothing for it?* He went on to compare the Committee to 
the Subbas, 9who did everything for the people and who 
returned whatever they took. 1 The anusion was to the 
traditional balance of rights ana obligations which
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characterized the buobass relations with his dependents.
By implication, ho accused the Committee of emphasizing
only its rights at the exp one e of its obligations."1*
Brahmins, because of their close identification
in Limbu eyes with the Committee, come in for a fair share
2of the general hostility to Panchayats. Protests were 
voic.ed about the lack of consultation at the time every­
one was categorized for the assignment of contributions.
The Limbus were not satisfied with the explanation that 
the ward representatives had made the assignments. Resi­
dents of the two wards in which Limbus are a majority and 
which are both represented by Brahmins complained bitterly 
that they had played no part in choosing their represen­
tatives and did not feel that their best interests were 
being served by these men. Following a threat by the 
Committee that the police would be called in if contri­
butions were not forthcoming, a meeting of Angbung residents 
was held. One of the Subbas suggested bringing a complaint 
to the Government against the Brahmins fwho because they 
are so rich and educated run the Committee and think they 
can do anything they want to do.* There was much talk
1. To be fair, not only the Limbus complained about having 
to pay. But members of other groups did not express 
their anger in quite the same terms.
2. Five of the present Committee members are Brahmins, 
three of them, including the chairman, are members of 
an extended family. See below for a discussion of
L inbu-Brahmin r e1at ions.
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of refusing to pay, and of fighting the matter in court, 
or, if necessary, resisting with forces
In the face of the Government-backed authority 
of the Panchayat Committee, the nimbus knew from the start 
that resistance would lead nowhere, When I left the field 
the building was nearing completion and the rate of pay­
ment of Limbu contributions was keeping pace with that of 
the rest of the Village population. The occasion had 
provided an opportunity to express hostility to the Commi­
ttee regarded both as the instrument of the Brahmins and 
a usurper of the powers of the Subba. The emotional 
flare-up over contributions to erect a building for the 
Committee thus served to bring together the local commun­
ity hehind the figure of the Subba who, in turn, symbolizes 
its unity,
Limbu-Brahmin Relations
The identification of Brahmins with the Pan­
chayat Committee stresses that local relationships with 
members of other castes has been affected by the wider 
question of Limbu opposition to the outside. It is now 
time to examine the nature of these ties. On the level 
of local interaction Limbu antagonism is directed primarily 
against the Brahmins. This is mainly because local 
Brahmins have derived most advantages from the Government's 
kipat policy and, at the expense of the Limbus, have
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become the most powerful group in the area. It seems 
necessary to ask why Brahmins were able to benefit more 
than other non-Limbus?
Three factors would seem to suggest possible 
explanations; numbers, literacy and Government service.
In the area under the jurisdiction of the Panchayat 
Committee the Brahmins constitute the single largest caste 
group with 32.5% of the population. They are 39.8% 
of the non-Limbu population in the Village, and 50.4% 
of this category within the indreni settlements. Thus, 
by weight of numbers alone Brahmins would be expected to 
be favoured by any legislation designed to benefit non- 
Limbus .
Literacy is another factor which has worked to 
their advantage. Most Brahmins were able to acquire the 
ability to read and write despite the almost total lack 
of formal educational facilities in Ilam until the 1940s. 
Traditionally, yoting Brahmins were instructed by religious 
teachers individually, or attended informal 'schools*
(pathshala) organized by learned men in the area where, 
through the medium of Sanskrit, they became literate in 
the Devanagari script. Some of the wealthier men sent 
their sons to Benares, Darjeeling or Kathmandu for 
schooling. A few Indreni Limbus were able to acquire 
literacy through friendships established with Brahmin 
tutors, but 011 the whole, until they began serving in
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the army, Limbus remained illiterate. In consequence, 
they were forced to rely on Brahmins, as were most other 
groups, to prepare the documents required at the time of 
property division, land transactions, disputes, etc.
And, as I have mentioned, only a few Brahmins with a high 
degree of literacy could manage the skills required in 
drafting petitions to various branches of the administration 
and the courts.
Ability to read and write was also one of the 
qualities demanded for Government service. Although the 
top posts in the district administration tended to be 
filled by Kathmandu appointees, some senior and most 
intermediate and junior positions were open to local 
candidates. As a result, Brahmins were able to play 
a key role in the local administration in Ilam. Govern­
ment service was actively sought by ambitious Brahmins 
from settlements in the vicinity of Ilam Bazaar. Wealthy 
men were able to widen their range of contacts and to use 
their positions to secure for themselves and their followers 
some personal advantage. For men without means, service 
in the administration was perhaps the only avenue of 
advancement and on their return to their settlements they 
were able to utilize the prestige and more concrete bene­
fits of service to enhance their wealth and status.
Some of tho most prominent Brahmin families in the Village 
have a history of Government service. The father of the
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faction loaders for example, was a senior official in the 
administration for many years.
These factors, then, undoubtedly provided 
the wherewithal for Brahmins to attain ascendancy in the 
politico-economic life of the area. largely because local 
Brahmins were the chief beneficiaries of the Government's 
kipat policy, they are regarded by Indreni Limbus as the 
prime instruments of that policy.
Following the establishment of Kathmandu's 
authority in Ilam members of various non-Limbu groups 
were encouraged by the Government to settle and take up 
land. During the first century following the pacifica­
tion of the district there was adequate land for settlement 
and cultivation. In these circumstances the Limbus 
accepted the immigian ts, the majority of whom were Brahmins, 
and made J.and grants to them. Gradually, in a number of 
ways catalogued in Chapter III more and more lands came 
into the hands of Brahmin immigrant settlers. By the last 
part of the 19th century, land pressures were beginning 
to be felt and there was a dearth of barren land to bring 
under cultivation. It was at this time that Kathmandu 
converted kipat grants already made to non-Limbu settlers 
into raikar and introduced a number of policies making it 
possible for members of other castes to bring kipat lands 
under raikar tenure.
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The Holdings granted "by Indreni Subbas have all
been converted to raikar and the Subbas no -Longer have any
\
rights whatsoever xn these lands/ limbus are adamant
about what ‘they allege to be the deception perpetrated on
the Subbas by their erstwhile dependents, the Tharis, whom
they accuse of responsibility for conversion of the Holdings.
Since the great majority (70.4$>) of recipients of land
grants given by indreni Subbas were Brahmins, the latter
receive the brunt of Limbu hostility. v'/hen discussing
Brahmin ’treachery9 (jjal) one Limbu informant summarized
his views in the following rhyme.
Tip of the sugar cane, root of the radish,
Keeping- a servant xs the ruxn of a house,
Left in the barn he drinks the cream,
Left in the home, he takes your spouse.
The Brahmin is thus regarded as an ’ungrateful
servant9 who, trusted to watch over the land he was granted,
’stole* it by converting it to raikar. The fact that the
Government provided the legislation necessary to enable the
Brahmins to effect the transfer is disregarded in the
face-to-face situation.
In a number of other ways, Brahmins in the area of
the Cluster took advantage of regulations to improve their
economic position at the expense of’the Limbus. A
Government ruling that possession of kipat land had to be
supported by documentary evidence of title proved lucrative
ground for ambitious non-Limbus. Since the Government
l. See the case of Jahare and the Jaisi Thari, pp.307 ff.
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did not possess the apparatus to enforce this ruling, 
it relied on, indeed encouraged, informants (polaha) to 
bring these matters to the attention of the local authorities. 
The reward to these informants for successful prosecutions 
of land 9 concealment * was the land itself. Immigrant 
settlers were thereby encouraged to contest the flimsy 
evidence of ownership rights held by their Limbu neighbours. 
Residents of the Indreni settlements did not escape these 
challenges to their rights to occupy kipat land in the 
Cluster.
In 1913> for example, a Brahmin from a settlement 
one mile south of Angbung petitioned in court in Ilam to 
be awarded about 4,000 units of paddy land registered as 
kipat in the names of five members of Chongbung lineage (4). 
He argued that the nimbus did not possess proper documen­
tary evidence of ownership rights to these lands. The 
defendants cited a number of written assurances given by 
the Government that uncultivated lands converted into 
paddy fields and brought under cultivation by the Limbus 
could be held as kipat. They also produced copies of 
several documents attesting to Chongbung rights to cultivate 
their ancestral rands as kipat. But the court agreed with 
the petitioner that the documents presented as evidence 
by the nimbus did not in fact prove sufficient title since 
for ' one thing there was 110 mention of boundaries and, 
for another, they were granted by local officials and not 
by the Crown. The members of the Chongbung lineage were
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fined Rs 1570 for 'false registration, and the lands,
representing approximately one half of the total lineage
paddy area, were converted into raixar tenure and given
1
to the Brahmin.
Another facet of the relations between the two 
groups concerns the fact that nimbus must rely mainly on 
Brahmins for the bulk of their mortgage credit. This 
has given rise to the notion, backed to an extent by readily 
cited experiences, that ail Brahmin landholders engage 
in sharp practices to the,.detriment of the. Limbu'kipat- 
owners. Bor example, at the turn of the century kipat 
landholders were, for the first time, required to share in 
the tax burden of those Limbu kipat-owners whose lands they 
had taken under pledge. Shortly after the regulation was 
introduced the Limbus began to complain that many landholders 
were attempting to claim ownership of the lands on the 
grounds of having paid the required tax share (damasahi).
The Government was obliged to assure the Limbus and the 
landholders belonging to other castes that it did not 
intend this to happen.
Another ruse was employed m  land pledging trans­
actions whereby the landholder would provide a small amount
1. Another Brahmin from the same settlement, encouraged by 
this case, brought a petition in 1929 against ail the 
Subbas of,Ilam, contesting their rights to hold kipat.
The case was thrown out on the grounds that the petitioner 
did not specify which lands were being cultivated as 
kipat.
410.
of mortgage capital and after obtaining the signature -
or, more finely, thumbprint - of the kipat-owner, would
then add 9a few zeros9 to the amount, thus making it
impossible for the xipat-owner ever to raise the required
capital to repay the mortgage and resume his lands. One
old Limbu, referring to a Brahmin with whom he had had
such an experience, related how the landholder ’would
invite me to his home and offer me rice and meat. Then
hu made me put my thumbprints on papers. He would give me
a few Rupees and then when I came some months later to
return the mortgage and take back my land, he would says
"this is not enough. Why do you bring me a few rupees and
ask for your land back? The document says tne mortgage is
five hundred and you bring me fivel What am I, a fool?"
What can you do to such a man? They are ail like that,
1
the Brahmins, they are ail treacherous.’
When the registration of land transactions 
became wide~S|jread after 1945, such abuses were less fre­
quently perpetrated. Bven so, according to one Brahmin 
informant, clerks in the treasury offices could usually
be bribed to register amounts which had not m  fact been
2transferred to the kipat-owner. btiin, registration
1. ' At fTrst^XJTOTs undeF ”0^e”3^^Ts¥ion”"Thatl, this "was 'only
a local habit of a few unscrupulous landholders. But 
the practice is mentioned m  several references as being 
common throughout Linbuan. Of. Bhandari, 1959? Report 
of the Muluki Office, 1947»
2. In one survey of agricultural conditions in the eastern 
hills, the author blamus petty officials for their com­
plicity in aggravating the conditions of agricultural 
indebtedness. ’...one can say that the G-overnment offi­
cials are the worst exploiters of farmers in the hills.9 
(G-urung, 1949, p • 9)
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has apparently alleviated the problem of mistrust between 
the contracting parties. It is worthwhile noting that on 
the whole only land transactions involving Indreni Limbus 
with members of other castes are registered. Treasury 
office records list only four cases where land transactions 
in. kipat between Indreni Limbus were recorded. The 
explanation offered by Limbus and Brahmins alike is that 
’Limbus trust one another; they do not have their trans­
actions registered at the office.*
Although the numbers of Brahmins with whom ^he 
Limbus have any kind of links represent only a small 
proportion of the total number in the area, the attitudes 
and stereotypes are generalized and applied to the whole 
group. A legend related by a Limbu ritual specialist 
expresses the nature of the antagonism. ’A Brahmin and 
his wife came from the west and arrived at the Mai River. 
They told the River Goddess that they had nothing and were 
hungry. She gave them rice, lentils, vegetables and
spices. Then she gave them fire, and some vessels in
which to cook. They ate and rested, and when it became 
dark they went away, talcing everything with them. When she 
saw what they had done the River Goddess thought it would 
have been better not to give such people anything. So she^  
cursed them and said that she would produce no more fish. 
Since that time men cannot fish in the river and harvests 
have also been reduced.9
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The hostility feit towards the Brahmins is 
overtly expressed in the Jegend. The themes of theft 
and deceit which occur here follow the stereotypes held 
of the Brahmins by the Limbus, The River Goddess, wor­
shipped by all castes, echoes the antagonism and gives‘it 
universal and supernatural sanction. Moreover, production 
deficiencies in fish and agriculture are referred directly 
to the stereotypical qualities and behaviour of the 
Brahmins. The latter, the Limbus would argue, who have 
abused the kindness and generosity of the River Goddess, 
have behaved in like fashion towards their erstwhile Limbu 
benefactors.
The hostility occasioned by land grievances is 
reinforced by Brahmin attitudes towards Limbus. The term 
most often ajjplied by the former to the latter is * simple1 
(lato). Brahmins claim that because Limbus are simple 
they care only for the present. A Brahmin informant 
observed that if nimbus had thought of the future, the 
Brahmins would never have been allowed to remain in Ilam 
since., they would have had no lands on which to settle. 
Brahmins express their annoyance with and fear of their 
precarious position as landholders of kipat, emphasized 
in continuous nimbu demands for bard. But, on the other 
hand, they regard the practice as symptomatic of the Limbu 
lack of concern for the future. A Brahmin landholder 
pointed out that when a member of his own caste is forced 
to pledge raikar land ho would never allow his debt to
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increase by adding to the mortgage capital as do the Limbus, 
since a Brahmin would be concerned first of all with reposses 
sing his land as soon as possible.
Brahmin attitudes towards Limbus are also con­
ditioned by the special treatment the former traditionally
received at the hands of the Law. Punishments and fines 
er-ewa© related not merely to offences but to caste as well. 
Thus, for example, a member of a lower caste who was 
cuckolded by a Brahmin was prohibited from Killing the latter 
a right which he could exercise under certain conditions 
against members of any other caste. Brahmins, too, were 
exempted from compulsory labour for Government and from 
paying certain kinds of taxes, which obligations others, 
including Limbus, were required to meet.
The special position of the Brahmins was protected 
in local conditions as wexl. Iii 1957, n quarrel ensued 
between a Brahmin and a Limbu when the former diverted an 
irrigation channel into his own paddy field after a Kambo 
Limbu of Chitok had already begun flooding his own terraces 
situated below. The nimbu struck the Brahmin and the 
matter was brought to the Panchayat Court. At three sepa­
rate points in his petition the Brahmin repeated the wordss 
•I, a Brahmin, was beaten by a Limbu.1 When the court, 
whose members were ail Brahmins, fined the kambo, they too 
concentrated not on the morality of physical violence, 
but on the contravention of a ritual code embodied in the
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caste hierarchy. ’You should not have beaten him 
because ho is a Brahmin.f
Brahmin feelings of superiority are occasioned 
by differences in the religious practices of the two groups. 
To the extent that we can speak of two systems, it should 
nevertheless be stressed that the boundaries are not clear 
cut. For one thing, there is an awareness by members of 
each group of the religious beliefs and customs of the 
other. Members of one group may profess belief in the 
efficacy of certain deities associated with the other.
Thus, for example, many Brahmins placate the Limbu Grand­
mother -goddess although the form of worship is adapted to 
the brahmanic pattern. Limbus, in turn, often rationalize
i
their own religious customs in terms of Hindu beliefs.
Both groups also enjoy a set of convictions regarding 
certain forms of divination associated mainly with illness, 
and share a common pool of ritual specialists for this 
purpose. Finally, along with the rest of the population 
Limbus observe the principal Hindu festivals such as Dasein 
and Tiwar since these have become national holy days.
Nevertheless, despite the overlap, we can distin­
guish analytically, as do the Lirnbus and Brahmins in prac­
tice, between two distinct religious systems. The feature 
most often stressed by members of both groups as symbolizing 
the distinction is the fact that the ’religion of the 
1. Cf. Benedict, 1962, p.1237.
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Brahmins* is a written tradition while the indigenous 
religion of the nimbus is not. The following legend, which 
I heard repeated on several occasions by nimbus, illustrates 
the relative value they assign to the two systems.
’Some ancient Hindu sages wrote the scriptures 
and covered the books with deer skin for their protection, 
and floated them in the rivers so that men would find them. 
Many Brahmins and Limbus found these books* The Brahmins 
kept them safeiy, but the nimbus ate the skin and used 
the pages for their fires. Bo the Brahmins learned how 
to marry and mourn and conduct their daily lives from these 
books. But the Limbus who didn’t obey these scriptures 
made their own customs which are not written down, but 
are handed on by their forefathers.'
This legend suggests the fact, expressed in other 
contexts as well, that Limbus have conceded the superiority 
of the written tradition of Hinduism adhered to by the 
Brahmins. This is not surprising considering that Nepal 
is officially a Hindu state and remembering the super­
ordinate status enjoyed by the Brahmins. The latter, 
too, hold in contempt many Limbu customs which they regard 
as 'jungaiee' ways. They point to the Limbu habit of 
eating buffalo and pork and drinking spirits and to their 
pre-conquest traditions of beef-eating, which they con­
sider responsible for the low ritual status of the Limbus.
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To sum up, then; antagonism between nimbus and 
Brahmins has emerged mainly as a result of a historical 
confrontation over land. This confrontation has given 
rise to stereotyped attitudes held by each group about 
the other. These are both related directly to historical 
experiences and expressed in terms of cultural differences 
between the two groups. Moreover, the differences are 
conceptualized as hierarchic in order. In other words, 
Brahmins and nimbus are not merely distinct and opposed 
groups, but opposed in a hierarchy based on ritually 
assessed attributes.
We might now examine how the hierarchic nature 
of Limbu-Brahmin relations is expressed in and reinforced 
by interaction between members of the two groups. There 
is, first of am, the question of intermarriage. Although 
the overall caste structure provides for the accommodation 
of offspring of hypergamous marriages into the (Khatri) 
Chetri group, both Brahmins and Limbus express distaste 
for such intermarriages. The union of a Limbu woman and 
a Brahmin (or any higher caste) male would place her 
outside the matrix of her natal group. On economic 
grounds alone, her marriage could not oe welcomed since 
her group would receive no bridewealth and consequently 
would give no dowry. Her kinsmen would take no interest 
in her well-being and would not offer the protection and 
support usually given a daughter or sister even after
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marriage. Such marriages, in any case, are a statistical 
rarity * In one instance I have recorded, the widow of 
a Kambo man of Chitok married a Brahmin from a neighbouring’ 
settlement. In another a Brahmin of Bharapa who spent 
ten years as a policeman in a town about five miies west 
of,, the Cluster took a Limbu wife resident in the town.
On his return to the Cluster - where he has a Brahmin wife - 
he did not bring the Limbu woman, although he continues to 
visit her occasionally and provides for her support. The 
marriage drew wry comments from Brahmins and nimbus alike, 
and the husband himself admitted that such unions are 
regarded with disdain and pointed out that if he had brought 
her to live in the Cluster both he and the woman would 
huvu. been scorned by everyone.
Since hypogamous relations until recently were 
violations not only of caste but of the Law, they 
cannot be considered as instances of intermarriage. A
Brahmin woman (or any other of higher caste) who forms a 
liaison with a Limbu, automatically forfeits her caste 
status and assumes that of her partner. But despite the 
fact that she is regarded as a Limbu in the eyes of the 
Brahmins and the Law, she is not considered as such by 
the Limbus themselves. The only circumstance in which 
such a relationship could survive would be if both part­
ners fled to a town where they were unknown or, as is 
usually the case for hypogamous couples, if they settled
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in India. In the only case of this nature involving an 
Indreni Limbu, which occurred about forty years ago, the 
couple fled to Assam, severing axl ties with their kinsmen. 
The man, who was a kambo, forfeited his share of the house­
hold property since he never returned to Chitok. That the 
burden of the stigma falls most heavily on the woman is 
illustrated by another example involving a Limbu from a 
settlement a few miles from the Cluster. After the seduc­
tion of a Brahmin widow from the same settlement, both went 
to the Darjeeling area where they remained for several 
months. The Limbu then returned alone to Ilam. He was 
accepted back by his kinsmen and his Limbu wife as a matter 
of course, but it was clear that the Brahmin woman could 
never join him. The Limbu*s prestige was not at all 
compromised and as long as he made no attempt to introduce 
the union into the settlement he suffered no personal dis­
advantage .
The virtual absence of intermarriage between mem­
bers of the two groups provides what is perhaps the most 
important measure of social * segregation'. I have already 
indicated other contacts in which interaction is minimal. 
Attendance at marriage and mourning rites tends to be 
restricted to members of a single caste group. wealth 
and the pattern of residence are partly explanative factors. 
Numbers in attendance are limited by the ability of the 
host to provide the necessary feasts. Then, the
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obligation to consider bonds of neighbourhood ensures that 
guests are drawn primarily from surrounding households 
which, in most cases, means members of the host’s own 
caste group. But even where neighbours are members of 
another caste, the additional factor of status differential 
between host and potential guest contrives to exclude 
Brahmins from the rites of the great majority of Limbus.
But factors of wealth, status and residence are supported 
by the overriding opposition of the two groups which, 
though largely a function of these factors, assumes a 
reality sui generis. Brahmins who can afford a large 
wedding feast, for example, do not invite Limbu neighbours 
to attend unless they are Limbu Notables. Limbu hosts, 
in consequence, explain the absence of Brahmins from their 
rites in terms of their own exclusion from the rites of 
the Brahmins. The result is a virtual absence of inter­
action in most of the important social contexts.
In economic matters, the ties are more wide­
spread, but here too status differentials determine the 
nature of the interaction. As shown in Chapter V Limbus 
rely on Brahmins for the greater part of their mortgage 
credit. They are also dependent to a large extent on 
Brahmin landholders for tenancy rights by which they earn 
a substantial proportion of their agricultural income.
The same landholders hire nimbu agricultural labour to 
work on fields they do not give to tenants. Brahmins also
420.
extend a substantial amount of loan credit to Limbu 
borrowers. Economic necessity thus rimes together members 
of the two groups. But the principal characteristic 
of these relationships is their contractual basis. Because 
Limbus are invariably in the subordinate position the ties 
are not reciprocal. By contrast, economic links among 
Limbus, at least until the emergence of a small wealthy 
class, tended to be reciprocal and non-contractual.
Limbu households still recruit work gangs on the basis of 
labour exchanges. The difference, as I have explained, 
is related to scarce cash resources among the Limbus, to 
the fact that only wealthy Brahmins traditionally had 
sufficient lands to require labour they could not repay 
in kind from their own household, and the reluctance of 
wealthy Brahmins to send their women to work in the fields 
of others. Thus labour practices both express and derive 
from status differentials among the two groups. The 
distinctions have begun to blur with the rise of newly 
wealthy Limbus, but even the latter exchange labour with 
other Limbus, and then hire for wages whatever labour they 
still require.
Daily, in a number of other ways, the hierar­
chical basis of relations between Limbus and Brahmins is 
reflected in interaction. There is, for example, the 
pattern of deference which symbolizes their respective 
statuses. The manner in which greetings are exchanged
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reflects the relative status of the persons meeting.
Unless they are kinsmen, when specific forms are called 
for, it is usual for a subordinate to incline his fore­
head to be ’tapped* by the super-ordinate. The criteria 
of relative status are not easy to isolate. Between 
members of the same caste they are usually a combination 
of wealth and age. Across caste lines, ritual rank becomes 
an additional criterion, so that Limbus almost always are 
the subordinate greeting partners of Brahmins. I have 
seen a sixty-year old Subba go along a row ..of Brahmins to 
be ’tapped' and only a small percentage of these were his 
seniors in age, although most were his economic betters.
Only those ex-army pensioners who, because of 
their age, wealth and overall status as Notables, are 
greeted as equals by the most prominent Brahmins. But it 
is significant that even young Brahmins of inferior wealth 
do not assume a subordinate greeting posture when meeting 
these men; they either avoid greeting them at all, or 
exchange the equalitanan namaste salutation.
The same pattern applies to verbal forms of 
address. Brahmins use the lowest honorific grade (ta), 
which an older genera.iiy uses to a junior, when addressing 
Limbus, regardless of their relative ages. Here, again, 
the exceptions are the ex-army Notables, for whom are 
reserved the highest honorific grade (tapai) as a sign 
of respect.
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Commensal relations reflect both the ritual and 
secular statuses of the two castes. Ritually defined 
norms proscribe the acceptance by Brahmins of certain 
foods prepared by Limbus. Thus foods nabelied bhat 
(rice, maize, millet), dal (lentils) or tarkari (vegetables 
or meat) which are cooked in water by Limbus cannot be 
eaten by Brahmins, Moreover, such foods, even when pre­
pared by Brahmin cooks must not be eaten unless members 
of the two groups are seated in separate lines. Violation 
of these rules can lead to a loss of caste. A Brahmin 
who willingly disregards commensal regulations would cease 
to be welcome in the kitchens of other Brahmins, would not 
be able to offer any hospitality to fellow caste members, 
and would not be likely to find a Brahmin spouse for his 
child.
Considerations of secular status, however, can 
lead to a widening of commensal rules such that acceptance 
of even ritually unimportant foods from Limbus is not 
countenanced. Some Brahmins, for example, in attempting 
to validate high secular status, insist that commensal 
prohibitions extend to ea-i types of food. Such attempts 
to restrict ail commensal interaction aye often the cause 
of bitterness and resentment among nimbus. They argue, 
as do jjoor Brahmins, that foods prepared in oil or clarified 
butter, or beverages such as tea, are ritually neutral 
and can be shared by all, save untouchables. When I
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asked several Limbus in Angbung who make an annual Satya 
Narayan ritual why they prefer a particular Brahmin priest, 
the reply was that the latter willingly accepted tea and
the doughnut-shaped breads (sel roti) prepared - in
clarified butter - for the occasion. One Limbu changed
his Brahmin priest because the latter refused to accept
even tea.
Such Brahmins tend to sanction their behaviour 
by- reference to ritual interdictions, but explanation must 
be sought in terms of secular status. As I have shown 
in a different context, a man who accepts hospitality 
admits the equality or superiority of status of his host. 
This is true no less of Brahmins than of Limbus. For 
example, most of the wealthy and important men who attended 
a Brahmin wedding at which I was present left before the 
wedding- feast was served to the guests. One poor Brahmin 
guest explained sardonically that ®big men come and look, 
then they leave; only the poor eat.®
In the context of Limbu-Brahmin relations the 
extension of commensal restrictions becomes a means of 
validating in ritual terms the existence of politico- 
economic distinctions. The ritual - secular dichotomy 
is evident when we regard the position of ex-army 
Notables. Here, commensal relations are proscribed only 
by focal i.e. ritual limitations. Brahmins recognize 
the equality of secular status of these Limbus by accepting
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all foods not prohibited by ritual considerations.
Limbu Notabless Intoreaiary Role
From the foregoing discussion we note that the 
rise of a small wealthy class among the Limbus has begun 
to alter the traditional relationships between Brahmins 
and Limbus in the Indreni area. Since the end of the 
19th. century, when Brahmins gained control of access to 
the productive resources of kipat land, their politico- 
economic ascendancy has coincided with superior ritual 
status. Relations between the groups were thus seen to 
exist in a single hierarchical order. Moreover, cultural 
factors tended further to emphasize the structural 
cleavages. The growth of status differences within the 
Limbu community, however, has led to the emergence of what 
might be called an intercalary category in the society.
On the one hand, these Limbu Notables have interests in 
maintaining the unity of the nimbus as a group in opposi­
tion to the Brahmins, On the other hand, they have an 
equal, though contradictory welfare in stressing associa­
tion with the dominant section within the wider community. 
In the following paragraphs I consider each role in turn.
Although Limbu Notables are treated as a special 
category by Brahmins, there is no question of these Limbus 
validating this new secular status in ritual or marriage 
terms. Commensal relations, as I have stressed, are
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immutable insofar as certain foods are never accepted by 
members of ritually higher groups. in addition, inter­
marriage with members of higher castes is not an avenue 
through which socially mobile Limbus m  the Indreni area 
can hope to express rising status. They tend, therefore, 
to create marriage links with Limbus of similar status in 
other settlement clusters, so developing a far reaching 
network of affines who constitute an elite sector of the 
Limbu population.
But other kinds of ties to nimbus in the local 
community cannot be ignored. Ex-serVicemen who have 
achieved prominence require, certainly no less than others, 
the co-operation of kinsmen and neighbours in a number 
of contexts. The proper rites following on the death 
of a Limbu must be performed by his lineage mates.
Crises arising out of marriages, as shown in the previous 
chapter, require the recruitment of supporters to act 
on an individual’s behalf. Since the marriages and 
funerary rites of ex-army Notables are grander than those 
of most less affluent Limbus, the former must enlist more 
assistance to carry out the manifold tasks involved in 
entertaining largo numbers of guests at their feasts.
They too, require witnesses to sign the many documents they 
write over land transactions, and in the event of their 
involvement in disputes, may need to caul on support 
from within the local community.
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Economic considerations also motivate Limbu Notables 
to maintain amicable relations within the local community.
The wealthiest among them have taken a substantial amount 
of kipat land under mortgage. That portion not given to 
tenants which they cultivate themselves requires the hiring 
of some labour from within the Cluster. As I have pointed 
out, Limbu households which hire out labour accept less than 
'market® rates from those to whom they are linked in other 
social contexts. By accepting the obligations imposed on 
them by kinsmen and neighbours the Limbu Notables thus guaran­
tee their supply of a relatively cheap source of labour.
Of even greater importance is the fact that these 
Limbu landholders can employ their ties of kinship and 
neighbourhood to keep open their access to land at a minimum 
cost. When a serviceman or pensioner enters the market for 
kipat land he utilizes his relationships within the Limbu 
community to obtain landholding rights to kipat previously 
held by members of other groups. By diligent attention to 
his obligations he can expect the kipat-owner to co-operate 
in transferring the landholding rights away from the present 
landholder. Once installed as landholder himself, the ex­
soldier seeks to hold tne mortgage capital at the lowest 
possible level and at the same time obviate the possibility 
that the land will be transferred to yet another landholder.
In Chapter V I explained how limbu households can employ 
their rights of kipat ownership to obtain what amounts to
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interest-free loans which are added, to the mortgage capital 
(bard). These demands are sanctioned by the threat of trans­
ferring landholding rights. It was suggested that an impor­
tant brake on the owner8s freedom of action relates to the 
extent of his involvement in a multiplicity of other ties 
with the landholders.
Table 37
Comparison of mortgage distribution 
(in units and cash value)______
Percentage of 
Mortgaged 
Land Held
Limbus Resident in Cluster 
Brahmins Resident in Cluster 
Brahmins Resident outside
Cluster
21.3 /
11.3 °/°
35. 6fo
Perc ent age of 
Mortgage 
Credit Provided
15.5?*
12.1/*
41.3#
Table 37 compares the percentage of the total 
amount of land held under mortgage by various categories of 
landholder with the percentage of mortgage credit provided.
It will be noted that Limbus resident in the Cluster have 
provided only 15.5# of the cash value of air mortgages on 
Indreni kipat while holding 2i.3/ of the land mortgaged.
The proportion is equally favourable for the two ex-army 
Notables who are tne largest Limbu landholders. Between them, 
tney hold 10.1/ of the laud and have provided only 6.5/ 
of all mortgage credit. A relatively greater multiplicity 
of ties with Limbus would also provide at least a partial 
explanation for the fact that Brahmins resident inside the 
Cluster have provided a lower amount of mortgage credit in
428.
proportion to the lands they hold under mortgage than those 
resident outside the Indruni settlements.
These figures support the contention that if a 
landholder is a limbu, he can, by actively cultivating his 
ties within the Cluster, keep the kipat-owner’b demands for 
bard to a minimum, while successfully neutralizing the latter*s 
potential rights of transference of the usufruct. Limbu 
Notables, in particular, because of the strong economic and 
political sanctions they can bring to bear to reinforce their 
kinship and neighbourhood links, are seldom if ever deprived 
of landholding rights b;y transference. I know of only one 
case where a kipat-owner transferred land away from a Limbu 
Notable and in this instance there were mitigating circum­
stances since the former needed the land to trade off to an 
Indreni Brahmin with whom he was involved in a complicated 
transaction.
The overall importance of Limbu Notables in the 
economic life of tne Cluster is evident in the numbers of 
households which are in one way or another dependent upon 
them. The two wealthiest ex-servicemen, Lajahang and 
Parsade, for example^. are linked as landholders to 30/
(22) of all kipat-owning households m  the Cluster. Bight 
of these households are also tenants of one of these Notables 
while an additional two Limbu households cultivate as 
tenants the kipat of others given in mortgage to the two 
men. boven households, three of them already linked by
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mortgage or tenancy ties, are beholden to them for monies 
borrowed on interest. Their economic relationships extend 
to all four Indroni settlements and extend beyond the boun­
daries of lineage or clan segment.
Their wealth confers on them prestige and consider­
able influence within the Cluster. I have already pointed 
to the role of Notables in the mediation of disputes. Their 
help is also sought in a variety of other matters. On most 
mornings men from every part of the Cluster are to be found 
in the adjacent courtyards of Lajahang and Parsade. They 
come to seek advice on the wording of a document, on the 
advisability of giving a daughter to a suitor, to report 
the latest gossip or merely to enjoy the company of men 
from other parts of the Cluster whom they otherwise seldom 
meet. In a very real sense, these ex-servicemen have become 
the focus of social life in the community.
This .suggests that the existence of a nucleus of 
very wealthy men among the Limbus serves an additional, latent, 
functions the exertion of a centripetal influence on social 
life in the Cluster. This tends to counteract the centri­
fugal forces of the terrain, settlement distribution and the 
highly individuated character of the household. Because of 
their wealth and status, nimou Notables bring together at 
such important occasions as weddings and funerals residents 
from every part of the Indreni settlements. At the wedding 
of Lajahang9s grandson, for example, (winch Lajahang financed
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since the boy was a part of his household), every Indreni 
household was represented. In tno absence of other Cluster- 
wide rituals, these events serve as an important means of 
stressing the links among all residents of the Cluster, and 
bolstering their awareness of themselves as a solidary 
community.
The importance to Limbu Notables of identification 
with the Limbu community derives also from their interests 
in maintaining the kipat system. Indeed, wealthy Limbus 
benefit most from the system. They obtain access to land at 
a reasonable cost and on a relatively secure basis. The share 
of taxes they pay to the kipat owners is a negligible sum 
compared to the taxes they would be assessed on comparable 
raikar land. Moreover, the guarantee of perpetual owner­
ship rights enables men to serve in the army for lengthy 
periods of time in the knowledge that the lands they and their 
kinsmen own will still be intact and, if mortgaged, available 
for redemption on their return to active social life in the 
community. Thus, ex-army Notables share, in common with all 
Limbus, a fundamental interest in kipat and in combatting 
any attempts to compromise their rights. Although none 
of the indreni Limbu Notables was able to be active in the 
political activities led by the bubbas before the overthrow 
of the Ranas, they did begin to participate in the meetings 
following their retirement from service in the early 1950s.
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Lajahang, the Cluster1s wealthiest Limbu, was on the organi­
zing committee for a mass meeting held m  1958 to draw up 
a series of proposals on kipat for the Government's considera­
tion.
Wealth and high military rank earned by Gurkha
service also confer on Limbu Notables a high status within
the wider community. I have noted how Brahmins must adjust
their attitudes and behaviour towards a traditionally
undifferentiated Limbu population to take account of this
newly emergent category. The Notables, in turn, seek to
validate their new role by adopting some of the cultural
practices usually associated with the higher caste groups.
With greater frequency than their less affluent kinsmen they
employ the services of Brahmin priests for a variety of ritual 
1occasions. Tney assume some brahmanic dietary practices 
by giving up eating pork or buffalo. Lajahang does not 
drink beer or spirits. Language, too, has become a symbol 
of differentiation. Both Lajahang and Parsade prefer to 
speak only Nepali to the exclusion of Limbu kura, which both 
understand without difficulty. The familiar process of 
®Sanskritization* thus has led to a blurring of cultural 
boundaries which traditionally converged with the structural 
cleavage.
1. A frequent topic of gossip "is how some~I7inVbu’“NoTables 
in other areas of Limbuun have begun to marry off their 
children by Vedic ritual and to adopt brahmanic mourning 
practices. This has not yet occurred in the Indreni Cluster.
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Notable status within the wider community places 
these Limbus in a structural position at which conflicting 
role expectations occasionally intersebt. As Limbus, they 
are expected to uphold the norms and values of the group, 
which stress opposition to the Brahmins, As Notables, 
however, they share interests in common with wealthy Brahmins, 
the protection of which imposes co-operation between affluent 
sectors of both groups. The intercaiative nature of their 
position was dramatized in the spring of 1964 when rice 
prices in the area rose in response to seasonal shortages.
The District Panchayat offered to import rice from the Terai 
and sell it to the Panchayat Committee for resale in the 
Village at Government-controlled prices. In common with 
other poor sections of the poxjulation Indreni Limbus supported 
the idea. But at the meeting of the Committee where the 
matter was discussed the 9 comprehensive committee* composed 
of Notables opposed the scheme. The argument put forward 
by the opposition was the difficulty of transporting the rice 
to the Village and the problem of distribution. Informants, 
however, were quick to note that the Notables, most of whom 
sold rice in the area, were concerned about the threat to their 
own commerce. The Limbu Notables, who sell very little rice, 
at first supported the plan since they realized that the 
Limbus would be among those benefitting from controlled 
prices. Under pressure from other Notables, however, they 
agreed to ’further investigation*, which effectively 
shelved the idea.
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The nature of Limbu antagonism to Brahmins conflicts 
with the desire of ninbu Notables to maintain good relations 
with Brahmins, especially those m  the Cluster. The manner 
in which one minor dispute was settled indicates how highly 
such relations are valued. When cattle tended by Parsade9s 
son destroyed some wheat growing in (the faction leader)
Tunka Nath’s fields, the latter tied up the cattle and asked 
both Parsade and Lajahang to assist in estimating' the crop 
damage. Tunka Nath reminded them that this was the third 
time such a thing occurred and that if someone other than 
Parsade9s son had been responsible he would have ’tied him to 
a post and beat him.1 The entire procedure of negotiation 
over the amount of damage was quite unlike any similar 
occasion 1 had witnessed. It was characterized by extreme 
politeness and constant reassurances on both sides that 
there was no quarrel between them, oniy a need to arrive at 
a fair figure for compensation, so that Parsade*s son would 
realize that he had to be punished for endangering the good 
relations which had always existed between these men. Tunka 
Nath addressed both Limbus in high grade honorific terms 
and referred to them as his elder brothers (dajvu). Agree-iwipaHMWuita w
merit was reached (over tea) without the need for mediators. 
Several passersby were asked only for their opinion of the 
amount of dannge since wheat is a new crop in the region.
The only note of discord was sounded by one of these 
observers who inquired if a promissory bond was not required.
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He was turned oxi by both the nimbus and the Brahmin who 
reminded him that the word of a Notable is sufficient bond.
Limbu Notables are of two minds about their rela­
tions with the Panchayat Committee. On the one hand, pro­
minent men are expected to associate themselves with the 
aims of the Committee and they are continually pressured by 
other Notables (and now by the Government) to participate 
in its deliberations. There are advantages to be gained 
from such association since the Committee provides the oppor­
tunity for a periodic display of Notability. On a variety 
of holidays the Village’s most influential residents are 
given the platform for several minutes during which they 
comment appropriately on the significance of the particular 
occasion for the gathering. The order of speech-making 
reflects the assessment of status, and the right to speak 
is usually awarded those who attend Committee meetings with 
some regularity. There is another advantage to be gained 
by attending meetingss the opportunity to influence 
decisions taken by the Committee, When one Notable com- 
plamed about the amount he was being asked to contribute 
towards the erection of the Panchayat building he was 
reminded that he was invited to attend but had not shown up 
at the meeting at which the assessments were decided. Thus 
a Notable who refuses to associate with the Committee invites 
criticism from his peers, forfeits the opportunity to dis­
play his prominence a.ud risks being left out of decisions
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which, might affect him.
On the other hand, if Limbu Notables were to be 
too closely identified with the Committee, they would be 
regarded as working hand in hand with the Brahmins against 
the interests of the Limbus. Since the Committee is seen 
by Limbus as a direct challenge to the traditional rights 
and privileges of the Subbas, the ex-servicemen could well 
jeopardize their ties within the Limbu community by becoming 
too involved m  Committee affairs. Since the Panchayat*s 
inception in 1953? they have assiduously avoided serving as 
Committee members. When the present system was established 
in 1962, Tunka Nath sought to encourage Lajahang to repre­
sent the Chitok-Bharapa ward instead of Bishnu Prasad who 
had announced his intention of becoming the candidate.
Lajahang refused on two main grounds. Firstly, he was 
determined to avoid becoming involved in factional strife 
and it was obvious that an overriding motive for Tunka 
Nath’s suggestion was to keep his brother out of the Committee. 
Secondly, despite the support of the Limbu residents in the 
ward, Lajahang realized that he would be highly vulnerable 
to accusations of being m  league with the Brahmins if he 
did accept the position. As he explained? ’They (the 
Limbus) begged me to be a representative, but if X had, then 
whenever the Committee would decide anything, they would 
murmur amongst themselves that 1 was working with the 
Brahmins against then.®
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The same reasoning was behind the Limbu Notables’ 
decision not to serve on a special sub-committee established 
to collect assessments for the building project. Both 
Lajahang and Parsade were elected to the sub-committee’s 
executive at a Committee meeting which they did not attend. 
At the following meeting they resigned their post's pleading 
impending absence away from the Cluster on other business. 
The level of assessments was deeply resented by the Limbus, 
a fact of which the Notables were aware. The sensitivity 
of the latter to any suggestion that they were in any way 
responsible for categorizing the Limbus for purposes of 
assessment is illustrated by the following incident. During 
a meeting with several members of the Committee a number of 
Limbus demanded to know the person responsible for deciding 
how the Limbus were to be differentiated for purposes of 
assessment. In an attempt to assuage their resentment, 
the Committee members stated that Lajahang had been present 
at the meeting in question (which he was) and had taken 
responsibility for assigning the Limbus to the various cate­
gories (which he had not). The nimbus thereupon met with 
Lajahang, who assured them that.not he but.the Brahmin 
representative of the ward had suggested the categorization.
What can be described as the balance of conflicting 
expectations on the small class of wealthy ex-servicemen 
thus defines the limits of their political activities based 
on the Committee. Recently, however, uuw associations
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have been created under the aegis of the Government, 
which provide a framework for political expression by 
Limbu Notables, what is more, by participation in the new 
associations, they avoid the conflicting demands inherent 
in their intercalary positions. This is because these 
bodies, by their very nature and definition exclude anyone 
other than ex-servicemen.
The primary school in the indreni Cluster was 
built in 1958 with funds provided by the District Soldiers’ 
Board, an organization of ex-Gurkha servicemen with branches 
throughout those areas of Nepal which contain heavy ex­
army populations. The Board was established in 1952 to 
administer a fund given by the India Government to the 
Government of Nepal for the benefit of Nepalis who had 
served in World War IX.^ The monies have been used to 
build dispensaries and schools throughout the country.
The District Soldiers’ Board provided an initial grant of 
Bs 750 to build the Indreni school, and continues to pay 
the salaries of its three teachers.
The organization of the Board in Ilam provides for 
a three-man district executive to administer financial 
allocations and to handle matters of liaison with education 
authorities. The executive appoints a representative in 
each of the district’s four sub-divisions who is responsible 
for working with the local school committees. Lajahang is
1. The fund is called the Central Co-ordixmtion Board post­
war Reconstruction Bund. Cf. Hitchcock, 1963* p.80.
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vice-president of the District Boldiers® Board in Ilam and 
Parsade, his younger brother, is the Board’s representative 
for the liam-Darda sub-division.
The former has been president and the latter 
treasurer of the indreni school committee since its creation 
in 1958. Because the curriculum of the school is laid down 
by the national education authorities, the committee has a 
largely administrative and watchdog function. Meetings 
discuss payment of school fees, employment of teachers and 
maintenaxice of the building.
In contradistinction to their attitude to the 
Panchayat Committee, Indreni Limbus regard the school commi­
ttee as represexiting their own interests. Because it is 
effectively controlled by Limbu Notables, other Limbus 
attend its meetings and accept minor responsibilities if 
asked to do so by the executive. Of the twenty members 
excluding the president and treasurer, nine are Limbus from 
the Indreni Cluster, though only four of these have children 
attending school. The remainder are mainly Newars and 
members of other non-high caste groups.
The ex-Servicemen*s Association provides Limbu 
Notables with yet another framework for political activity. 
The Association is one of seven ’class’ organizations created 
along with the Panchayat system in 1962, and is designed 
to serve the interests of veterans of the Indian, British
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and Nepal armies. ^  The organization of the Association 
parallels the four-tier Panchayat structure with executive 
bodies at the village, district, zonal and national levels, 
and sends two representatives to the National Panchayat.
Lajahang and Parsade are chairman and treasurer
respectively of the Village executive, and Jahare, the only
2other Limbu who can be termed a Notable, is its secretary. 
Parsade is also treasurer.of the district executive, while 
Lajahang is a member of the zonal executive. The Association 
concerns itself with improving pension-paying facilities 
and money transfer arrangements for servicemen, so that its 
activities are conducted outside the arena of settlement 
politics. Recently, however, the district executive obtained 
a grant of land in t&e Terai adequate for the resettlement 
of 200 families of ex-servicemen in the first stage. Con­
ceivably, membership on the Village executive, hitherto a 
post conferring prestige but little other advantage, could 
become important for dispensing patronage. But this is 
still m  the future.
1. The other six 'classes* similarly organized are peasants, 
labour, women, students, youth and children. By 1964 only 
the ex-Servicemen®s Association had established an 
organization in the settlements of Ham.
2. To establish a 'Village® executive there must be 100 ex- 
servicemen who are paid up members of the Association.
Por this reason areas under the jurisdiction of more than 
one Panchayat Committee may be amalgamated as a Village 
for the purposes of the Association. There are thirty- 
eight such units in Ham.
CHAB1BH IX 
CONCLUSION
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One way of approaching the study of social change
is to focus on the causal interdependence and co-variation
among certain e v e n t s T h i s  necessarily involves a xarocess
of selection. Even if we make no attempt to attribute change
to single causes, we nevertheless ignore many conditions
precisely because the phenomena are so complex, and we cite
2
only the most important causes. In this thesis, I have 
identified the kipat system of land tenure and the effects 
of Government policy on that system as the principal cata­
lysts of social change in the Indreni cluster of settle­
ment s.
Implicit in the analysis was the distinction of 
two historical periods within each of which certain economic 
and political institutions were seen to be interrelated 
in a systematic way. No single dramatic event allows us 
to pinpoint a specific moment in time before which a certain 
social pattern obtained and after which it was replaced by 
a different pattern. But the facts suggest that towards 
the end of the nineteenth century the introduction by 
Government of certain policies related to kipat land set 
in motion a number of xorocesses which, both singly and in 
combination with other developments such as those related
1. J.Bo Watson, 1953.
2. Ginsberg, 1958.
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to military service and the commercial growth of Ilam 
Bazaar, brought about the social changes which f have des­
cribed. Bor the purposes of this summary I refer to the 
time before the effects of these processes became evident 
as the Early Period.
This Period was characterized, first of ail, by 
a subsistence economy, in the sense that agricultural require­
ments were met within the Cluster. Some of the produce 
was undoubtedly traded in the region to acquire the few goods 
which could not be made or grown locally, and to find the 
cash needed to pay taxes, but by and large the economy was 
self-sustaining. Mair has argued that 9in such an economy 
there could be no commodity more valuable than land, no
circumstance in which it would be profitable to dispose of 
1land.9 I think this is true of the Early Period in Ilam, 
but I would stress also that an abundance of rand was as 
much a reason for this fact as the existence of a subsis­
tence economy per se. Land had no exchange value because 
it was a free good. This meant that production was limited 
primarily by technological know-how and the supply of labour. 
Availability of land explains the readiness of the Limbus 
to make generous grants of Holdings to the non-Limbu 
immigrants who entered the district in the wake of the G-orkha 
army. Regmi has suggested that the lands may have been
p
given for financial gain, but it seems possible to speculate
1. Mair, 1957, p.46.
2. M ,C , Regmi, 1965, P •97•
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that the immigrants were unlikely to have had sufficient
resources to invest in land; certainly, the story as the
Limbus tell it is very different. In any case, what is clear
is that laud was given in return for economic and political
support, so that in Gluckman's terms the 'series of estates 
1in land9 mirrored the political hierarchy of Subbas,
Tharis and dependents. The hierarchy was bolstered by the 
various prerogatives enjoyed by persons in suxoerordinate 
positions vis a vis their subordinates and symbolised in the 
system of tributary payments. The Subbas, then, stood at 
the summit of a political structure based on differential 
rights to land.
Their political roles had another dimension as 
well. As lineage headmen they were the dominant leaders 
within the Limbu community. Here, too, control of land pro­
vided the basis of their power. The right to allocate kipat 
constituted a principal sanction of hcadmanship and empha­
sized the coriJorateness of the lineage. Households obtained 
secure rights to an estate by virtue of membership in a 
ioatrilineage which imxolied, among other things, allegiance 
to a Subba. It was shown how, in conditions of land plenty, 
the lineage appeared not overly concerned with defining 
membership criteria too narrowly. As a result, outsiders 
were occasionally absorbed into the lineage or 'accommo­
dated9 in other ways. The desire to enhance a political 
1 c Griuchman, 1943 ? P • 45 *
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following would seem to have motivated this practice.
But even in the Early Period the political 
organization could not be expressed in terms of the rela­
tions between Limbu descent groups. Whatever the system 
existing in Ilam in pre-Gorkha times, the imposition of rule 
by the Kathmandu Government left no doubt where the monopoly 
of power resided. Yet, by incorporating the existing 
hierarchical structure into the administrative apparatus 
of the state, the Government, for a time at least, crystal­
lized the authority of the Bubba and the strength of the 
lineage he headed. In their roles as tax-collectors and 
the main instruments of administrative control in the settle­
ments the Subbas9 powers were sanctioned by the authority 
of the state.
The politico-economic conditions existing today 
follow from several interconnected developments. One kind 
of development relates to land shortages caused by the 
pressures of population growth and exacerbated by a Govern­
ment decree converting into raikar tenure all land grants 
made by Limbus to immigrant settlers. In the course of the 
analysis several effects'have been noted.
Pirstly, the criteria for lineage membership 
have become more stringently defined in order to limit the 
numbers with rights to kipat. As a result, the Cluster is 
now inhabited by a number of nimbus without ownership rights 
to kipat land within the Indreni settlements.
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Secondly, in the absence of surplus lands to 
allocate, the Subbas have lost the economic sanction for 
their power and influence in the lineage. In rare instances 
where lands are abandoned or become vacant through the 
absence of lineal heirs, households related as co-heirs 
are quick to press their rights to the vacated land. Linea­
ges have lost their corporate functions in respect of land, 
as households have acquired and exercise greater rights 
against the former. Moreover, with the introduction of a 
rule requiring the registration of land titles on an indivi­
dual basis, the household no longer need reassert continuously 
its membership in a wider kin group. The fact that the 
household is the most important corporate group in the Limbu 
community presented certain problems of method and analysis.
Traditionally, anthropologists have equated the 
study of small-scale societies with the study of relations 
between structural groups of varying depth. In many areas 
undergoing change this orientation is no longer useful.
Even Bott's guarded statement that 1 in a small-scale, 
relatively closed society, the encapsulating (viz. local 
or kin) groups have a great deal of control over the family' 
is clearly not appropriate to the Limbu context.’1' To use
Bott's own term (in a qualified way) the Limbu household is
2a comparatively * individuated* unit. The household
1. Bott, 1955, p.374.
2. By 9individuation*, says Bott, 9I mean that the elementary
family is separated off, differentiated out as a distinct,
and to some extent autonomous social group...9 Ibid, p.375.
445 •
exercises a wide measure of choice in the formation of social 
ties. Through its control of an estate,which is further 
secured by the rule prohibiting the permanent alienation 
(i.e. sale) of land held under kipat tenure, the household 
is able to manipulate its rights to gain the maximum advantage 
for itself.
I have not tried to suggest that a household is 
completely unhampered in its freedom to enter into or opt 
out of social ties. There are restraints, of course, but 
these are not, by and large, the restraints of encapsulating 
groups. The limitations on a household's freedom of choice 
are referable, rather, to the restrictions of poverty, which 
necessitate the establishment of credit and tenancy links 
with wealthy elements in the populat ion; to the require­
ments of agriculture, which compel the household to rely 
for assistance in cultivation tasks on its neighbours; to 
those situations which induce it to call on others for 
support or to mediate in its disputes; and so on. Thus, 
from the point of view of any household it is the multiplex 
pattern of ties in which it is ensconced which dictates 
the boundaries of choice.
Precisely because of the smallness of scale of 
rural communities many of those on whom a household relies 
for assistance may share membership with the focal household 
and with each other in ongoing groups. But the reasons for 
which they are recruited may have nothing whatever to do 
with this fact. It is not necessarily because they are
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lineage or clan mates that a household seeks their help; 
it may be because they possess certain qualities or attri­
butes which the focal household requires at a particular 
time to press its own advantage. In other words, the align­
ment of households in groups may be distinguished from and 
irrelevant to their alignment in ego-centred 'networks* or 
•action-sets*• In such circumstances it was thought best 
to concentrate in the analysis not on the relationships 
between "kinship groups, but on the nature of the ties 
emanating out from individual households and the ways in 
which they are utilized in social situations,
A third outcome of the land shortages which 
occurred around the turn of the century relates to their 
effects on household composition. kven as household esta­
tes have become smaller and less viable, the tendency has 
been for young men to press for partition and a division of 
property shortly after marriage. The trend has become even 
more pronounced with the growth of new commercial opportu­
nities outside the agricultural economy. As young men begin 
to recognize their importance as earners of wealth in the 
cash economy, they are more reluctant than ever to share 
these earnings with a large family groups This is espec­
ially evident in the case of some army servicemen who, even 
before marriage, act as heads of potential households
1, This kind of trend has been noted in areas where labour 
migration is an important part of economic rife. See 
Firth, 1954.
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by retaining a substantial proportion of their earnings 
against the time they will marry and establish an independent 
unit. The efforts of their eiders to keep the household 
estate intact for as long a ^eriod as possible are rendered 
ineffective, and only the wealthiest households can hope, 
by holding out the prospects of an expanding estate, to 
delay the process of division. Thus, as the rate of land 
fragmentation has increased, household size has become 
smaller and these groups progressively less able to support 
themselves from the land.
Fourthly, in the absence of alternative sources 
of income during the latter part of the nineteenth and 
early part of this century, a dearth of xand meant that 
household obligations could only be met by mortgaging kipat 
land to non-Limbus. There emerged the familiar syndrome 
of agricultural indebtednesss as more and more lands were 
pledged to raise non-productive capital, the Limbus gradu­
ally lost the means to rexoay these debts and resume their 
lands. Thus, the economic foundation on which the poli­
tical hierarchy of the Kariy Period had been built eroded 
with the general impoverishment of the Limbus - Subbas and 
their lineage mates alike. The twice-born castes, especi­
ally the Brahmins, became the economically ascendant sector 
of the population, and the chief source of credit and 
tenancy for the nimbus. Moreover, the conversion of their 
land grants into raikar tenure in the xBbOs secured the
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rights of the non-Limbus to these lands and freed them of 
any further economic or political dependence on the Limbus. 
Thereafter, the Tharis were beholden to the Government 
and not the Subbas for their titles and authority. When 
the system of tax-collection was re-arranged so that Tharis 
paid taxes directly to the treasury office instead of to the 
Subbas, the last remnants of the hierarchy were dissolved 
in Ilam.
Another development which had a profound effect 
on the social pattern relates to the Government decision 
of 1901 to prohibit the permanent alienation of kipat land 
to non-Limbus. Since pressures on raikar land have been 
growing steadily, non-Limbus have been forced to compete 
for access to the usufruct of kipat lands. This has placed 
Limbus in a position from which to exploit their ownership 
rights by demanding interest-free loans (bard) against the 
security of lands already pledged. In addition, they retain 
the right of first refusal of tenancies in the event that 
the mortgagees can or will not cultivate the lands themselves. 
These rights, moreover, are sanctioned by the threat of 
transferring the usufruct to new landholders. The effects 
of impoverishment are thereby mitigated so that the pattern 
of total economic dependence which characterizes the 
relations between, for example, landlords and non-Limbu 
landless has never developed. And the fact that now Limbu
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households can get at least a part of their living from 
commercial sources has reduced further their dependence on 
the non-Limbu landholding class.
The retention of ownership rights to kipat is 
especially important in the context of military service. 
Because land rights remain intact during their lengthy 
absences, servicemen are able to accumulate substantial 
savings and pensions which are used to regain usufruct to 
their own lands or to take the lands of other Limbus under 
mortgage. This means that the proportion of lands to which 
the Limbus now have 9unrestricted* access has begun to 
increase at the expense of the Brahmins and other non-Limbus. 
It means, too, that monies earned in the commercial economy 
contribute to slowing down the rate of kipat mortgaging. 
Moreover, as these monies find their way back to the Indreni 
Cluster, the agricultural sector of the Limbu economy 
improves accordingly.
The political effects of these new alternatives 
have been no less far-reaching. Service in the Gurkhas has 
given rise to a small class of affluent Limbus, who through 
their wealth and status earned in the army, have usurped 
much of the power and influence of the traditional Limbu 
headmen. Of equal importance is tneir assumption of leader­
ship within the wider community - the arl-Nepal arena, so 
to speak - expresssed in their control of new political 
associations created by the Government.
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Colson points out that the existence of the Makah 
'as a distinct group9 is due mainly to 'the creation of
1
a separate status for the Makah by the reservation system* * 
The Nepal G-overnment' s ban on the sale of kipat can be 
seen in a similar light• By halting the trend towards 
abolition of this form of rand tenure, the G-overnment inad­
vertently provided a new impetus for the Limbu struggle to 
defend their lands against encroachment.
The kipat system blends with and adds a structural 
dimension to the fact of curtural exclusiveness. Limbu 
relations with and attitudes towards their Brahmin neighbours 
are influenced by the fact that the latter have' benefitted 
most from the Government's land policy°9 indeed, they are 
seen as the instruments of that policy. In a different 
direction, the continuing influence and prestige of the 
Subbas are explicable, too, in terms of the confrontation 
over land. Their traditional importance as lineage head­
men has given way to their roles as symbols of Limbu unity. 
Not only have they been in the forefront of the political 
activity over kipat, but express the opposition of the 
Limbus to the Banchayat system, which is seen both to be 
controlled by the Brahmins, and to represent the greatest 
obstacle to a resurgence of the traditional powers of the 
headmen.
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1. Colson., 1953s pp.144-5*
451.
Ill 1964, a comprehensive series of land reform 
measures were announced by the Kathmandu Government, and 
the intention is to introduce the programme in all areas of 
the Kingdom not later than 1967* Although nowhere in the 
legislation is sijecific reference made to the future of the 
kipat system, the successful implementation of such a scheme 
would seem to be predicated 011 the prior conversion of ail 
lands to raikar tenure. Whether or not this will be done 
remains to be seen. In the right of this study, however, 
it is safe to assume that the abolition or fundamental 
alteration of the kipat system of land tenure would bring 
about further changes in the existing pattern of social 
relations.
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APPENDIX 
Ihe Measurement of Land
The problem of measuring land arose early in my 
fieldwork and proved something of a problem. The last 
revenue settlement in H a m  took place in 1936 so that the 
records were out of date and of little value. Moreover, 
only irrigated lands were in fact surveyed, but dry fields 
were not.
Hill peasants themselves have no exact knowledge 
of the size of the fields they cultivate. They speak only 
of the amount of seed they sew in the case of paddy lands, 
and of the number of hul they own when referring to dry plots. 
A hul means a pair of bullocks, and in this context implies 
the number of mornings it takes to plough a dry field.
This gives no indication of its size since the figure varies 
with the condition of the soil, the time of year, the strength 
of the bullocks and the skill of the ploughman.
Under these circumstances the only alternative 
was to use the figures for production. A ’unit1 therefore, 
is not, strictly spea&ing, a measurement of land, but of 
its productivity. The figures given in the text are for the 
year I spent in the fierd. There is nothing to suggest 
that 1964-65 was a year of abnormal yield - either below 
or above par.
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There are two weaknesses in this approach which 
become immediately apparent. The first is thiss how was 
I to know whether the production estimates given me by my 
informants were accurate? Limbus, like peasants everywhere, 
are never happy to speak about their yields. But the fact 
that the great majority of their fields were mortgaged made 
them less reluctant to give me the information I asked for, 
and at the same time made it possible for me to check their 
statements. Since in most cases two and often three persons 
had rights to the same plot of land I was able to verify 
the production figures by relying on more than one source.
Then again, certain areas were known to yield a determinate 
quantity of grains per seed planted. So that, for example, 
most cultivators knew that fields along a specific ridge 
produced twenty times the amount of seed sewn, while others 
in another area produced twenty-five or thirty times the 
amount. This provided an additional means of verification. 
Finally, I was present on a number of occasions when grains 
were counted at harvest time, and was able to check personally 
the statements I had taken.
Perhaps a more serious drawback of attempting to 
employ production figures as an objective measurement of land 
relates to the fact that yields can vary from year to year.
In this regard I can only point out that any significant 
variations in production would occur ’across the board’ and 
so would not substantially alter the land pattern I present.
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Because agricultural techniques are standardized the skills 
of individual cultivators would have little bearing 011 
yields. The figures given in this thesis are therefore 
presented as a reasonably accurate estimate of the production 
of Indreni kipat fields.
To enable me to compare production with consumption 
requirements I have defined the ’unit’ as the amount of food 
an adult (aged fourteen and over) eats in one day (two meals). 
With the husks removed two measures of paddy will give one 
measure of rice. A measure of maize on the cob will give 
three-quarters of a measure of edible grain. MilJ-et, on the 
other hand, is reckoned to give full ’measure for measure’.
The figures used, then, are for net edible grains.
Crops are normally measured in muri, pathi, and mana. 
One mana is equivalent to about one pound. There are eight
mana in a pathi and twenty pathi in a muri. One muri corres­
ponds to a volumetric measure of 2.4 bushels. An adult eats 
one mana of meal (whether rice, maize or millet) at a single 
meal •
SiOSSASI
amSl
aputSli
Ssik
ba<^
ba<pi hakim
bHlak
ball
bjarT
beSyS
boysSkh
bhalSdmi
bhHt
bhog bandhaki
birodhi
boknu
boksi
buc^euli
bu^o
candH
chumlung [L] 
cori bihS 
culo
dgijo
dajyd-bhgi
dSl
dSmSsahi
c[erH
dhHn nHc 
dhSrla 
dhoti 
dukha
office
Subba*s court or council 
childless person 
blessing
lit* increment. An additional loan 
taken against security of land already 
pledged.
Governor of a district 
infant
annual payment in grain made to a 
member of a service caste 
dry (unirrigated) land 
whore
first month of Nepali year 
notable, important person 
cooked rice, maize or millet 
possessory mortgage 
opponent
to carry, to support (in a dispute) 
wi tch 
spokesman 
an elder
contribution 
mass meeting 
theft marriage 
hearth
dowry
brothers
lentils
a proportion of tax paid by land­
holder to the owner of kipat land, 
a temporary shelter 
Limbu paddy dance 
water source 
loincloth 
hardship
[L ] - Limbu words
gSft settlement, village, cluster of houses
ghar home, household
ghar bSri homestead plot
goj;hSlo cowherd
gotra an exogamous unit usually wider than
clan
guhHr help
hal amount of land ploughed by a pair of
bullocks in one morning
jHct millet beer
jal treachery
jgri marriage by abduction of another man's
wife
jHrikal compensation paid to a cuckolded husband
jat caste
jethS eldest sibling
jiuni property kept by parents for support in
old age
j^tho ritually impure
kam [L] soil
kanyg virgin, unmarried girl
karta functionary appointed by Subba
kEErb^ri functionary appointed by Subba
khar kind of grass used for thatching
khet irrigated land
khukuri curved knife
kipat form of land tenure associated with Limbus
kiriyH putra principal mourner
kul dentil ancestor god
kurU language
lagan wedding ceremony
lalmohar decree bearing the royal seal
lHt° simple, stupid
lokanti women accompanying bride to her wedding
miagh Nepali month
m&gi biha arranged marriage
m31 treasury office
mana unit of measure (about one pound)
marcS yeast loaf used in making liquor
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matvHli
mHuli 
mi t
m’Ql ghar 
muri
kind.of possessory mortgage whereby 
capital is reduced annually by a fixed 
amount.
member of a ’drinking' caste, ranked 
below twice-bcrn castes 
mother’s natal family 
ritual friend
main house (from which sons divide) 
unit of measure (2.I4, bushels, also 
1369 sq. ft. )
namaste 
nStz kamSunu 
navarni 
nimto
nUn tel chunu 
nvHgi
popular form of greeting 
to make a name, earn a reputation 
ninth day of the festival of Dasein 
invitation
touching salt and oil ( a ritual 
lifting pollution after a death) 
ritual offering at harvest time
pac khat 
pakkH
p&nT na calne 
pap
pareli 
pathi 
pH'th.S alH 
perengo [l ]
peva
phedangma [L] 
polShH 
purohit
rSi 
rales i 
ratyowli
roybandi
roykar 
royti 
rin 
ri t
certain offences which can be dealt 
with only by Government courts 
real, genuine 
untouchable (caste) 
sin
mutual labour exchange
unit of measure (equal to eight manas) 
religious school
small wicker purse containing meat 
(given as part of marriage payments) 
a woman’s private possessions 
Limbu ritual specialist 
informer 
Brahmin priest
functionary appointed by Subba 
1i quo r
performance by women of a groom’s 
settlement on the night of his wedding 
(practised by high castes only), 
system of periodic re-distribution 
of land
form of land tenure (akin to freehold) 
dependent of a headman 
interest-bearing loan 
marriage payments made by groom
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sabhH
saimondri [l ]
sanad
sapat
sarap bag^unu
sel roti
sidur
sikya [l ] 
silok
sir u*th15une 
soranni
subbS 
suhang [L] 
sunauli [L]
assembly of Village adults 
fee paid by man to wife* s natal 
kin to enable former to mourn wife 
Government order
short-term loan without interest 
ritual performed to ’wash away’ ill 
feelings within a lineage 
kind of doughnut made on special 
occasions
red powder worn by bride to signify
marital status
nettle
verse competition engaged in by relatives 
of bride and groom at a high caste 
wedding
raise one’s head i.e. prestige
land grants given by Subbas to immigrant
settlers in Limbuan
Limbu headman
sub-division of the tribe
bridewealth
ta
tSgS&hHri
tapSl
tarkSri
thar
thari
thum
tongba [L] 
tulasi
low grade honorific form of ’you’ 
twice-born caste
high grade honorific form of ’you
vegetable or meat curry
clan
headman on raikar land 
sub-division of a district 
ritual mark on forehead 
bamboo container with millet beer 
a sacred plant (ocimum basilicum)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bailey, F.G-.
1957. Caste and the Economic frontier. Manchester, 
University Press.
1960. Tribe, Caste, and Nation. Manchester,
University Press.
1961. ’"Tribe" and "Caste" in India9, Contributions to 
Indian Sociology. 5, pp.7-19.
1965. ’Decisions by Consensus in Councils and Committees 
in Political Systems and the Distribution of Pov^er.
(ASA Monograph 2T "'edited by M. BantonT Londons 
Tavistock Publications.
Benedict, B.
1957. ’Factionalism in Mauritian Vixxages9, British 
Journal of Sociology, 8, pp.328-342.
1962. 9Stratification in Plural Societies9, American
Anthropologist t 64, PP-1235-1245.
Bhandari, K.P. 1959 (in Nepali).
’Kipat9, in Samyukta Prayas, Kathmandu, 13th and 20th 
September.
Bott, E. 1955.
•Urban Families: Conjugal Roles and Social Networks1,
Human Relations, 8, pp.345-384.
Buchanan, F. 1928 (see Hamilton, 1928).
Campbell, A. 1840.
•Note on the Limboos, and other Hill Tribes hitherto
undescribed9, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,
9, pp.595-615.
Chatterji, S.k. 1950*
9 Kirat a-J ana-Krti 9, Journal of the Royal Asiatib 
Society of Bengal, 1*5", pp. 143-235 .
4 6 0 .
Chemjong, B .13. 1957 (in Nepali)
Palio-Kirat Limbuan Ka Mag Haru (Demands of Limbuan 
F ar-Kir at,)' Kat hmandu.
Chemjong, I.S. (in Nepali)
1952. Kirati Itihas (History of the Kiratis). Gangtok.
1961. Introduction to Limbu-Nepali-Angrezi Shabda Kosli 
(Limbu-Nepali-English Dictionary). Kathmandu: Nepal' 
Academy.
Cohen, A. 1965.
Arab Border-Villages in Israel. Manchester, University 
Press.
Cohn, B. 1955.
’The Changing- Status of a Depressed Caste9 in Village 
India, edited by M. Marriott, Chicago, University Press.
Colson, E.
1953. The Makah Indians. Manchester, University Press.
Davis, K. 1951.
The Population of India and Pakistan. Princeton, 
University Press.
Donaldson, F. 1900.
Lepchaland. London: Sampson Low, Marston.
Driver, J.E.S. 1963.
•Party and Government in Nepal* in Politics in 
Southern Asia9 edited by S. Rose, Londons Macmillan.
Eisenstadt, S.N. 1961.
•Anthropological Studies of Complex Societies9,
Current Anthropology, June, pp.201-222.
4 6 1 .
Firth, R.
1954. ’Money, Work and Social Change in Indo-Pacific 
Economic Systems’, International Social Science Bulletin, 
6,pp. 400-410.
1957. Introduction to 'Factions in Indian and Overseas 
Indian Societies3, British Journal of Socio'
8, pp.291-295.
Freedman, M. 1958.
Lineage Organization in Southeastern China. London1 
Athlone Press.
Fried, M.H. 1957*
•The Classification of Corporate Unilineal Descent
Groups1, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,
87, pp.1-29.
FUtrer-Haimendorf, C. von. 1956.
•Elements of Newar Social Structure5, Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute, 82, pp,15-38I
Ginsberg, M. 1958.
•Social Change*, British Journal of Sociology, 9> 
pp.205-229.
Giuseppe, Father 1790.
•An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, Asiatick Researches
2, pp.307-322.
Gi uc kman, M . 19 43 *
Lozi Land and Royal Property. Rhodes-Livingstone 
Papers,' No. 10' London: 0.U .P .
Gough, K. 1955.
•The Social Structure of a Tanjore Village* in Village 
India, edited by M. Marriott, Chicago, University Press.
Gould, H. 1964*
•A Jajraani System of North India: Its structure,
magnitude and meaning*, Ethnology 9 3, pp.12-41.
Gurung, C„B. 1949.
Report on the Study of Agricultural Conditions of the 
Eastern Nepal Hiils, East N o T  "to IIaffiT"Tmimeographed) .
4 6 2 .
Hailey, Lord 1952.
•The Land Tenure Problem in Africa9, Journal of African 
Administration (special Supplement), pp.3-7*
Hamilton, P.
1819 An account of the Kingdom of Nepal, and of the 
territories axme'xedTo this dominion by the House of 
G-orkha. EdinburghT Constable, — —
1928. An Account of the District of Purnea in 1809-10. 
Patna: Bihar and Grissa Research Society.
Harper, E.B. 1959*
•Two Systems of Economic Exchange in India*, American 
Anthropologist8 61, pp.760-778.
Hitchcack, J.T.
1963. ’Some Effects of Recent Change in Rural Nepal*, 
Human Organization. 22, pp.75-82.
1966. The Magars of Banyan Hill. New Yorks Holt, 
Rinehard and Winston.
Hodgson, B.H.
1880. 'Route from Kathmandu, the Capital of Nepal, to 
Darjeeling in Sikkim*, Section KI in Miscellaneous 
Essays Relating to Indian Subjects. Vol. II, Londons 
Trubner.
n.d. Hodgson Collection. Miscellaneous texts presented 
to the India Office Library. Unpublished.
Jackson, R.D, 1940.
India's Army, London: Sampson Low, Marston.
Karve, I. 1965*
Kinship Organization in India (second revised edition). 
Bomb ay: Asia Publishing House,
Kolenda, P.M. 1963.
•Toward a Model of the Hindu Jajmani System', Human 
Organization, 22 pp.11-31-
Kumar, D. 1965.
Land and Caste in South India. Cambridge, University 
Press.
463.
Kuper H. 1947.
An African Aristocracy: Rank among the Swazi of
Swaziland. Londons International African Institute.
Lama, S,B. 1959 (in Nepali).
I lain Larpard (Mirror on Ilam) . Darjeeling.
Landon, P. 1928.
Nepal, 2 vols. Londons Constable.
Leach, E.R.
1961a, Rethinking Anthropology. Londons Athlone Press 
1961b. Pul Eliya. Cambridge, University Press.
Lloyd, P. 1962.
Yoruba Land Law. Londons O.U.P.
Mair, L.P. 1957.
Studies in Applied Anthropology. Londons Athlone Press
m — — Hi pi p— ■ ■ m i — —  bw Mi i— iliMMiniiiw— w m  i —  im t wi w i M M i i M
Malhotra, R.C. 1958.
’Public Administration in Nepal’, Indian Journal of 
Public Administration, 4, pp. 451-4*64'. "
Maron, S; Rose, L| and Heyman, J. 1956.
A Survey of Nepal Society. Berkeley: University of 
California.
Marriott, M. 1955.
’Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization’ in 
Village India, edited by M. Marriott. Chicago, 
University Press.
Mayer, A.C,
1952. Land and Society in Malabar. London: O.U.P.
1957. ’Pactions in Fiji Indian Rural Settlements’, 
British Journal of Sociology, 8, pp.317-328 .
i960. Caste and kinshiy in Central India. Berkeley:
University of Caiifornia. ~
1963. 'Some Political Implications of Community 
Development in India’, European Journal of Sociology,
4, pp.86-106.
464*
Mayer, A,G.
1966. ’The Significance of Wuasi-Groups in the Study 
of Complex Societies’ in The Social Anthropology of 
Complex Societies (ASA M 0 no gna pli^TT , edited by M. Bant on, 
Londons Tavistock Publications.
Nakane, C. 1966.
’A Plural Society in Sikkim® in Caste and Kin in Nepal. 
India and Ceylon, edited by C. von FUrer-Haimendorf, 
Bombay: Asia Publishing House.
Nebesky-Wojkowitz, R. von 1956.
Where the Gods are Mountains. Londons Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson.
Nicholas, R.W. 1965*
’Factions: A Comparative Analysis’, in Political
Systems and the Distribution of Power (ASAMonograph 2), 
edited by M.~Banton, London: Tavistock Publications,
O ’Malley, L.S.o. 1907*
Bengal District Gazetteers: Darjeeling, Calcutta:
The Bengal Secretariat Book Depot.
Opler, M.E 0 1956.
’The Extensions of an Indian Village’, Journal of. Asian 
Studies, 16, pp.5-10.
Qrans, M. 1965.
The Santal. Detroit: Wayne State University.
Pant, Y.P. 1965*
Economic Development of Nepal. Allahabad: kitab. Mahal.
Patterson, G.N. 1962,
'Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and towards the 
Himalayan Border States', The China Quarterly,
12, pp.191-206.
Phago, J o S o l843 *
see Hodgson, (n.d.).
465.
Pradhananga, G.B. 1952 (in Nepali).
Limbuan no Kipat Samasya (The nipat Problem of Limbuan). 
Kathmandu.
Kao, M.S.A. 1957.
Social Change in Malabar. Bombay: Popular Press.
Regmi, D.R.
1960. Ancient Nepal. Calcutta: k.L. Mukhopadhyay.
1961. Modern Nepal. Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay.
Regmi M .C .
1963. Land Tenure and Taxation in Nepal. (Vol. 1)
The State as Landlord: Raikar Tenure. Berkeley:
Institute of International Studies, University of 
California.
1964. Land Tenure and Taxation in Nepal. (Vol. II)
The Land Grant System: Birta Tenure. Berkeley:
Institute of International Studies, University of 
California.
1965. XAnd Tenure and Taxation in Nepal. (Vol. Ill)
The Jagir,' Bakam andHQpaTTTenure Systems. Berkeley: 
Institute of lnterziaFTonaT™^FudTeF7^Hivnrsity of 
California.
Rock J.P. 1953.
'Excerjots from a History of Sikkim’, Anthropos, 48, 
r pp. 925-948,
Ro;se L.E.
1963a. ’Nepal’s Experiment with Traditional Democracy’, 
Pacific Affairs, 36, pp.16-31.
1963b. ’The Himlayan Border States: "Buffers" in
Transition', Asian Survey. 3, pp.116-121.
Tuker, Sir, P. 1957*
Gorkha, the story of the Gurkhas of Nepal. London: 
Constable.
Vansittart, E. 1915.
Gurkhas. Calcutta: Superintendent of Government
Printing.
4 6 6  •
Watson, J.Bo 1953.
'Four Approaches to Cultural Change; a Systematic 
Reassessment’, Social Forces, 32, pp.137-45.
"Watson, W. 1958.
Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy. Mono he st er, 
University PressT
White, C.M.N. 1958.
'Terminological Confusion in African Land Tenure', 
Journal of African Administration, 10, pp.124-130.
White, J.C. 1909.
Sikhim and Bhutan: Twenty-one Years on the North-West
Frontier"! London: Edward Arnold! —
Worsley, P. 1961.
See Eisenstadt, S.N.
Wright, D. 1958.
History of Nepal. Calcutta; Susil Gupta. (Indian 
reprint. Firsf“published by Cambridge in 1877).
Primary Sources
Royal Order to the Limbus of Far Kirat, 1774.
Order regarding the failure to register lands and homesteads 
in Far Kirat, 1868.
Order to the Dhankutta district court, 1880.
Order regarding the restoration of kipat lands in Far Kirat, 
1881.
Order to the officers and clerks of the Iiam administration, 
1913.
Order regarding kipat land in H a m  and Las Majhia, 1917. 
Report of the Muluki office, 1947.
Petition of the Suobas of Ilam, 1951.
Report of Leva Man Angdembe to the Shahi Commission, I960.
